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CHAPTER ONE
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AND PROBLEMS POSED BY
FAU.ED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS.
"It is 'obvious and unarguable' that no governmental interest is more compelling
than the security of the Nation."
-Haigv. Agee, 453 U.S. 280,307 (1981)
(quoting Aptheker v. Secretary ofState, 378 U.S. 500, 509 (1964)).

I.

Introduction
The central theme of this thesis is to critique and proffer appropriate legal and

military responses to the endemic problems of failed states and international terrorism

within the context of contemporary international law.
The work will legally define the phenomenon known as "failed states," which
encompasses such states where the central government has collapsed and has ceased from
providing good life to its citizens.
The dissertation will also look at the definition of Terrorism and Terrorist
Organizations. 1 A perSon or an organization would have engaged in terrorist activities, if
they were to commit in an individual capacity or as a member of an organization, an act
of terrorist activity or an act which the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords
material support to any individual, organization, or government in conducting a terrorist
activity at any time.
The thesis will conclude by arguing that international responses to the dangers
posed by weak and/or failed states, as well as international terrorists living in such failed
states, may involve a full scale military action, such as that which occurred in
Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in March 2003. In addition, the thesis will argue for the

1
•

See generally, Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International

Law, 94 A.J.I.L. 348, 365 (2000) ("Murphy 1").

1

introduction of newer international rules that will govern international military strikes
against failed states, especially, where the United Nations Security Council has refused
to act, or is incapacitated from acting, to curb the danger posed by the roguish states to
global peace and security. Finally, the thesis will argue for the use and/or introduction of
other less drastic measures such as economic, social, financial, and diplomatic
sanctions-such as was used to coerce the collapse of apartheid in South Africa. It shall
posit the use of other positive nation-building measures, such as universal education,
good governance, eradication of hunger, population stability, and other financial aid and
support to the poorest nations of the world, where such nations are the hotbed of
discontent that fuel the failure of states and international terrorism. The final conclusion
is that when the gap between the poor and the rich nations is sufficiently bridged, there
would be less failed states, and less danger to the world.

ll.

Current Treatment of Falled States and Terrorist Organizations.

The subject of"Failed States" now occupies the central stage of international law,
especially after the events of September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States'
soil. In dealing with failed states and the terrorists that such states harbor, United States

has launched military attacks against Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein. However,
this thesis argues that the culprit was no one individual, organization, or government but,
instead, a set of conditions: interminable civil wars, shattered civil societies, and weak,
non-responsive governance.
Outside powers, including the United States, also contributed generously to these
conditions over the years-grinding down Afghan and Iraqi societies, for instance, by

2

seeking variously to subjugate the countries, to use them as springboards for their
strategic ambitions, or by exploiting their internal divisions and conflicts. All these
contributed to the failure of Afghanistan and Iraq, for instance. No military force or
military invasion can, single-handedly, solve the attending consequences of state failure
in these societies without a thorough re-examination of the social, political, historical,
and economical factors and conditions, as they exist in those nations.
For instance, between 1979 and late 1990's, United States supported the
Mujahedeens against the Soviet occupiers, in Afghanistan. At the end of the Afghan
campaign, these Mujahedeens later joined the Talebans and al-Qaeda to fight against the
United States.
Also, between 1979 and 1990, United States armed and fortified Saddam Hussein
and the Iraqi forces to curtail the influence of the Iranian Spiritual Leader-Ayatollah
K.homeini, who had overthrown the late Shah of Iran, Reza Pehlavi, in 1979. Indirectly,
United States promoted the Iraqi state failure by arming the Iraqi Sunnis minority against
the majority Shiites. Coincidentally, the Shiites constituted the majority population in
neighboring Iranian State. The situation was that while the Shiites were being oppressed
in Iraq by the United States-backed Sunnis, the Shiites were in political control in Iran
fuelling the ethnic conflict. During the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, Saddam Hussein and
Iraq received substantial military and material support from United States. Both
Afghanistan and Iraq have now failed, as States, and now harbor terrorists-who also
contend with the United States. It is, therefore, imperative to carry out a re-assessment of
the diplomatic goals and objectives, and the foreign policy of the United States in the
Gulf Region.

3

In effect, because of the above unusual scenario, and in order to achieve victory in

its fight against international terrorists and their hosts-usually-"Failed States,.. it is
submitted that United States must employ the strategy of "dislocation.. against the hydraheaded terrorist groups and their counterpart failed states.
These amoebic opponents possess the unique capabilities not only to absorb the
weapons of conventional warfare, for instance, by living and hiding in stateless societies
such as Somalia, Afghanistan, or Iraq-blending perfectly with the native communities,
but, also, are able to hide in the hidden labyrinths and mazes of the Torah Bora mountains
of eastern Afghanistan. Thus, these enemies "benefited.. from the military attacks carried
out against them and also grew stronger by having decentralized and autonomous
converts and followers in various States of the world. These converts are not affected by
the effects of conventional warfare.
The above conclusion has because some unique features of al-Qaeda and other
international terrorist organizations, such as Egypt's Jihad Group and Islamic Group,
Pakistan's Al-Ansar Movement, the Jihad Movement of Bangladesh, Algeria's Armed
Islamic Group, and the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines, make them the peculiar
types of organizations that cannot be easily "decapitated,.. or destroyed by one
devastating blow to a "center... Even if such decapitation were possible, such must be
carried out within the confines of international law and regulations.
Thus, the United States must alter the terms, nature, and objectives of the war
against terrorism. To defeat al-Qaeda and international terrorism, the United States and
its allies must employ asymmetrical strategies, just as Heracles did in defeating his two
• unnatural foes-Alcyoneus and Antaeus during the Olympian battle.

4

Unconventional and asymmetrical approaches must be undertaken by the western
nations to counter the political, religious, economic, and military strength of these
organizations, within the confines of international law.
Mere use of raw military might, founded either on rules of preemptive strike or
anticipatory self-defense, would not achieve the desired objectives.
Undeniably, United States military action in Afghanistan and Iraq had attracted
several criticisms from various nations and international law scholars. Yet, as this
dissertation would show, rather than heap all the blame on President George Bush and
United States, the solution would involve a broad historical and legal understanding of
the contemporary rules of international with regards to the role of the United Nations and
the Security Council, as well as an appraisal of the rules governing protection of
international peace and security and of self defence under contemporary international
law.
Carrying out military actions against failed states and/or international terrorists
living therein would involve an exercise of self defence rights by the country affected by
the wrongful conduct. We must note, however, that one view of the sources of self
defense rights under international law is that of the Positivists, i.e., that the right of selfdefense does not exist independently of positive law and can be altered by it. 2 With this
in mind, we shall endeavor to show that positive law requires that the United Nations and
its Security Council be able to act-punctus officio, in carrying out their obligations in

2

• See HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 791-92 (1950); D. BOWETI, SELFDEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 187 (1958); Roberto Ago, Addendum to Eighth Report on State
' Responsibility to the International Law Commission, [1980] 2 Y.B. Int'l. Comm'n, Pt. 1 at 13, 66-67, UN
DOC. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.1; YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE
169-72 (1988).

5

the realm of protecting global peace and order. If they fail to do so, it would become
impudent, on the parties affected by the lack of action, to act in protecting their interests.
The world must avoid the inaction that occurred during the 1950 Korean conflict and
during the Bosnia peccadillo in the 1980's-which both led to voluminous loss oflives. 3
In the end, we shall argue for the introduction of the "humanitarian intervention"

exception to the rule prohibiting use of force under the United Nations Charter. The
United Nations' Security Council can not abdicate its role under Articles 39 and 42 which
charges it to maintain international peace and security.
Another issue to be discussed is the status of open-ended resolutions of the United
Nations Security Council-whether international law and international practice have
definite rules on the life span of resolutions passed by the Security Council-especially
those resolutions authorizing military actions as in the 1950 Korean conflict and the 1990
Kuwait invasion. We shall, further, propose for the introduction of definite rules on the
status of resolutions passed the Security Council and other organs of the United Nations.
The thesis, therefore, proposes a thorough reappraisal of the role of the United
Nations and the Security Council. We will, also, propose for a reappraisal of the use of
''veto power" by the Security Council's permanent members.
Finally, we shall propose for an amendment to the United Nations Charterespecially Articles 2, 39, and 51 dealing with the use of force and self defense rights.

3

• See Paul Heinbecker, Kosovo, in TIIE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM TIIE COLD WAR TO TIIE
21ST CENTURY 537, 542 (David Malone ed., 2004); See also, John F. Murphy, Force and Arms, in TIIE
UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 108 (Christopher C. Joyner ed., 1997); C. Warbrick,
The Invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, 40 ICLQ pt. 1, at 482-492 (1991); D. Gilman, The Gulf War and the
United Nations Charter: Did the Security Council Fulfill its Original Mission?, 24 Conn. L. Rev. 1131,
1149 (1992).

6

UI.

Post 1945 International Law and Failed States/International Terrorism Issues
Never, since the end of the Second World War, in 1945, has the world seen weak

and/or failed States occupying the central focus of international politics and international
law. Recently, with the conflagration of hostilities between the State of Israel and the
Hezbollah militants, starting from July 10, 2006, the problem of the failed Lebanese State
has been brought into fore. 4 According to Professor Leopold Lovelace, Jnr.,5 failed states
are usually used by terrorists as their hiding place in order to avoid detection.
"Failed or collapsed state concepts are attractive because they capture and
synthesize the totality of a situation 'where the structure, authority (legitimate
power), law, and political order have fallen apart and must be reconstituted in
,,6
some fiorm, old or new ...
According to the Los Angeles Times' Editorial of July 23, 2006, Lebanon, which
has been dubbed the "'Humpty Dumpty' of the Middle East region," may never be put
back together again-in view of the civil war that ravaged the country in the 1980's and
the taking over of Lebanese social and political life by the Hezbollah Islamic
fundamentalist militants. 7 In fact, Lebanon's recent position of being used as a launching
base for Hezbollah's attacks against the Israeli State has been likened to the 1990's state
of affairs in Afghanistan and Somalia. 8

4

• See Los Angeles Times Editorial. Peace Abhors a Vacuum Israel-Lebanon warring illustrates the peril of
failed states, Los Angeles Times. July 23. 2006. Available at: http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-edmideast23jul23.0,202136l.story?coll=la-opinion-leftrail. Last visited: July 23, 2006. (Hereinafter "Los
Angeles Times Editorial").

5
• Distinguished Professor

of International Studies Program at the Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.

6
•

See Leopold Lovelace Jr., Has International Law Failed Africa? a Paper prepared for the International
Studies Association Annual Convention, Chicago, illinois, held between February 21-24, 2001.
7
•

See Los Angeles Times Editorial, supra note 4.

8
• Ibid.

7

While there have been various disagreements with the justification for the
November 2001 military action against Mghanistan by United States and NAT0,

9

Lebanon's recent position of being used as a launching base for Hezbollah's attacks
against the Israeli State has provided serious legal and evidentiary justification for the so
called "Bush Doctrine." The "Bush Doctrine," which mandates military action against
international terrorists and failed sates harboring them, simply stated, goes thus:
"From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism
will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime .... I will not forget this
wound to our country and those who inflicted it. I will not yield; I will not rest; I
will not relent in waging this struggle for freedom and security for the American
people." 10
That weak and/or failed states are subject to military action is no more in doubt, and thus,
the Los Angeles Times' Editorial had noted:
"the tragic lessons of shattered states past are worth contemplating. It's also worth
acknowledging that the Bush administration has gotten at least one of those
lessons right: Weak and failing states provide a power vacuum that the most
violent and extreme groups are best equipped to fill."ll
The above position-United States' abhorrence of failed states being used as safe havens
for militants and/or terrorists have been echoed by the United States Congress:

9

• See the Papers delivered at the Discussion Forum of the European Journal of International Law on the
Attacks at the World Trade Center including: Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is also Disrupting Some Crucial
Legal Categories of International Law. Available at: httt>://www.eiil.org/forum WTC/ny-cassese.html.
Last visited: July 9, 2006; Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Attack on the World Trade Center: Legal Responses,
The Law after the Destruction of the Towers. Available at: http://www.ejil.org/forum WTC/ny-dupuy.html
Last visited: July 9, 2006; Giorgio Gaja, The Attack on the World Trade Center: Legal Responses, In What
Sense was There an "Armed Attack"? Available at: http://www.eiil.org/forum WTC/ny-gaja.html. Last
visited: July 9, 2006; Frederic Megret, 'War'? Legal Semantics and the Move to Violence. Available at:
http://www.ejil.org/journaWol13/No2/artl.pdf. Last visited: July 9, 2006; Alain Pellet, The Attack on the
No,
This
is
not
War!.
Available at:
World Trade
Center:
Legal Responses,
http://www.ejil.org/forum_WTC/ny-pellet.html. Last visited: July 9, 2006.

10

• President George Bush's Address to Joint Session of Congress, 37 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1347,
1349, 1351 (Sept. 20, 2001).

11

• See

Los Angeles Times Editorial, supra note 4.

8

"Afghanistan has become a new safehaven for terrorist groups. In addition to bin
Laden and al-Qa'ida, the Taliban play host to members of the Egyptian Islamic
Jihad, the Algerian Armed Islamic group, Kashmiri separatists, and a number of
militant organizations from Central Asia, including terrorists from Uzbekistan and
t ,12
T aJ"iki"san.
Other countries, apart from United States, have also acknowledged the dangers posed by
failed states to international peace and security. According to British Foreign Secretary
Jack Straw:
''the comity of nations must rise over and above their individual and parochial
differences and interests, and strive to identify, albeit very quickly, those common
human attributes that define every man on the planet as a member of the human
race. The industrialized and more politically stable western nations must come to
the aid of the weak African and Asian nations. To maintain an unconcerned and
detached attitude towards the weak states would be an invitation for opportunistic
terrorists to take over those weak states. It is clear that the stage in that process
would be unpalatable for all: a weak state's disintegration would definitely impact
on the lives of people many thousands of miles away in the western nations, even
at the heart of the most powerful democracy in the world." 13

In addition, according to the above October 2, 2001 statement by NATO SecretaryGeneral Lord Robertson, (a statement that evidenced NATO's condemnation of the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks), it is now clear that, under contemporary rules of
international law, failed states and their unwanted guests-terrorists constitute threats to
international peace and security:
"We know that the individuals who carried out these attacks were part of the
worldwide terrorist network of Al-Quaida, headed by Osama bin Laden and his
key lieutenants and protected by the Taliban. On the basis of this briefing, it has
now been determined that the attack against the United States on 11 September
was directed from abroad and shall therefore be regarded as an action covered by

12

• Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Near East and South Asian Affairs of the Senate Foreign
Relations Comm., 106th Cong. (Nov. 2, 1999) (testimony of Ambassador Michael A. Sheehan, coordinator
for
counterterrorism,
U.S.
Dep't
of
State),
available
in
<http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/9911 02_sheehan_terrorismhtml>.

13

'

• See Failed and Failing States, a speech given by Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, at the European
Research Institute, University of Birmingham, (September 6, 2002). Available at:
http://www.eri.bham.ac.uk/jstraw.htm. Last visited on February 2, 2004. (Hereinafter "Jack Straw").

9

Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack on one or
more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack
14
against them a11."
Along the same line, the above Los Angeles Times' Editorial had likened the takeover of
Lebanon by Hezbollah to the way and manner that the Mujahedeens/Talebans/al Qaeda
and Islamic militants of Farrah Aideed took over the failed states of Afghanistan and
Somalia, respectively, in the 1990's:
"It happened in Mghanistan after the battered Soviet Union withdrew its forces in

1989. Ripped asunder by warring factions, the miserable nation was ripe for
eventual takeover by the Taliban and the parasitic AI Qaeda. It happened again in
Somalia, which, after years of intermittent civil war, was the epitome of anarchy.
Now come the Islamists to fill a Middle East vacuum with capricious law and
brutish order." 15
To underscore the similarities between the 1990's Afghanistan and Somali failed states,
with the current Hezbollah take over of a weak and/or failed Lebanese state, the
aforementioned Los Angeles Times' Editorial also surmised thus:
"If it seems farfetched to compare cultured, urbane Lebanon with the barbarous
Afghanistan or Somalia of the 1990s, consider what these nations have in
common: a weak or nonexistent central government unable to control the militias
waging war on its territory; an intractable history of religious, ethnic or clan strife;
and a propensity among the neighbors to arm, fund and otherwise encourage the
warring factions." 16

This, then, is the main focus of this thesis: "How should the victim states affected
by the acts of terrorists living in a failed state react to threats and dangers posed by the
terrorists and their hosts?"

14

See Statement by NATO Secretary-General
WWW.nato.int/docu/speech/200 1/sO 11 002a.htm.
15
16

• See

Los Angeles Times Editorial, supra note 4.

• Ibid.
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Consistent with States practices, the above question would show that international
law and rules with regards to dealing with failed states and the terrorists using failed
states as safe havens, the concept of "armed attack," collective and individual selfdefence rights, pre-emptive strikes, and other international security measures have
changed:
"In the 1990s we witnessed the emergence of a small number of rogue states that,
while different in important ways, share a number of attributes. These states:
brutalize their own people and squander their national resources for the personal
gain of the rulers; display no regard for international law, threaten their
neighbors, and callously violate international treaties to which they are party; are
determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with other advanced
military technology, to be used as threats or offensively to achieve the aggressive
designs of these regimes; sponsor terrorism around the globe; and reject basic
human values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands." 11
IV.

The Call for Amendments to the United Nations Charter
It was against this background that the last five (5) years after the September 11,

2001 terrorist attacks have brought about the need for an extensive revision of the United
Nations Charter and international law rules governing the concept of "armed attack,"
collective and individual self-defence rights, pre-emptive strikes, and other international
security measures within the context of trans-national relations:
"For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack
before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that
present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists
often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent
threat-most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces
preparing to attack. We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the
capabilities and objectives of today 's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do
not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would
fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of

11
•

United States, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, (September 2002) at

Y!WW. whitehouse.gov/ncs/nss.html
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mass destruction-weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and
. ,,18
used wzt. hout warnmg.
The earliest time that the connection between a failed state and an international
terrorist group, after Lebanon, were inextricably interwoven was when al Qaeda used
Somalia as a base for launching attacks against United States interests

mKenya and the

Gulfin the 1990s. Clearly, in the aftermath of the August 7, 1998 simultaneous bombings
of the United States embassies in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania and in Nairobi, Kenya, it
became evident that United States and its interests were being attacked by Osama bin
Laden and al-Qaeda organization.
It also became clear that al-Qaeda was exploiting the failed state status of

Afghanistan--clearly bringing into fore, the problems posed to international peace and
security by the "unholy alliance,, between international terrorists and failed States. In
describing that network and its connection to Afghanistan, the U.S. State Department's
coordinator for counterterrorism stated:
"Todays terrorist threat comes primarily from groups and loosely-knit networks
with fewer ties to governments. Bin Laden's organization operates on its own,
without having to depend on a state sponsor for material support. He possesses
financial resources and means of raising funds-often through narcotrafficking,
legitimate "front" companies, and local financial support. Today's nonstate
terrorists benefit from the globalization of communication, using e-mail and
Internet websites to spread their message, recruit new members, raise funds, and
connect elements scattered around the world.
"Bin Laden and al-Qa'ida represent an alarming trend in terrorism directed against
us. Bin Laden has created a truly transnational terrorist enterprise, drawing on
recruits from areas across Asia, Africa, and Europe, as well as the Middle East.
Bin Laden's alliance draws together extremist groups from different regions,
linked only by hatred of the United States and those governments with which we
have friendly relations. Perhaps most ominously, bin Laden has avowed his
intention to obtain weapons of mass destruction.
18
•

Ibid. Chapter V.
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"Afghanistan has become a new safehavenfor terrorist groups. In addition to bin
Laden and al-Qa 'ida, the Tali ban play host to members of the Egyptian Islamic
Jihad, the Algerian Armed Islamic group, Kashmiri separatists, and a number of
militant organizations from Central Asia, including terrorists from Uzbekistan
'7' ""ki" t
an d .1a]z
san. ,19
The issue then was how should the rest of the world, and the United Nations deal with
problems posed by this unholy alliance between failed states and international terrorists
living therein.

v.

Nature of the War Against Failed States and International Terrorism
It appears as if the Greek mythology of the Battle of Olympus between the Titans

and Heracles is being replicated on the international scene, especially with regards to the
methods being used as well as the rationale underlying the international war against
terrorism, and against weak/failed states harboring the terrorists. United States and the
rest of the World Gust like Heracles20) are fighting an asymmetrical foe in an
asymmetrical war. The enemy-al-Qaeda and other similar organizations-have unique
capabilities like Alcyoneus. 21 To defeat international terrorism and failed states
phenomenon, United States and its allies must employ asymmetrical strategies, just as
Heracles did in defeating his two unnatural foes-Alcyoneus and Antaeus-during the
Olympian battle.

19
•

Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Near East and South Asian Affairs of the Senate Foreign
Relations Comm., supra note 9.
20

• Also known as the Greek mythical warlord-Hercules; See also, Walter Enders and Todd Sandler,
Transnational terrorism in the post-Cold War era, 43 International Studies Quarterly 1 (1999); John
Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age (Arquilla
• and Ronfeldt, eds., 1997).

21

• Pindar:

Nemean Odes, Isthmian Odes, Fragments (Loeb Classical Library) (William H. Race ed. 1997).
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However, whatever methods that are to be adopted in combating terrorism and
state failure, such must be within the confines of international law.
The world must note that al-Qaeda and other international terrorist organizations
are relatively independent of state support. They have no armies and have no fleet battle
ships or squadrons of airplanes and bombers. Thus, they cannot be dealt with in the

conventional and/or traditional methods. Also, these organizations are dependent on the
phenomenon of weak or "failed states," which they exploit, as in the cases of
Afghanistan, Somalia, and Iraq.22
As we saw earlier on, the entire world now faces an asymmetrical battle because
some unique features of al-Qaeda and other organizations make them organizations that

cannot be easily "decapitated" or destroyed by one devastating blow to a "center." 23
Therefore, attacks on individual terrorist cells, groups, and components will be far less
effective in collapsing this type of organization than they would have been had they been
used against centralized governments or nations. The same applies to failed states.
Thus, this present thesis will submit that rather than investing heavily in military
artilleries and/or ammunitions, in the hope for a "knock-out" blow, a more systematic
approach is required-that is, an approach that attacks the terrorist network
comprehensively as a system.24 Such an approach, while, primarily, aimed at eradicating
terrorists from the territory of the failed states, must also, secondarily, include rebuilding,
re-fortifying, and repairing failed states that these terrorists inhabit.
22

• Carl Conetta, Dislocating Alcyoneus: How to combat al-Qaeda and the new terrorism, Project on
Defense Alternatives Briefing Memo #23, delivered on June 25, 2002. Available at:
http://www.comw.org/pda/0206dislocate.html. Last visited on July 6, 2006.
23

24

• Ibid.

• Ibid.
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To achieve victory, the United States must employ the strategy of "dislocation"
against the hydra-headed terrorist groups and their counterpart failed states. It is now
clear that al-Qaeda and similar organizations possess unique capabilities not only to
absorb the weapons of conventional warfare, for instance, by living in stateless societies
like Somalia, Afghanistan, or Iraq, but also to hide in the hidden labyrinths and mazes of
the Torah Bora mountains of eastern Afghanistan. Thus, these enemies benefit from the
attacks against them and also grew stronger by having decentralized and autonomous
converts and followers in various States of the world. 25 Clearly, the United States must
alter the terms, nature, and objectives of the war against terrorism. The United States
must understand the end-game of al-Qaeda:
"We are seeking to incite the Islamic nation to rise up to liberate its land and to
conduct jihad for the sake of God. " 26
In a nutshell, understanding the policies and objectives of these failed states and/or

terrorist organizations would greatly assist in fashioning out appropriate responses to be
undertaken in dealing with the problems.

VI.

End of the "Cold War" and Contemporary International Issues of Conflict
At the height of the Cold War, the world's focus was on the strength and

overreaching powers between the world's two super-powers-United States and the then
Union of Soviet Socialists Republics (U.S.S.R.). The proliferation of the Warsaw Pact

25

• See Megan K. Stack, THE CONFLICT IN IRAQ: In Arabs' Eyes, the U.S. Is on Trial, Not Hussein, A
Shiite with reason to hate the ex-leader is his defense lawyer because he defied America, Los Angeles
Times of July 8, 2006. Available at: http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fgsaddamtrial8jul08.0.5086919.story?coll=la-home-headlines. Last visited on: July 8, 2006.

26

• This quote is from a June 1999 a1-Jazeera interview, see: A sampling of quotations from Osama bin
Laden, Reuters, September 20, 2001. See also, Magnus Ranstorp, Interpreting the broader context and
meaning ofBin-Laden'sfatwa, 21 Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 4 (1998).
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group led by USSR and its western counterpart, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(N.A.T.O.) witnessed great amassing of wealth and weapons of war, including nuclear
warheads, ballistic missiles, and other weapons of mass destruction. This was during the
height of the Cold War.
These nations and international organizations were so powerful that they posed
enormous threat to the rest of the world-they were then too powerful for global peace to
reign. However, with the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev's Glasnost and Perestroika in the
late 1980's, the fall of the U.S.S.R., and with disintegration of the old Eastern bloc, the
threat posed by these over-powerful States had reduced. The Cold War has since ended,
leaving behind several vacuum in the sphere once covered in several international funds,
grants, and aids sustained by rivalry between superpowers, and weak governments and
nations that were propped up by the rivalry between the Superpowers. Most of these
nations, such as Somalia, depended, almost exclusively, on foreign aids, grants, and
donations-being unable to fend for themselves.
Unfortunately, the end of the Cold War has led to the revelation of the weak
foundations upon which some of the nations were built. Such "Weak States" have either
failed totally, or are in the process of disintegrating.
In addition, during the Cold War, the superpowers used several expedient allies in

their struggle to contain each other's influences. Unknowingly, these allies have since
become "dogs of war.'m For instance, the "Mujahedeens of the 1970's and the 1980's,
21
• Culled

from Frederick Forsyth's 1974 Novel-Dogs of War, located in Zangara, in Africa. It is centered
around a company of European mercenary soldiers who were hired by a British industrialist to overthrow
the government of a fictitious African nation called Zangara. While many people frowned at the
~cenaries, they tend to forget that the mercenaries were soldiers of fortune who were created by
mtemational superpowers during the fight for control of the mineral rich Katanga and Zaire (Congo) in the
early 1960's. The lesson is that: those who arm loose soldiers to fight ''their wars" against ''their enemies"
may soon find those "loose soldiers" fighting against their benefactors at the end of the hostilities.
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that were armed and trained by United States to resist the 1979-1989 Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan have since become the bedrock of al-Qaeda's forces. They constitute
inexhaustive conundrums for drawing foot soldiers, infantry, and officer corps of the alQaedaarmy
That such "dogs of war" and terrorists find habitable spaces in Failed States such
as Afghanistan, has made the study of weak and failed states of the world today the
veritable subject of international law in the twenty-first century.
This thesis shall argue that if, and when, the problems of state failure arising from
the end of the Cold War, are fixed, ipso facto, international terrorism would be curtailed
as well.

Vll.

New Version of International Rules of Self-Defense
As seen earlier, international terrorists and failed states usually carry out acts that

harm the interests of other states and the international community. Thus, in combating
international terrorism and failed states phenomenon, United States and other western
nations had adopted a novel rule of international armed confrontation: that of attacking
international terrorists and the host failed states wherein the terrorists operate fromespecially, once a perceived threat or likely harm has been evidenced from those
territories.
The subject of this thesis is to see how international law rules of "armed attack,"
"anticipatory attack," and "pre-emptive strike," under the United Nations Charter as
expansively employed by the United States and its allies between 2001 and 2006, may be
• used in curbing growing international terrorism.
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In particular, we shall see whether the expansive and broad approach on self
defense rights by the United States would solve the growing trend of terrorism across the
globe. Some of the questions to be asked, addressed, and critiqued are:
(a).

Must all failed states be attacked, simply because some terrorists are
perceived to be occupying such failed states?;

(b).

Can the growing problem of failed states and international terrorism be,
solely, eradicated by armed invasion and conventional/traditional warfare
in all cases?;

(c).

Are there other ways, means, methods, and approaches that can effectively
curb the growth of international terrorism and their objectives?;

(d).

Can weak states be saved from failure, either through rebuilding,
salvaging and/or re-invigorating existing infrastructure as was the case
under the "Marshall Plan" of 1945 that aided western European nations
recovery after the Second World War?;

(e).

At what point, in the slide towards failure, can a failed state be
anticipatorily attacked or, better still, when can a weak state be lawfully
pre-emptively attacked because a known terrorist group occupies such
nation's territory without actual or immediate threat to the world or any
other State?

(f).

Are there veritable ways, means, methods, and approaches to helping
failed states from failure, such that those failed states can be made
inhabitable for terrorists, even if such help could come from nonneighboring nations?; and

(g).

What are the most effective and most popular methods of combating the
twin-related problems of failed states and international terrorism that
would serve the ends of the greater objective of the United Nationspromoting world peace and eradicating the scourges of wars that had
plagued mankind in the past?

The above topical issues would be answered in this present dissertation. At the
end of this work, it would become clear that the growing phenomenon of terrorism
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championed, by Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, is a catalytic international warfare, and

. 1 means of mternationa
.
. 1Ww1are.
__c. 28
so, not amenable to conventlona
Jn the end, also, this thesis shall argue that rather than waging an all-out-war
against failed states and terrorists inside them, the foundation of a systematic campaign
against al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations would be activities that:
(i) would "squeeze the blood flow" of the organization, especially, its financial
support system;
(ii) would throw more light on the organization's members, cells, groups, leaders,
training camps, and components through intelligence gathering activities;
(iii) would impede the movement of the organization by increasing the sensitivity
of screening procedures at critical gateways, especially, at the borders, financial
exchanges, arms markets, and transportation portals; and
(iv) improve the protection of high-value targets in the United States, United
Kingdom, Spain, France, Canada, and other western nations and/or allies. 29
As would be seen later on, these measures would serve to diminish al-Qaeda's
stealth, flexibility, and resourcefulness, while also decreasing the vulnerability of its
preferred targets.

30

In addition, several of these proposed steps would make the routine

activities of al-Qaeda more risky for its members, because such clandestine activities
involving recruiting, traveling, changing residences, collecting resources, training, and
reconnoitering targets would all carry a higher risk of detection and apprehension. 31 At
the same time, better protection of preferred targets will force al-Qaeda into more
demanding and risky maneuvers, imposing a higher cost for success, that will make the

28

29

. See Carl Conetta, supra note 22.
./bid.

30./bid.
31

• Ibid.
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operatives to be apprehended.

32

Not only would this approach increase the likelihood of

detection and apprehension or interdiction, it would also leave al-Qaeda less able to
recover from strikes by military or law enforcement agencies.

33

To benefit from the less coercive measures, United States must step up its targeted
attacks on the leadership and top echelons of al-Qaeda and other organizations. By using
extensive intelligence gathering, such as would help incapacitate these organizations,
rather than starting an all-out war, the war against terrorism may be more strategically
defined to lure the leaders out of their liars and by using effective propaganda to stultify
the pool of recruits from which al-Qaeda draws.

vm.

Lessons From The Greek Mythology.
The fight against terrorism and failed states requires both unconventional methods

and strategic asymmetrical warfare. Let us look into history. Sometime ago, Sky (Uranus)
and Mother Earth (Gaea)34 gave birth to twenty-four giants-tall and frightening
creatures with long hair and beards (the "Titans"). 35 They were born at a place called
Thracian Phlegra ("place of burning"). Later on, there was a ten-year war between Zeus
and these Titans, after which Zeus prevailed. 36 After Zeus defeated the Titans, as

32
• Ibid.
33

• Ibid.

34

See
"G/GANTES (The Giants)
REVOLT OF THE
GIANTS." Available
http://thanasis.com/modemlgiants.htm. Last visited on July 6, 2006. [Hereinafter "Gigantes"].
35

at:

• "But Earth, vexed on account of the Titans, brought forth the giants, whom she had by Sky. These were
matchless in the bulk of their bodies and invincible in their might; terrible of aspect did they appear, with
long locks drooping from their head and chin, and with the scales of dragons for feet." Apollodorus,
Library and Epitome (Sir James George Frazer ed.)
36
•

See Gigantes, supra note 34.
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punishment, he confined them to the deepest pits of Tartarus. Gaea was unhappy about

this, and so she directed the Titans to seek revenge by attacking Mount Olympus, with
orders to overthrow Zeus and his fellow Olympians. The Titans set out for war at
Olympus. The Titans were very scary in their appearances and their battle methods:

"In the oldest works of art the Giants are represented in human form and equipped
with armor and spears; but in course of time their attributes became terrific -awful faces, long hanging hair and beard, the skins of wild animals for garments,
trunks of trees and clubs for weapons. In the latest representations, but not before,
their bodies end in two scaly snakes instead of feet...ln the Gigantomachia of
Pergamus, the grandest representation of the subject in antiquity, we find a great
variety of forms; some quite human, others with snakes' feet and powerful wings,
others with still bolder combinations of shape; some are naked, some clothed with
skins, some fully armed, and others slinging stones. " 37
The giants, led by Alcyoneus, gathered together and, without warning, began to
hurl huge rocks, oak tree trunks and fire-brands upwards from their mountaintops, laying
siege to mighty Mount Olympus and startling the unsuspecting Olympians. The Titan
threatened to overwhelm the gods with their ferocious attack, piling huge rocks one atop
another in an effort to construct a stairway to Heaven. Further, to make matters worse,
Hera, Zeus' wife, prophesized that the Giants could never be killed by any Olympian
god-only a single, lion-skinned mortal could perform this Herculean task38
Zeus held a war council with Athena, war-like goddess of wisdom, and the two
crafted a plan of action. Athena went off to find Heracles (Hercules), the lion-skinned
mortal whom Hera had referred to. 39 As usual, Heracles came with his dreaded bows and
arrows--arrows that had been dipped in the putrid blood of the dying Lemean Hydra,

37
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Thurston Peck, Harpers Dictionary of Classical Antiquities (1898).
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which made the arrows deadly poisonous. Heracles, at once, struck an arrow at the
charging leader of the Giants, a brute named Alcyoneus-("Mighty Ass"). The aim was
true and the arrow found its mark, dropping Alcyoneus to the ground. But, instantly, the
Giant sprang back up to his feet, uninjured, in spite of the poisoned arrow, much to the
dismay of the Olympians.

40

Unknown to Heracles, Gaea had made Alcyoneus invulnerable in the land of his
birth-at Phlegra-where Alcyoneus and Heracles confronted each other.41 So,
Alcyoneus was able to brush aside Heracles' best efforts and kill many of Heracles'
companions.
Eventually, Athena intervened to reveal Alcyoneus' secret. Heracles then dragged
Alcyoneus beyond the borders of his homeland and was able to defeat him. Heracles used
a similar stratagem to defeat another of Gaea's sons, Antaeus, a wrestler who grew
stronger whenever he was thrown to the earth. To prevail, Heracles wrapped his arms
around Antaeus, lifted him off the ground, and crushed him to death while, holding him
aloft-with Alcyoneus' feet not being able to touch the ground. 42
Carl Conetta has likened the struggle between Heracles against Alcyoneus and
Antaeus, along with the attendant use of unnatural powers and forces, as being similar to
the struggle between western nations against international terrorists and failed states
harboring the terrorists because, success in the war against terrorism and failed states

40

• Ibid.

41

• See Carl Conetta, supra note 22. The land ofPhlegra was Alcyoneus' native home and falling to its soil
at once revived him As long as Alcyoneus remained on Phlegra, he was unbeatable. See Gigantes, supra
note 34.
42

• Ibid.

per Carl Conetta.

22

would require dislodging and dislocating terrorists from those places, where they are
most comfortable, to arenas, where they can easily be defeated:
"Both stories describe Heracles using a strategy of dislocation to defeat an
asymmetric foe. The unique capabilities of these foes allowed them not only to
absorb Heracles' assaults with relative impunity, but to actually benefit from
them: they grew stronger as the Greek hero grew weary. In order to defeat them,
Heracles had to alter the terms of battle in an unusual way. Devising a successful
strategy required that he understand the specific asymmetry that allowed his
opponents to turn his assaults to their advantage. The stories of Alcyoneus and
Antaeus also call attention to the important distinction between 'asymmetric
strategies' and 'asymmetric foes.' An asymmetric strategy for defeating a
Heracles-like character would involve avoiding tests of brute strength. By
contrast, an asymmetric foe (such as Alcyoneus) might allow or even seek direct
confrontation. This, because the foe's very nature would transform the dynamics
of the engagement." 43
Contemporary international law rules must also aun at preventing those
conditions causing state failure. In order to dislocate al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups,
international governments must isolate them politically and morally from the
constituencies these groups hope to mobilize or co-opt.
Further, this work will propose that western governments must minimize actions
that have the effect of increasing the resonance of the terrorists' message. Thus, actions
that fail to respect these limits can have broadly destabilizing effects, swelling the ranks
of the terrorist organizations and the discontented. 44
This dissertation will also argue that widespread international cooperation is also
needed in battling the twin scourges of international terrorism and failed states.
Commensurate with the decentralized and distributed form of the threat, a program of
counter- measures must be coordinated globally and rooted locally in nations around the

43./bid.
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world. 45 Moreover, recognizing that transnational terrorist organizations depend on and
exploit the gaps in international society will make international cooperation must be
seamless, because what is needed most is an expanded multinational cooperation in
intelligence gathering and law enforcement activities. United States must court Middle
Eastern nations, because the participation of nations in and around zones of instability is

very important. Otherwise, the terrorists can easily elude capture. Only this type of effort
can match the distributed character of the threat. 46
This work will also suggest that military action should be carefully focused and
must emphasize the disruption and interdiction of terrorist groups--not large-scale
attacks on nation states. Military action must be discriminating in a way that most wars
are not. Thus, Carl Conetta has surmised thus:
"Large-scale bombing campaigns, for instance, cut too broad a swath of
destruction. This can feed the well of anti-Western sentiment that in tum shields
and sustains terrorism. Terrorists care little about the destruction they bring down
on people around them. On balance, patient intelligence gathering efforts, law
enforcement, and measures of homeland protection are more important tools than
large military strikes.'.47

IX.

Expanding the Role and Functions of the United Nations.

The campaign against terrorism must NOT be perceived as the privileged
instrument of a few western states. Otherwise, it will not elicit the cooperation essential

46
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David Corn, Unlikely Doves: Counter-terrorism Experts, AlterNet.com, September 28, 2001; Tyler

Marshall, Limited, Low Profile Strategy Called Key; Afghanistan: Neither a massive U.S. attack nor token
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for its success. Thus, the campaign must be placed in a multilateral, legal framework as
soon as possible. The functions and the role of the United Nations as well as the various
bodies and other organizations constituted under the United Nations Charter must be
expanded. Such organizations would include the General Assembly, the Security
council, the International Criminal Court, etc
All nations should endorse the International Criminal Court ("ICC") and extend
the Court's purview to cover terrorism. This Permanent International Criminal Court was
established under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 48 The ICC was
meant to complement national jurisdictions with power to bring to justice, persons
accused of the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The ICC is
now established at its seat in the Hague, Netherlands. 49 The Court's jurisdiction will
contribute to international criminal jurisprudence as follows:

•
•
•

it will serve as a permanent deterrent to people considering the crimes of
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes; 50
it will have a much wider jurisdiction than existing ad hoc tribunals; 5 1 and
the Statute contains advanced provisions for the protection of victims from
retraumatization, as well as provision, that the Court may order a convicted
person to provide reparation, in the form of compensation, restitution,
rehabilitation, satisfaction, guarantees of non-repetition, and any other type of
reparation the Court deems appropriate.

48

• U.N. Doc. 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, entered into force July 1, 2002. The Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court was adopted by the international community, on July 17, 1998, at a diplomatic conference
in Rome, Italy.

49

• The

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court came into force on July 1, 2002.

50
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In most cases, in the last fifty years, international mechanisms to prosecute people accused of these
crimes have only been set up after the crimes have occurred.
51

•

• For example, the work of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
have been limited to crimes committed in a particular territory, while crimes committed in other territories
have not been addressed.
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It is submitted that the United States must join other nations of the world in

ratifying the Treaty that set the ICC up, and support the use of the ICC to prosecute and
punish international terrorists.
Further, the International Police Organization ("Interpol") and the United Nations
Terrorism Prevention Branch ("U.N.T.P.B.") should be reinforced substantially to help
lead international cooperation in law enforcement and in policing the world. As at
present, the Vienna-based U.N.T.P.B. researches terrorism trends and assists countries in
upgrading their capacities to investigate-but, above all, to prevent-terrorist acts. The
U.N.T.P.B. is an arm of the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime
Prevention. Its functions include:
* Strengthening international cooperation and technical assistance in promoting the
implementation of the universal conventions and protocols related to terrorism within
the framework of the activities of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime;52
* Strengthening international cooperation and technical assistance in promoting the
implementation of the universal conventions and protocols related to terrorism within
the framework of the activities of the Centre for International Crime Prevention; 53
*Strengthening the UN Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Program; 54
* Implementing the Vienna Declaration and Plans of Action; 55
* Enacting Measures to eliminate international terrorism; 56
* Dealing with questions relating to the program budget: (Strengthening the
Terrorism Prevention Branch); 57 and
52

53

• See

UN General Assembly Resolution AIRES/59/153.

• See UN

General Assembly Resolution AIRES/58/136.

54

• See UN General Assembly Resolutions AIRES/58/140, AIRES/57/173, AIRES/56/123, AIRES/55/64,
AIRES/54/131, AIRES/53/114, AIRES/52/90.
55

· See UN General Assembly Resolutions AIRES/57/170, AIRES/56/261, AIRES/55/59

56s
. AIRES/58/81
· ee UN General Assembly Resolution
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"' Strengthening international cooperation and technical assistance within the
framework of the activities of the Centre for International Crime Prevention in
.
.
preventing and comb atmg terronsm.
~

Clearly, international fight against terrorism must embrace U.N.T.P.B. Military
action against terrorism-apart from acts of immediate self-defense. All efforts should
proceed under United Nations auspices, as obtained during the First Gulf War in 1991.
the United nations had never shied away from performing its functions viz-a-viz
international terrorism and failed states' problems. As the Secretary-General, had
declared on August 21, 1998:
" ...the international community must come together to combat this menace ... " 59
Further, the United Nations General Assembly has adopted the same posture:
" ...terrorist acts are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the consideration
of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or of any other
nature that may be invoked to justify them ... " 60
Along the same line, the United Nations Security Council reacted after the September 11,
2001 attacks, thus:
" ..the Security Council calls on all States to work together urgently to bring to
justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks and
stresses that those responsible for aiding, supporting or harbouring the
perpetrators, organizers and sponsors ofthese acts will be held accountable .... " 61

57
• See

UN General Assembly Resolutions NRES/57/292, NRES/56/253, NRES/52/220

58
• See

ECOSOC 2002/19

S9

· See United Nations Press Release, GA/U3008; See also, "Measures to Eliminate International
Terrorism" Statement by Ambassador Gelson Fonseca Jr., Permanent Representative of Brazil to the UN
New York, 3rd October 2001.
60

61

• The

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 49/60

· Statement by the United Nations Security Council on September 11, 200 I.
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Clearly, the United Nations has long been active in the fight against international
terrorism. There is an unwavering determination of the international community to
eliminate both threat. Thus, the United Nations and its agencies have developed a wide
range of international legal instruments that would enable the international community to
take action to suppress terrorism and bring those responsible to justice.
In fact, as far back as the early 1960's, these arrangements have always provided
the basic legal tools to combat international terrorism in its many forms - from the
seizure of aircraft to hostage-taking to the financing of terrorism. Many of these
agreements have been ratified by the majority of countries around the world, including
the following:

62

(a).
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft, adopted in Tokyo in 1963, which authorizes the airplane commander to
impose reasonable measures on any person, who has committed, or is about to
commit such acts, and requires States parties to take custody of offenders;
developed by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICA0); 63
(b).
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, adopted
in The Hague, 1970; requires parties to punish hijackings by "severe penalties",
and either extradite or prosecute the offenders; developed by ICA0; 64
(c).
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation, Montreal, 1971; requires parties to punish offences by "severe
penalties", and either extradite or prosecute the offenders; developed by ICA0. 65
There are the Protocols for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at
Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Montreal, 1988, that further extend
the provisions of the Convention to encompass terrorist acts at airports;

62

• There is the most recent convention, entitled ''the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism" which is not yet in force.

63

• Signed at

Tokyo, Japan, on September 14, 1963 (TOKYO CONVENTION).

64

•

• Signed at The Hague, on December 16, 1970 (THE HAGUE CONVENTION). 174 States parties as of
September 17, 200 1.

65

• Signed at Montreal, on September 23, 1971 (MONTREAL CONVENTION), U.N.T.S. No. 14118, vol.
974, pp. 178-184: Entry into Force: January 26, 1973.
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(d).
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, New York, 1973;
requires parties to criminalize and punish attacks against State officials and
representatives. Adopted by the General Assembly in 1973;66
(e).
Convention against the Taking of Hostages; adopted by the General
Assembly, New York, 1979. Parties agree to make the taking of hostages
punishable by appropriate penalties; to prohibit certain activities within their
territories; to exchange information; and to carry out criminal or extradition
67
proceedings;
(f).
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Vienna, 1980;
obliges parties to ensure the protection of nuclear material during transportation
within their territory or on board their ships or aircraft; developed by IAEA; 68

(g).
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, Rome, 1988; obliges parties to either extradite or prosecute
alleged offenders, who have committed unlawful acts against ships, such as
seizing ships by force and placing bombs on board ships; developed by
International Maritime Organization. This Convention is supplemented by the
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf adopted by the International Maritime
Organization ("IMO"), Rome, in 1988, which, in turn, extended the requirements
of the Convention to fixed platforms, such as those engaged in the exploitation of
offshore oil and gas; 69
(h).
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of
Detection, Montreal, 1991, seeks to curb the use of unmarked and undetectable
plastic explosives; developed by ICAO; 70

(i).
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, New
York, 1997; adopted by the General Assembly; seeks to deny "safe havens" to
persons wanted for terrorist bombings by obligating each State party to prosecute

66

• Signed in New York, on December 14, 1973 (NEW YORK CONVENTION), 107 States parties as of 17
September 2001.
67

68

•

Signed in New York, on December 18, 1979.

•

Signed in Vienna and at New York on March 3, 1980.

69

• Adopted in Rome, Italy, on March 10, 1988; Entry into force: March 1, 1992. There is the Protocol for
, the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf,
1988. Adoption: March 10, 1988. Entry into force: March 1, 1992.
7o

· s·1gned.m Montreal, Canada, on March 1, 1991.
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such persons, if it does not extradite them to another State that has issued an
. request ;71 and
extradibon
(j).
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism, New York, 1999; adopted by the General Assembly; obligates States
parties either to prosecute or to extradite persons accused of funding terrorist
activities, and requires banks to enact measures to identify suspicious
.
72
transactions.

The General Assembly as an Organ of the United Nations, on September 11,
2001, strongly condemned the heinous acts of terrorism, and called for urgent action to
enhance international cooperation to prevent and eradicate acts of terrorism.
The Legal Committee of the General Assembly has also commenced elaboration
on a convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism and a comprehensive
convention on the elimination of terrorism.
In addition to bringing about four of the above conventions, the United Nations
General Assembly has adopted the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International
Terrorism73 and the Declaration to supplement the 1994 Declaration. 74 These
international treaties and/or conventions condemned all acts and practices of terrorism as
criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomever committed, and they urge all
States to take measures at the national and international level to eliminate international
terrorism.

71

. s·tgne d.m New York on January 12, 1998.

n. Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in resolution 54/109 of December 9, 1999;
Signed in New York on January 10, 2000.
73

• See the United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/49/60, at 84th plenary meeting, dated
December 9, 1994.

•

14
•

See the United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/51121 0, adopted at 88th plenary meeting
on December 17, 1996.
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The United Nations Security Council-as the principal international organ
dealing with international peace and security-has also long been involved in the fight
against terrorism.
The Security Council as an Organ of the United Nations also restated the position
of the UN. Immediately after the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks on Pennsylvania,
New York, and Washington, D.C., in its resolution 1368 (2001)/5 the Security Council
condemned, in the strongest terms, the terrorist attack against the United States and called
on all States to work together urgently to bring the perpetrators to justice. Earlier on, it
had demanded that Mghanistan's Taleban authorities act swiftly to close all camps, where
terrorists are trained. 76 It, also, unequivocally condemned all acts of terrorism as criminal
and unjustifiable, and called on Member States to adopt specific measures. 77 The Security
Council also demanded that the Talebans turn over Osama bin Laden to appropriate
authorities, so that he can be brought to justice.78
In sum, not only has the UN acted with boldness and decisiveness at all times, it

has unequivocally, through its organs stated the international organization's position very
succinctly.
However, it is also clear that every action to be undertaken must have a
worldwide support. Although it would appear that the United States was justified in
orchestrating the Mghanistan and Iraq military missions in October 2001 and March
2003, respectively, however, internationalization of the military campaigns could have
15

• This Resolution is the reaffirmation of the 'inherent right of individual and collective self-defence as
recognized by the Charter of the United Nations'. It referenced Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

76

• See the

United Nations Security Council's Resolution 1333 (2000).

• ".See the United Nations Security Council's Resolution 1269 (1999).
78

• See

the United Nations Security Council's Resolution 1267 (1999).
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been advanced, had the United Nations Security Council established a special tribunal on
the crimes of September 11, 2001.

It is, hereby, submitted that the best approach towards building a broad-based
international military action would have been to allow the Security Council to convene an
international summit to map out international strategy on terrorism.

X.

Making the World a Safer Place.
In concluding, we must remember that fragile states should be considered major

gaps in international society and, as noted above, transnational terrorist (and criminal)
organizations live and breed in such gaps. History has informed us that the post-cold war
demobilization of large numbers of military personnel and insurgents is a related
problem, especially in regions where these fighters have not been successfully reintegrated into civilian life and economy.

79

At the conclusion of this dissertation, the following would be the suggested policy
guidelines for tackling failed states, and the attendant international terrorism that they
seek to foster on the rest of the world.
(a).
First, effective action against terrorism and failed states requires that we
attend to and balance, the variety of issues that constitute the problem cluster of
which the new phenomenon of international terrorism and failed states are only
one aspect. 80
(b).
Second, the international community must redouble its efforts to clean-up
the effluent of the Cold war, defuse chronic conflicts, and stabilize war-ravaged
societies. This task is harder and more expensive than once imagined, but clearly
the price of neglect is even greater. 81

79

. See Carl Conetta, supra note 22.

80

• Ibid.
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(c).
Finally, nations must (at minimum) avoid feeding the fires of toxic
regional conflicts through destabilizing arms transfers and military assistance.
Outside powers must finally abandon the reckless notion that such conflicts or
their participants can be reliably harnessed to support national objectives. 82 If the
20-year Afghan civil war and its aftermath teach any lesson, it is this: the dogs of
war, once stirred, are likely to run out of control. We ignore this lesson at our
·183
pen.
The thesis will argue for an increased role for the United Nations and its various
organs as well as regional international organizations in maintaining world peace and
regulating military actions.
The work ends by reminding the United States and the rest of the World that, in
the fight against international terrorism, they are fighting an asymmetrical foe in an

asymmetrical war, because the enemy-al-Qaeda-has unique capabilities. Thus, to
defeat al-Qaeda and international terrorism, the United States and its allies must employ

asymmetrical strategies, since the target terrorists and failed States cannot be dealt with
in the conventional and/or traditional methods. The solution must be in providing
sustainable development, economic empowerment, and uplifting social and economic
conditions in the hidden comers of the world. With sustainable growth available to all,
and with justice, peace, and equal access to good standards of living, the breeding places
of the terrorists may be foreclosed--ending the war on international terrorism.

81

.Jbid.

82

.Ibid.
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'

• Mort Rosenblum, In a different world, Osama bin Laden was seen as one of the 'freedom fighters',
Associated Press, September 20, 2001; Robert Scheer, CIA's Tracks Lead in Disastrous Circle, Los
Angeles Times, September 17, 2001; Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America, and International
Terrorism (2000); Mary Anne Weaver, Blowback: The CIA poured billions into a jihad against Sovietoccupied Afghanistan, creating a militant Islamist Abraham Lincoln Brigade believed to have been
involved in bombings from Islamabad to New York, Atlantic Monthly, May 1996.
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CHAPTER TWO
CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW RULES ON TERRORISM

I.

Introduction.
The subject of international terrorism, although has acquired extreme proportions

in international law lexicon in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in
the United States, has always been of major concern to internal lawyers and
commentators. 1 Thus, to Sinan Fidanci, as far as international law is concerned, the term
of "terrorism" is not a new phenomenon since the people of the world have always been
threatened and have suffered various patterns of terrorism. 2
We must note that the United Nations Security Council has clearly stated thus:
"the act of international terrorism constitutes one of the most serious threats to
international peace and security in the twenty-first century."3
The United States as the victim of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks had
characterized the attacks as a "war."4 The impact of the September 2001 attacks was so
devastating that Antonio Cassese had opined that:
"The terrorist attack of 11 September has had atrocious effects not only at the
human, psychological and political level. It is also having shattering consequences
for international law. It is subverting some important legal categories, thereby
'. See, e.g., L. Bantekas, & S. Nash International Criminal Law (2nd ed. 2003); Antonio Cassese,
International Criminal Law (2003); Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal
Categories of International Law, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 993, 997 (2001); K.K. Chaisaree, International
Criminal Law (2002); Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the 'war against terrorism ·, 78
International Affairs 2 (2002); N. Haffrey, The UN and International Efforts to Deal with Terrorism" in
Pew Case Studies in International Affairs, Case 313 (1998); M.J. Sorel, Some Questions About the
Definition of Terrorism and the Fight Against Its Financing, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 2 (2003)
2
• See

Sinan FIDANCI, Definition of 'Terrorism • in International Law, Journal of Turkish Weekly, Sunday,
February 5, 2006. Available at: http://www.turkishweekly.net/articles.php?id=1 03.
3
•

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1377 ofNovember 12, 2001.

4
•

President's Address to Joint Session of Congress, 37 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1347, 1349, 1351 (Sept.
20, 2001).
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imposing the need to rethink them, on the one hand, and to lay emphasis on
general principles, on the other." 5
With the near consensus that the attacks were monumental and very serious, it is
undisputed that these attacks have caused the need for a revision of international law
rules governing the treatment of acts of international terrorism. 6 Along this line, Cassese
has agreed that:
"Here we are confronted with an extremely serious terrorist attack by a non-State
organization against a State. Admittedly, the use of the term 'war' has a huge
psychological impact on public opinion. It is intended to emphasize both that the
attack is so serious that it can be equated in its evil effects with a State aggression,
and also that the necessary response exacts reliance on all resources and energies,
as if in a state ofwar." 7
Clearly, the recent developments, such as the terror attacks in the United States, on
September 11, 2001, in the area of international law, suggest that elaborating on a
succinct understanding and making a clear definition of the concept of "international
terrorism" is a necessary prerequisite for mobilizing international support against
terrorism and essential to responding to the terrorist acts in an effective way. 8 Thus, as a
result of recent developments in the arena of international law and international human
'.Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories ofInternational Law, 12
EUR. J. INT'L L. 993 (2001). (Hereinafter "Cassese 2001").
6
• Kofi

A. Annan, In larger freedom : towards development, security and human
rights for all. Report of the Secretary-General (United Nations, document N59/2005, 21 March 2005), pp.
26-27 (paragraphs 87-94). Accessible online from: htto://www.un.org/largerfreedom/; Jane Boulden and
Thomas G. Weiss, 'Whither Terrorism and the United Nations?', in Jane Boulden and Thomas G. Weiss,
eds., Terrorism and the UN Before and After September 11, at pp. 3-26 (2004); High-level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change, A more secure world: our shared responsibility 47-52 (United Nations,
A/591565, December 2004). Accessible from: h!tJ>://www.un.org/secureworld/; Human Security Report
2005:
War
and Peace
in
the
21st Century
42-46
(2005).
Accessible
from:
http://www.humansecurityreport.info/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=28&Itemid=63; Edward
C. Luck, 'Another Reluctant Belligerent: The United Nations and the War on Terrorism', in Richard M.
Price and Mark W. Zacher, eds., The United Nations and Global Security at 95-108 (2004); William G.
O'Neill, Fighting Terrorism for Humanity. Conference Report (2004). Accessible under "Reports 2004"
from: http://www. ipacademy. org/Publ ications/Pub lications.h tm
7

· S~e Cassese 2001, supra note 5, at 993.

8
• See

Fidanci, supra note 2.
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relations, there have been various concerns about (a) the legal characterization of the
terrorist attack from the viewpoint of international criminal law, and (b) the question of
what sort of forcible action international law permits the United States to take, and
.
hom. 9
agamstw
It is however necessary to define what constitutes "international terrorism" under
contemporary international law rules, in view of the terror attacks in the United States on
September 11, 2001.
11.

Identifying Terrorism and Terrorist Organizations Under International Law. 10

Despite the fact that the political and criminal effects of "terrorism" are frequently
and extensively discussed in everyday life, no single universal definition of it has ever
been adopted under internationallaw. 11
The major reason why there is no universally accepted defmition is due to the
ideological differences between the major world players:
" ... it is important to emphasise that making a single universal definition of
terrorism under international law is extremely difficult since there is always a
possibility for the actions of a person or group are described as terrorism (criminal
acts) by one side, while the same actions are called as the movement for freedom
(political acts) by the other side. For instance, The Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) and other groups fighting against Israel in order to set up an
independent state for their people are terrorist groups for Israel, but liberation
movements for Muslims and, in particular, for Arabs; the Kashmiri resistance
groups have always been described as terrorists by India, however, they have
always been credited as liberation fighters among the Pakistanis; the Afghani
Mujahedeen were freedom fighters for the West but a bunch of terrorist criminals
for the Soviet Union during the Cold War period. From this point of view, it is

9

·See Cassese 2001, supra note 5, at 993

10

· See generally, Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International
L~, 94 A.J.I.L. 348, 365 (2000) ("Murphy 1").
11

• L.

Bantekas & S. Nash, International Criminal Law 17 (2nd ed. 2003). (Hereinafter "Bantekas & Nash").
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obvious that the policy of double standards continues while the UN is still unable
to arrive at a definition ofterrorism." 12
Thus, we must take into consideration that it is virtually impossible to arrive at a
comprehensive and definitive definition of the term "terrorism," basically for two
reasons: (a) first, the term is employed to denote a wide variety of acts; and (b) secondly,
States differ in their perception of what constitutes terrorism.

13

According to the

Encyclopaedic Dictionary of International Law:
"The term is imprecise; it is ambiguous; and above all, it serves no operative legal
purpose .... The intentional use of violence or the threat of violence by the
precipitators (sic) against an instrumental target in order to communicate to a
primary target a threat of future violence. The object is to use intense fear or
anxiety to coerce the primary target into certain behavior or to hold its attitude in
connection with a demanded power (political) outcome." 14
In the context of foreign intelligence surveillance, "international terrorism" is defined as
activities 15 that:
(1) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any other State, or that would be a
criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or any
State;
(2) appear to be intended (A) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(B) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(C) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping;
and
(3) occur totally outside the United States, or transcend national boundaries in
terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear

12

. See F'd
1 anc1,· supra note 2.

13

• See Michael C. Bonafede, Note: Here, There, and Everywhere: Assessing the Proportionality Doctrine
and U.S. Uses of Force in Response to Terrorism After the September 11 Attacks, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 155,
158, fn 10 (2002). (Hereinafter "Michael C. Bonafede").
14

. ·Encyclopaedic Dictionary of International Law 393-94 (Clive Parry et al. eds., 1986) (citations omitted).
15

• See

Michael C. Bonafede, supra note 13, 158, fn 10.
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intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate
16
or seek asy1urn.
In the international context, the very first attempt to define "international terrorism" was
under the 1937 League of Nations Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of
Terrorism. 17 Thus, the first international attempt for the codification of the single
definition of this concept was under the League of Nations Convention for the Prevention
and Punishment of Terrorism. Under Article 1(2) of the Convention, "terrorism" was
defined as
" ... criminal acts directed against State and intended or calculated to create a state
of terror in the minds of particular persons, or groups of persons or the general
public." 18
Because the Convention is, as at present, not a part of the body of international law rules
known as at today, since the Convention was never entered into force due to the failure of
the ratification process, this definition is only good for academic sake.
Another international attempt to define the concept of "international terrorism"
occurred in 1972, when the United Nations adopted a draft resolution on terrorism, which
led to the creation of an Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism. 19
We must note that, at this time, the Ad Hoc Committee on International
Terrorism's most fundamental task was to produce an operative definition of terrorism.
However, at the end of the consultation processes, the Ad Hoc Committee did not reach

16

.50 U.S.C. 180l(c) (2000).

17

• League of Nations Doc. C.546.M383.1937.V (1937); See, also C. Walter, Defming Terrorism in
11.
Available
at:
http://edoc.mpil.de/conference-onNational
and
International
Law
terrorisrnlpresent/walter. pdf .
18

·League ofNations Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, at Art. 1(2).

19

· N. Haffrey, The UN and International Efforts to Deal with Terrorism in Pew Case Studies in
International Affairs, at Case 313: 1 ( 1998).
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an agreement on the issue as to whether a definition of "terrorism" was either necessary
or desirable. 20 The first State to object to Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism's
proposed definition was the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) delegation.
According to the USSR's delegation,
"it is unacceptable to give a broad interpretation to the term 'international
terrorism' and to extend it to cover national liberation movements or acts
committed in resisting an aggressor in occupied territories." 21
Based on the opposition encountered, and in spite of a further attempt made by
the Ad Hoc Committee in March 1977, in order to re-examine the possibility of finding a
definition of "terrorism," once again, no consensus was reached on a generally acceptable
definition of terrorism. 22 Due to the lack of co-operation towards the definition of this
concept, the Committee was dissolved in December 1977. 23
Also, in 1996, another Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism was established by the
United Nations General Assembly in order to:
"elaborate a comprehensive convention on international terrorism ... developing a
comprehensive legal framework of conventions dealing with international
terrorism. " 24
Under the 1996 General Assembly Resolution No. 51/210 of December 17, 1996, at its

Art. 2, one of the proposed definitions of "terrorism" that was drawn by the United
Nations General Assembly was that the term "terrorism" encompasses:

20

21

22
23

24

•

Ibid. at Case 313:2.

•

Ibid.

• See

Fidanci, supra note 2.

• Ibid.

• General

Assembly Resolution 51/210 ofDecember 17, 1996.
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" ... criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general
public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any
circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political,
philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be
25
invoked to justify them."
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the President of the United Nations
General Assembly issued a statement stating that the
"primary task facing the international community at present is to ensure that an
effective legal framework for the prevention and elimination of international
terrorism is in palace. "26
Following the above October 5, 2001 statement by the President of the United Nations
General Assembly, a draft resolution, in which "terrorism" was defined as all acts,

methods and practices of terrorism were considered as criminal and unjustifiable,
wherever and whomsoever committed, was approved by the Legal Committee of the
General Assembly on November 21, 2001. 27
Given the above ideological differences as well as the underlying political
undertones, despite these encouraging attempts, up until now the member States cannot
agree on as to the circumstances that, exactly, constitute terrorism.28
Earlier on, in September 2000, the United Nations General Assembly had begun
to take into consideration the Indian Draft of a comprehensive convention on terrorism. 29
Also, in January 2001, the United Nations General Assembly passed and adopted

~.Ibid. at Art. 2. Available on http://www.un.org/documents/galres/51/a5lr210.htm
26

• Statement by the President of the GA at the Conclusion of the Plenary Meeting on Measures to
Eliminate
International
Terrorism,
October
5,
2001
available
on
http://www.un.org/terrorisrnlstatements/gapresconclusion.html
21

28

29

• Available

at: http://www.un.orglapps/news/story Ar .asp?NewsiD=2230&Cr=assembly&Cr 1=terrorism

. See F'd
1 anc1,· supra note 2.
· See, generally, the Indian Draft of the definition of"terrorism" at: http://www.un.int/india/ind386.htm
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Resolution 551158 which reminded member states to remain committed to drafting the
convention, work which is still continuing.

30

However, it is noteworthy to indicate that the adoption of this comprehensive
convention has not concluded yet due to the opposition of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference (OIC). The OIC is loath to accept the articles of this convention dealing with
the definition of terrorism and claiming for liberation movements have to be excluded
31

from the definition of terrorist action.

111.

Definition of "Terrorism" Under the Domestic Laws of the United States.
We must also note under the United States Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 32 the American Secretary of State is authorized to
designate an organization as a "Foreign Terrorist Organization" ("FTO"), i.e., that it is a
non-U.S. organization that engages in terrorist activity that threatens United States
nationals or national security.33 The AEDPA's antiterrorism goal was:
"to provide the Federal Government the fullest possible basis, consistent with the
Constitution, to prevent persons within the United States, or subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, from providing material support or resources to
foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activities."34

30

•
See General Assembly Resolution 55/158 of January 30, 2001. Available at:
http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Site%20Map/compendium/Compendiumllnstruments/UN%20resolutjons%20
(Terrorism)/A%20RES%2055%20 158.pdf.

31

. See F'd
1 anc1,· supra note 2.

32

• Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, § 301, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B note (Supp. IV 1998).
For background, see H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-518, at 113 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924,
944; Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 1 PUB. PAPERS
6~0-32 (1996); Jennifer A. Beal1, Note, Are We Only Burning Witches? The Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996's Answer to Terrorism, 73 Ind. L.J. 693 (1998).
33

· 8 U.S.C. § 1 I 89(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1998).
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Under the AEDPA, where similar to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks occur, a
person or an organization would have engaged in terrorist activities, if they were to
commit
"in an individual capacity or as a member of an organization, an act of terrorist
activity or an act which the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords
material support to any individual, organization, or government in conducting a
terrorist activity at any time."35
In this regard, terrorist activities include such acts as hijacking, kidnapping, assassination,
and the use of any explosive or firearm, "with the intent to endanger, directly or
indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals, or to cause substantial damage to
property." Threats, attempts, and conspiracies to commit36 the above acts also come
within the definition ofterrorism. 37
Under AEDP A, once an FTO has been designated by the Secretary of State, there
are several legal and practical consequences that follow. For instance, such an
organization and its members may be faced with the following sanctions:
(a).
(b).
(c).

Those who are not U.S. citizens will not be admitted to the United
States. 38
All assets of the FTO located in the United States may be frozen at the
discretion of the secretary of the treasury. 39
All persons who knowingly provide material support or resources to the
FTO (other than medical or religious supplies) may be fined or imprisoned
for up to ten years. 40

34

• See§ 301, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B note (Supp. IV 1998); See also H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-518, at 113
(1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924,944.
35
36

37

• Ibid.

§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).

• Ibid.

§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(ii).

. See Murphy I, supra note 10, at 365.

38
•

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(V).

39.8

·

u.S.C. § 1189(a)(2)(C).
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(d).

A financial institution that becomes aware that it controls funds of an
FTO (or an FTO's agent) must freeze the funds and alert the U.S.
government, or face substantial fines. 41

Procedurally, the AEDPA requires the Secretary of State to notify Congress of every
designation of a person or an organization as a foreign terrorist and to publish them in the
Federal Register. 42 Thus, on October 2, 1997, the erstwhile Secretary of State, Madeline
Albright, made the first designations under the AEDPA, by specifying thirty (30)
43
· ·
orgamzat10ns
as FTO' s.

The laws of United States afford due process to everybody, and so, an
organization designated as a terrorist organization may challenge its designation in
federal court, within thirty days following publication of the designation. 44 Thus, in

People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. United States Dep't of State, 45 the court upheld the
secretary's FTO designation of the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran, and of the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Also, in Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno,46 the
court upheld the constitutionality of the AEDP A, save for its prohibitions on providing
"personnel" and "training" to FTOs, which was found unduly vague.

40

. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1).

41

• Ibid.§

42

•

2339B(a)(2) & (b).

8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(2)(A).

43

• See 62 Fed. Reg. 52,649-51 (1997) (designating 30 FTOs). The designations were published and became
effective on October 8, 1997.

44

45

46

./bid. § 1189(b).
· 182 F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1999),petitionfor cert. filed Dec. 27, 1999, No. 99-1070.
•

c·IV. A. Nos. 98-56062, 98-56280, available in 2000 WL 235310 (9th Cir. Mar. 3, 2000)
43

A notable designation occurred on October 8, 1999,47 when Osama bin-Laden and
al-Qaeda were included among the FTO's.
Clearly, the lack of one single definition of terrorism has resulted in the
international law and the domestic laws of different States choosing various forms of
counter-measures against the certain acts of terrorism under different international
conventions since 1963 and to introduce measures to make sure international cooperation to investigate, combat and eliminate terrorist incidents in certain situations. 48
Therefore, the major anti-terrorism conventions are drafted within the framework of the
United Nations Charter and ratified by many states. 49 Accordingly, at present, there are
12 international conventions addressing terrorism and related activities, each covering a
specific type of criminal activities, including seizure of airplanes, political assassination,
the use of explosives, hostage-taking, nuclear terrorism and assorted bombing etc. 50 It is
obvious that all these conventions require contracting states to introduce appropriate
national legislations in their own jurisdiction in order to punish the specific crimes
mentioned by each convention. 51 Regrettably, implementation of these conventions has
not been easy and, more importantly, no operational mechanism has been established to
evaluate measures undertaken by the states parties. However, by way of United Nations
Security Council's Resolution 1373 of September 28, 2001, it was decided by the

47

· Fed. Reg. 55,112-13 (Oct. 8, 1999); see also U.S. Dep't of State Press Release on Terrorism
Designations (Oct. 8, 1999), available in <http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1999/991008.html>.

s

48
49

· ee Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law 120 (2003) (Hereinafter "Cassese 2003").
. See F'd
1 anc1,· supra note 2.

'0

·_See the previous discussion in this Dissertation, at Chapter One, Para. IX, at pages 28-30, infra.

51

• See

Fidanci, supra note 2.
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Security Council that member States are under an obligation to prevent the financing of
terrorism and the sheltering of the performers of such terrorist acts. Under paragraph 6 of
this Resolution 1373, it was decided that member States were obliged to report the
concrete measures taken to implement their obligations within 90 days to a committee set
up for thi s purpose.

52

It is, however, essential to emphasize that even if states parties are under
obligations to assist each other in connection with criminal proceedings brought under a
given convention or protocol, none of these conventions provides a clear definition of
•

terronsm.
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Consequently, despite the absence of a single universal definition of terrorism it is
important to indicate, according to Antonio Cassese, that three main elements seem to be
required for the crime of international terrorism to occur (i.e. the "Cassese Factors"):
(a) the acts must constitute a criminal offence under most national legal systems,
such as murder, kidnapping, hostage-taking, bombing;
(b) they must be aimed at spreading terror by means of violent action directed to a
State, the public, or particular groups of persons;
(c) they must be politically, religiously, or ideologically motivated. 54

52

• See note 49, supra. These Conventions include the 1963 Tokyo Convention on Offences and certain
Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, the 1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft, the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
of Civil Aviation, the 1973 New York Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against
Internationally Protected Persons, the 1979 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the
1979 New York Convention against the Taking of Hostages, the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, the 1988 Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, the 1988 Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, the
1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Identification, the 1997
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing and the 1999 International Convention
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.
53

· supra note 2.
_. See F"d
1 anct,
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·See Cassese 2003, supra note 48, at 124.
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Nevertheless, for our purposes, we shall use the "Cassese Factors" and the
AEDPA designations, as our starting point, in identifying terrorist organizations in our
discussions.

IV.

Treatment of Acts of International Terrorism Under International Law.

Perhaps a good starting point for the discussion on the treatment of international
terrorism under international law is Principle 1 of the 1970 United Nations General
Assembly's Friendly Relations Declaration, 55 which provides thus:
"The principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations.
"Every State has the duty to refrain in its international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Such
a threat or use of force constitutes a violation of international law and the Charter
of the United Nations and shall never be employed as a means of settling
international issues.
"A war of aggression constitutes a crime against the peace, for which there is
responsibility under international law.

"In accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, States
have the duty to refrain from propaganda for wars of aggression.
"Every State has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force to violate the
existing international boundaries of another State or as a means of solving
international disputes, including territorial disputes and problems concerning
frontiers of States. " 56

55

• See General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, UN Doc. A/80 18 (1970). Available
at: http://www.hku.edu/law/conlawhk/conlaw/outline/Outline4/2625.htm.
56
• Ibid.
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However, it is the Security Council, the "executive" organ of the United Nations
that is in the forefront of curtailing international terrorism. Consistent with Chapter VII of
the United Nations Charter, as well as Articles 24(1 )&(2), 39, and 51 of the United
Nations Charter, the Security Council had taken numerous actions to preserve
international peace and security, while curtailing growth, and by promoting global
explorer peace and security.
In the aftermath of bombings of the Pan American Flight 103 and the Union des

Transports Aeriens Flight 772, in 1992, the United Nations Security Council passed its
Resolution 731 condemning the acts. Under paragraph 2 of the preamble to Security
Council's Resolution 731 of January 21, 1992,57 acts of international terrorism were
proscribed, while conferring on the injured State the right to protect itself 8 from
terrorists:
"right of all States, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and
relevant principles of international law, to protect their nationals from acts of
international terrorism that constitute threats to international peace and
security." 59 (emphasis added).
Concerning the Lockerbie incident during which United States accused the
Libyan government of Colonel Moamar Ghaddafi of complicity, paragraph 6 of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 748 (1992), was drafted to expressly state the
Libyan Government's obligation to curtail terrorist activities from its territory:
"every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or
participating in terrorist acts in another state or acquiescing in organized activities

51

58

• See

United Nations Security Council Resolution 731 of January 21, 1992, U.N. Doc. S /RES/731 (1992).

· We must note that how and the extent to which the injured State may go in choosing to protect itself, its
and nationals from terrorists is subject to wide debate.

~roperty,
59

· See United Nations Security Council Resolution 731 of January 21, 1992, at para. 2.
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within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when such acts
60
involve a threat or use of force. "
Also, following the August 7, 1998 bombing of United States embassies in Nairobi,
Kenya and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, the Security Council passed Resolution 1189
(1998), 61 wherein it condemned the:
"indiscriminate and outrageous acts of international terrorism that took place on 7
August 1998 in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania ... [and that] every
State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating
in terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its
territories directed towards the commission of these acts." 62
Going on, the Security Council called:
"upon all States and international institutions to cooperate with, and provide
support and assistance to, the ongoing investigations in Kenya, Tanzania, and the
United States to apprehend the ferpetrators of these cowardly criminal acts and to
bring them swiftly to Justice." 6
There is also the Security Council Resolution 1214 of 1998 wherein the Security Council
requested that the Taleban authorities in Afghanistan stop providing sanctuary and
training for Osama bin-Laden and the al-Qaeda followers. 64 This was followed by
Security Council Resolution 1267 of 1999 which condemned the failure of the Taleban
authorities to adhere to paragraph 113 of Security Council Resolution 1214 of 1998. The
Security Council went on to note Afghanistan's failure to: "cooperate ... to bring indicted
terrorists to justice" and that such acts constituted threats to international peace. 65

60
•

61

62
63
64
65

United Nations Security Council Resolution 748 (1992), at para. 6.

• United

Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1189 of August 13, 1998

./bid. See United Nations Security Councilll89 (1998), at paras I and 5 ofthe preamble.
./bid at para. 3.
·_ United

Nations Security Council Resolution 1214 of 1998, at para. 113.

• United

Nations Security Council Resolution 1267 of 1999.
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The above shows that there is sufficient evidence that international law, as well as
domestic laws, strongly curtail international terrorism.
Not only does international curtail international terrorism, it also imposes
punishment on the states that harbor such terrorists. Terrorist attacks have usually been
defined as serious offences, to be punished under national legislation by national courts. 66
Thus, numerous international treaties on the matter oblige the contracting States to
engage in judicial cooperation for the repression of those offences, and so trans-national,
state-sponsored or state-condoned terrorism amounts to an international crime, and is
already contemplated and prohibited by international customary law as a distinct category
of such crimes.

67

V. The International Criminal Court's Role in Curtailing International Terrorism.

Some States, in particular Algeria, India, Sri Lanka and Turkey, have proposed
that terrorism be considered as one of the international crimes to be subjected to the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC), 68 namely as a "Crime Against
Humanity." 69 Salutary as this cause may have been, many States including the United
States have opposed the proposal essentially on four grounds:
(i) the offence was not well defined;
(ii) in their view the inclusion of this crime would politicize the Court;

66

·See Cassese 2001, supra note 5, at 993.

67
• Ibid.
68

·U.N. Doc. 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, entered into force July I, 2002. The Rome Statute of the International
~rimina/ Court was adopted by the international community, on July 17, 1998, at a diplomatic conference
m Rome, Italy.

69

• See NCONF.l83/C.IIL 27.

49

(iii) some acts of terrorism were not sufficiently serious to warrant prosecution by
an international tribunal;
(iv) generally speaking, prosecution and punishment by national courts were
considered more efficient than by international tribunals. 70

In addition, many developing countries also opposed the proposal for they felt that the
Statute should distinguish between terrorism and the struggle of peoples under foreign or
colonial domination for self-determination and independence. As a result, several
proposals attempting to define "terrorism" as well as a later one by India, Sri Lanka and
Turkey, were reJ.ecte d.71
Nevertheless, the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 has been defined a crime
against humanity (a) by a prominent French jurist and former Minister of Justice, Robert
Badinter, (b) by the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, as well as (c) by the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson. 72 In addition,
distinguished international lawyers have taken the same view. 73 Indeed, that atrocious
September 11, 2001 action exhibits all the hallmarks of crimes against humanity, i.e.,
considering the magnitude and extreme gravity of the attack as well as the fact that it has

70

See
US
Opposition
to
the
International
http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/icc/usindex.htm
71

Criminal

Court.

Available

at:

• See NCONF.183/C.1/ L 27/Rev 1.

12

• Badinter and Annan have made statements to the French radio and CNN respectively. For the statement
ofM.Robinson, see UN Daily Highlights, 25 September 2001, http://www.un.org/News/dh/20010925.htm;
See, also, the text of the decision in Bulletin des arrets de Ia Cour de Cassation, Chambre crlmlnelle,
March 2001, no. 64, at 218-9. See thereon the comments by S. Zappala, in 12 EJIL (2001), 595-612 and
by F. Boitard in 105 RGDIP (2001), at 474-91.

73

· See for instance, Alain Pellet, in Le Monde, 21 September 2001, at 12. Also the British lawyer G.
RObertson, Q.C. had suggested this definition (see The Times, 18 September 2001, at 18).
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targeted civilians, being an affront to all humanity, and part of a widespread or systematic
•

practice.

74

Current state of the law shows that States gradually have come to share this
"Crime Against Humanity" characterization. These States now consider serious crimes of
terrorism as falling under crimes against humanity, and in particular, under the
subcategories of "murder," "extermination" or "other inhumane acts" included in Art. 7
of the ICC Statute. 75 As this continues, the notion of what constitutes "Crimes Against
Humanity" would be broadened further.
The remaining issues to be dealt with would be: (i) the specific conditions under
which terrorist attacks fall under this "Crimes Against Humanity" theory, and of (ii)
whether the future ICC would be authorized also to adjudicate serious cases of
•

terronsm.
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Be that as it may, it is perhaps plausible to contend that large-scale acts of
terrorism showing the atrocious features of the attacks of September 11, 2001 or similar
to those attacks, fall under the notion of crime against humanity as long as they meet the
requirements of that category of crimes (whereas no special account should be taken of
one of the specific features of terrorism, namely the intent to spread terror among
civilians). 77
Thus, it appears that a customary rule of international law has arisen to treat
terrorist attacks of high magnitude as "Crimes Against Humanity" falling under the
74

. See Cassese 2001, supra note 5, at 994.

15

• Ibid.

16

./bid

11

./bid
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subcategories of "murder," "extermination" or "other inhumane acts" included in Art. 7
of the ICC Statute.

VI.

78

International Cooperation Needed to Combat International Terrorism
Since 1960s, the practices of the United Nations suggest that despite the failure of

a single universal defmition of terrorism, there is, at least, a consensus among the
international community that terrorism cannot be effectively addressed without
international co-operation.

79

Lack of ability to agree upon an internationally recognized operative definition of
this concept has prevented the emergence of an effective international counter-terrorism
strategy among nations and seriously undermined international efforts towards fmding a
solution to this problem. There is no doubt that a general definition of terrorism is
necessary in order for the international community to fight against terrorism in a precise
way. Nowhere is the fact brought into fore than the Iraqi debacle presently unfolding
since the March 2003 invasion.
However, it should be borne in mind that even international definition or treaties
alone cannot solve the problem since the state parties' co-operations are extremely
essential in order to eliminate the threat of terrorism and make the world a safer place.

VII.

Conclusion
Clearly, both the United Nations and the United States share an interest in

isolating and defeating terrorism, not each other, and in containing the threat of weapons
18
79

.Ibid.
• See

Fidanci, supra note 2.

52

of mass destruction falling into the hands of state or non-state terrorists. We must note
that the rhetoric of "war" appears to be fundamentally misleading. 80 A combination of
several international law factors determines whether terrorist organizations will thrive, be
defeated or simply fade away.
We must note that international terrorism is a problem to be tackled mainly by
law-enforcement agencies, in cooperation with military forces. At the end of this paper,
we shall show that, even though its magnitude can be brought down to "tolerable" levels,

however, it can never be totally "defeated," just as United States cannot have an
absolutely crime-free society. International terrorism is now part of the growing trend
towards the lowered salience of the state in the new security agenda that emphasizes
human as well as national security. The wise strategy has to be a multi-layered one that
addresses grievances and counteracts the causes of individual and group humiliation and
indignity. The object is not to destroy the motivation of every individual terrorist but to
neutralize support for terrorists in the communities in which they live and generate the

will and capacity to act against them by relevant authorities. Clearly, the underlying or
root causes of terrorism can be grouped into five categories:
(a) lack of democratic institutions and practices, political freedoms and civil
liberties;
(b) group grievance based in collective injustice;
(c) intractable conflicts;
(d) poverty; and
(e) inter-civilization suspicions.

80

· ~mesh Thakur, International Terrorism and the United Nations, (Keynote Lecture) UNU Global
Sem_mar Shimane-Yamaguchi Session 2006.
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The previous discussion, under this chapter, shows that the background
information about the growth of international terrorism would lead to two (2)
conclusions: (a) First, ensuring widespread global cooperation in the fight against
terrorism will go a very long way in winning the "War Against Terrorism." (b) Secondly,
according the International Criminal Court with sufficient legal and moral power to deal

with the acts of terrorism will also ensure that the root causes and unintended
repercussions are appropriately dealt with.

54

CHAPTER

THREE

"FAILED STATES" AND CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW RULES
"From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism
will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime... . I will not forget this
wound to our country and those who inflicted it. I will not yield; I will not rest; I
will not relent in waging this struggle for freedom and security for the American
people."

-President George W. Bush, September 20, 2001.*

1.

Introduction
Over and over, in the current fight against growing international terrorism and

fundamentalism, statesmen, anny generals, international [a~jurists, etc, have recognized
the strategic positions that failed states 1 occupy in the current dispensation. Whether
•7

referred to as "failed states," or as "rogue states," this present author would argue that
there should be clear standards set, under international law, and which must be met prior
to which military actions may be carried out against another sovereign state, irrespective
of whether or not the latter state has "failed." At the conclusion of this thesis, this author
will strongly propose that the United Nations, International Organizations, the affluent
and more developed industrialized western nations, and super-national corporations must
develop ethical, moral, and humanitarian obligations akin to the 1945 Marshall Plan to
assist weak states from failing, and to assist failed states to get their acts back together.
This author's position is to make a strong argument for engaging the forces of
world order, in an appropriate manner, towards strengthening weak states and towards
globally deterring those factors that impel or motivate state failure. He also argues for

• President's Address to Joint Session of Congress, 37 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1347, 1349, 1351 (Sept.

20, 2001).
r
· Also known, and sometimes referred to, as "Failing States" and/or "Weak States."
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increasing the capacities and capabilities both of the United Nations, regional
international bodies, and the United States-led Coalition Forces to judge and deal with
impending failure. Finally, there would be a strong argument against military invasions,
as occurred in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003, respectively.

n.

Treatment of Failed States' Problems Under International Law.

It is against this backdrop that the central theme of this dissertation would be to
carry out an examination of the subject of "failed states" in the context of growing
international terrorism under international practice viz-a-viz the expansion of
international law rules regarding self-protection, self-defense, anticipatory military
actions, and pre-emptive military strikes under Articles 2(3) & (4) and 51 of the United
Nations Charter? Thus, the questions that this paper seeks to answer are:

* What are the characteristics of a "failed state"?
* What happens when a failed state is held ransom by an international terrorism
suspect?
* When can the United Nations Security Council, or any superpower, on its own
volition, embark on a military action against a failed state that has been used as a
launch-pad for exporting terrorism? 3
Suppose an international fugitive decides to hide within the territory of a failed
state, however while having not carried out any act of terrorism, the terrorist openly
declares its intent to carry out terrorist acts at a later time, would the proposed target of
the terroris c lthreats be entitled to carry out a pre-emptive military strike against the
fugitive on the territory of another sovereign state? If and when the intended target takes
7dl hc::-J,.
2

· See generally, Articles 2(3)&(4) and 51 of the United Nations Charter on the right of sovereign states to
act in self-defense .
3
• • Especially,

the rules that govern pre-emptive military strike that have been employed by the United states
of America against Afghanistan (in 2001) and Iraq (in 2003).
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preeJD.P~asure,

is the theory of "anticipatory and/or preemptive self-defense" valid

under contemporary international law?
Under international law, anticipatory self-defense is best understood to describe

military action against an "imminent attack" and such use of force is justified under
traditional notions of self-defense. 4 Preemptive self-defense, on the other hand, is used to
describe the use of force against a more remote, yet significant threat. 5
~~

----

'I
'

Under the United Nations Charter, a prerequisite to the exercise of the right of
self-defense is an act that constitutes an "armed attack."6 Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter permits a nation to act in self-defense in the face ofp~~e!Yed d8illter. 7
Under what circumstances, then, would the United Nations Charter and the
growing rules of international law permit the United Nations' Security Council and/or
any other member state to undertake a military action against another sovereign state?
Article 2(4) forbids the use of force and aggression. Articles 39 and 42 allow the Security
Council to use force, if necessary, to curtail threat to world peace and security. Are there
alternative non-military pacific means of alleviating the inimical effects of state failure
upon neighboring states and the international community? The above questions are
necessary, in view of President Bush's 2002 Security Council address, which states inter

alia:
•. See Joseph L. Falvey, Jr., Our Cause is Just: An Analysis of Operation Iraqi Freedom Under
International Law and the Just War Doctrine, 2 Ave Maria L. Rev. 65, 72 (2004).
5

• See Christopher Greenwood, International Law and Pre-emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida,
and Iraq, 4 San Diego Int'l L. J. 7, 9 (2003).

6

· Abraham D. Sofaer, The Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International Law: Te"orism, the

Law, and National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REV. 89,96 (1989).
7

~

\.

.. See Leo Van den Hole, Anticipatory Self-Defense Under International Law, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
69, 94 (2003); See also Military and ParamiUta Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. at 347 (Schwebel,
J., dissenting)).
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"For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer attack .(.l("c""' ~
before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that ..(.~~u-/;) . c;.n....
present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists J-..e<-n-.. ~~ -1-often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent ~-t/ ~fi.a.-" ..J..
threat-most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing k-<,p .?- «-0J)'
for attack. We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and H?J-'1-...A.... JJ.. objectives oftoday's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack
us using conventional means. They kliow suCh attacks would fail. Instead, they
rely on acts of terror and potentially, the use of ~~.!l ons__Q_f. mass destructionweapons that can be ~asil concealed delivered covertly, and used without
warmng .... The United States has long maintained the o tion of reem~tive actions
to counter a sufficient threat to our national securi . The greater the threat, the
greater the risk of inaction-and the more compelling the case for taking
anticipatory action to defend ourselv~s, even if uncertainty remains as to the time
and place of the enemy's attack. To orestall or revent such hostile acts b our
a_dversaries, the United States will, if necessa , act reem tivel ." 8 [emphasis
added].
h..k [ .,._.,( r-1-l A..h.,.Jn. 2. ~ f.J{JJ J
7 '·-.:

G

tA

"2. 7

With this "Bush Doctrine" re-emerged the concept of Pre-emptive strike, more
'
forcefully under international law lexicon. Is it right that the law of pre-emptive strike
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when the nation on the receiving end is a "failed" or "failing" state? These are the
questions that this dissertation seeks to address via historical and empirical research.

III.

Regulatory Provisions Under the United Nations Charter

First, we must note that Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter makes it
mandatory that all states refrain from the use of force. The statute specifically provides

thus:

8

._NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2002) (emphasis added), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc /nss.pd.f.
last visted on February 11, 2002.
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another nation's action as meriting punishment via military invasion? What happens
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possess such little strictures? Can a single state possess the right and legitimacy to declare
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"[A]ll Members shall refrain, in their international relations, from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any state, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."
This prohibition against the use of force under the U.N. Charter must be tested in
light of other relevant provisions. For instance, under Article 42, the United Nations
Charter states that the "Security Council may take military enforcement measures in
conformity with Chapter Vll." It appears that Article 42 gives only -to the Security
Council-the sole right to use military force under the UN Charter.
Further, Article 51 clearly allows lawful use of force by a target state in the even
of an armed attack:
''Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence, if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of
this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council
and shall not, in any way, affect the authority and responsibility of the Security
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary, in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
In the context of article 51, therefore, "armed attack" has been broadly interpreted
to include circumstances where "military personnel, citizens, commerce, and property"
have been attacked. 9
The next question, flowing from article 51, pertains to what constitutes "armed
attack"? As we shall see, the concept of armed attack, as stated under the present UN
Charter, has been overtaken by recent events. In this regard, we may quickly mention the
1837 Caroline incident, during which Canada attacked and destroyed a ship used by
Canadian rebels on the United States soil. United States Secretary of State, Daniel

-9

· See Sofaer, supra note 6, at 96.
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c..
Webster, gave a locus classi~us explanation that has long been regarded as a definitive
statement of the right of anticipatory self-defense.

10

Webster argued that the United

States need not await an actual attack, but could act in anticipation of a threatened armed
attack, provided that there was "a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming,
leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation."

11

For a long time the Webster statement has been accepted as the predicates to be
satisfied before the "Use of Force," and as governing self-defense rules.
As evidenced from the above, while the UN Charter does not specifically address

whether a right to anticipatory self-defense exists outside of Article 51, Leo Van den
Hole has argued that anticipatory self-defense right exists under traditional or customary
?

international law, because ''the UN Charter did not eliminate the right of self-defense

-
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under customary international law, or confine its scope to the express terms of Article
51 ."12 Along the same line, Christopher Greenwood has also submitted that, historically,
the United Kingdom and the United States
"have consistently maintained that the right of self-defense also applies when an
armed attack has not yet taken place, but is imminent." ~
Over the years, for example, the United States has always argued that it has an
/

--Lv~..:;

This right must be measured against the principles of international law, as laid down in
__-t<.e - v~

10
• See

Christopher Greenwood, supra note 5, at 12.

11

• Ibid. at 13, where Greenwood quoted a letter from Secretary of State Daniel Webster to HenryS. Fox,
dated April 24, 1841, in 29 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1129, 1138 (1857) (citations
omitted).
12

_ ·Leo Van den Hole, supra note 7, at 94.
13

• See

Christopher Greenwood, supra note 5, at 12.
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the 1986 decision of Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.),
International Court of Justice held that only a substantial milit
armed incidents, rises to the level of an "armed attack".

15

14

where the

ttack not isolated

It then follows that if a nation

')

has not been subjected to an "armed attack," then no right of self-defense exists. Finally,
the use of force in self-defense is permissible only if such force is preceded by actual { (). )
'1
......----C v '\tt.....-?
Mf:z. cLc.
16
,rnecessity and the responding force is roportional to the initial attack.
1

~The "imminence" element as used in this context, is very similar to that standard
used in Article

m litigations standing under the federal constitutional law of the United

States, which consists of three elements. First, for an injured plaintiff to sue for redress
based on an alleged injury, he must "have suffered an 'injury in fact'-an invasion of a
judicially cognizable interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." 17 The imminence requirement:
"ensure[s] that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article ill purposes -that the injury is 'certainly impending."'
In addition, there must be a causal connection between the actual and/or imminent
injury and/or risk alleged and the conduct complained of. Thus, the injury/risk posed by
the failed state to its neighbors and international community must be fairly traceable to
the fact that the particular state's internal control and official functions have become

14

. 1986 I.C.J. 14, (June 27}.

IS.

/bid. at 103.

16
•

Lt Cmcir. Micheal F. Lohr, JAGC, USN, Legal Analysis of United States Military Responses to StateSponsored International Terrorism, 34 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1985).
17
•

See Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154, 1163 (1997) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildfile, 504 U.S.
555, 560-561 (1992) (footnotes, citations and internal quotations omitted)).
18

·See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 n.2 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990) (noting that
the standing inquiry "in no way depends upon the merits").
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inefficient. It must not be the result of conduct by a third party or because of another
•

ulterior motive.

19

)

Furthermore, it is clear that the danger posed by the failed state must be likely,_as
/

t'IIA
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OppOSed to being specul tive,-and that the actual and/or immediate risk and injury posed
by failed states to (a) their neighbors, (b) international peace, and (c) the international
community of states would be redressable through foreign intervention, either by the
United Nations or through an international action authorized by the United Nations,
before the extreme action of military invasion would be permitted. 20 It cannot create more
chaos than was existing prior to the military invasion. Thus, a sovereign state should
undertake war only to promote a more just peace 21

;;;---

Finally, under the United States' constitutional law, the courts have always held
that "[T]he party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these
[above] elements." 22 This rule is also applicable to the topic under discussion. Before the
United Nations' Security Council may allow

~other

military invasion against another

overwhelming. Such facts cannot be fishy or conjectural. This is mor o in view of the
unabating controversy surrounding the underlying facts in support of the speech made by

19

• As will be seen later in this paper, some schools of radical thoughts believe, and have strenuously
. stressed, that the United States' invasion of Iraq in 2003 was aimed at stabilizing and securing the
importation of petroleum oil from the Gulf Region into the United States over any other excuse.

20

• See Bennettv.

Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154, 1163 (1997) (citing Lujan v. Defenders ofWildfile, 504 U.S.

555, 560-561 (1992).
21
• Saint Augustine,

House 1993).

The City of God, Book XIX, ch. 12 (Marcus Dods trans., Modem Library ed., Random
-

22

-.See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975).
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Hon. Colin Powell before the United Nations just prior to the beginning of the March
2oo3 invasion of Iraq. On February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell told the
United Nations Security Council:
"Our conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a stockpile of between 100 and
500 tons of chemical weapons agent. That is enough to fill 16 000 battlefield
kets .,23
roc
_____..

I

As we later found out, no weapon of mass destruction had been discovered in
Iraq, more than four (4) years after the above statement was made. As Weapons Inspector

David _ay had _rightly s_!ated, the failure of pre-war intelligence resulted in the conclusion
that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. 24 In fact, it can be argued that the
American-led military invasion of Iraq hastened the fail e and the attendant collapse of
the Iraqi state. Therefore, to avoid similar mistakes in future, the party-indeed the
sup

ower invoking the right of self-defense, anticipatory attacks, military incursions,

and/or right of pre-emptive strike, as a basis for military action against another sovereign
nation, must bear a very high burden of establishing the following elements:
1.

That the nation against which military action was being considered poses
actual and/or immediate risk to
fvYtJ..AA.v~ t1-t1
(a) their neighbors, 7
(b) international peace, and
L-L,'V\
(c) the international community of states; t. ( rl'

2.

The nation arguing for military invasion of a failed state must have
suffered an 'injury in fact'-an invasion of a judicially cognizable interest
which is
(a) concrete and particularized, and
(b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;

23

• Remarks to United Nations Security Council, 2/5/03, pg. 12. The truth is, to date, the United States has
not found any of this material, or those thousands of rockets loaded with chemical weapons.

24 .

· See Walter Pincus & Dana Milbank, Kay Backs Outside Probe of Iraq Data: Ex-Inspector Again Says
Forbidden Arms Probably Didn't Exist, Wash. Post, Jan. 29, 2004, at Al.
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3.

There must be a causal connection between the actual and/or imminent
inj
and/or risk alleg~d and the fact that second state has failed as a
nation, and

4.

The actual and/or immediate risk and injury posed by failed states to (a)
their neighbors, (b) international peace, and (c) the international
community of states would be redressable through foreign intervention,
either by the United Nations or through an international action authorized
by the United Nations. This must be crystal clear, before the extreme
action of military invasion would be permitted.

On the satisfaction of the above elements, through evidence satisfying the "beyond
?

to initiate military action against a state so properly classified as a "failed state."
Applying the above "not too speculative" standard to the working definition being
adopted by this author towards identifying failed states, it is clear that before a state could
be termed as having "failed" by the rest of the world, not only must the particular state
have failed to satisfy all the necessary requirements of statehood under contemporary
international law, but also, the actual or immediate risk that the state poses to (a) its
neighbors, (b) international peace, and (c) the international community of states must not
be "too speculative." The suspected risk or danger must be concrete, actual, obvious, or
highly imminent. For instance, in January 2004, Pentagon Weapons Inspector in Iraq,

David Kay,

r~

weapons of mass

that continuing efforts in Iraq have (a) failed to reveal any actual

destructi~n,

(b) that

s~kpiles

of such wea ons rob ably did not exist

at the time the United States launched

--------------~--------~----------------~

that a failure of pre-war intelligence resulted in the conclusion that Iraq possessed
weapons of mass destruction. 25

25

• See David Kay, Statement on the Interim Progress Report on the Activities of the Iraq Survey Group
(ISG) Before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Committee on
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These latter acquired facts seriously undermined the immine y of the March
Z003 military action.
The above shows that while there 8:fe inexhaustive legal rul s in supporLoLthe
concept of "anticipatory" self defense rights under contemporary international law, the

:-=-:--

right to carry out "preemptjve" seJf defense attacks appe

IV.

limited.

Defming Weak States, Failed States, and Collapsed States.

Coming back to the subject of failed states under international law, while this
topic, like most subjects under international law, remains controversial, and not highly
amenable clearly defmed legal rules, this author's working definition of a "failed state" is
that the concept should only apply to states that pose actual and/or immediate risk and/or
danger to (a) their neighbors, (b) international peace, and (c) the international community
of states. This classification of failed states is aimed at curbing the contravention of
international law rules on the grounds of self-preservation and the right to launch preemptive strikes by the super powers.
The term "failed state" was first used by Gerald B. Helman and Steven Ratner in
1992.26 Because of its wide acceptance, the term was quickly adopted by policy-makers
and the media in America. By this single stroke, the concepts of failed, collapsed, or
disintegrated states were introduced into the international political and legallexicon.27

Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Oct. 2, 2003),
available at
http://intelligence.house.gov/PDF/KayStatementl00203.pdf. Last visited on November 3, 2003; See also,
See Walter Pincus & Dana Milbank, supra note 24, at A1
26
•

Gerald B. Helman and Steven Ratner, Saving Failed States, 89 Foreign Policy 1, 5 (1992-93).

27

· See Riikka Koskenmaki, Legal Implications Resulting from State Failure in Light of the Case of
Somalia, 73 Nordic Journal of International Law 1, 2 (2004)
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In this chapter, we shall thoroughly examine the gradual process of state failure,
by considering the causes and characteristics of state failure. We must note that the exact

definition of a "failed state" has not been given. This writer, thus, is of the view that a
clear definition of the failed state concept is very important, in order to fully grasp the
subjects under discussion. For instance, Robert Rotberg has submitted that, in order to
devise an effective policy, "state failure" and "state collapse" should be used precisely,
not loosely, and not synonymously with state implosion and state disaster. 28
There have been several concepts and definitions ascribed to the phenomenon of
"state failure" over the years. It has been said that it is a situation where the structure,
authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen a~art. 29 To Amy Eckert,
it is the disintegration of legitimate governmental authority. 30 It is also the breakdown of
effective government. 31 In Riikka Koskenmaki' s opinion,
"From the international law perspective, it may be simply understood as the
implosion of effective government, usually linked to an internal armed conflict.
State failure occurs with varying intensity and geographical scope, and it has even

28

• See Robert I. Rotberg, Nation-State Failure: A Recurring Phenomenon?, a paper delivered at the NIC
2020
Project
on
November
6,
2003,
at
2.
Available
at:
http://www.cia.gov/nic/PDF GIF 2020 Suimort/2003 11 06_j)apers/panel2 nov6.doc. Last visited on
February 13, 2006. [Hereinafter "Rotberg NIC 2020"]. Rotberg went on to note that the lack of precise
definition had sabotaged well-meaning projects in the past: "During the 1990s, the CIA sponsored two
major studies and other research to discover the causes of state failure. But the nature of failure was never
defined strictly, and the variables developed on the basis of detailed quantitative analysis proved less than
. robust, and not immediately useful." Ibid.

29

• I.W. Zartman, Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse, in COLLAPSED STATES: TilE
DISINTEGRATION AND RESTORATION OF LEGITIMATE AUTIIORITY 1 (1. W. Zartman ed. 1995).

30

• Amy

E. Eckert, United Nations Peacekeeping in Collapsed States, 5 J. Int'l L. & Prac. 273, 280 (1996).

31

• Daniel ThUrer, Der Wegfall effektiver Staatsgewalt: "The Failed State," in Der Wegfall effektiver
Staatsgewalt: "The Failed State" 9 (C. F. MOller Verlag ed., 1995); See also Matthias Herdegen, Der
Wegfall effektiver Staatsgewalt im Volkerrecht: "The Failed State," also in Der Wegfall effektiver
Staatsgewalt: "The Failed State" 49 (C. F. MUller Verlag ed., 1995) (English translation 'The "failed State"
and international law', 836 International Review of the Red Cross (hereafter 'IRRC') 731-761 (1999).
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led to the emergence of a state totally lackinf government, Somalia from 1991
through 2000, the failed state par excellence."3
Although generally lumped together in academic discourse, the concepts of

~

~

'
I

' I

"Weak States," "Failed States," and/or "Collapsed States" are separate subjects, even
though they are related stages in the life of states. According to Riikka Koskenmaki:
" .. .this conceptual difficulty lies in 'the antagonism between expansive and
narrow definitions of the minimum requirements of government in international
relations'. While the former, expansive definitions, reflect political and social
perspectives to state collapse, the latter is preferred in legal discourse. In fact, the
mere existence of an effective government with centralized administrative and
legislative organs has been traditionally considered sufficient as the required legal
elements of government. Since the expansive definitions of failed states embrace
a number of states that temporarily lack some of the requirements for effective or
legitimate government, it is suggested that these states should be called failing or
collapsing states. Thus, the notion of a failed or collapsed state should be
reserved, in line with the narrow definition and for the purpose of conducting a
legal analysis, for states in which the government institutions have ceased to
function, or have totally disappeared, for a prolonged period of time. As already
noted above, such cases include only Somalia and, according to some
commentators, perhaps, Liberia." 33
The journey, generally, starts at the end of the spectrum, with a state that is
founded on weak social, political, and economic structures, gradually degenerating from
being a weak state into becoming a failed state. If events do not change, the state then
collapses, and its fragments may be absorbed by other viable states, or form separate
states of their own. A "Weak State" is a nation that is inherently weak because of

32

• See Koskenmaki, supra note 27, at 2; See also Daniel Thtlrer, ibid. at 12-13 and A. Yannis, State · \
Collapse and the International System. lm losion ofgovernment and the international/ega/ order from the
French Revolution to the disintegration ofSomalia, ese No 604, Universite de Geneve, IUHEI, Geneve,

104 (2000).

------.,

• 33

· Ibid. per Koskenmaki at 4-5.
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geographical, physical, or fundamental economic constraints, or a state that Is
situationally weak because of internal antagonisms, greed, or despotism. 34 To Rotberg:
"Weak states typically harbor ethnic, religious, lin 'stic or other tensions that
may, at some near point, qe
nn.e.d_into_all out conflict between contending
antagonisms. Their ability to provide adequate amounts of po Itic goods is
diminished or diminishing. Physical infrastructural networks are deteriorated.
Schools and hospitals show signs of neglect. GDP per capita and similar
indicators have fallen or are falling, sometimes dramatically. Levels of venal
corruption are high and escalating. The rule of law is honored in the breach. Civil
society is harassed. Despots rule. There is a special category of weak state, the
seemingly strong one, always an autocracy, which is secure but at the same time
provides few other political goods. Cambodia under Pol Pot was one such state.
Iraq under Saddam, and today's Belarus, Turkmenistan, Libya, and North Korea
all fit this rubric." 35
A weak state is, thus, a state that is foun e<ton weak_fo.undat!9~. 36 and though it
may be in the grip of failure at one time or the other, but may manage to escape, since
"endemic weakness" does not necessarily translate to failure. 37
When the internal working departments and structures within the "weak" states

----

continued to be assailed and weakened, and when internal warlords emerge to feed on the
carcasses, a failed state then emerges. According to Robert Rotberg,
"A failed state is a hollow polity that is no Ion er willing or able to perform the
fundamental tasks of anation-state
the modem world. Its msti1iitions are
fl£;ed. " 38 - - --

-m

A "Failed State," therefore, is one whose enduring character _is Qlat of violence,
and it is the direction of such violence against the existing government or regime, and the

---- ---

34

. See Rotberg NIC 2020, supra note 28, at 2.

35
• Ibid.

at 2-3.

36

· See See Robert I. Rotberg, The New Nature ofNation-State Failure, 25 Washington Quarterly 85, 90-93
(2002) (Hereinafter "Rotberg New Nature").
37_. Ib'd
r .
38

at 91.

· See Rotberg NIC 2020, supra note 28, at 3.
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vigorous character of the political or geographical demands for shared power or
autonomy that rationalize or justify that violence that identifies the failed state.

39

A failed state is unable to enforce its laws and regulations throughout a substantial
portion of its territory for a considerable period of time. Its legislative, executive, and
judicial organs have lost the confidence of the people and are inefficient and ineffective.
At all levels of its administration, corruption is endemic, and the nation is deeply in debt
and can never expect to climb out of its burden on its own. Its administrative agencies are
so inefficient and corrupt that they cannot absorb and utilize foreign aid effectively,
however voluminous the aid. In fact, the more voluminous the aid, the more it clogs up
the system and feeds and fattens corruption. The country has neither the hard
infrastructure, the managerial infrastructure, nor the legislative infrastructure required for
rapid development. Indiscipline at the workplace and low productivity are endemic. Law
and order rapidly break down and criminal elements are rampant. The polity is
characterized by endless bickering among factions whose primary goal is power, rather

than the welfare of its people. 40 The following represents the salient characteristics of
failed states:
(a) Failed States provide only very limited quantities of essential political goods; 41
(b) Failed states exhibit deteriorating or destroyed infrastructures;42

39

. See Rotberg New Nature, supra note 36, at 85-86.

40

• Stanley Jayaweera, The spectre haunting Sri Lanka -Are we a failed state'?, in AVADIn LANKA
ACI'IVIST-ISLAND
ON
SUNDAY,
dated
Sunday,
Jun
15,
2003,
available
at:
http://www.srilankamuslimcom/FAILED.HTM. last visited on February 2, 2004.
41

• See Rotberg NIC 2020, supra note 28, at 3. According to Rotberg, failed states forfeit their role as the
preferred national suppliers of political goods to upstart warlords and other nonstate actors and the
bureaucracy of the state has long ago lost its sense of professional responsibility, and helps to oppress
~tizens. Ibid.

· lb'd
z ·per Rotberg NIC 2020, at 3. The poor nations become more and more impoverished, and battered.

42
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(c) Failed states offer unparalleled economic opportunity for a privileged few, and
nothing much for everyone else;43 and
(d) Failed states are insecure, because, they cannot project power much beyond
the capital city, or control their national peripheries.44

!'

li·''
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In a failed state, there is always violence which then cascades into all-out internal

il

t

war, massive deterioration of standards of living, decay of ordinary life's infrastructure,
and greed by rulers which overwhelms their responsibilities to better their people and

r··

their surroundings.45 When a state fails completely, it becomes a collapsed state.

1·1

A "Collapsed State" has been defined as the end of the tunnel, at which stage the
incurable ?Ptimists and diehards, who had been hoping for a miracle, suddenly discover
that there is really no likelihood of redemption. All hope is now lost, everyone has to
scamper from the sinking ship for safety. The safest harbor for sub-state actors and

.,

terrorists such as Osama bin Laden and his band of d raved miJ!ds, to find shelter, is in a
collapsed
state, since it offers them the perfect cover to evade detection from peace_---.,
loving nations who are often the targets of his terroristic devices. According to Rotberg,
"a collapsed state is an extreme version of a failed state, in that it has a total
vacuum of authority. It is a mere geographical expression, a black hole into which
a failed polity has fallen. Dark energy exists, but the forces of entropy have
overwhelmed the radiance thatmtherto- provided some semblance of order and
other vital political goods to the inhabitants embraced by language affinities or
borders. " 46

44

• Ibid. at 4. Thus, Rotberg stated thus: "Crime rates rise. Unable to establish an atmosphere of security
throughout the nation, the faltering state's failure becomes obvious even before, or as, rebel groups and
other contenders arm themselves, threaten the residents of central cities, and overwhelm demoralized
government contingents, as in Liberia, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Congo, and Cote d'Ivoire."
45

· See Rotberg New Nature, supra note 36, at 85-86.

46

• Ibid.
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While, by definition, they are illegitimate and unrecognized, these sub-state actors
sometimes assume the trappings of a failed, collapsed, or a quasi-state, such as
Somaliland in northern Somalia, where the USC ruled. However, within the collapsed
state disorder, anomie behavior, and the kinds of anarchic mentality and entrepreneurial
pursuits--especially gun and drug running-that are compatible with networks of terror
47

become pronounced.

Therefore, it is the attractiveness of the weak, failed, and/or collapsed states to
terrorists and illegal occupiers that is the subject of this paper. Terrorists understand that
the gradual process that leads to the collapse of states is in their own interest. They
actively support the decline in states' function, as Osama bin Laden did, while supporting
the ineffectual Taleban enthronement. It is necessary to find solutions to the above
endemic problems, in order to end international terrorism. In doing this, this author will
examine the characteristics and symptoms ofUganda.

V.

Non-Violent Programs Aimed at Rebuilding Failed and/or Weak States.
The international community must pay attention to weak and failing states of the

world because such states pose strategic implications for world peace. Further, from a
cost-benefit analysis, it is much less expensive to prevent state failing and failure than it
is to provide post-conflict humanitarian relief and/or funds for post-conflict
reconstruction. 48 As experience has shown us in recent history, the United States-led
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq showed how costly intervention can be a much more

47

· See Rotberg New Nature, supra note 36, at 90.

4a

·See Rotberg NIC 2020, supra note 28, at 8-9.
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expensive process of societal rebuild.ing.49 Today, the Pentagon is spending more than
$5.8 billion a month on the war in Iraq, according to the military's top generals. 5°
Professor Rotberg has aptly submitted that the reasons for paying close attention
to the weak and/or failed states will remain relevant for years, if not decades.51 He goes
on to note thus:
"Unless the developing world becomes much more stable, intercommunal (ethnic,
linguistic, and religious) conflict is reduced or ceases altogether, corruption
vanishes, good governance becomes common, or the war against terror is won
conclusively, the propensity of nation-states to fail will be high and the policy
consequences of that failure will correspondingly be serious and many. Most of
all, every time a nation-state lurches toward or into failure, it poses humanitarian
and possible relief issues. It may also become a breeding ground for terror;
the more anarchic and anomie the nation-state, the more non-state actors
and the forces of terror can take opportunistic advantage of a deteriorating
internal security situation to mobilize adherents, train insurgents, gain
control of resources, launder funds, purchase arms, and ready themselves for
assault on world order."52 [author's emphasis]
One very crucial point that will quickly emerge is that state failure is a slow and

-

--

tedious decaying process, rather than a sudden one. As we saw earlier, the concept of
state failure in international law entails a situation where the apparatus and machineries
of government have broken down totally, and where the government of a state
take care of its citizens, maintain

s~curity

within its borders,

su~~the

c~t

p_rovision of

amenities to its citizens, or participate within the comity of nations. 53 In the words of
Professor Leopold Lovelace, Jnr.,54

49

• Ibid.

50

• See United Press International, Iraq War Topping $5.8 Billion A Month, November 18, 2004. Available
at: http://www.militarv.com/NewsContent/0.13319.FL cost I I I804,00.html?ESRC=eb.nl. Last visited on:
February 13, 2006.
51

. See Rotberg NIC 2020, supra note 28, at 1.
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"Failed or collapsed state concepts are attractive because they capture and \
synthesize the totality of a situation 'where the structure, authority (legitimate
power), law, and political order have fallen apart and must be reconstituted in
~
some J.Orm,
old or new ... ,,ss
1bis writer's position is that a duty must be imposed on the international
community of states and neighboring states to act to correct the anomalies in the
collapsing state. In fact, the international community must act to stop the rot. The danger

in leaving such failing states on their own has been aptly stated by George Lopez thus: 56
"Among other dynamics, failed states are characterized by a breakdown in the
capacity of the governing elite of the state and its agencies to execute domestic
and foreign policy, including the protection of individuals from harsh and
arbitrary violence. Under such breakdown, any number of practices and
occurrences which are at sharp variance with international law, from the inability
or unwillingness of leaders to control illicit trade of various goods, to choosing to
invade a neighboring country, to enga~g in mass extermination of a rival group,
might warrant international response." 7
Clearly, international action is needed because this internal breakdown of law and
.order affects not only the imploding state, but also cascades upon the surrounding
neighboring states. When a state collapses, the fragments, like splinters of glasses, scatter
and spread onto its close neighbors. 58 Finally, the imploding state cascades and crumbles

53
54

• See generally
•

Zartman, supra note 29.

Distinguished Professor of International Studies Program at the Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.

ss. See Leopold Lovelace Jr., Has International Law Failed Africa? a Paper prepared for the International
Studies Association Annual Convention, Chicago, Illinois, held between February 21-24, 2001.
.

56

• See George A. Lopez, Economic Sanctions and Failed States: Too Little, Too Late, and Sometimes Too
Much?. A paper prepared for the Purdue Conference on Failed States, AprilS- 11, 1999.

57
• Ibid.
58

• According to Joseph B. Frazier, in U.S. Tackles Failed State in Haiti, Associated Press, Posted on Mon,
Mar. 01, 2004. "For the second time in a year the United States is sending troops to a failed state, but the
differences between Haiti and Iraq are huge. Both have become political issues at home as U.S. elections
~.ar. But while many ask whether we should have gone into Iraq at all, many are asking why we didn't get
mto Haiti sooner. While Haiti has no oil, terrorists or advanced weapons programs, it does have one huge
strategic interest for the United States- location. Umest here can lead, fairly quickly, to an influx of boat
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down into oblivion leaving opportunist offsprings like terrorists and warlords to occupy

its previous abode. In this connection, failed states are also defined by the patterns of
governmental collapse within a nation which often bring demands because of the
refugees they foster, the human rights they abridge, and their inability to forestall
starVation and disease which threaten the security of their surrounding states and region. 59

Il .
I

Earlier on, in the previous decade, after a state has collapsed,
of nations usually responded with humanitarian and
pppulace~ trapped

~conomic

support for the local

H

in the weakened state, along with reconstruction of the state

government machineries. 60 Ironically, a decade after the emergence of the phenomenon,
the international community now has a renewed interest in these "no law zones" and
people on the shores of Florida; corruption here can swell the flow of drugs into the U.S. market." See:
http://www. timesleader.com/m.ld/charlotte/807 5623 .htm?template=contentModules/printstory.j sp.
59

• See generally MOHAMMED AYOOB, THE TillRD WORLD SECURITY PREDICAMENT: STATE
MAKING, REGIONAL CONFLICT, AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM (1995); BARRY BUZAN,
PEOPLE, STATES AND FEAR: AN AGENDA FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES IN THE
POST-COLD WAR ERA (2nd ed. 1991); Robert Dorff, Democratization and Failed State: the Challenge of
Ungovernability, in PARAMETERS 17-31 (1996); Joshua Bernard Forrest, State Inversion and Nonstate
Politics, in THE AFRICAN STATE AT A CRITICAL JUNCTURE, 45-56 (Leonardo A. Villalon, and
Phillip A. Huxtable, eds., 1998); Ted Robert Gurr, "The Failed States Project: A Report'', being a Paper
delivered at the Conference on Failed States and International Security Causes, Prospects, and
Consequences, Purdue University, West Lafayette, on February 25-27, 1998; Gerald B. Helman and Steven
Ratner, Saving Failed States, 89 Foreign Policy 1 (1992-93); John Herz, The Territorial State RevisitedReflections on the Future of the Nation-State, in THE NATION-STATE AND THE CRISIS OF WORLD
POLmCS, 226-252 (1976); Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorensen, WHOSE WORLD ORDER:
UNEVEN GLOBALIZATION AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR (1993); Kalevi, J. Holsti, THE
STATE, WAR. AND THE STATE OF WAR (1996); ROBERT H. JACKSON, QUASI-STATES:
SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND TillRD WORLD (1990); ROBERT
KEOHANE and JOSEPH NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD POLffiCS IN
TRANSmON (1977); John J. Maresca, 'Helsinki Accord,' 1975, in U.S.-SOVIET SECURITY
COOPERATION: ACHIEVEMENT, FAILURES, LESSON 106-122 (Alexander L. George, Philip J.
Farley and Alexander Dallin eds. 1988); HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS:
THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE (Alfred A. Knopf Rev. 5th ed. 1978); Janice E. Thomson,
State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Empirical Research,
39 International Studies Quarterly, 213-234 (1995); Leonardo A. Villalon, The African State at the End of
the Twentieth Century: Parameters of the Critical Juncture, in The African State at a Critical Juncture, 326 (Leonardo A. Villalon and Phillip A. Huxtable eds. 1998).
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• M.R. Hutchinson, Restoring Hope: U.N. Security Council Resolutions for Somalia and an Expanded
. Doctrine ofHumanitarian Intervention, 34 Harv. Int. L. J. 624 (1993); R. van Eijk, The United Nations and
the Reconstruction of Collapsed States in Africa, 9 A.J.I.C.L. 573 (1997).
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"terrorists' enclaves" long known to be centers of illegal activities, including
international terrorism. 61 Military invasion being advocated by the United States'
government of President George W. Bush

i~~ only solution.

This paper supports
1'.
II'

l·I
/.1

VI.

•

Changing Rules Regarding the Treatment of Weak and/or Failed States.

I

Clearly, after the events of September 11, 2001, the concept of failed states has
become a central focus of international law because individual failed states in different
parts of the world provide conducive and habitable hiding places for international ~.fo<.Jl-r
-

-·-------·

terrorists to reside, as bases for launching their evil missiles on the hapless law-abiding
citizenry.
As we saw earlier, the rising incidences of state failure is linked directly to the
end of the Cold War because, with the fall of the Iron Curtain, particularly in the central
and eastern states of Europe and in Africa, the fortune and political governance of most
states changed for the worse. 62 Without the support and money from the Cold War era,
the incompleteness of some states became very glaring. In Africa, the deficiencies in the
constitution of some states have become very glaring and apparent after the end of the
Cold War, since there was no incentive for either the western capitalistic nations or the
socialist bloc to continue to prop the weak African nations up. Thus, in Africa and other

t

developing countries of the world, the attending consequences following the end of the

I'

Cold War were catastrophic, and since the East and West no longer needed to maintain
61
•

See Koskenmaki, supra note 27, at 3.

S~~. at the European
• See Failed and Failing States, a speech given by Foreign Secretary,
Research Institute, University of Birmingham, (September 6;-2002)./ Available at:
http://www.eri.bham.ac.uk/jstraw.htm. Last visited on February 2, 2004. (Hereinafter "Jack Straw").
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extensive spheres of influence through financial and other forms of assistance to weak
states, hitherto existing bargain between the major powers and their client states
unraveled. Consequently, this had a particularly pronounced impact on Africa, where
manY regimes were over-reliant on their international sponsors. It also radicalo/. changed
the strategic balance in sensitive areas like the Middle East. 63
The states that were used to a steady flow of support found the taps turned off,
and this exposed internal weaknesses in many of their governments, bringing to the fore
their structural problems which often included legacies of the colonial era during which
borders were drawn with little regard for terrain, the availability of resources, and ethnic
or linguistic cohesion. 64 With the growing trend, whereby improperly constituted
governments and loosely assembled nations continued to crumble, Dr. Rotberg had
rightly opined that some handful of the world's 191 nation-states can be categorized as
failed, or collapsed, which is the end stage of failure. Several dozens more are weak and
serious candidates for failure. 65
This, again, brings the focus of this thesis into clear sight, these "handful" failed
and/or collapsed states are very strategic for world peace, because failed states are

hospitable to, and harbor, non-state actors-warlords and terrorists-therefore, a sound
and deep understanding of the dynamics of nation-state failure is central to the war
against terrorism. 66 In particular, with the events leading to the build-up and fighting of

63

./bid.

64

./bid.

65

66

·See Rotberg New Nature, supra note 36, at 85.

./bid.
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the First and Second Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003, respectively, in mind, and while
considering the alleged breach of international legal rules by the United States led
coalition forces, the question as to whether Iraq was a failed state has brought the subject

I .

I,•I~
II

of this thesis into fore again. Thus, much of the efforts in this book shall be directed at
preventing the world's weak states from collapsing, and ultimately preventing their
invasion and occupation by the United States. In the past, scholars have addressed state
failure primarily in the contexts of humanitarian intervention, state-building, and
(neo)colonialism focusing on the impact on the statehood and sovereignty of failed
states, as well as international human rights and humanitarian law concerns, with the
general debates concentrating on the future of the state and the erosion of sovereignty. 67
However, state failure gives rise to a series of additional legal

dilemmas~

especially of practical importance, which seem to be still largely unexplored. 68 These
unexplored legal, practical, and social effects of state failure within the context of
international law shall be the primary focus of this thesis.

Vll.

Conclusion
Most weak states, very clearly, are strong candidates for occupation by warlords

and terrorists. The best solution to the above quagmire would be to accept Rotberg's
admonition, that, in the fight against global terrorism, rather than continue to pummel
collapsed states into a state of total submission, it would be necessary to strengthen the

67
•
68

• See Koskenmaki,

supra note 27, at 3.

• Ib l'd •

77

weak states, before their collapse.

69

Helping the weak states prior to their failure or total

. a useful venture. 70
collapse 1s
In this chapter, we have tried to examine the concept of failed states, along with

other related concepts, such as ''weak states" and "collapsed states." From the above, the
major cause of state failure is inept and corrupt leadership. This problem of bad
leadership is particularly very common among most weak states. The central purpose: of
this thesis is: avoiding habitation of a weak and/or failed state by a terrorist, as well as
avoiding a foreign invasion by a superpower. After providing the above background
explanation, it is, therefore, imperative for all legal scholars, government officials, and
jurists, with the interest of world peace and security in their hearts to rise up and salvage
weak and/or failing states from the jaws of w ltures waiting for these states to fail. One
cann t but agree with British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw that:
''the comity of nations must rise over and above their individual and parochial \
differences and interests, and strive to identify, albeit VID uickl_y, those common
human attributes that define every man on the Jifanet as a member of the human
r~e industrialized and more politically stable western nations must come to
the aid of the weak African and Asian nations. To maintain an unconcerned and
detached attitude towards the weak states would be an invitation for opportunistic
terrorists to take over those weak states. It is clear that the stage in that process
would be unpalatable for all: a weak state's disintegration would definitely impact
on the lives of people man thousand..§ o !piles away in the.west~m nation~even
at the heart of the most powerful democracy in the world." 71
69

. See Rotberg New Nature, supra note 36, at 85.

70

• See generally, Chadwick F. Alger, "Peace building in the Post cold War Era," 1993 Tamkang
University, Tamkang Chair Lecture Series 102 (1993); Arjun Appadurai, Sovereignty Without
Territoriality: Notes for a Postnational Geography," in Tiffi GEOGRAPHY OF IDENTITY, 40-58
(Patricia Yaeger ed. 1996); LEROY BENNETT, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: PRINCIPLES
AND ISSUES (5TH ed. 1991); BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, 1995, (2nd
ed. 1995); JOHN BURTON, CONFUCf: RESOLUTION AND PREVENTION (1990); SAMUEL SHlliTAI CHEN, TIIE TIIEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1979); and
HAROLD GUETZK.OW, MULTIPLE LOYALTIES: TIIEORETICAL APPROACH TO A PROBLEM IN
JN'I'ERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1955).
71
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Clearly, it is in the best interest of the United States and other stronger western
nations to recognize the obvious tocsins of deterioration in weak nation-states so that it
.~,

can help avert the slide toward failure and the enormous costs and consequences of such

I

lu~~~ 'I··
'ir

I

I

a slide.
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For the next fifty years, failed states shall continue to be a problem for the

United States, their neighbors, the geographical regions, the United Nations, and
international humanitarian agencies, since there will be no end of cases and instances of
occurrences. Thus, this paper will look at the policy choices concerning where and when
to intervene, and how early to intervene.
At the conclusion of this paper, this author shall make a strong argument for
engaging the forces of world order, in an appropriate manner, towards strengthening
weak states and towards globall_y deterring those

-

~actors

that impel or motivate state

failure. This author shall argue for increasing the capacities and capabilities of the United
Nations, regional international bodies, and the United States-led Coalition of Forces to

r...
..

..•

(

judge and deal with impendin failure.
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CHAPTER FOUR
AFGHANISTAN: A FAILED STATE AND A HAVEN FOR TERRORISTS.

I.

Introduction
With the expansive discussion of the problematic Somali State in the previous

chapter, it is necessary to consider the textbook case of another failed state that existed
prior to Iraq-Afghanistan. While the seeds of Afghanistan's failure preceded the advent
of ai-Qaeda entry onto its territory, however, the immediate causes of Afghanistan's
failure can be most associated with the Talebans and Osama bin Laden-led al-Qaeda.
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York, Washington, D.C.,
and Pennsylvania, the whole world came to have full knowledge of the precarious
situation that faced Afghanistan and its people.
According to Carl Conetta, the events of September 11, 2001, also, clearly set out
the necessity of attending to the stability of Afghanistan-not because Osama bin Laden
and his cohorts resided in that country, nor even because top Taliban leaders permitted
them to do so, but due to historically documented volatility of the region. 1 Thus, while
both of the above facts were symptomatic of conditions that have made Afghanistan an
incubator of terrorism for more than twenty years, it must be made clear that the culprit
and causes of the Afghan state failure was no one individual, organization, or government
but, instead, a set of conditions, among which are: interminable civil war between the

I

· Carl Conetta, Dislocating Alcyoneus: How to combat al-Qaeda and the new terrorism, Project on
Briefing Memo #23, delivered on June 25, 2002. Available at:
ttp://~.comw.org/pdal0206dislocate.html. Last visited on July 6, 2006.
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Soviets and the Mujahedeens, a shattered civil society, and weak, non-responsive
governance.

2

Conetta had, further, surmised that outside (external) powers, including the
United States, contributed generously to these conditions over the years-thereby
grinding down Afghan society and seeking variously to subjugate the country, use it as a
springboard for their strategic ambitions, or exploit its internal divisions and conflicts. 3
Showing the inter-relationship between state failure and international terrorism,
Conetta, therefore, concluded thus:
"The case of Afghanistan shows how the new terrorist threat is related to several
other distinctive challenges of the post-cold war era: the rash of failed and fragile
states, the increase in communal conflict, and associated regional rivalries.
Fragile states should be considered major gaps in international society and, as
noted above, transnational terrorist (and criminal) organizations live and breed
in such gaps. The post-cold war demobilization of large numbers of military
personnel and insurgents is a related problem in regions where these fighters have
not been successfully re-integrated into civilian life and economy. Also related is
the broad availability of light weapons, which in many places has fed a
Kalashnikov culture. Together these challenges form a 'problem cluster' that has
significantly determined the character and magnitude of the new terrorism.'t4

I

Because al-Qaeda "lived and bred" within the Afghan "gap," this thesis will
submit that the October 2001 military action conducted in Afghanistan was justified
under international and humanitarian laws-to rebuild the country, to infuse hope and
confidence to the Afghans, and to assist Afghanistan escape failure. Achieving these
objectives required flushing out the camps and hordes of terrorists located therein. Thus,

2
• Ibid
3
• Ibid.

4
• Ibid
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Professor ~as eloquently stated the case for United Nations-backed
October 2001 military action against terrorists as follows:
"The collective measures undertaken by the United States, together with its
NATO and other Allies such as the United Kingdom and Australia, to launch an
all out attack against the terrorist groups and the Taliban Government that allowed
the Afghan territory to be used as training ground and facilities, but also refused
to surrender Osama bin Laden, the notorious leader of Al Qaeda in hiding in
Afghanistan after an ultimatum or mise en demeure was duly delivered to
5
Afghanistan."

,,

By the Fall of 2001, terrorists have held the people of Afghanistan in captivity for
tong and the Afghan state had failed. Thus, to free the Afghans and the rest of the world
from the claws of the terrorists, the United Nations authorized the United States and
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") to carry out a military
action in Afghanistan ("Operation Restore Hope.")
Drawing the world's attention to Afghanistan was Mr. Jack Straw, the British
foreign minister, when he made the following statement in the aftermath of the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks:
"And if the main challenge before the collapse of the Soviet empire and
throughout the 20th century consisted of states with too much power, the problem
of the 21st century may be states with too little power. After the murder of
thousands of people in the heart of Manhattan, no one can doubt that the primary
threat to our security is now posed by groups acting formally outside states, or
from places where no state functions. It used to be possible to ignore distant and
misgoverned parts of the world. That is no longer so. In the world without
borders, chaos is now our neighbor, whether it is in Africa, in Asia or in
Afghanistan. " 6

5

· See Sompong Sucharitkul, A Just World Under Law: A Just and Peaceful World Under the Rule of Law,
a Speech delivered at the 15th Annual Fulbright Symposium Lectures, held in San Francisco, on April 8,
2005.
6

. · See Failed and Failing States, a Speech delivered by Foreign Secretary Jack Straw at the European
Research Institute, University of Birmingham, on Friday 6 September 2002, available at:
hnp://www.eri.bham.ac.uk/jstraw.htm. (Hereinafter "Jack Straw").
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Afghanistan presents an opportunity to discuss the two inter-related contemporary
problems facing mankind: "international terrorism" and "failed state phenomenon." The
two concepts are now closely inter-related. They mutually co-exist. As we can remember,
the subject of this doctoral dissertation is, ultimately, to examine the viability of the
argument in support of unilateral use of force, exercise of individual and/or collective
self-defense rights, and the doctrine of pre-emptive strike and/or anticipatory rights

1

against failed states under international law. In particular, we have started by considering
the doctrine of failed states, and moved on to examine how states emerge and become
viable towards satisfying the legal prerequisites of international law. We have similarly
-ft-...
discussed how failed states pose enormous risk, not only to themselves, but to rest of the
1\

world, as well.
The present world order has recognized that modernity, easily accessible weapons
of mass destruction, and easily accessible technology have jointly facilitated the
exportation of terrorism across world borders, notwithstanding various security measures
that may have been put in place by the targeted countries.
Before

e delve into the circumstances surrounding Afghanistan, w

'J

~··

must

understand the character of the 'conflicts' involving the Taleban and Al Qaeda. There are

i

two separate armed conflicts: One, between the United States and its allies against the
Taleban, the de acto government of Afghanistan, which took place on the territory of

I

·l

I

Afghanistan. This is an international armed conflict. Two, between the United States and
its allies against al Qaeda, which is not confined to the territory of Afghanistan. Its status
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as "international" or "non-international" has not received widespread acceptance and, as

well, is not defined.

11.

7

Background to the United States-led October 2001 Invasion of Afghanistan.
In the fight against terrorism, three (3) states stand tall in the forefront of being

havens for terrorists and for exporting terrorists to other nations. These are Somalia,
Afghanistan8 and Iraq. 9 Because the United States had not commenced any military
action against Somalia that can be termed as an invasion, this work will not deal with
Somalia in detail.
In this chapter, we shall examme Afghanistan's descent into chaos, which

actually started as soon as it became a nation-state-right from the beginning of its
statehood. Credit must be given to the ordinary Afghan-the common man-who has
endured all natural, artificial, and self-imposed deprivations inflicted on him by the
environment, historical factors, religion, his neighbors, and his supposed rulers, and all

•. Afghanistan was the subject of a US-led invasion that commenced in October 2001. The goal was to
flush out Osama bin Laden and his AI Qaeda members, who were using the Afghan territory as bases for
striking other countries. Invariably, the Taleban government of Mullah Muhammad Omar, that failed to
hand over bin Laden, was overthrown as well. We shall see how the Talebans undermined the Afghan
political system to the lowest level, in this paper. We shall also see how incessant warfare and the inability
of a people to settle their political differences through non-violent means constituted impediment to
collective growth and state failure.
9

· Iraq, for much of its history in the 20th and 21 51 centuries, has been synonymous with its erstwhile
p~ount ruler-Saddam Hussein el-Tarikh. Hussein, his family, his kinsmen, and his political acolytes
mfl1cted lopsided economic, political, and social policies that caused the demise of a viable Iraqi nation.
!hey foisted unnecessary civil war and international wars on their people. They invaded Kuwait and caused
International sanctions to be imposed on the Iraqi people. They delved into the production of weapons of
?'ass-destruction, against international proscription. Finally, they failed to allow international inspectors to
~nspect the plants where those nuclear weapons were being manufactured. A detailed study of the Iraqi
·Imbroglio will be carried out in the next chapter of this Dissertation.
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who are obligated to provide better life for him. The ordinary Afghan would have
triumphed over all adversities, but for the last straw that broke the camel's back-the

--

1996 invitation, hospitality, and sanctuary extended to the enfant terrible-Osama bin
Laden and his al

aeda followers, by Mullah Muhammad Omar and the deposed Taleban

government of Afghanistan. This marked the end of the old Afghan State.
For instance, on September 12, 2001, immediately after the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks in New York, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania, the United Nations
Security Council, pursuant to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 10 passed and

)

adopted-unanimously-Security Council Resolution 1368, 11 which provides that the
~

United Nations, as a body:
1.
Unequivocally condemns, in the strongest terms, the horrifying terrorist
attacks on 11 September 2001 in New York, Washington D.C., and Pennsylvania,
and regards such acts, like any act of international terrorism, as a threat to
international peace and security ...
2.
Expresses its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to terrorist
attacks on 11 September 2001, and to combat all forms of terrorism, m
accordance with responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations. 12

I··;·

f>
,.!:

~I ..
I I
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The defunct Taleban government of Afghanistan failed to heed this warning.
Because Afghanistan had failed as a state, at this point in time, and because it was a
launch-pad for terrorists, the state became subject to the full brunt of United Nations

r Security Council Resolutions 1269 13 and 1373. 14 Under these two resolutions,
international law rules on terrorism had crystallized as thus:

10
• See

Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, June 26, 1945,
(entered into force Oct. 24, 1945). ("U.N. Charter").
11

• United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368 of September 12, 2001, U.N. Doc. S /RES/1368
(2001).
.,..__

t

12
• Ibid.
13

Tl

•

d

· umte Nations Security Council Resolution 1269 of October 19, 1999, U.N. Doc. S /RES/1269 (1999).
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a.
b.

c.
d.

e.

All States shall prevent and suppress the financing of terrorists;
All States shall take necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist
acts, including by provision of early warning to other States by exchange
of information, i.e., calling upon all States;
All States shall exchange information and cooperate on administrative and
judicial manner to prevent the commission of terrorist acts;
All States shall note, with concern, the close connection between
international terrorism and transnational-organized crime, illicit drugs,
money laundering, illegal arms trafficking, etc; and
All States shall declare that acts, methods, and practices of terrorism are
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 15

From the above, the October 2001 military action by United States and its NATO
allies were carried out, strictly, to combat international terrorism and the lawlessness that

··1

I •

,,.I

usually exists in failed states, from taking root in Afghanistan and, as well, curtailing its

r''

spread to other countries. It is, therefore, clear that the United States-led military action
was proper, legal, and consistent within the parameters of the prevailing rules of
international law. Osama

bi~ Laden and Afghanistan defied the world and violated rules

I!'

i]·

5;

•l
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il'i 1

of customary and legislative international law, by sponsoring international terrorism and
by flouting international law rules, as stated in United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 1269, 1368 and 1373.
I

I
ill.

The Growth of al-Qaeda and Its Entry Into Afghanistan.

Curiously, one person and the terrorist group that he created-have become
synonymous with Afghanistan's ultimate failure as a state. Osama bin Laden and al
Qaeda. Ironically, Osama bin Laden is not from Afghanistan. He is from Saudi Arabia

14

· United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 of September 28, 2001, U.N. Doc. S /RES/1373
(2001).
--15

· see Sompong Sucharitkul, supra note 5.
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(with ancestral origin from Yemen), a nation that has been noted to supply two (2) main
products into the world-petroleum oil and religious fanaticism. In fact, almost seventeen
members of the twenty-man group that carried out the dastardly September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks in the United _States, have been identified as_Saudi Arabia nati_o_nals.
Backing up to Saudi Arabia's political and social life, it would be clear that the
root causes of growing political discontent in Saudi Arabia can be traced to th

ackluster

I!.
I

I~

1:

attitude of the Saudi Rulin .

o al House and towards embracing democracy and

liberalism. A more volatile cause of Saudi youths' susceptibility to violent religious
I'

doctrines can be ascribed to improper religious doctrines, based on the radical
Wahabbism faction of the Islamic religion that is very endemic in lUyadh, Me.cctl,

---

Medina, and other Saudi cities.
Perhaps if the Saudi political system had been founded on democracy, this would

have been different, however, the Saudi government has been noted to resist economic
and political modernization over the years. Thus, most young men have taken comfort in
radical religious and political doctrines, with the promise of salvation through violent
struggle with the western nations and western values. With vast oil revenues at its
disposal, the ruling Fahd family has been known to have closed all doors that would have
led to changing the present political set-up.
AI Qaeda, on the other hand, is a growing terrorist group founded, principally, on
Islam and its assumed opposition to western/American culture. Because the most
powerful and most influential nation in the west is the United States of America, terrorist
strikes by al Qaeda, have always targeted the United States-being the most noticeable
symbol of western culture and its principal allies.
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Al Qaeda actually started in the 1990s, as a series of disparate groups in Algeria,
Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, comprising of disgruntled elements seeking to topple their
respective governments. In fact, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's second-in-command
originally came from Egypt, and was involved in the 1979 assassination of the former
Egyptian President-Anwar Sadat. 16 With the futility of fighting against their home
governments, the al Qeada-backed rebels decided to turn their attention against the power
behind the thrones and the upholder of order in the Middle East-the United States of
America.
Al Qaeda moved around and., finally settled in Afghanistan. Afghanistan had the
misfortune of being under a 4e facto Taleban government that allowed the Afghan
territory to serve as a launching base for such violent political uprisings. 17
Osama bin Laden's entry into Afghanistan's political climate first came into being
with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Osama bin Laden joined
other Islamic Jihadists to fights as Mujahedeens against the Soviets on the platform of
··------ --Islamic revolution. 18

..,______.._...

The bin Laden network arose from brigades of Islamic volunteers who traveled to
Afghanistan to fight Soviet occupation during the ~s

19

It served initially to channel

people and resources into that struggle and to support forei@ veterans of the civil war
---------- · - - - -.
16

• Hamied N. Ansari, The Islamic Militants in Egyptian Politics, 16 International Journal of Middle East
Studies 123-144 (1984); Raymond William Baker Sadat and after: Struggles for Egypt's Political Soul
(1 990); Muhammad Said Ashmawi and Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, Against Islamic Extremism: The Writings
ofMuhammad Said Al-'Ashmawy (1998).

17

· See Barnett R. Rubin, Persistent Crisis Challenges the UN System, UNHCR Writenet, August 1998,
http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/country/writenet/wriafg03.htm. ("Rubin Persistent Crisis").
18

:The story ofthe December 1979 Soviet invasion, the rise ofthe Mujahedeens and the 1989 Soviet
Withdrawal will be narrated later in this chapter.
19

· See Carl Conetta, supra note 1.
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and their families. 20 By various estimates between 35,000 and 50,000 foreign Islamic
volunteers have fought in Afghanistan, although most of these have been Pakistanis.
Between 10,000 and 15,000 of these volunteers came from the Arab world and many of
these "Arab Afghans" moved through the channels that Osama bin Laden came to
21

manage and contro1.

At the start of the recent Afghan war, approximately 2,000-3,000 volunteers were
under al-Qaeda control inside Afghanistan, although perhaps only 25 percent of these
were formal cadre of al-Qaeda, having taken an oath or bayat to bin Laden.22 Outside of
Afghanistan, formal members certainly number less than a thousand, but they try to
recruit among the much more numerous veterans of the Afghan wars.23 Through an
umbrella formation, the Islamic World Front, al-Qaeda..___
is also
with Egypt's Jihad
__linked
_
Group and Islamic Group, Pakistan's Al-Ansar Movement, the Jihad Movement of
oup in the

'

Philippines. Al Qaeda is estimated to have affiliations or operational cells in more than

il

---

-:___

i·

40 countries. 24

20

21
22
23

.lbid.
• Anthony

t

Davis, Foreign fighters step up activity in Afghan civil war, Jane's Intelligence Review (200 I).

. See Carl Conetta, supra note I .
. lbid.

24

· Kenneth Katzman, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, CRS Report for Congress of
September IO, 200I ; Rohan Gunaratna, Blowback: a special report on AI Qaeda, JIR (August 200I); AI
Qa'ida (The Base), Federation of American Scientists, Intelligence Resource Program, March 200I; Judith
Miller, Holy Warriors: Dissecting a Terror Plot From Boston to Amman, New York Times, January IS,
200I; Miller, Holy Warriors: Killing for the Glory ofGod, in a Land Far from Home, New York Times
January I6, 200I; and, Stephen Engelberg, Holy Warriors: One Man and a Global Web of Violence, New
York Times January I4, 200 l.
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Ironically, the United States of America, that is presently hunting Osama bin
Laden and his Taleban collaborators, created the conducive atmosphere for the growth of
the reactionary Islamic irredentists. The United States, allegedly, poured over $3billion
into the Afghanistan/Mujahedeen resistance during the 1980s, by providing weapons and
other resources for Osama bin Laden and thousands of others who later became his loyal
and fierce supporters.

'

~.
II

However, with the advent of glasnost and perestroika in the old Soviet empire, in

I
I·..·,

1989, the Soviets withdrew their forces that were then occupying Afghanistan. And it
was at the end of the Afghanistan campaign that Osama bin Laden, already highly
radicalized, formed the now dreaded al Qaeda, i.e., "the Base," an organization of exMujahedeens and other supporters by channeling fighters and funds to the Afghan
resistance.
Al-Qaeda has been said to be a transnational umbrella group that has evolved
from a loose association of Islamic militants who had flocked to Afghanistan during the
1980s to join the jihad (holy war) against the Soviet occupation.2 5 Following the Soviet
..., / withdrawal in 1989, many of these estimated 2_5,000 "Arab Afghans" 26 returned home,

I.

where they fostered radical Islamic movements in many ~uslim countri_es? According

Ii

7

to U.S. intelligence reports, bin Laden, at the end of the Afghan war, sent Islamic

I

'.

~. See James Phillips, "Defusing Terrorism at Ground Zero: Why a New U.S. Policy Is Needed for
Afghanistan," Heritage Foundation BackgrounderNo. 1383, July 12,2000. [Hereinafter "Phillips 1"].
26

• "Arab Afghans" were those Jihadists from neighboring Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Morocco,
Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Algeria, Bahrain, etc, who came to the aid of Afghanistan to fight in the "Jihad"
against the Soviets, staring from 1979.

27

·At the conclusion of the Afghan campaign, these fighters returned to their native countries to start
revolutions there.
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extremists to many Islamic states to organize an armed militia, establish schools and
•

clinics, and prepare to setze power.

28

The Afghan campaign also effected an idealistic and political far-reaching change
on Qsama bin Laden. He was noted to have remarked thus:
lt

"in this jihad, the biggest benefit was the myth of the superpower destroyed, not
only in mind, but in the minds of all Muslims. " 29

~~~
I

Osama bin Laden came back to Afghanistan in 1991, and was able to use the
Afghan rugged terrain with its highly radicalized populace, its terror inspiring ruling class
(Talebans), the battle/war-hardened elites and populace, its limitless mountains, peaks,
valleys, caves, and other hiding places to the greatest advantage of the al-Qaeda group.
For a while, Osama bin Laden departed Afghanistan and went back to Saudi
Arabia (his home nation) and then to Sudan in 1991. He was stripped of his Saudi
I

citizenship after he had instigated strikes against Saudi territory. The Saudis then

r\',1
·I

pressured the Sudanese government to expel him. From there, bin Laden went to
Afghanistan.
Earlier on, in September 1990, Saddam Hussein of Iraq invaded the oil rich, but
tiny, Kuwait. The United States of America led a February 1991 coalition of nations to

--

flush out Saddam from Kuwait (the

1st

Gulf War). To fight the Iraqi army of occupation

sent to Kuwait by Saddam Hussein, various military bases were sited on the territory of
~audi Arabia. While in Sudan, Osama bin Laden, in 1996, issued a fatwah-a religious

--

28

· See James A. Phillips, Somalia and ai-Qaeda: Implications for the War on Terrorism, The Heritage
Backgrounder: Executive Summary, Backgrounder #1526, of April 5, 2002. Available at:
http://www.heritage.org/Research!HomelandDefense/BG 1526.cfm. Last visited on June 12, 2006.
[Hereinafter "Phillips II"].

29

:See Nancy Peckenham, Osama Bin Laden: The Myth, The Reality, The Mission, and Method ofOsama
Bm Laden, available at: www .cnn.com/CNN/Programs/people/showslbinladen/ rofile.html.
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ruling directing all Muslims to kill all United States troops on Saudi soil. This was the
second assault launched by Osama against another superpower-after the Soviets. Osama
bin Laden declared thus:
"The US government has committed acts that are extremely unjust, hideous and
criminal ... We believe the United States is directly responsible for those killed in
Palestine, Lebanon, and Iraq."30
Further, bin Laden had also instructed that: "We have to cut off the head of the
snake," while referring to the United States of America. 31 Thus began bin Laden's
encounters with the United States. Without much ado, this anti-American stance is
misplaced, unjustified, and unjustifiable. In 1998, upon his arrival in Afghanistan from
Sudan, bin Laden issued a second fatwah-this one calling for the killing of innocent
United States civilians.
~.

'

Pursuant to this, from 1998 until the present, batches upon batches of Arab
warriors trained in Afghanistan to carry out terrorist strikes on various properties,
embassies,
and personnel of the United States. They started with the attempted and actual
.__.-----...
bombings of United States targets in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa.

-----

Al-Qaeda's first known terrorist attack against the Western World was the
-

December 1992 bo!!_l_!:>ing of a hotel in Aden,_Y._emen, used by American soldiers en route
to Somalia to participate in the relief operations. However, the soldiers left before the

- --

bomb exploded, killing two tourists. 32
- - ----.

30
• Ibid.
31
:

Mark Fineman and Stephen Braun, Life Inside a/ Qaeda: A Destructive Devotion, The Los Angeles
Tunes, September 24, 200 I.

31

·Vernon Loeb, A Global Pan-Islamic Network, The Washington Post, April23, 1998, at p. A24.

92

II' '

AI Qaeda, then, graduated into the August 7, 1998 bombings of the United States
embassies in Dar-es-Salaam, Tw:,g;ania. and

N~robi.

Kenya. whe.re..-o.ver two hundred

people were murdered. It was after this dastardly act that the United States carried out its
ftrst self-defense attack on Afghan soil. On August 20, 1998, cruise missiles were rained
on suspected terrorist camps and on a nefarious pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum,
Sudan.
On September 11, 200 1, Osama bin Laden's lieutenants struck in the heart of
America-in New York, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania. They struck at the twin
towers of the World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon (Military Headquarters)
I•

passenger~.

and also attempted at a fourth target, but for the heroic acts of the flight

The

loss of lives was put at over 3,000. This marked the beginning of US-led invasion of

~:
\·'
(.'
1'
I

~1

I

Afghanistan, starting from October 2001.
In this chapter, we shall examine how Afghanistan descended so low as to have
- - - - - - -----,.
~

been used as a breeding ground for destabilization, for terrorism

ex~ortation,

.

for

-~

shielding gangsters and irrep! essible fanatics fro~ justic~, _and for fo sting .a rei~ar,
depravity, and uncontrollable penchant for bloodlettin on the whole world. How did the
Afghan state fall under the rule of the Talebans? With the attending October 2001 United
States-led military action in Afghanistan, the question is whether there are chances that
the Mghan nation would not fail again-in the future? In answering the questions, it
would be very necessary to carry out a historical examination of the evolution of the
Afghan state, within the context of its peculiar geographical, social, and cultural settings.
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JV. Political and Social Background Facts to the Afghanistan's Failure as a State.

The history of Afghanistan is one founded on warfare and foreign invasions, from
the Moguls, the Safavids, the Indian Mughals, the Arabs, Soviets, Taleban rebels from
pakistan, and lately the United States-led (and NATO/United Nations-backed) October
2001 military action.

33

According to Adam Ritscher, 34 in his work entitled "A Brief History of
Afghanistan,"
"[T]he story of Afghanistan is in so many ways a very tragic one, .principally,
because the nation is one of the most impoverished nations of the world, one of
the most war-torn, most ravaged, and most beleaguered of nations. The tragedy of
Afghanistan stems from the fact that it has been beset by invasion, external \
pressure and internal upheaval since before the time of Alexander the Great, and
its people have endured more than most historians can ever imagine because all
that has changed in the last one thousand years are the weapons which have been
. t so many ofth em. " 35
use d agams
/; 1'9- AtiLt
In Afghanistan, the Pashtuns comprise the largest ethnic group (50%) and have

r

(''
I

,!.('1

I

i2h J/?j I·~·.
I

dominated the government for centuries. Other major ethnic groups in Afghanistan
include Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks. 36 Because Afghanistan is the link between Central
Asia, the Middle East, and the Indian sub-continent, and as well due to innumerable
invasions and migrations, it is also made up of other nationalities, such as Baluch, Chahar

Aimak, Turkmen, Nuristani, Arab, Kirghiz, Pashai, and Persian. 37
33

• See generally, AHMED RASHID, TALIBAN: MILITANT ISLAM, OIL AND FUNDAMENTALISM
IN CENTRAL ASIA (2000); OLIVIER ROY, AFGHANISTAN: FROM HOLY WAR TO CIVIL WAR
(1 995); WILLIAM MALEY, FUNDAMENTALISM REBORN: AFGHANISTAN AND THE TALIBAN
(William Maley, ed., 1988).
34

·
See
Adam
Ritscher,
A
Brief
History
of
Afghanistan,
htto://afghangovernment.comlbriefhistozy.htm. [Hereinafter "Ritscher"].

available

at:

3

' ./bid.

36

· For more on Afghanistan's ethnic groups, see Human Rights Watch backgrounder, Armed Conflict
Poses Risk of Further Ethnic Violence.
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The entire populace is almost Islamic, due to prolonged Arab rule that occurred in
the gth and 9th centuries. The earliest invaders were the Arabs. After them arrived the
Mongolians, who overran the entire Asian inland in the 13th century. The Mongolians
ruled the Afghan territory until the 1500s.
At the departure of the Monguls, Afghanistan historical tragedy crystallized. The
nation became a battleground between two great powers in the 1500s. From the west
came the Safavids from Iran-who pillaged and overran the entire nation from present
day Persian region. From the east, came the Mughals of Northern India. Each of these
annies reduced the Afghan territory into a battleground-the mountains, caves, and
valleys of Afghanistan became battlegrounds to be vanquished by the incoming invaders.
Those persons, buildings, farms, structures, livestock, etc, that may have been spared by
the Mughals in retreat, were, in tum, ravaged by the Safavids pursuing the Mughals. And
when the Mughals had the upper hand, they also destroyed the people, animals, and/or
things that the Safavids may have left intact or alive.
This situation continued until 1747, when the Safavid Nadir Shah died in Iran.
Quickly, his former Afghan bodyguard-Ahmed Shah-a Pashtun seized the throne, and
thus creating a dynasty of the Shahs for more than two centuries. According to Ritscher:
"Ahmad was able to unify the different Afghan tribes, and went on to conquer
considerable parts of what are today eastern Iran, Pakistan, northern India and
Uzbekistan. His successors though proved unable to hold his vast empire together,
and within 50 years much of it had been seized by rival regional powers. Within
the country there were numerous bloody civil wars for the throne, and for many
Afghanis it meant little that their lives were now being uprooted and destroyed by
ethnic kin, as opposed to foreign invaders. " 38

17

31

· see Ritscher, supra note 34.
• Ibid.
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In the later part of the 19th century, the European countries embarked on a
conquest of the globe. Germany, Great Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, and the
Dutch, raced one other to capture territorial gains in the Americas, Asia, Africa, and the
New World of the Pacific.
The British captured and annexed present day Pakistan and India, and so they
sought to keep what they had captured. This brought the British into confrontation with
the Czarist Russians. The British were expanding and consolidating their colonial
holdings on the India sub-continent, and intended to use the Hindu Kush mountains of
Afghanistan as a natural barrier to prevent invasion by the Russians.
The Russians, also, were expanding south and east, swallowing up several
formerly independent sultanates and emirates in Central Asia. Thus, the two great powers
essentially engaged in a race for Afghanistan, and their fiendish seizures of land,

i

1:

'

overthrow of indigenous nations, and reckless interference into the affairs of the

"I

I",

remaining independent states in the region became known as "the Great Game. "39

'

It appears that the British annexed Afghanistan first. On two occasions, Britain

!:;

installed two puppet governments in Afghanistan and these acts led to two Anglo-Afghan

1
I

t'

1

I

wars of 1838 and 1878.
In 1838, the Russians had sent an envoy to Kabul, a move that the British saw as a
threat to their economic interests in Afghanistan. Thus, Britain demanded that Dost

1

----

Mohammad, the Afghan king, ensure that the Russian envoy leave Afghanistan, that
Afghanistan had no other contacts with either Iran or Russia, and also hand over a large
tract of Pashtun land. King Mohammad agreed. The British, notwithstanding the
.;
39
•

I

Ibid.
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agreement, invaded Afghanistan. In a deft political move, the British enforced a
regimental and excruciating rule all over Afi anistan. Within a short time, the Afghans
revolted and massacred the entire fifteen thousand British army stationed in the country.
Again, in ~sh became infuriated over the arrival of the Russian
diplomatic envoy in Kabul. The British invaded and captured all Afghan cities. A mutiny
by the Afghans was scuttled b the B itish this time. As a result, Afghanistan was under

the British rule until the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917.
Because of the popularity of the successes achieved by the Russian proletariat in
1917, most central Asian states followed suit. The people of Afghanistan led by
Amanullah and with the support of Lenin and Russia fought against their British
overlords. The rebellions forced the British to leave in 1919. Afghanistan became
independent.
The victory was short-lived. Internal civil war broke out, and Amanullah was
overthrown, and succeeded by Muhammad _Zahir~ah-Afghan '~_!_~t King. He
introduced a very autocratic rule-similar, only, to the British rule. Afghanistan became a
monarchy under Muhammad Zahir Shah who had come to J2_o_werin

1 23 ~ After

World

War II, both the United States and Soviet Union courted Zahir Shah by using economic
assistance to compete for influence. After the United States established military ties with
the Soviet Union for s__upp..Qrt.
The king was overthrown in 1973 b

Daoud Khan_ with the help of an

underground party named the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan ("PDP A"}-a

I

[

pro-Moscow communist party. Perhaps the present day history of Afghanistan would
have been different, but for the fact that in staging t~ 1973 coup, Daoud had allied

97

l.

himself with the Parcham faction of the PDPA, the Moscow Marxist-Leninist party that
had been formed in 1965. That the PDPA had aided and collaborated with Daoud in
exchange for government posts was not in doubt.
Earlier on, in 1967, the PDP A had split into two factions-the Parcham and the
J{halq. The Parcham ("flag") group drew its support from urban, educated Pashtuns,
along with other ethnic groups, while the Khalq ("masses") faction had the support of
educated rural Afghans, also predominantly Pashtun.

I
j;

I

:~

I
i

Once he had consolidated power and after gaining power, Daoud Khan felt that he
no longer needed his PDPA controversial allies, he ditched them, and ordered a crack
down upon the PDPA party. Daoud also tried to marginalize the Parchamis and distance
his government from the Soviet Union. This was a poor judgment.

f'

.. /

Daoud Khan's political miscalculation precipitated Afghan's present catastrophic

1:
position-it made the Soviets to come to Kabul, led to the rise of the Mujahedeens and

•

the first arrival of Osama bin Laden into Afghanistan and also led, albeit indirectly, to the

('.. '

emergence of the malevolent Talebans. Thus, in 1978, the PDPA seized power from

'.

Daoud in a military coup, and after seizing power, PDPA began a series of limited
reforms, by declaring a secular state, and that women were deserving of equal treatment
of men. They also sought to curtail the practice of purchasing brides, and tried to

l,

'·

1.:

1I,..
I•
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1,:
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implement a land reform program. Obviously, the Leni~st-Socialist PDPA was oblivious
of the Afghan Muslim heritage. A fierce opposition developed from the deeply religious

,,
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population, though. PDPA responded with heavy-handedness, aggravating the situation,
leading to various open armed rebellion against the PDPA government.

v.

40

The Soviet Invasion and its Aftermath.
When the PDPA became estranged from Daoud Khan's government, they

restructured. The two factions of the PDPA-the parcham and the Khalg-reunited in
1977 and launched a coup on April 27, 1978, killing Dao\.!P and seizing power. The new
I

PDPA government, under Khalq leadershi

embarked on a campaign of social life and

radical land reform accompanied by mass repression in the countryside that resulted in
the arrest and summary execution of many Afghans. PDPA sought to introduce
egalitarian socialist ways of life into A£ hanistan.

~1
PDPA targeted political figures, religious leaders, teachers, students, and other

~r

'

I

professionals, including Islamist organizations, and members of ethnic minorities,
I~

particularly the Hazaras, a Shi'a minority that has long been subject to discrimination by
Afghanistan's ruling elite. PDP A government's repressive measures, particularly its
!_. .

attempt to reform rural society through terror, provoked uprisings throughout the country.

J'

At the same time, the Parcham and the Khalq became divided again. The party's
long history of factionalism came to a bloody head, as the more radical wing of the party

i·

sought to wipe out the more moderate leaning wing. For instance, about 12,000 people

I·

40

· See OLIVIER ROY, ISLAM AND RESISTANCE IN AFGHANISTAN (1986); See also, BARNETT R.
RUBIN, THE FRAGMENTATION OF AFGHANISTAN: STATE FORMATION AND COLLAPSE IN
THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM (1992).
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were executed in Pul-i Charkhi prison in Kabul during this period, and as many as

1oo,000 may have been killed in the countryside.

41

All these events paved the way for the Soviets to militarily enter Afghanistan in
1979-sixty (60) years after Afghanistan had become an independent country from the
British rule.
Alarmed by the deteriorating situation, especially the collapse of the army and the
prospect that a disintegrating Afghanistan would threaten its security on its southern
border, the Soviet Union airlifted thousands of troops into Kabul on December 24,
42

1979.

The Soviets introduced Stalinist policies and strategies. For instance, the Khalq
president, Hafizullah Amin, was assassinated after Soviet intelligence forces took control
of the government and installed Babrak Karm~l,_a Earchami,_ ~ president.
The Soviet occupation force of some 115,000 troops and the Karmal government
sought to crush the uprisings with mass arrests, torture, and executions of dissidents, and
aerial bombardments and executions in the countryside. Over one million Afghans died
during this period, most in aerial bombardments. These measures further expanded the
resistance to the communist government in Kabul and fueled a flow of refugees out of the
country that soon reached five million out of a population of about sixteen million.
It was during this repressive Moscow-backed government that the Mujahedeens
emerged. Several Islamic fundamentalist groups sprang up and began waging guerilla
warfare, many of them operating from camps set up by the American Central Intelligence
41

· /bid. Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, at 95-97.
42

· BARNETT RUBIN, THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN AFGHANISTAN: FROM BUFFER STATE TO
FAILED STATE 29 (1995).
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Agency ("CIA") and Pakistani Intelligence within Pakistan, from which they could strike
into Afghanistan, and then beat a hasty retreat into Pakistan.
At the same time, a major event took place in the Middle East in 1979, the Shah
of Iran-Reza Pahlavi, was overthrown by the popular uprising. He was the American

~ I

staunchest ally in the Middle East, outside Israel. Immediately after this event, and
because of the intensity of the Cold War, the United States, needing to replace Iran with
Afghanistan, concentrated extensive military and economic resources to the Afghanistan
debacle. The United States began providing military training to the Mujahedeen, and
provided finances amounting to billions of dollars worth of weapons, including
sophisticated anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles that allowed the guerillas to take out

i

'I

(t

·I -...

modem Soviet tanks and jet planes.

·:

The CIA kept increasing and updating the Mujahedeen's supply of weaponry,
Saudi Arabia and Persian Gulf Emirates also contributed billions of dollars to the

;

't

!:.

I

ol,
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Mujahedeen's coffers, and thousands of Arabs responded to the Mujahedeen's call for

'•'

s

-r
..:

-.
.
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jihad (holy war), against the secular Soviets-including the wealthy Saudi citizen, Osama

. .,
t

bin Laden-who quickly became one of CIA's most important operatives in its proxy war

,I

i

!

i

against communism.
Millions of Afghans perished. The Soviets suffered untold casualties. They were
able to occupy and hold all of the major cities, but they were unable to subjugate the
countryside.
Then came Mikhail Gorbachev and his twin theories of Glasnost and Perestroika,
m 1989. The old Union of Soviet Social Republics (US_SR) crumbled. The eastern

I.

European and Baltic states obtained their independence. The Soviets began to withdraw
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from Afghanistan. By the end of 1989, most Soviet troops had left the Afghan territory,
leaving the PDP A government to itself.

II

It

The Mujahedeens battled the PDPA into submission.
Immediately, after the PDPA left power, ironically, the Mujahedeens broke into
tights between themselves-because their common enemy had been defeated, the
hitherto glossed over ethnic and regional divides among the various Mujahedeens became

,, I

jI

~.

I,
,I
I

very obvious. Various warlords emerged among the Mujahedeens.
There was Burhanuddin Rabbani, who, as a warlord, ruled over Kabul city from
1992, until his ouster in 1996.43 It was said that during his reign, over 60,000 people were
murdered and thousands of women were raped. 44
There was, also, Rashid Dostum, who was in control of the city of Mazar-E-

n

Sharif, from 1992, until his ouster in 1997. The warlord, Ismail Khan, ruled the city of

c

r

These warlords were answerable only to themselves. They traded in opium and
other hard drugs, causing extensive damage and destruction to the country and the
people. 45

I,

It was in the context of this lawlessness and continuous fighting that the Talebans

emerged. 46

43

• Amin Saikal, The Rabbani Government, 1992-1996, in William Maley, ed., Fundamentalism Reborn?
Afghanistan and the Taliban, supra note 14, at 33.

44

• See

Rubin, The Fragmentation ofAfghanistan, supra note 42, at 272-73.

·

In.
Its annual human rights report for 1994, the U.S. State Department estimated that some 2,650 people,

~.

William Maley, "Interpreting the Taliban," in Maley, ed., Fundamentalism Reborn?, supra note 33, at

45

mo~ of them civilians, were killed or injured in the fighting in the last two weeks of September 1994 alone.
Umted States Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 1994 (1995), at 1203.

15.
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Heart from 1992 to 1995, and warlord, Yunis Khalis, ruled Jalabad from 1992 to 1996.

~

r...
i.

VI.

The Emergence of the Tale bans and Influx of Al-Qaeda Into Afghanistan.
The Talebans' primary goal was to unite the then divided and war-plagued

Afghanistan nation under a strict and unyielding version of Islam-to create the foremost
theocratic state in the Asian peninsula. At the end of the Soviet-Afghan war, the
Mujahedeens, who had united to fight against the Soviets, became disillusioned-they
now recognized their different ethnicities-Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Tajiks, etc. They were also
divided along their regionallines. 47
Towards the end of the Soviet-Afghanistan war at the latter part of the 1980s, a
radicalized type of Islamic religion, with a strong leaning towards the Wahhabism sect,
originally developed, along the eastern Pakistani border of Afghanistan. The earliest
members of the Taleban movement came from the poverty-stricken refugee campswho, out of nothing else to do, attended the Islamic schools (called "Madrasses") and
48

r
I I
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imbibed the Sharia laced-fervent, fierce and fundamental Wahhabism doctrines.

By September 1994, Mullah Muhammad Omar had emerged as the leader of the
Talebans, and he created a special militia group at the Kandahar province. It was Omar,
who, in the wake of Soviet withdrawal, started the Taleban towards overcoming
Afghanistan's descent into warlordism and lawlessness.
In November 1994, the Pakistani government, anxious to conduct inland business

with European countries and Turkey, engaged the Talebans to assist to uide and secure

47

· See Ahmed Rashid, supra note 33, at 90-91.

48

·_Anthony Davis, How the Taliban Became a Military Force, in Maley, ed., Fundamentalism Reborn?.
supra note 21, at. 43; and Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, supra note 33, at 24-25.
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the goods through hostile territories. Surprisingly, the Talebans won victories over all the
local warlords that they encountered on the way.

49

These victories attracted more followers-who were more attracted to the
Talebans' strict, regimental, religious, and disciplined life over that of the widely

I

.\'·

dispersed Afghan government. On September 11, 1994, the Talebans won their very first
victory-they annexed the eastern city of Jalalbad. They then proceeded to conquer
Kabul on September 27, 1996.

50

I!

Omar declared himself the Amir-ul-Momineen or "Head of the Muslims." With
r-95% of Afghanistan under the Taleban control, they set to transform the country into the
purest Islamic state in the world under the~"Minis

of Vices."

Despite the wide acceptance offered to the Taleban government, its rulership of
Afghanistan for seven years was disastrous. 51 While ordinary Afghans disagreed with

I I

i

~

Taleban hardline interpretation of Islam, others were willing to endure the Taleban's
excesses in exchange for the relative peace that Talebans brought into Afghanistan.
In building a "perfect" Islamic state, Talebans showed little regard for the
concerns of the outside world. Public executions and am utations were commonplace.
----~

Talebans' treatment of women attracted international condemnation.

49

• Among the passengers on the convoy were two Pakistani intelligence officers. Davis, "How the
Taliban ... ," supra note 21, at 47-48; Barnett R. Rubin, "The Political Economy of War and Peace in
Afghanistan," 28 World Development, 1794 (2000); and Rubin, The Searchfor Peace... , supra note 42, at
138-39.

so· "New Rocket Attack on Afghan Capital," BBC News Online,
http://news.bbc.co.uklhi/englishlworld/south_ asia/newsid_177000/177253 .stm.

September

22,

1998,

Sl

·See Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan: The Massacre in Mazar-i Sharif, 10 Human Rights Watch Short
Rep·ort, 6 (November 1998); See also Maley, Interpreting the Taliban, supra note 46, at 11-12.
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In early 2001, the Talebans destroyed two (2) ancient

statu~_dd4a

carved

~

into cliffs near the town of Bamiyan-they ignored the pleas of Moslem countries, as
well. They used dynamites to blow the statues into minutest fragments. Mullar Omar
described the statue destruction as merely "breaking bones."
Taleban War against other Afghan warlords, and its aftermath have laid
Afghanistan, waste. Nearly all the cities lacked drinkable or cleru.:_

~ater.

There were

about 9-1 0 million landmines in the countryside. Drought p~shed much of the nation into

famine.
To compound the catastrophic state, the Talebans shunned all feasible
administrative, techno_logical, and governmental solutions to modem day economic
and/or political life.
The Talebans, under the direction of Mullah Muhammad Omar, acted to bring

--

C: l
c

about order in Afghanistan, through the institution of a very strict interpretation of Sharia,

~

r

-

or Islamic law. The Talebans instituted public executions. Public punishments became

...

(

regular events at Afghan soccer stadiums. In fact, frivolous activities, like kite-flying,
were outlawed, and in order to root out "non-Islamic" influence, television, music, and

I· ,,
I

I"

~'

the Internet were banned. The Talebans required men to wear beards, and subjected them
to public beatings, if they did not.

-------

Perhaps, historians would give credit to the socialist PDPA in their treatment of

--- ----

women. To the modem and western world, Taleban's treatment of women was _Q._ssly

school. Also, women were barred fro

working outside the home. This caused a crisis in

healthcare and education. Women were also prohibited from leaving their home, without
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a male relative. Those that did so, risked being beaten, even shot, by officers of the
•ministry for the protection of virtue and prevention of vice." A woman caught wearing
fingernail polish would have had her fingertips chopped off. All these, according to the
Taleban, were to safeguard women and their honor.
The Talebans were very corrupt. They were hypocritical. In contrast to their strict
beliefs, the Taleban profited from smuggling operations, smuggling electronics, and
opium cultivation. Eventually, they bowed to international pressure and cracked down on
cultivation and by July 2000, they were able to claim that they had cut world opium
production by two-thirds. Unfortunately, the crackdown on opium also abruptly deprived
thousands of Afghans of their only source of income.
Although the Talebans managed to re-unite most of Afghanistan, they were
unable to end the civil war. They did not improve the conditions in cities, where access to
food, clean water, and employment actually declined during their rule. A continuing
drought and a very harsh winter (2000-200 1) brought famine and increased the flow of
refugees to Pakistan.
While the Talebans presented themselves as a reform movement, they have been
criticized by Islamic scholars as being poorly educated in Islamic law and history-even
in Islamic radicalism, which has a long history of scholarly writing and debate. Their
implementation of Islamic law seemed to be a combination of Wahhabi orthodoxy (i.e.,
banning of musical instruments) and tribal custom (i.e., the all-covering birka made
mandatory for all Afghan women).
The Taleban regime faced international scrutiny and condemnation for its
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Taleban as Afghanistan's legitimate government. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attack on the United States, Saudi Arabia and the UAE cut diplomatic ties with the
Taleban.

.'···

52

IJ'

~

The Taleban allowed terrorist organizations to run training camps in their territory
and, from 1994 to, at least, 2001, provided refuge for Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda
organization. The relationship between the Taleban and bin Laden was close, even
I

1·.

familial, based on inter-marriage. Osama bin Laden fought with the Mujahedeen, has

I

I

financed the Taleban, and has reportedly married one of his daughters to Mullah
Muhammad Omar.
After the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United Nations Security Council passed
two resolutions, Resolutions 1267 ( 1999i3 and 13 73 (2000), 54 demanding that the
Taliban cease their support for terrorism and hand over bin Laden for trial.

,'I
J

~
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The Taliban recognized the need for international ties, but wavered between

.

(36cf

r..

/

,II..
~I

cooperation-they claimed to have drastically cut opium production in July 2000-and

(

defiance-they pointedly ignored international pleas not to destroy the 2000-year-old

'I

Buddhist statues of Bamiyan. However, they made no effort to curb terrorist activity

Ii

within Afghanistan, a policy that ultimately led to their undoing.

,.I

2

s • These three states remain the only ones to have recognized the Taleban as the Afghan government. The
Saudi ambassador was withdrawn from Kabul in August 1998 to protest the Taleban refusal to surrender
Osama bin Laden, a Saudi citizen, to Saudi authorities following the August bombings of U.S. embassies in
East Africa. Since that time, Saudi diplomats have made occasional visits to Kabul. The UAE Embassy is
reportedly empty (although a number of Islamic charities based in the UAE maintain active offices), and
only Pakistan maintains a fully staffed, active embassy in the city. No Western country maintains an active
embassy in Kabul, although French diplomats fly into the city on a regular schedule to maintain the French
embassy buildings. Human Rights Watch interview with a staff member of an international
nongovernmental organization (NGO) in Kabul, July 1999; See also "Chechen Embassy Opens in Kabul,"
Associated Press, January 24, 2000.
Sl

·RESOLUTION 1267, S/RES/1267 (1999). Adopted by the Security Council at its 4051st meeting on 15
October 1999
r)
1 ~.- ~~~-,
S4
·UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001)~ ~eptember 28,2001
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Even after their ouster, the Taleban's brand of Islamist radicalism continued to
threaten and to destabilize other countries in the region, including Iran, China,
Uzbe~

and Pakistan. The Taleban's relationship with Pakistan was especially

problematic. A high percentage of the Taleban are ethnic Pashtuns; Pashtuns are a sizable
minority in Pakistan and dominate the Pakistani military. Public support for the Taleban
ran (and still runs) very high in the Pashtun North-West Frontier province, where proTaleban groups have held uprisings and sought to emulate Taleban practices by
performing public executions and oppressing women.
In September 2001, the United States placed significant pressure on the Taleban

to tum over bin Laden and al-Qaeda in response to the September .!..1._ 2001, terrorist
1,' I

attacks. On October 7, 2001, after the Taleban

refused~give

up bin Laden, the U.S.

t!'I

$I

- I
t· t1
I~

began bombing Taleban military sites and aiding the Northern Alliance. By November
21 , 2001, the Taleban had lost Kabul, and by December
9, 2001, the Talebans and al...
~

Qaeda had been completely routed.

:I
~
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An interim government was agreed upon by representatives of Afghanistan's

;I

I':·

various factions during talks held in Bonn, Germany. 0~. December 22, 2001, Hamid

Karzai, an Afghan tribal leader, was sworn in as interim ch_airm~ o~ the governmen_~ v"
Karzai initially supported the Taleban and is respected by many former Taleban leaders.
In January 2002, the Taleban recognized the interim government.
The future of the Taleban is unclear. While many of the Taleban's most radical
leaders and supporters were killed, taken prisoner, or fled the country, many former
Talebans returned to their homes and continue to work for the Taleban's goals.
Moreover, while moderate Taleban l~aders may re-emerg~_on the political landscape
r.
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representing religious, ethnic, or regional factions, some Talebans have chosen to fight
the new government.

vii.

An Assessment of the October 2001 Military Action in Afghanistan
In all honesty, the United States-led October 2001 military action against the

Talebans and al Qaeda in Afghanistan was justified by all standards. The pursuit of
terrorists to eliminate them has always been a permissible measure of individual and/or
collective self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, after the

r

September 11, 2001 armed attacks have been found to have taken place against the
United States. Similar terrorist attacks have been committed in Bali and Madrid in
different forms and with different magnitudes. As noted by Sucharitkul, the threats of

I

II
Ill

further attacks against the United States, its official chanceries, embassies, and consulates
abroad, as well as United States warships, American citizens, and corporations seem to be

11
'I

'i

'4'

•l'

continuing, unabated. 55
As the events of July 7, 2005, in London, England, have shown, foreign terrorists
are not concentrated on the United States alone. They have bombed, murdered, and
maimed thousands of people in Sinai and Cairo in Egypt, Mecca-Saudi Arabia, Madrid
in Spain, London in Britain, and in Bali. The whole world now lives under the shado
terrorism.
~

I

Earlier on, on March 11, 2004, ~embers of al Qaeda carried o~t devastating

I

attacks in Madrid, Spain. Ten (10) bombs exP-loded on four (4) trains in three (3) stations _
in ~orning rush hour. All fo:.::ur
::.-:t:r..:r:::
u·n:::s::..-:.:h=
ad,._,.__.-=-=-=:.==~=-"'=-'
station
on their way to the Atocha
terminus
in the city centre. As each one stopped, the
.
,._----,
,_

I'

"·See Sompong Sucharitkul, supra note 5.
I'
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bOmbers loaded bags packed with about 1Okg of explosives onboard.

56

The message was

to strike terror in the hearts of the populace.
According to Abu Dujan al-Afgani, 57 "You [Westerners] want life and we
[terrorists] want death." After identifying himself as al-Qaeda's military spokesman in
Europe, he claimed al Qeada's responsibility for the Madrid attacks, which killed 200
people.

'I

58

Spanish Police investigations revealed that a key figure in the March 11 2004
bombings, Jamal Ahmidan, 33, was one of the cell commanders and had links to alQaeda. Also, the supposed ringleader, Serhane ben Abdelmajid Fakhet, 35, reported to be

the one who set off the bomb, had started to show "clear signs" of preparation for an
attack in Madrid in 2003, after being influenced by communiques released by Osama Bin
Laden's al-Qaeda network. 59
The same events, as the Madrid bombings, occurred in London, England, on July

!

7, 2005, and was almost replicated on July 22, 2005. The terrorist bombings in London
bore the hallmarks of the al-Qaeda terrorist network. According to British Foreign
Secretary, Jack Straw,:
"[T]he bombings, which occurred within an hour toward the end of London's
morning commute, were similar to previous attacks by al-Qaeda, the group also
responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States." 60

56

. See How the Attacks Happened, at:
http://news. bbc.co. uk/ 1/shared/spl/hi/europe/05/madrid_ bombingslhtmV 1.stm

51

51

.

· Alleged Al-Qaeda military spokesman in Europe.
·See AI-Qaeda 'claims Madrid bombings, at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/or/fr/-/1/hi/world/europe/3509426.stm.

Published: 2004:fl3 ' 14 I I :41 :29 GM r
59

· . See
Piecing
together
Madrid
bombers' past,
at:
. lllhi/world/europe/3600421.stm. Published: 2004/04/05 II :07:46 GMT
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In fact, the United States Press (UPI) reports showed that:
"A terrorist captured near the Syrian border last month had a computer 'thumb
drive' that contained planning information about the July 7 suicide bombings in
London, according to a U.S. military officer. Col. Robert Brown, commander of
the 1st Brigade 25th Infantry Division in Mosul, said that the man was captured
north of Qaim in western Iraq and that authorities had connected him to the al
Qaeda terrorist network. The reference is to small USB portable hard drive ... this
is the first clear evidence of al Qaeda using Iraq as a base for attacks against the
West since the beginning of the war in 2003." 61

l

---

Finally, on September 1, 2005, al Qaeda's second-in-command, Ayman al~·

claimed responsibility for the Jul 7, 2005 London bombings in a video aired on

Al-Jazeera that included a farewell statement by a man identified as one of the four
suicide attackers. According to Ayman al-Zawahri:
"I talk to you today about the blessed London battle which came as a slap to the
face of the tyrannical, Crusader Bntls arrogance, ... It's a sip from the glass that
the Muslims have been drinking from ... This blessed battle has transferred- like
its glorious predecessors in New York, Washington, and Madrid- the battle to
the enemies' land, after many centuries of the battle being on our (Muslim) land
and after (Western) troops have occupied our land in Chechnya, A£ anistan, Iraq
and Palestine. " 62
~----

It also became evident that the leader of the contingent of bombers that attacked
London-Mohammad Sidique Khan-had visited the al Qaeda training camp on the
Pakistan Afghanistan border, in 2004. 63
Clearly, international terrorism is spreading all over the globe. The solution to the
above problem is as laid down by the United Nations, i.e., that the whole world must
60

· See
Al
Qaeda
claims
responsibility
http://www.keralanext.com/news/?id=259085

61

· See Definitive Link Between al Qaeda
http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/O 11590.php

for
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Bombings,

at:
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·
See
AI
Qaeda
Claims
London
_http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/09/0I/terror/printable81220 1.shtml.
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at:

regard such acts of international terrorism, as a threat to international peace and
security. 64 In addition, all the nations of the world, must express their readiness to take all
necessary steps to respond to terrorist attacks and combat all forms of terrorism, in
accordance with responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations. 65
Viability or failure of a state notwithstanding, the whole comity of nations must
abide by the tenets of the United Nations' Security Council Resolutions 126966 and

1373.

67

In particular, all States must exchange information and cooperate on
administrative and judicial manner to prevent the commission of terrorist acts-including
denying terrorists any material, financial, or moral support, as the Talebans did m
Afghanistan, by allowing the al Qaedas to roam and flourish unhindered. 68
The European Union ("E.U.") has quickly recognized these dangers. It introduced
"European Common Arrest Warrant." 69 There is also the European Union-wide definition

64

•

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368 ofSeptember 12, 2001. U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001).

65

. /bid.

66

• United Nations

67

•

~

I

~~

Security Council Resolution 1269 of October 19, /999, U.N. Doc. SIRES/1269 (1999).

I.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 ofSeptember 28, 2001, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001).

61

• See Security Council Resolutions 1269 and 1373 providing that international law rules on terrorism have
crystallized as thus:
a.
All States shall prevent and suppress the financing of terrorists;
b.
All States shall take necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, including
by provision of early warning to other States by exchange of information, i.e., calling
upon all States;
c.
All States shall exchange information and cooperate on administrative and judicial
manner to prevent the commission ofterrorist acts;
d.
All States shall note with concern the close connection between international terrorism
and transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money laundering, illegal arms
trafficking, etc; and
e.
All States shall declare that acts, methods, and practices of terrorism are contrary to the
purposes and principles of the United Nations.
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of terrorism, implementation and adjustment of national laws towards laying down
minimum sentences for terrorist cnmes; and enacting laws enabling cross-border
communication intercepts and monitoring of bank accounts. 70 The EU intelligence
agency, Europol, has commenced steps towards transcending traditional obstacles to
intelligence sharing, although sustained efforts must be concerted towards enabling thirty
four (34) European Union nations law enforcement agencies to share "high grade" and
real-time intelligence on terrorism that can be acted upon immediately. 71
Any disobedience to international law rules by any state shall lead to military,
fmancial, political, moral, and economic sanctions under Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter. This marked the end of the old Afghan State.

VIII. Conclusion.
Undeniably, the magnitude of the terrorist attacks launched from the territory of
Afghanistan by al Qaeda, with the connivance of the Taleban government, constitutes a
crime against humanity under international customary law. The connivance and
complicity of the Taleban authorities not in doubt, they carried vicarious liability for their
''visitors" action that caused injury in United States. The resolutions passed by the United
Nations' organs show that the military response was justified within the limits of the
United Nations Charter. With the enthronement of the regime of Hamid Karzai as the
new leader of Afghanistan in 2001, it became clear that military occupation was not the
69

· See Magnus Ranstorp with Jeffrey Cozzens (of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political
St
Andrews)
The European terror challenge, httj>://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/Violence,
/1/hi/world/europe/3563 713 .stm. Published: 2004103 /24 I~ :25:21 GMT.
70

71

• Ibid.
• Ibid.
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sole goal of the October 2001 military action, but arresting the rot in Afghanistan and
expelling the terrorists that held the nation in bondage. Clearly, the military response was
proportional to the danger posed and it effective. What follows next is deep study of the
Iraqi state as well as its demise and that of its paramount ruler-Saddam Hussein.
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CHAPTER FIVE
IRAQI STATE UNDER SADDAM HUSEIN
"When the seventh day dawned, the storm from the south subsided, the sea grew
calm, the flood was stilled; I looked at the face of the world . . . and the light fell
on my face."

--- Gilgamesh (Andrew George, The Epic of Gilgamesh: A New Translation
(Barnes & Noble, 1999))

1.

INTRODUCTION

I

Undeniably, Iraq had not failed prior to the March 2003 United States-led military

I·,.

action. If there is any justification for the military invasion, it may be ascribed to acts of
genocide arising to level crime against humanity. The acts of genocide carried out by
Saddam Hussein against his own Iraqi populace-especially, the Kurds, the Shiites, and
the Marshland Shiites 1 will forever remain unrivalled in the annals of state failure?
Although the crime of "genocide" was formally outlawed under international law in

I!

II

1948, genocide has existed in practice from time immemorial, 3 with multiple biblical
references discussing its uses as a war tactic against ethnically or religiously distinct
cultures. 4 Be that as it may, Saddam Hussein is exceptional, as a modem head of
state/leader, in his genocidal acts against his own people and against his neighbors in
modem times.

1
· •

Christopher Greenwood, Focus: The Trial of Saddam Hussein, Independent (London), Dec. 21, 2003, at
12; Neil A. Lewis, Iraqis Just Recently Set Rules to Govern Tribunal, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 2003, at A16.

2
• Foreign

& Commonwealth Office, Saddam Hussein: Crimes and Human Rights Abuses 14-16 (2002).

3

·Matthew Lippman, Genocide: The Crime of the Century. The Jurisprudence of Death at the Dawn of the
New Millennium, 23 Hous. J. lnt'l L. 467, 474, 485, 506-07 (2001).
4
•

Michael J. Kelly, Can Sovereigns be Brought to Justice? The Crime of Genocide's Evolution and the
Meaning of the Milosevic Trial, 16 St. John's L. Rev. 257, 260-61 (2002). (Hereinafter "Kelly 1").
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"With tacit blessing from the West, Saddam was able to inflict grievous harm on
those who opposed his regime in Baghdad. His own ruling clan within the Ba'ath
Party was based in Sunni Islam - practiced by a minority segment of the total Iraqi
population, which consists of twenty percent Sunni Arabs, seventeen percent
Sunni Kurds, and sixty percent Shi'a Arabs. For this additional reason, Saddam
followed the pattern of other ethnic minority governments in such states as South
Africa, Rhodesia, Rwanda, and Burundi, in brutalizing his own people to remain
.
,s
mpower.
Prior to 1948, the crime of genocide, in the ancient world, was a legitimate
practice, and it was used most famously by the Romans against Carthage. 6 In addition,

,.
I

historical accounts state that throughout the Middle Ages and into the modern era,
genocide was regularly practiced, until the slaughter of the Armenians by the Ottoman
Turks during World War 1. 7
The carnage inflicted by the Ottoman Turks, who also ruled the nation now
known as Iraq, on the Armenians was so atrocious that international condemnation was
very high. Thus, international outrage at the atrocity moved world opinion toward
condemning genocide, culminating in the adoption of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of Genocide 8 ("Genocide Convention") in 1948 after World War II and
the Holocaust. 9

5
.•

Michael J. Kelly, Milosevic & Hussein on Trial: PERSPECTIVE: The Tricky Nature of Proving
Genocide Against Saddam Hussein Before the Iraqi Special Tribunal, 38 Cornell Int'l L.J. 983, 987 (2005).
(Hereinafter "Kelly II").
6

. See Kelly I, supra note 4, at 262-64.

7

.Ibid. at 267-69.

8

· Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for signature Dec. 9,
194.8, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. (Hereinafter "Genocide Convention").

9

·See Kelly I, supra note 4, at 272-81.
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Under international law, the crime of"Genocide" means any of the following acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction, in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the grouJ'; and
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 1
Clearly, the genocidal killing of the Kurds of northern part of Iraq, the majority Shiites
Arabs, the extermination and forced relocation of ·the Marshland Shiites, the use of
chemical weapons against the Kurds resistance at Anfal and Halabaj a, and the
extermination of the people of Duj ail, are all outlawed under international law. These acts
and others helped to destroy the Iraqi nation under Saddam Hussein, prior to the military
action led by the United States-led army in March 2003.

However, the gloom has now lifted from over the Iraqi state on April 9, 2003,
when the maximum leader, Saddam Hussein, was deposed from his throne as the
recalcitrant tyrant of Iraq. According to Faleh Hassan, an Iraqi worker at Abu Ahmed
restaurant in central Baghdad:
"It's a long story, the history of Iraq. We feel peaceful, and we feel relieved, but
we are still fri~htened of tomorrow. . . . I can tell you the fear has lifted from
people's hearts" 1

.
· ee Genoc1de
Convention, supra note 8, Art. 2.

loS
II

·Anthony Shadid, Hussein's Baghdad Falls: U.S. Forces Move Triumphantly Through Capital Streets,
Cheered by Crowds Jubilant at End of Repressive Regime, Page AOI Washington Post, April9, 2003.
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Signifying the total liberation of Iraq's future from the old was the removal of the statue
of Saddam Hussein from central Baghdad (the Iraqi capital) after the liberating forces of

i].i

l
.,'I

!I
[.,,

J'f'

the coalition army had entered the city:

I,

"But scenes of celebration were more common. In images broadcast around the
world, hundreds of Iraqis poured into Firdaus Square, where they headed for a
statue of Hussein perched on a 20-foot pedestal of purple granite. First came a
sledgehammer. Men took turns knocking chunks off the base, to the wild applause
of the crowd. Then a rope, tied like a noose, went over the statue's head. Finally,
Marines brought an M88 tank recovery vehicle. They tethered one leg, then two,
before finally settling on a thick chain that went around the statue's neck. It fell
halfway, then crashed to the ground. All that was left was the twisted metal of his
feet, two rusted pipes jutting out. With the rage of grievances accumulated over a
lifetime, members of the crowd beat the fallen statue with sledgehammers, rocks,
chains, and their feet. Some slapped their shoes on it. Others made off with its
head, dragging it through the streets. 'It was a strong statue,' said Stefan Abu
George, as he watched the scene unfold. 'It's not strong anymore. '" 12

\:

j'

'

Although Saddam Hussein and the Ba'athists had fallen from power, the war did not end

with the fall of Saddam Hussein, however. This is because Iraq is a diverse country of
over 25 million people. There are Arab Kurds, Turks, Assyrians, and other tribes. Iraq is
also comprised ofSunni Muslims, Shiite (Shi'ah) Muslims, and Christians. There are also
diverse political opinions, i.e., those desiring one-man government (autocracy), rule by
the people (democracy), or rule by religious authority (theocracy). Clearly, the vacuum

':

created by Saddam Hussein's fall will propel these diverse and conflicting positions to

I

the fore in the years to come. 13
This is the real cause of the problems faced by Iraq, and Saddam Hussein was
unable to manage these diverse ethnicities. With all the bizarre political posturing of
various leaders in Iraq, the country's Shi'ite majority never overcame its suspicion of
12

• Ibid.

13

· JASON RICHIE, IRAQ AND THE FALL OF SADDAM HUSSEIN 5 (2003). (Hereinafter "Jason

Richie").
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Arab nationalism as a Sunni project, and this is because Shi'ite grievances against the
sunnis were primarily political, pertaining to Swmi dominance over Iraq's political
l

order. 14 Over time, the Shi'ites would point to the paucity of their numbers among the
decision-making elite and in the ranks of the administrative and military institutions. 15

r,
'•
i

The subject of this chapter is to examine the third example of state failuret

Iraq-and, perhaps, the most volatile failed state in contemporary world history. This
chapter will trace the origin of the Iraqi state and identify the factors that led to its failure,

!

!
i:
I

under the despotic rule of its erstwhile maximum leader-Saddam Hussein. ,
The chapter will conclude with a brief discussion of the policy justifications for
the March 2003 military intervention undertaken by coalition of forces that freed the Iraqi
state from the firm grip of Saddam Hussein. The conclusion is that while there are major
-~

lapses and insurmountable contradictions underlying the rationale for the United States-

I,
led military action, the March 2003 Second Gulf War, as led by the United States and

l
d
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Great Britain, that toppled Saddam Hussein's tyrannical rule is a new opportunity and a

~

~

-.
(

renewal of hope for the average Iraqi, serving as a basis to look forward to a hopeful

I

!.

future that will harbinger a renaissance for the Iraqi state and its citizens.

r
D.

Iraqi Debacle as an Offshoot of Foreign Interference in the Middle East.

I.

I

The Iraqi state's failure would forever be tied to (a) its turbulent history in the
I

Middle East, (b) the effect of colonialism and the resentment against the Western powers

li

14

· Amatzia Baram, Neo-Tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein's Tribal Policies, 1991-96, International
Journal of Middle East Studies, 1, at 2-3 (Feb. 1997); Adeed Dawisha, Identity and Political Survival in
Saddam's Iraq, Middle East Journal, 562, 562-567 (Autumn 1999).
IS

· 'Abd al-Karim al-Uzri, Tarikh fi Dhikrayat al-'lraq, 1930-1958 242-243 (1982).
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that colonialism bred, and (c) the advent of the Ba'ath party 16 in the Middle East. 17
As stated earlier, the aim of this chapter is to carry out the background history of

the Iraqi State starting from its formation in the 1920's after the end of the First World

!'
War-when the Ottoman Turks were defeated by the British, until the March 19, 2003
18

commencement of the Second GulfWar, when the United States launched the liberating
militarY action against Saddam Hussein and the ruling Ba'ath party in Iraq. 19
We must note, from the onset, that the Iraqi state's turbulent history did not start

with Saddam Hussein's 1979 entry into the political scene. After losing the First World
War, the Ottoman Empire was dismantled, and most of the Ottoman Turks' territory was
claimed by Great Britain?0 Successive rulers in Iraq, thereafter, adopted political systems
and ideologies that served as bases for Arab Nationalism to counter the effect of the
British rulers.
Perhaps, the greatest contributing factor to the upheaval in Iraq was the advent of
British rule in Iraq. Going back, in 1921, the British created Iraq from parts of the old
Ottoman Turk Empire. Thus, the country had been at war since then, being that these
various peoples fought and killed for their separate vision of Iraq's future. 21 Clearly, the

16

The Ba'ath party is an offshoot of the Arab Nationalist Party, and it took root under the tutelage of Sati
Al-Husri, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Michel Aflaq. The Ba' ath party flrst came to power in Syria, before
gaining power, also, in Iraq.
•

17
•

See Jason Richie, supra note 13, at 6; See also GERALDINE MCCAUGHREAN, 1001 ARABIAN
NIGHTS (2000).
II

·Alexandra Boulat, Baghdad Before the Bombs, in NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC (June 2003), at 52-69.

19

• The invasion was originally code-named "Operation Iraqi Liberation," but it later changed to "Operation
Iraqi Freedom."

20
•

21

~ee Jason Richie, supra note 13, at 6.

• Ibid.
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modem state of Iraq is an artificial creation, as it was constructed by the British Foreign
office, at the conclusion of World War I, with an eye on offsetting French influence in
the Middle East.

',,

22

During the course of dismembering the defeated Ottoman Empire, the western
powers also cobbled together Palestine, Syria, and Trans-Jordan, and in doing this, Iraq
was the fusion of three Ottoman provinces: (a) the Kurdish Sunni Mosu/ province, rich in
oil reserves; (b) the Arab Sunni Baghdad province, the administrative center; and (c) the
Arab Shi'a Basra province, also with oil wealth and a seaport?3 Perhaps, with hindsight,

it was a mistake that Britain served as the mandatory power under the League of Nations
Mandate system, and that it was charged with the responsibility of bringing Iraq and its
other "mandates" along the road toward independence. 24
Indeed, two of the three Iraqi kings that ruled over the Iraqi nation until 1958
.wanted the nation to serve Great Britain to the chagrin of the citizens. 25 At this time,
Britain backed these kings with military and logistic power. 26
However, there were other kings that hated the British hegemony and wanted to
unite all the Arabs as a whole into a single nation-under the policy of Gamal Abdel
Nasser, 27 the erstwhile Egyptian leader. 28

22

. See Kelly II, supra note 5, at 986.

23

·Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919, 395-409 (2001); Vera Beaudin Saeedpour, Establishing State Motives
for Genocide: Iraq and the Kurds, in Genocide Watch 59, 67-68 (Helen Fien ed., 1992).
.
24
· 8II' Arnold T. Wilson, Mesopotamia, 1917-1920: A Clash of Loyalties; A Personal and Historical
Record 240-41 (193 1)
23

• King

26.

Faisal I and King Faisal II.

C'

· "ee Jason Richie, supra note 13, at 6.
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Still, there was, also, a Third Faction, comprising of people that wanted Iraq to be

for the Iraqis, solely, and not part of some bigger Arab nation as advocated by Nasser?9
The single Arab nation is the sole bequest of Nasser to the Arab world. 30

~:1

Ultimately, the above third faction's political view, as ensconced in the Iraqi
Ba'ath party's objectives triumphed. The pro-British monarchy was overthrown in 1958,
and a power vacuum and successive assassinations and coup d'etats followed unti11979,
when Saddam Hussein seized power. Although, this brought relative tranquility, it was a
period of bloodshed and political castration of the Iraqi state and people.

Anouar Abdel-Malekh, Egypt: Military Society (1968); "Aswan High Dam", in Encyclopaedia of the
Orient:1996-2006, published on March 25, 2005. Available at: http://lexicorient.com/e.o/aswandam.htm.
Last visited on: December 22, 2006; Miles Copeland, The Game of Nations (1969); Mohamed Heikal, The
Cairo Documents: The Inside Story of Nasser and His Relationship with World Leaders, Rebels, and
Statesmen
(1973);
Egypt's
Judges
Step
Forward,
Available
at:
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/P017.borwn.FINAL.pdf. Last visited on: December 22, 2006;
Anthony Nutting, Nasser (1972); Robert Henry Stephens, Nasser; A Political Biography (1972).
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30

• According to an account, Gamal Abdel Nasser ofEgypt was born in 1918 and died in 1970. Nasser was
a pivotal figure in the recent history of the Middle East and played a highly prominent role in the 1956
Suez Crisis. Nasser has been described as the first leader of an Arab nation who challenged what was
perceived as the western dominance of the Middle East. Nasser remains a highly revered figure in both
Egypt and the Arab world. At the age of fifteen, he took part in anti-British demonstrations. Those who
protested also targeted some in the royal family who, it was believed, tacitly supported the power Britain
still maintained over Egypt by its joint-ownership of the Suez Canal. It was felt by some that the Royal
Family was willing to accept this, as long as no attempt was made by the British to weaken the family's
power within Egypt itself. In 1935, Nasser was wounded in the head by the British during an anti-British
demonstration. In 1938, Nasser graduated from the Royal Military Academy and joined the Egyptian
Army. Within the army, Nasser continued with his anti-British activities. The account also stated that in
1942, an incident occurred which is said to have been the key turning point in Nasser's activities. In
February 1942, the British persuaded/forced the king of Egypt, King Farouq, to accept a government that
was to be headed by Nahas Pasha. At this time, Britain's power in North Africa was reaching a peak with
the defeat of the Afrika Korps and this power was especially felt in Egypt. Nasser was appalled by what he
considered to be the interference in the internal affairs of one country by a colonial European power. For
~e next seven years, he used his influence to persuade officers in the Egyptian Army that a) such
mterference was unacceptable and b) that all vestiges of British rule/influence had to be removed from
Egypt. During this time, Nasser was stationed as an instructor in the Egyptian Army Staff College. This
gave him direct access to young officers who might be more prone to his views when compared to the older
officers in the Egyptian Army. See, History Learning Site: Modern World History-The Middle East 1917
to 1973, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Available at: http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/gamal abdel nasser.htm.
· Last visited on: December 22, 2006.
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The Iraqi territory, it must be noted, also has a rich and illustrious history.
Situated between the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers, the Iraqi state (previously known as

Mesopotamia-the land between two rivers) has always been blessed with abundant
fertile soil for agricultural and industrial growth. In fact, the nation's legacies are one of
the most admired in the world. 31 These include monumental cultural markers, such as the
world's first civilization, the world's first complete and most comprehensive legal

I

~.

documentation of laws, civil and criminal rights, and punishments-the Hammurabi
Code,32 and Hanging Gardens of Babylon. 33 Much of Hebrew history also originated in
Mesopotamia. The Biblical Prophet Abraham34 was from Ur, and Abraham's sons,' in
turn,-Isaac's and Jacob's wives came from the region. 35
However, we must also remember that the Iraqi land and history have also been
stymied by various foreign invasions and internal upheavals. The last of these invadersthe western European colonialists who came after the 1914-1919 First World War-have
made such political impact on the Mesopotamians that the resentment generated by these
invasions resonates till the present. According to Bernard Lewis, 36 colonization and
modernization have not gone swimmingly in Mesopotamia and the rest of the Middle

31
32

• Janine

DiGiovanni, Reaching for Power, in NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC (June 2004), at 2-35.

• TAMERA

BRYANT, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF HAMMURABI (2005). (Hereinafter "Bryant").

33

• See Gleaves Whitney, Iraq, After the Flood: New life?, a Paper published by National Review on April
21, 2003. Avail able at: htql://www .nationalreview.com/comment/comment-whitney0421 03 .asp. Last
visited on October 31, 2006. (Hereinafter "Whitney").

34

• The Father of Isaac and husband to Sarah. Abraham was instructed by the Lord to leave his family and
go to an unknown land of Canaan.
35

• Ibid.

36
•

Bernard Lewis, What Went . Wrong: Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response 42-47 (2002)
(Hereinafter "Lewis").
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East, because it bred resentment toward the West, and because this resentment has bred

.
. 37
manY revo1ut10nanes.
Among these revolutionaries were Gamal Abdel Nasser, Sati' Al-Hasri, a Syrian
named Michel Aflaq, a Libyan named Mohammed al-Ghaddaffi, and an Iraqi named
Saddam Hussein Al-Tikhrit. The origin of the Iraqi political troubles in the last 30 years
can be directly traced to the Ba'ath party. The Iraqi Ba'ath party, itself, has its origins in
Michel Aflaq and the Syrian Ba'ath party. 38 Ba'athism first took root among Syrians,
who were resentful of the colonizing French, and among Iraqis, who were resentful of the
British colonialists.

111.

Iraqi Ba'ath Party's Ideology and Sati' AI-Hasri & Michel Aflaq's Influence.
The founder of the Ba'ath party, Michel Aflaq, was himself influenced by the

teachings of Sati' al-Husri. 39 Clearly, the tenets of Arab nationalism were formulated by
Sati' al-Husri. 40 Al-Husri's Arab Nationalism ideology reflected the ideas of nineteenthcentury German cultural nationalism, which, in turn, to German nationalist thinkers,
boasted that unifying the German nation was the supreme goal and a sacred act, and that
this necessitated the subordination of individual will to the German (Arab) national

31

./bid.

38

• See, generally, D. Roberts, The Ba'ath & the Creation of Modem Syria (1987); R. Hinnebusch,
Authoritarian Power and State Fonnation in Ba'athist Syria (1989); M. Khadduri, Socialist Iraq (1978).

19
•

Michel Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath 161-162 (1963); Kanan Makiya, Republic of Fear: The Politics of
Modem Iraq 206 (1998); Abu Khaldun Sati' al-Husri, Abhath Mukhtara ti al-Qawmiya al-'Arabiya 80
(1 985).

40

:See Adeed Dawisha, Requiem for Arab Nationalism, Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2003. Available at:
hno://www.meforum.org/article/518. Last visited on December 22, 2006. (Hereinafter "Dawisha II").
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Similarly, to Al-Husri and progenitors, notions of liberty or freedom were

distractions, and when they contradicted the national will, they had to be repressed.
Earlier on, the eminent German historian, Heinrich von Trietschke had justified the
Gennan annexation, in 1871, of the German-speaking population of Alsace, the majority
of who wanted to remain politically within France thus:
"'We desire,' Trietschke writes in a chilling tone, 'even against their will, to
restore them to themselves. "'42
Unlike the English and French nationalisms whose ideological responses to
indigenous efforts were to principally liberalize the absolutist state and create a liberal
and virtuous society, the German nationalism (and the Arab nationalism fashioned after
it), in contrast, sought not to:
" ... secure better government, individual liberty, and due process of law, but...to
drive out a foreign ruler and to secure national independence. The word liberty
did not mean primarily, as it did for the western peoples the assertion of the rights
of the individual against his government, but of the independence of the nation
against foreign rule ... When the western peoples strove for regeneration, they were
primarily concerned with individual liberty; in central and eastern Europe the
demand for regeneration often centered on the unity and power of the group.'.43
The above German ideology was the intellectual legacy upon which AI Husri built
his theory of the Arab nation and Arab nationalism. 44 History has it on record that Sati'
al-Husri voiced the frustrations of Arab nationalists in an introduction to a book
published in the 1950s. Written in the form of an elegy, the introduction was entitled
"How Strange":

41

• Elie

42

Kedourie, Nationalism 47 (1960).

· Hans Kohn, The Ideas ofNationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background 582 (1944)

43

:Hans Kohn, Prelude to Nation-States: The French and German Experience, 1789-1815 254 (1967) .

..· see Daw1sha
. II, supra note 40.
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"We rebelled against the English; we rebelled against the French ... We rebelled
against those who colonized our land and tried to enslave us .. . We repeated the
red revolutions many times, and we continued with our white revolutions over a
number of years ... And for this we endured so much suffering, sustained so many
losses, and sacrificed so many lives ... But: When we finally gained our liberty, we
began to sanctify the borders that they had instituted after they had divided our
land ... And we forgot that these borders were but the boundaries of the 'solitary
confinement' and the 'house arrest' which they had imposed on us!" 45
Clearly, a single and unarumous Arab nation was paramount. Thus, Arab
nationalism, until its final decline in the late twentieth century, continued to embody the
tenets of German cultural nationalism, and Arab nationalists advocated the rejuvenation
of the Arab nation, its political unity, its secularism, and its sovereignty. 46
Historical account showed that although Arab nationalists were infused with the
absolutists and illiberal ideas of cultural nationalism, in actual practice, they had almost
nothing to say about personal liberty and freedom, and thus, to Al-Husri:
" ... the form of government was of no great interest to him ... public attention
should focus on the problem of unity: it [was] the national duty of every Arab to
support the leader who is capable of achieving Arab unity." 47

...

(-J.
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Even when advocates of Arab nationalism mentioned personal liberty, it was to make it
conditional upon the Arab nation's well being. 48 Thus, according to Al-Husri:
"patriotism and nationalism before and above all .. . even above and before
freedom. " 49
Going on, Al-Husri also espoused thus:

4
'·

46

47

Abu Khaldun Sati' al-Husri, Al-'Uruba Awalan 7 (1955).

• See

Dawisha II, supra note 40.

· Mll.Jl"d Khadduri, Political Trends in the Arab World: The Role ofldeas and Ideals in Politics 201 (1970).

41

·_See Dawisha II, supra note 40.

49

·Abu Khaldun Sati' al-Husri, Safahat min al-Madhi al-Qarib 42 (1984).
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"Under no circumstances should we say: 'As long as [an Arab] does not wish to
be an Arab, and as long as he is disdainful of his Arabism, then he is not an Arab.'
He is an Arab whether he wishes to be one or not. Whether ignorant, indifferent,
undutiful, or disloyal, he is an Arab, but an Arab without feelings or
50
consciousness, and perhaps even without conscience.''
In the midst of this Arab nationalist ferment emerged the charismatic Gamal
Abdel Nasser of Egypt. 51 Nasser vilified the Western nations as the perfidious "other,"
the undying nemesis of the Arabs, the determined obstacle to their progress. In fiery
speeches, Abdel Nasser reminded Arabs continuously of their glorious history and of
their military and intellectual superiority over the West.

52

In promising the Arabs

freedom, Abdel Nasser echoed Al-Husri's conception, i.e., that it was not personal
freedom and liberty that was important; rather, it was freedom from Western domination.
Liberal democracy had no place in this new order. 53 According Abdel Nasser,
"The separation of powers is nothing but a big deception, because there really is
no such thing as the separation of powers. " 54
Another of Al-Husri's students was Michel Aflaq, whose writings bear the
unmistakable influence of Al-Husri's ideas, candidly identified "cruelty" as the most
reliable instrument to effect the desired transformation:

0
' • Abu

Khaldun Sati' al-Husri, Abhath Mukhtara fi al-Qawmiya al-'Arabiya 80 (1985).

1
' •

Mohamed Heikal, The Cairo Documents: The Inside Story of Nasser and His Relationship with World
Leaders, Rebels, and Statesmen (1973); Anthony Nutting, Nasser (1972); Robert Henry Stephens, Nasser;
·A Political Biography (1972)
2
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Dawisha II, supra note 40.
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Ahmad Hamrush, Qissat Thawrat 23 Yuliyu: Kharif 'Abd an-Nasir, al-Juzi' al Khamis 386-387 (1983);
Sami Gawhar, As-Samitun yatakalamun: 'Abd an-Nasir wa Madhbahat al-Ikhwan 89-92 (1975).

in Ali Karim Sa'id, 'Iraq 8 Shibat 1963: Min Hiwar al-Mafahim ila Hiwar ad-Damm, Muraja'at
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Dhakirat Talib Shabib 213 (1999); Mustafa 'Abd al-Ghani, "'Abd an-Nasir wa'l-Muthaqafun," in AlMbstaqbal al-' Arabi, Dec. 2000, at p. 110.
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"When we are cruel to others, we know that our cruelty is in order to bring them
back to their true selves, of which they are ignorant." 55
Going on, Aflaq defined cruelty as a facet of the nationalist's love for his people. 56
This aspect of cruelty as an integral element of state practice later became perfected by
Saddam Hussein in massacring his citizens and neighbors.
Al-Husri's nationalist beliefs were carried over into the 1950s and 1960s,
becoming the slogans of the nationalist avalanche, and, by then, Arab cultural
nationalism had triumphantly emerged over other competing ideologies and identities,
capturing the hearts and minds of that quintessentially nationalist generation, a generation
that fervently believed in Arab nationalism as the elixir by which a glittering past would
be transformed into a glorious future. 57
Michel Aflaq followed Al-Husri. After schooling in Paris, and after studying
various European leftists such as Friederich Nietzsche, Vladimir "Lenin" Ulyanov,
Joseph "Stalin" Dzughazvili, and Karl Heinrich Marx, came back to Damascus, Syria,
and founded the Ba'ath Arab Socialist party. Ba 'ath is Arabic for "resurrection" or
"renaissance." As an ideology, Ba'athism stands for pan-Arabism, secularism, and
socialism; it claims to be the nostrum to Western colonialism and modernization. Aflaq
then published, in Arabic, his book "Fi Sabil Al Ba'ath" 58 (On The Way Of
Resurrection)--in five volumes. 59

''. Michel Aflaq, supra note 39, at 161-162; Kanan Makiya, supra note 39, at 206.
56
•

See Dawisha II, supra note 40.

57

• See, Walid Khadduri, Al-Qawmiya a/- 'Arabiya wa'd-Dimuqratiya: Muraja 'a Naqdiya, in Al-Mustaqbal
al-'Arabi, Feb. 1998, at p. 45; See also, Dawisha II, supra note 40.

'a.· Avat'Iable at: http://alBa'ath.online.fr/.
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When Aflaq created the Ba'ath party, its main ideological objectives were
secularism, socialism, and pan-Arab unionism. Thus, the Ba'ath party-formerly known

as "Arab political party," after being founded in Damascus in 1941 and reformed, with

I.

j

the name Ba'ath, in the early 1950s, it rapidly achieved political power in Syria.
The Ba'ath Party, as the leader of the Arab nationalist march, followed a parallel
Ba'athist ideology which focused their intellectual energies on "Arab unity" and the
"anti-imperialist struggle." The Ba'athists said little about democratic institutions. While
the constitution of the Ba'ath Party did assert the principle of the people's sovereignty
and Ba'athist support for a constitutional elective system, it also gave the Ba'athist party
the central role in determining the scope and extent of political freedoms.

60

According to Raymond A. Hinnebusch, from the very beginning, Aflaq's ideas
were endowed with a:
"strong statist strain [in which] individual self-realization [would] derive from
participation in the general will of the community." 61
In the opinion of John Devlin, Aflaq and Ba'ath party's view of freedom would
be associated with the struggle against imperialism, rather than with individualliberty. 62
These views led Adeed Dawisha to conclude that this illiberal Ba'athist
orientation reinforced the Ba'ath party's flirtation with political power in the 1950s and
early 1960s. And thus, in the party's sixth national congress held in 1963, the Ba'ath
9
" •
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·Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba'athist Syria: Army, Party, and
Pe~ant 89 ( I990); Elie Kedourie, Democracy and Arab Political Culture 90 ( I992).
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·John F. Devlin, The Ba'ath Party: A History from Its Origins to I966 3I (1976).
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finally and unequivocally rejected the notion of liberal parliamentarianism, espousing,
instead, the Soviet concept of democratic centralism, based upon the party's role as the
"vanguard" political institution in the state.

63

However, years passed before the Ba'athist flood would begin to alter the course
of Iraq's history. 64 But when it roiled through the Tigris and Euphrates valleys, it did so

with a vengeance. In Iraq, the struggle against colonialism also constitutes the third
,.

"fundamental" principle of the constitution of the Ba'ath Party. 65
In February 1963, the Ba'athist party thugs seized power by

assa~sination,

and

then came to power with Abd al-Salem Arif becoming the president. Interference from
the Syrian Ba'athists and disputes between the moderates and extremists culminated in an
attempted coup by the latter in November 1963. This served to discredit the extremists.
However, the moderate Ba'athists continued to play a major role in the succeeding
governments. In July 1968, a bloodless coup brought Ba'athist General Ahmad Hassan alBakr. General Bakr became the President oflraq from 1968 until 1979.
Wranglings within the Ba'ath party continued during Al-Bakr's rule, and the
government periodically purged its dissident members, leading to the emergence of
Saddam Hussein. From 1968, the Ba'athists held power continuously, until 1979. when
Saddam Hussein overthrew his mentor. Thus, entered Aflaq's devoted student, Saddam
Hussein, and he rose rapidly on the destructive Ba'athist tide. He initiated a widespread
palace coup and pogrom, and, after a series of purges, his grip on power became absolute.
63
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It was during his reign of terror that the real looting of Iraqi culture began. We must,

however, remember that the Iraqi problems did not start with Saddam Hussein. As
Geaves Whitney had noted, it is very hard to keep track of all the cultural and political
tides that have swamped Mesopotamia because:
"Every few centuries, sometimes every few decades, the region experienced a
new flood of invaders that changed the regime and often the culture: Akkadian
and Elamite; Kassite and Assyrian; Persian and Greek; Muslim and Mongol;
Ottoman and British. Many regime changes were the result of outside invasion;
many others were triggered by internal upheavals - palace coups, assassinations,
internecine wars. " 66
However, it was the creation and influx of Ba'athism into the Iraqi State and
government that ultimately led to its collapse in 2003. This writer is not oblivious of the
views of various writers who hold contrary opinions and criticize the 2003 Iraqi military
action. The position of this thesis, regarding the merits and de-merits of the Second Gulf

War, will be canvassed in detail in a later chapter.
Clearly, the Iraqi rich history came at a price, because Iraq's legacy is also one of
cultural invasion and instability, particularly in modem times. 67
At the end of this chapter, this work shall assess the 2003 United States-led
military action against the Saddam Hussein regime. Apparently, it was, assumedly,
initiated to clean the past from the present and to change the course of destructive past
that Saddam Hussein and the Ba'athists have charted for the Iraqi nation.

IV.

66
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It is apposite, at this juncture, to take a brief look at the Iraqi nation's rich history.
The earliest occupants of the Mesopotamia68 region were the Sumerians. 69 The Sumerians

!,

arrived in the region about 6000 B.C. and they built cities around the Tigris and
Euphrates rivers. The floods from the rivers gave freshwater to the Sumerians and also
provided alluvial soil for the plants being planted. Thus, under the Sumerians,
Mesopotamia was a land of lush vegetation, abundant wildlife, and copious waterresources. By 6000 B.C., many people migrated from neighboring areas into its water
rich land where the Tigris met Euphrates in the South. Undeniably, the civili;zed life that
emerged under the Sumerians was shaped by the unpredictable devastating floods of the
two rivers and the deposit of soil to make a low-level fertile marshy land. For the first
time in history, the Sumerian people learned to grow surplus food. As surplus production
increased, and as collective management became more advanced, a process of
urbanization evolved and Sumerian civilization took root in Southern Iraq. The
Sumerians were highly innovative people who responded creatively to the challenges of
nature. They innovated many great legacies to the humanity, such as writing, irrigation,
the wheel, astronomy, and literature. 70 The most prominent Sumerian city was Ur.
After the Sumerians, came the Akkadians, Babylonians and the Assyrians whose
civilization flourished in Mesopotamia long before the Egyptian, Greek and/or Roman

68
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69
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civilization. First, in 2302 BC, the Sumerians were overthrown by the Akkadians, led by
71

l!
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Sargon 1.

The Akkadians ruled Mesopotamia from 2302 BC to 2108 BC. Their most
prominent ruler was Sargon I, who ruled from 2334 to 2279 BC. 72 He was the first
person, in recorded history, to create an empire. During his 56-year reign, he formed the
vast kingdom of Akkad and was known as a great warrior-king. Rulers after Sargon
studied and followed his ways.

73

Second, after the Akkadians came the Babylonians. One of the cities that grew in
the aftermath of settling down in Mesopotamia was Babylon. Thus, by 3500 BC, Babylon
was a thriving city of business, trade, art, and architecture, and like other cities then and
now, it began to spread out. Inside the main city were businesses, homes, and temples.
Outside the city lay farms and smaller towns and communities. Babylon rulers claimed
parts of the outlying areas. 74 The city and its surrounding towns became a city-state,
much like a very small country. 75 As stated above, after the Akkadians came the

Babylonians, who united the Sumerians and the Akkadians, using the City of Babylon as
the capital. The greatest Babylonian leader was Hammurabi, 76 a brilliant military
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strategist and administrator. 77 Hammurabi, on succeeding his father, fortified the City of
Babylon, making it stronger.78 Over the years, archaeologists have discovered several
salient features of Hammurabi's lifetimes/9 such as Hammurabi's year date formula, 80
Hammurabi's letters, 81 and Hammurabi's stele. 82 The Hammurabi's stele comprises of a

·:

tall stone column that has Hammurabi's law code inscribed in it. 83
Hammurabi also fought several battles and wars. For instance, during
Hammurabi' s 29th year of reign, neighboring kings-Elam and Eshnunna, attacked

'~J
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77 •

The Legend of Naram-Sim, in FROM DISTANT DAYS: MJYTHS, TALES, AND POETRY OF
ANCIENT MESOPOTAMIA 176-177 (Benjamin R. Foster ed. 1995).

11

• The Stele of Hammurabi, in READINGS IN ANCIENT HISTORY: THOUGHT AND EXPERIENCE
FROM GILGAMESH TO ST. AUGUISTINE 31 (Nels M. Bailkey ed. 1992); DAUD ALI, et.al., GREAT
CIVILIZATIONS OF THE EAST (2001); PETER CHRISP, MESOPOTAMIA: IRAQ IN ANCIENT
TIMES (2004); SAMUEL NOAH KRAMER, et.al, THE CRADLE OF CIVILIZATION (1987); ELAINE
LANDAU, THE BABYLONIANS (1997); LORNA OAKES, STEP INTO MESOPOTAMIA (2001); LEO
A. OPPENHEIM, LEITERS FROM MESOPOTAMIA (1967); TIME-LIFE BOOKS, MESOPOTAMIA:
THE MIGHTY KINGS (1995);

79

• MARCEL SIGRIST AND PETER DAMEROW, MESOPOTAMIA YEAR NAMES: NEO
SUMERIAN AND OLD BABYLONIAN DATE FORMULAE. Preprint Version, COL, Potomac,
Maryland, 1991. Available at: cdli.ucla.edu/tools/yearnames/yn_index.html. Last visited on December 20,
2006.
10

• According to Tamera Bryant, Hammurabi's year date formula was a list of all the years that Hammurabi
was the king of Babylonia. Each year had a number and a description that told about a major act or
accomplishment, usually of the year before. Thus, we know from the year date formula that, in his third
year as the King of Babylonia, Hammurabi made a magnificent and significant throne dais for the temple of
Nana in Ur. Other significant acts in other years included building and restoring temples, digging canals,
constructing city walls, and fighting wars. See Bryant, supra note 32, at 14.
11

• Also, archaeologists have discovered about 150 Hammurabi's letters where Hammurabi, personally,
took interest in all aspects of Babylonian life. He sent letters directing the cleaning out of canals, the
shipment of wood, and the delivery of dates and sesame seeds. Most of the letters were addressed to SinIdinnam, his deputy at Larsa. Thus, the bulk of the letters were found in Larsa, with others in Mari. There
were other letters authored by Hammurabi to other kings and ambassadors .. See Bryant, supra note 32, at
14-15.

12

· The Hammurabi's stele was a column of diorite that stood nearly eight (8) feet tall. The famous
Hammurabi Code were inscribed in 49 columns of the cuneiform.

13

· See Bryant, supra note 32, at 15.
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Babylon. 84 Prior to the attack, another king-Rim-Sin had promised to support
Haromurabi against the formidable foes. At the right time, Rim-Sin reneged. However,
Haromurabi triumphed over the invaders. 85 To compound the betrayal, Rim-Sin invaded
some Babylonian towns and took captives. Hammurabi, after consulting his advisers,
attacked Rim-Sin, and defeated him. 86 Hammurabi used his knowledge of waterways and
canal-building to bring the war to an end, by ordering the canals destroyed and the
Euphrates River dam cut off from supplying water to Larsa. 87 The city surrendered.

88

The Babylonian empire was later invaded by the Hittites, Hurrians, Kassites, and

Assyrians. Thereafter, the Assyrians gained control of Mesopotamia. They ruled from the
City of Nineveh, now known as Mosul. In 705 BC, the Assyrian king, Sennacherib,
gained ascendance as the King. He

inv~ded

Babylon and slaughtered most of the

inhabitants.
Among the Assyrians was King Nebuchadnezzar (605-562 BC), who re-built
Babylon. History has it to King Nebuchadnezzar's credit that he built the Hanging
Gardens, which he was reported to have built for his wife-Queen Amytis. In rebuilding
Babylon, he used burnt bricks, as his raw materials.

·

84

• See

Sigrist and Damerow, supra note 79.

85

• See

Bryant, supra note 32, at 28-29; See also, Sigrist and Damerow, supra note 79.

86

• A. LEO OPPENHEIM, LETTERS FROM MESOPOTAMIA: OFFICIAL, BUSINESS, AND PRIVATE
LETTERS ON CLAY TABLETS FROM TWO MILLENIA (1967).

87

. See Bryant, supra note 32, at 30-33.

88

·See III L.W. KING, THE LETTERS AND INSCRIPTIONS OF HAMMURABI, THE KING OF
BABYLON 14, 17 (1900).
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After the passing of King Nebuchadnezzar, Babylon was invaded by Cyrus the
Great of Persia, in 53 8 BC, when he conquered Babylon. In 331 BC, Alexander the Great
conquered Mesopotamia, as part of the Persian Empire.
However, in 226 AD, control of Mesopotamia reverted to the Sassanid Dynasty of
Persia, who ruled from Ctesiphon. Because of the incessant unrest, in 651 AD, the
Jihadist Moslem invaded Mesopotamia.
The entry of Islam into Mesopotamia proved to be far-reaching. At the death of
Prophet Mohammed in Mecca in 632 AD, there was a power struggle between Ali ibn
Abu Talib (Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law) and Muhammad's comrade in armsAbu Bakr. Those who supported Ali ibn Abu Talib became known as the Shiites"Partisans of Ali," while those who followed Abu Bakr became known as the Sunnis.
Abu Bakr and the Sunnis prevailed, and Abu Bakr succeeded Prophet Mohammed.
While the Shiites are the minority Moslem sect in the Middle East, in Iraq, the
Shiites comprise of over sixty per cent (60%) of the total population, and, thus, are the
majority. They are, however, oppressed by the more politically opportuned and affluent
Sunnis.
In 680 AD, Hussein, son of Ali was invited by the Shiites to become the Leader of
the Moslems at al-Kufah, but he was murdered, along with his followers at Karbala. As at
present, Karbala remains the holiest city for the Shiites, to which they make annual
pilgrimages in honor of Hussein.
The Mongols also invaded Mesopotamia in 1258, when Hulagu Khan massacred
the whole of Baghdad. Next came the Ottoman Turks under Suleiman, the Magnificent,

in 1534. During the reign of the Turks, the daily running of the region was left to the
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educated Sunnis, who ruled over the more populous Shiites.

89

With the weakened rule of

the Turks, as well as the growing West-East trade, the European powers sought to open a

I

!:~· .
trade corridor to the Indian and Chinese Mainland. The Turks ruled Mesopotamia, until

I

the end of First World War in 1918, when Great Britain had defeated the Ottoman Turks
during the First World War.
At the onset of the First World War, the Central Powers-Germany and AustriaI.

Hungary were fighting against the Allies-Great Britain, France, and Russia. As a matter

[

of political miscalculation, the Ottoman Turks, then ruling in Mesopotamia, joined
Germany to fight against the Allies. The British then invaded Mesopotamia in November
1914, and defeated the Ottoman Turks. By 1918, Britain was in total control. With the
setting up of the League of Nations in 1919, Iraq was created in 1920. The final
boundaries were fixed in 1925-converging minority-but well educated Sunnis, with
the majority Shiites, the Turkmen, and the Kurds. This resulted in continuous revolts and

i;l

changes in leadership.

·-.. .J

Britain received a "sphere of influence" under its mandate from the League of
Nations in 1919, and this resulted from the secret Sykes-Picot agreement reached during
World War I, 90 dividing territorial "spheres" between France (Syria and Lebanon) and
Britain (Mesopotamia and Palestine). Arrangements for British control of Iraq were
cemented at the San Remo Conference in April 1920, and Winston Churchill dispatched

Sir Percy Cox, as Head of the British Colonial Office, to Baghdad from Tehran to act as
89

• This "Divide and Rule" system was adopted by the British, after 1919, and applied in Iraq, enabling the
Sunis to rule over the majority Shiites.

90

• See David H. Finnie, Shifting Lines in the Sand: Kuwait's Elusive Frontier with Iraq 47 (1992)
(Hereinafter "Finnie"); Thomas A. Geraci, BOOK REVIEW: Shifting Lines in the Sand: Kuwait's Elusive
Frontier with Iraq, 88 A.J.I.L. 398 (1994) (Hereinafter "Finnie").
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the Iraqi High Commissioner. Sir Percy Cox has been described as a 11 Sort of one man fire
It

brigade for the Middle East. 1191 Thus, because of the British Colonial Office's enormous
respect for Sir Percy Cox, the Office indicated that as long as Sir Percy Cox remained
High Commissioner in Iraq, he would also administer the political affairs of Kuwait. 92
This "joint portfolio" is the genesis of the constant border dispute between Iraq and
Kuwait, and the sole underpinning ofthe First Gulf War.
Unfortunately, the British decided to impose a monarchical government on the
Iraqis by appointing a non-Iraqi to be the King-Faisal ibn Hussein from Saudi Arabia,
whose fathers and relatives had supported the British during the First World War.
In July 1921, the Hashemite Emir Faisal was 11 elected 11 King of Iraq, under the
British Mandate. Yet, in 1922, Lord Winston Churchill opined that British support of
King Faisal in Iraq was not entirely beneficial to the British:
11

There is scarcely a single newspaper-Tory, Liberal, or Labor-which is not
constantly hostile to our remaining in [Iraq] .... At present we are paying eight
millions a year for the privilege of living on an ungrateful volcano ... ". 93
This view had earlier been stated by Sir Arnold Wilson, the acting commissioner for
Mesopotamia, in 1917, when he noted thus:
"The idea of Iraq as an independent nation had scarcely taken shape, for the
country lacked homogeneity, whether geographical, economic or racial .. . . It was
scarcely to be hoped that the vilayets of Basra and Baghdad could maintain their
existence as an autonomous state without the revenue it was hoped might
eventually be derived from the economic resources of the Mosul vilayet. Yet
three-quarters of the inhabitants of the Mosul vilayet were non-Arab, five-eighths
being Kurdish, and one-eighth Christians or [non-Islamic Kurds]." 94

91

92

• Ibid.

at 49.

• Ibid.

93
•

Ibid. at 54.
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As the British had rightly recognized, further political impasse arose from the
assorted ethnicities plugged together by the British from the defunct Ottoman Turks
Empire. The value of the Kurdish area in the old Mosul province was the linchpin for
Iraq's economy as early as the 1900's, the same obtained when Saddam Hussein seized
government in 1979, as he immediately saw that the ruling Sunnis, who dominated the
Ba'athist party, needed the oil fields in Mosul (under the Kurds) and the oil deposits in
Basra (under the Shiites). Thus, underlying the political and power-based rationales for
Saddam's approach to governance were the economic concerns, as the distribution of oil
wealth, Iraq's primary source of revenue, is inconveniently concentrated in the Kurdish
and Shi'a regions of Iraq's north and south, with very little left in the Sunni Arab lands in
the middle-Saddam Hussein felt he had no choice but to subjugate these "enemy
populace. " 95
Looking back to the administrative problems ceded by the British, King Faisal
ruled from 1921, until he died in 1933. Iraq became independent from British rule in
1932. Ghazi ibn Hussein succeeded the throne in 1933, and died in 1939. The new king
was the three-year-old Faisal II, who was aided by the Regent-Abdallah.
As we saw earlier, in 1958, Abd-al-Karim Quasim led a revolt killing both Faisal
II and Abdallah. In 1959, the Ba'athists entered into the fray by attempting to kill
. Quasim. Quassim escaped and sought to put over seventy-eight plotters to trial. One of
the plotters was Saddam Hussein, who escaped to Syria, and then, to Egypt.

94

• Sir Arnold T. Wilson, Mesapotamia, 1917-1920: A Clash ofLoyalties; A Personal and Historical Record
ix~x (I 931).

95

. See Kelly II, supra note 5, at 987-988.
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Finally, in 1963, the Ba'athists carried out a successful coup against Quassim.
Abd al-Salem Arif became the leader in a joint rule between the Ba'athists and the Arab
Nationalists. The Ba'athists overthrew and killed Arif in 1966. A period of continuous

I·I..~

I

1:

fights continued, allowing Saddam Hussein to succeed as the leader on July 16, 1979.
Apart from the administrative and demographic problems, there were other
divisions among the populace, based on religion and cultural identities. In present day
Iraq, most Iraqis are Moslems-followers of Islam, and for them, Islam is a way of life,
because Islam impacts their daily routine, food choices, marriage, divorqe, education,
political decisions, and death. 96
The twenty-five (25) years of misrule by Saddam Hussein has rendered the Iraqi
,,,.

I

I

~·

the world, i.e., with its large oil reserves-in the region of 200 billion barrels, the regime

.

.

state bankrupt. Although Iraq has the potential of becoming one of the richest nations of

...,..,

' II

"

of Saddam Hussein squandered the oil wealth (directly and indirectly) on three (3) costly
wars and much of the wealth was stolen by the Ba' athists, in sustaining their own opulent
1:

lifestyle. New oil production has always been hindered by a lack of research and
development, aging equipment, and wars and strife. Thus, the Iraqi nation has a high
level of poverty and massive international debt. 97

I

groups-the Shiite Moslems, Sunni Moslems, Kurds, and Turkmen. This makes the

96

• See BYRON AUGUSTIN and JAKE KUBENA, IRAQ: ENCHANTMENT OF THE WORLD 14
(2006) (Hereinafter "AUGUSTIN and KUBENA").
•

97

./bid. at 14-15.
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As noted earlier on, there are wide religious divides between the various religious

fonnation of a consensus government very difficult. Consequently, when Saddam

•
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Hussein took power in 1979, he was, immediately, confronted with the problem of

I

successfully governing a multiethnic, multi-religious state. 98 According to Professor

i'

Kelly:
"Faced with the practical problem of consolidating power and governing Iraq,
Saddam drew upon his cynical penchant for managing ethnic politics in a manner
similar to that of Tito, Yugoslavia's longtime dictator. Like Tito, Saddam justified
his iron-fisted rule as the only means of holding the conglomerate of ethnically
and religiously diverse people together. take that away, and Iraq, like Yugoslavia
without Tito, might fly apart into its constituent pieces, melting down into civil
war in the process." 99

1:,

The approach adopted by Saddam Hussein was, however, flawed. It must be
noted that the Western Nations were complicit, to a larger extent, in the misrule of Iraq.
Thus, for years, the West turned a blind eye on the human rights situation in Iraq,
encouraging, instead, the continued territorial integrity and stability of nation-states, most
of which they had helped to create. 100
Thus, while in power, Saddam Hussein killed and maimed more than one million
people over the twenty-four (24) years, in a ruthless quest to rule Iraq and make it a
leading power in the Middle East, and many of the Iraqis that perished were victims of
political murders, massacres of rebellious villagers, and acts of torture. Still others were
soldiers who died in the three (3) wars caused by Saddam Hussein-directly and
indirectly-(a) the Iraq-Iran War (1980-1988), (b) the First Gulf War (Kuwait Invasion
and Liberation: 1990-1991), and (c) the Second Gulf War-Operation Iraqi Freedom
(2003).101

98

99

. See Kelly II, supra note 5, at 986.
./bid. at 986-987.

1

~. Dale Anderson, Saddam Hussein, A Biography 19-20 (2004) (noting that European countries helped set
up governments in a number of Arab nations after World War 1).
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A Critical Study of Saddam Hussein AI Tikriti and His Stranglehold Over Iraq.
Saddam Hussein was the Chairman of the Ba'ath party-dominated Iraqi

Revolutionary Command Council and the fifth (5th) President of Iraq, having deposed his
cousin and predecessor-Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakr. He ruled from July 16, 1979 until
April9, 2003, after joining the Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party in 1957 at age twenty (20).
Saddam Hussein was born on April28, 1937, 102 in a small village of Al-Awja, 8
miles (13 km) from the Iraqi town of Tikrit, in the Sunni Triangle, to . a family of
shepherds. His full name was: Saddam Hussein Abd al-Majid al-Tikriti. The name
Saddam means "one who confronts." 103
Saddam Hussein's mother, Subha Tulfah al-Mussallat, had chosen the name of
"Saddam." 104 Some accounts state that Saddam never knew his father, Hussein 'Abd alMajid, who disappeared six months before Saddam was born. Shortly afterward,
Saddam's 13-year-old brother died of cancer, leaving his mother severely depressed in the
final months of the pregnancy. 105

101

. See Bryant, supra note 32, at 6.

102

• Under Saddam Hussein's government in Iraq, the above date was his official date of birth. His real date
of birth was never recorded, but it is believed to be a date between 1935 and 1939. See Con Coughlin,
Saddam The Secret Life Pan Books (2003 ).
103

• "Saddam" means the stubborn one or he who confronts in Arabic (in Iraq also a term for a car's
bumper). Hussein (Sometimes can also be translated as Hussayn or Hussain) is not a surname in the
Western sense, but a patronymic; it is his father's given personal name; Abd al-Majid his grandfather's, and
al-Tikriti means he was born and raised in (or near) Tikrit. He is commonly referred to as Saddam Hussein,
or Saddam for short. The observation that referring to the deposed Iraqi president as only Saddam may be
derogatory or inappropriate is based on the mistaken assumption that Hussein is a family name: thus, the
New York Times regularly refers to him as "Mr. Hussein", while Encyclopredia Britannica prefers to use
simple Saddam. See http://www. britannica. com/eb/artic/e-9041630/Saddam-Hussein.

- 104

. See Bryant, supra note 32, at 9.
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Thereafter, infant Saddam was sent to the family of his maternal uncle, Khairallah
Talfah, until he was three. 106 During this time, Saddam's mother remarried. However, his
stepfather, Ibrahim al-Hassan, treated Saddam harshly after his return. Thus, at about the
age of 10, Saddam fled the family and returned to live in Baghdad with his uncle,
J(haraillah Tulfah. Tulfah, the father of Saddam's future wife, was a devout Sunni
Muslim and introduced Saddam to Ba'athim. According to Tamera Bryant:
"During World War II (1939-1945), Kharaillah Tulfah worshipped Adolf Hitler.
One of Hitler's finest qualities, he felt, was his racism-his fanatical belief that
Germans were superior to other peoples. Kharaillah was an extremist like this,
too, but he believed Arabs were the superior race. Many years later, after Saddam
took over Iraq, Kharaillah published a pamphlet called 'Three Whom God Should
Not Have Created: Persians, Jews, and Flies."' 107
As earlier noted, the Iraqi Ba'ath party's motto espoused secular pan-Arabism,
economic modernization, and Arab socialism, and Saddam Hussein took this to heart and
so played a key role in the 1968 coup that brought his party to long-term power, when
General Abdul Karim Quassim was overthrown.
Later in his life, relatives from his native Tikrit, where Kharaillah Tulfah lived,
would become some of Saddam Hussein closest advisors and supporters. According to
Saddam, he learned many things from Kharaillah Tulfah-the militant Iraqi nationalist.
Thus, under the guidance of his uncle, Saddam Hussein attended a nationalistic secondary

105

• According to Tamera Bryant, Hussein al-Majid either abandoned his family a few years after Saddam's
birth, or died; both versions are told. The greatest influence on young Saddam became Subha's brotherKhairallah Talfah. See Bryant, supra note 32, at 9.
106

• From Elisabeth Bumiller's interview of Jerrold M. Grumpkin, the founder of the Center for the Analysis
of Personality and Political Behavior at the CIA in the New York Times (15 May 2004) on the importance
of events during Saddam Hussein's youth. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Was a Tyrant Prefigured by Baby
in
the
New
York
Times
of
(May
15,
2004.
Available
at:
Saddam?,
http:/lhnn.us/roundup/archives/11/2004/5/. Last visited on December 24, 2006 .
• 107

. See Bryant, supra note 32, at 9-10.
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school in Baghdad, and in 1957, at age 20, Saddam joined the revolutionary pan-Arab
sa•ath Party, of which his uncle was a supporter. According to Dr. Jerrold M. Post,

l'l'

J{haraillah Tulfah's influence regarding Arab Nationalism, on Saddam Hussein, was

I'

profound and limitless:

I

'

I

"When Saddam was only 10, he was impressed by a visit from his cousin who
knew how to read and write. He confronted his family with his wish to become
educated, and when they turned him down, he left his home in the middle of the
night, making his way to the home of his maternal uncle Kairallah in Tikrit.
Kairallah was to become not only Saddam•s father figure but his political mentor
as well. Kairallah had fought against Great Britain in the Iraqi uprising of 1941
and had spent five years in prison for his nationalist agitation. He filled the
impressionable young boy•s head with tales of his heroic relatives -- his great
grandfather and two great uncles -- who gave their lives for the cause of Iraqi
nationalism while fighting foreign invaders. Kairallah, who was later to become
governor of Baghdad, shaped young Hussein•s world view, imbuing him with a
hatred of foreigners. In 1981, Saddam republished a pamphlet written by his uncle
entitled 'Three Whom God Should Not Have Created: Persians, Jews, and Flies.'
Kairallah tutored his young charge in his view of Arab history and the ideology of
nationalism and the Ba•ath party. Founded in 1940, the Ba•ath party envisaged the
creation of a new Arab nation defeating the colonialist and imperialist powers and
achieving Arab independence, unity, and socialism. Ba•ath ideology, as
conceptualized by its intellectual founding father, Michel Aflaq, focused on the
history of oppression and division of the Arab world, first at the hands of the
Ottomans, then the Western mandates, then the monarchies ruled by Western
interests, and finally the establishment of the Zionist entity. Inspired by his uncle•s
tales of heroism in the service of the Arab nation, Saddam has been consumed by
dreams of glory, since his earliest days. He identifies himself with
Nebuchadnezzar, the King of Babylonia, who conquered Jerusalem (586 B.C.)
and Saladin, who regained Jerusalem in 1187 by defeating the Crusaders." 108
As at 1958, the spirit of Arab Nationalism, as espoused by Gamal Abdel Nasser,
had caught the world. 109 Thus, Saddam Hussein became an ardent follower of the
prevailing political culture:

108

• Dr. Jerrold M. Post, Explaining Saddam Hussein: a Psychological Profile, Being a Paper presented to
the House Armed Services Committee, in December 1990. Available at:
http://www.au.af.mil/aulawc/awcgate/irag/saddam post.htm. Last visited on December 25, 2006.
109

•

• See David Kimche, The Last Option: After Nasser, Arafat & Saddam Hussein : The Quest for Peace in
the Middle East (1992); See also, Dr. Jerrold M. Post, Explaining Saddam Hussein: a Psychological
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"Revolutionary sentiment was characteristic of the era in Iraq and throughout the
Middle East. The stranglehold of the old elites (the conservative monarchists,
established families, and merchants) was breaking down in Iraq. Moreover, the
populist pan-Arab nationalism of Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt would profoundly
influence the young Ba'athist, even up to the present day. The rise of Nasser
foreshadowed a wave of revolutions throughout the Middle East in the 1950s and
1960s, which would see the collapse of the monarchies of Iraq, Egypt, and Libya.
Nasser challenged the British and French, nationalized the Suez Canal, and strove
to modernize Egypt and unite the Arab world politically." 110

,,
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I
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When Saddam Hussein had started his secondary education, the schools were then
a hotbed of Arab nationalism and this had reinforced and confirmed his political leanings.
Thus, in 1952, when Saddam Hussein was 15, the Egyptian leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser,
led the Free Officer's Revolution in Egypt and became a hero to young Saddam and his
peers, because Nasser, as the activist leader of Pan-Arabism, became an idealized model
for Saddam. 111 From Nasser's model, he learned that only by outrageously confronting
imperialist powers could Arab nationalism be freed from Western shackles. 112
A similar event, as we had seen earlier, occurred in Iraq, when army officers led
by General Abdul Karim Qassim, overthrew Faisal II oflraq, in 1958. But unlike Nasser,
Qasim did not pursue the path of socialism and had turned against the Ba'ath party. Thus,
the twenty-two (22) year old Saddam was called to Ba'ath party headquarters and given
the mission to lead a five-man team to assassinate Qasim. 113 The mission failed,
reportedly because of a crucial error in judgment by Saddam.

Profile, Being a Paper presented to the House Armed Services Committee, in December 1990. Available
at: http://www.au.af.miVau/awc/awcgate/irag/saddam post.htm. Last visited on December 25, 2006.
110

•
See Saddam Hussein: From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Available at:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saddam Hussein. Last visited on: December 25, 2006. ("Hereinafter
"Wikipedia").
Ill

.

112

. See Post supra note 108 .
• Ibid.
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"Saddam was shot in the leg, but escaped to Tikrit with the help of the CIA and
Egyptian intelligence agents. Saddam then crossed into Syria and was transferred
to Beirut for a brief CIA training course. From there he moved to Cairo, where he
made frequent visits to the American embassy. During this time, the CIA placed
him in an upper-class apartment observed by the CIA and Egyptian operatives." 114

'I

'I

Saddam's escape to Syria, first by horseback and then by swimming a river,
achieved mythic status in Iraqi history:
"After the aborted assassination attempt, Saddam fled to a safe house where he
hid from the authorities. Unable to risk obtaining aid from a doctor, Saddam
directed his friend, as he cut the bullet from his leg. This anecdote would be
included with others that portrayed Saddam as a tough, fearless contender and a
revered leader dedicated to his beliefs." 115
Saddam went to Egypt, during this period of exile, to study law, rising to leadership ranks
in the Egyptian Ba'ath Party.
Concerned about Qassim's growing ties to Communists, the American Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) gave assistance to the Ba'ath Party and other regime
opponents, and so army officers with ties to the Ba'ath Party overthrew Qassim in a coup
in 1963. In the aftermath, Ba'athist leaders were appointed to the cabinet and Abdul
Salam Arif became president. 116 Saddam Hussein returned to Iraq after 1963 after
Qassem was ousted by the Ba'aths and was elected to the National Command. Historical
records state that Michel Aflaq, the ideological father of the Ba'ath party, admired young
Hussein, declaring the Iraqi Ba'ath party the finest in the world and designating Saddam

113

• See Saddam Key in Early CIA Plot, Newsmax Wires of Friday, April 11, 2003. Available at:
htt,p://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/4/10/205859.shtml. Last visited on: December 25,2006.
114

• See Richard Sale, Exclusive: Saddam key in early CIA plot, UPI International- Archive, April 10, 2003.
Available at: http://www.upi.com/archive/view.php?archive=1&StoryiD=20030410-070214-6557r.
11

_~. Phebe Marr, The Modem History oflraq 218 (1985)

116

• Morris

Roger, Remember: Saddam was our man, New York Times, March 14,2003
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Hussein as his successor. 117 Saddam, upon returning to Baghdad, continued his diligent
efforts to further the socialist Ba'ath party cause. His marriage to his cousin, Sajidah
Talfah, from an elite Tikrit family, furthered his influence, as he rose to a commanding
position in the Ba'ath party. 118
The post-1963 Iraqi leader-Arif-was uncomfortable with the Ba'athists.
Thus, Arif dismissed and arrested the Ba'athist leaders in the later part of 1963. Saddam

I'

Hussein was also imprisoned in 1964. As Major Larry D. Huffman had put it:
"Unfortunately, Saddam's education did not include study abroad, so prevalent in
today' s Arab world. This lack of contact outside his limited sphere of interest
deprived Saddam of a basis for understanding Iraq's place in the world order. The
absence of an understanding of world relationships would later contribute to grave
miscalculations in his dealings with Western powers. His activism continued with
a coup attempt in 1964. The plot was discovered and Saddam was again sent to
jail. He diligently recruited members into the Ba'ath party during this 2-year
period of incarceration." 119
Saddam escaped prison in 1967 and quickly became a leading member of the party. In
1968, Saddam participated in a bloodless coup led by Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr that
overthrew Abdul Rahman Arif. Al-Bakr was named president and Saddam was named
his deputy. Saddam soon became the regime's strongman. By 1969, Saddam's growing
influence was evident within the Ba'athist Party hierarchy. His personality and leadership
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style were commg into focus, as he became vice-chairman of the Revolutionary
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Command Council ("RCC"):
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"In the offices of both men (Saddam and Aziz [of Syria]) there were submachine
guns. Even at that stage, many features of Saddam's character were clearly
evident, features that were preserved and developed further when he became
leader of Iraq. He possessed a firmness that often turned into cruelty, a strong will
bordering on implacable stubbornness, a readiness to go charging toward his goal,
regardless of obstacles and the price, and an overblown understanding of such
concepts as honor and dignity. Saddam was quite rational, but he had a penchant
for making unexpected about turns.'' 120
Throughout his tenure, Saddam Hussein never forgot the tensions within the
first Ba'athist government, and this informed his measures to promote Ba'ath party unity
as well as his ruthless resolve to maintain power and programs to ensure social
stability. 121 Thus, soon after becoming deputy to the president, Saddam demanded and
received the rank of four-star general, despite his lack of military training. He also
became head of al-Jihaz a-Khas, the secret intelligence apparatus of the Baath Party.
To cement his control on the nation, on November 9, 1969, Saddam Hussein
caused the Iraqi RCC to broaden its power base within the state by expanding its
membership from 5 to 13. In addition, all new members of the Ba'thist party were
required to have outstanding party credentials and were all civilians, except one. This
loyalty to the party was also synonymous with loyalty to Saddam Hussein. The new RCC
dedicated themselves to improving the life of Iraqis, through a new interim
constitution: 122
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. See Phebe Marr, supra note 115, at 41.
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• Saddam was determined that the military would not have the opportunity to overthrow him. This
determination and the subsequent reorganization of the government would prevent disgruntled officers
from seriously challenging him, even when two devastating wars with Iran and the United States led
- coalition forces tasked the military beyond it's capability.
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"Iraq was to be a People's Democratic Republic with socialism as its economic
system. All natural resources would belong to the state [which] could better
manage them for the good of the people. Each Iraqi would have the right to a free
university education, medical care, and the right to be employed. Power was
centralized within the RCC and its president was given broad ~owers to appoint,
promote, and dismiss judiciary, civil, and military personnel." 12
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Saddam Hussein orchestrated a series of trials that removed many rival
Ba'athist contenders. Invariably, they were charged with spying, usually for the United
States or Israel, and so trials were held by secret military court, resulting in executions or
imprisonment. At least, eighty six people were executed. 124 Along the same line, the
Army was expanded and developed an imposing regional military capability, that by the
end of 1977, the Iraqi Army was two and one half times the size of Algeria's, a
comparable country in many ways. 125 Saddam's goal was to form an armed militia in
every municipality and to increase its military strength to 200,000, and with Saddam, as
the leader of the militia, he was able to exert his influence to the fullest.
Credit must, however, be given to Saddam Hussein for transforming the Iraqi
economic and social life. Even if it is later argued that these great contributions were part
of the grand plans for taking over of the Iraqi society, the judgment, by posterity, may be
kind on Saddam Hussein for using the surplus petroleum oil money to change the
fortunes of his people, in a region where all other feudal families and Arab caliphates
have subsumed their citizens' interests under theirs.
After coming to power in 1979, Saddam consolidated power in a nation riddled
with profound tensions because, long before Saddam, Iraq had been split along social,
122
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ethnic, religious, and economic fault lines: Sunni versus Shi'ite, Arab versus Kurd, tribal
chief versus urban merchant, nomad versus peasant. Thus, a stable rule in a country rife
with factionalism required the improvement of living standards. While serving under AlBakri, Saddam Hussein moved up the ranks in the new government by aiding attempts to
strengthen and unify the Ba'ath party and taking a leading role in addressing the country's
major domestic problems and expanding the party's following. 126 In the words of Tamera
Bryant:
"While running the country as Al-Bakri's deputy, Saddam built an impressive
record of reform and modernization. His greatest reform was nationalizing Iraq's
oil industry. Until June 1972, Iraq did not control its own oil. The Americans,
British, Dutch, and French did. The Westerners controlled production because
they controlled the market. In other words, when the Iraqis tried drilling and
selling their own oil, they suddenly found no buyers for the product. Saddam
changed all this. First, he allied Iraq with the Soviets in return for their promise to
buy Iraqi-produced oil. Then, to split the Western oil coalition, he offered cheap
oil to France and permitted its oil company to continue to develop Iraq's oil
fields. France backed out of its agreement with the other countries. The West's
ability to monopolize the market dissolved, and Iraq took charge of its own fields.
With the world's second largest oil reserves to draw from, Iraq was awash in
revenue. It built new schools, hospitals, a national radio, and television network,
and huge factories packed with the latest production equipments. Rural villages
were wired for electricity, and farmers received modem machinery. A network of
pipelines was laid to transport oil from fields and refineries to port. New
technology was imported to solve countless other problems." 127
Saddam actively fostered the modernization of the Iraqi economy along, with the
creation of a strong security apparatus, to prevent coups within the power structure and
insurrections apart from it, and because he was concerned with broadening his base of
support among the diverse elements of Iraqi society and mobilizing mass support,
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. See Bryant, supra note 32, at 16.
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Saddam Hussein closely followed the administration of state welfare and development
programs.

128

Thus Phebe Marr noted thus:

"On the other hand, Saddam was also exercising his powers in a paternal manner.
He kept hours in his office each week during which citizens could telephone and
have their problems summarily addressed by the President. His picture was
displayed in every manner of place, babies were given his name .... his virtue
became part ofthe party legend." 129
While constructing developments and grandiose infrastructure to improve the lots of
Iraqis, Saddam Hussein became a cult figure, as described by Phebe Marr:

r,,

" ... and young party members emulated his walk, his dress, and even pis manner
ofspeech ... Typical of this adulation was an advertisement in the New York Times
in July 1980 that asked whether Iraq would repeat her former glories and the
name ofSaddam Hussein would link up with that ofHammurabi, Asurbanipol, alMansur, and Harun al-Rashid?" 130
By becoming the embodiment of the Iraqi nation locally and internationally, and
building the Iraqi nation into a strong economic and industrial nation, Saddam Hussein
was propelled into limelight.
Despite Saddam Hussein's illustrious economic and industrial achievements,
Saddam Hussein committed various crimes against the Iraqi people and the Iraqi
nation. 131 At the least, Saddam Hussein is guilty of war crimes, crimes against humanity,
aggression, and genocide. 132 At his trial, at least, seven acts were used to substantiate the
indictments arraigned against Hussein:
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• David M. Gersh, Poor Judgment: Why the Iraqi Special Tribunal Is the Wrong Mechanism for Trying
Saddam Hussein on Charges of Genocide, Human Rights Abuses, and Other Violations of International
Law, 33 Ga. J. lnt'l & Comp. L. 273, 275-280 (2004). (Hereinafter "Gersh").

132

•
Defiant Saddam Rejects Court Charges, CNN.com, July
com/2004/WORLD/meast/07/0 1/iraq.saddam/. (Hereinafter "CNN").
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(a).
(b).
(c).
(d).
(e).
(t).
(g).

The Anfal campaign against Kurds in the late 1980s;
The Gassing of the Kurds in Halabja in 1988;
The Invasion of Kuwait in 1990;
The Crushing of the Kurdish and Shi'a rebellions after the 1991 Gulf War;
The Killing of political activists over thirty years;
The Massacring of the members of Kurdish Barzani tribe in the 1980s; and
The Killing of religious leaders in 1974. 133

Earlier on, we noted that Saddam Hussein flrst became involved in politics at the age of
nineteen, when he joined the Ba'ath (renaissance) 134 Party. 135 After participating in a
botched assassination attempt against Iraqi Prime Minister, General Abdel-Karim Qasim,

in 1959, Saddam was forced to flee the country for several years. 136 Saddam's .true rise to
power began when he returned to help engineer a successful coup in 1963, with help from
Iraqi generals and the United States Central Intelligence Agency, which approved of the
Ba'athists' anticommunist stance. 137 •

VI.

The Killing of the Kurds.
In addition to politically-motivated killings, a great deal of evidence has come to

...
light over the years indicating torture of civilians, generally directed at the Kurdish
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In the northern part of Iraq, Saddam Hussein commenced the "Arabization" of oilproducing areas, and by this, he evicted Kurdish farmers, whom he replaced with Arab
tribesmen. 140 Saddam Hussein was able to achieve this because the Iraqi Kurds were
politically divided, and Saddam could play the factions off one another, in return for
favors from Baghdad-meaning that Saddam was able to take advantage of this disunity
continually to keep them in check and eventually to eliminate large Kurdish populations
altogether.

141
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Because by the spring of 1987, during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, Iran was
already making significant advances in the north, which Saddam correctly ascribed to
assistance from Iraqi Kurds, Saddam decided to deal with "the Kurdish problem," by
tasking his cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid, leader of the Ba'ath Party's northern bureau, with
the job of eradicating all resistance, and granted him emergency powers to do so.
When Al-Majid undertook a series of eight military campaigns against Kurdish
"saboteurs" from 1987 to 1989, he escalated the reprisals, and so, what began as a
counterinsurgency during wartime ended in genocide. 142 Analysis of the documents,

.

conducted by Middle East Watch, 143 led to a report published by Human Rights Watch 144
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that established the genocidal intent of the Iraqi Government against the Kurds.
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According to the report, the documents provide "unequivocal evidence ... of Iraq's repeated
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"

I~

use of chemical weapons against the Kurds" in the late 1980s. 146
"The documents are crystal clear ... on the issue of culpability for the chemical
attack on Halabja on March 16, 1988." 147
The attack on Kurds living in Halabja is, perhaps, the best-known chemical attack
launched during the Anfal campaign against the Kurds. 148
"Between 40,000 and 50,000 people were living there at the time .... During three
days, the town and surrounding district were attacked with conventjonal bombs,
artillery flre, and chemicals-including mustard gas and nerve agents (Sarin,
Tabun, and VX). At least 5,000 people died immediately as a result of the
chemical attack and it is estimated that up to 12,000 people died during those
three days." 149
The attack on Halabja was one in a series of chemical attacks. Other allegedly genocidal
activities included mass executions, razing of villages, forced relocation of Kurds, and
economic blockades to cut villages off from support. 150 Thus:
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"In all phases of the ethnic cleansing program, which began when the Baath Party
first seized power in 1963 and culminated in the Anfal operation, it is estimated
that more than 4,000 villaFes in rural Kurdistan were destroyed and perhaps
300,000 people perished." 15

During the siege against the Kurds, following their attempted uprising against Saddam

.."

p

Hussein, the man in charge of neutralizing the Kurds' threat-Ali Al-Majid--employed a
I'

variety of chemical weapons during the Anfal campaign, including mustard gas--a

~

blistering agent-and Sarin-a nerve agent known as GB. Thus, his penchant for this

['

method of extermination earned him the sobriquet "Chemical Ali," a fearful reputation
for brutality almost matching that of Saddam himself.
According to Peter Galbraith, 152 who secured the documentary evidence for the
Senate and later went on to become ambassador to Croatia, al-Majid can be characterized
as the "Josef Mengele of [the Anfal] operation," referring to the Nazi doctor who carried
out experiments on Jews. 153 Thus, "Chemical Ali" tested both the mustard gas agent and
Sarin, to see which was more powerful:
"It was a deadly experiment to see which of these weapons were the most
effective." 154
According to Professor Kelly, one survivor of al-Majid's April 1987 chemical attacks on
Kurdish villages in the Balisan valley described the effect of the pink, gray, and yellow
gases drifting through the towns 155 :
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the Kurds to secure the documents, seized by the Kurds, which were later used to prove case of genocide
against Saddam Hussein.
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"It was all dark, covered with darkness, we could not see anything .... It was like
a fog. And then everyone became blind. Some vomited. Faces turned black;
people experienced painful swellings under the arm, and women under their
breasts. Later, a yellow watery discharge would ooze from the eyes and nose.
Many of those who survived suffered severe vision disturbances, or total
blindness for up to a month .. . . Some villagers ran into the mountains and died
there. Others, who had been closer to the place of impact of the bombs, died
where they stood." 156

In the annals of internal insurrection, the Anfal Campaign would remain a painful

albatross to legal historians, who would seek to unravel the cause of the dastardly attack
against its own citizens by Saddam Hussein. Of particular is the Halabja campaign, where
over 5,000 Kurds were gassed to death in an unconventional manner. 157 According to a
2002 State Department report, al-Majid's coldly diabolical approach can be discerned
from his methodology of extermination, 158 because having known that the gasses he
intended to use were heavier than air and would thus sink, he opened the March 16, 1988,
attack on Halabja with a conventional artillery bombardment for several hours, setting off
the air raid sirens. This drove the local Kurdish population down into tunnels, cellars, and
basements. 159 According to Professor Kelly, those underground shelters became gas
chambers, as al-Majid unleashed his bombardment of poison. Above the ground, animals
died and birds dropped out of trees. Below the ground, on the other hand, humans met
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their end, trapped. Those who managed to scramble to the surface emerged into thick
160
. al
clouds of chem1c gas :

"Dead bodies - human and animal - littered the streets, huddled in doorways,
slumped over the steering wheels of their cars. Survivors stumbled around,
laughing hysterically, before collapsing .... Those who had been directly exposed
to the gas found that their symptoms worsened, as the night wore on. Many
children died along the way and were abandoned where they fell." 161
Summing up the above events, Professor Kelly had concluded thus:
I ~

"All told, the Anfal campaign against the Kurds claimed between 50,000 and
100,000 lives, by a conservative estimate. However, no single action accounts for
all the casualties. There were multiple mass murders, multiple mass
disappearances, forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of noncombatants,
destruction of 2,000 villages that were classified in Iraqi government documents
as 'burned,' 'destroyed,' 'demolished,' or 'purified,' and the razing of a dozen
larger Kurdish towns and administrative centers." 162
The political murder of the Kurds continued until the overthrow of Saddam
Hussein in April 2003.

VII.

The 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War

We must note that the crimes alleged against Saddam Hussein's forces are not
limited to those committed against Iraqi citizens. Iraq allegedly used chemical weapons
extensively during the Iran-Iraq war, killing an estimated 20,000 Iranians with mustard

gas and the nerve agents-tabun and sarin. 163 While it is claimed that both Iraq and Iran
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repeatedly used chemical weapons, while denying their own use of such weapons, there
is sufficient evidence to support the allegation that Saddam Hussein used chemical
weapons to fight the Iranians. 164 For instance, the reported Iraqi chemical attack at Hoor-

ul- Huzwaizeh on March 13, 1984, was quickly and
"conclusively verified by an international team of specialists dispatched ... by the
United Nations Secretary General." 165
History and posterity would record it that one of the brutalities unleashed upon
the Iraqis was the ill-advised engagement in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. The origin of
the rivalry between Iraq and Iran was founded in the old rivalry between the Ottoman
Turk Empire and the Persian Empire.
According to Professor Kelly, the frontier between Iran and Iraq, to a large extent,
reflects the sixteenth-century collision of the expanding Persian and Ottoman Empires. 166
Subsequently, a treaty between the Persians and Turks formalized a mountainous border
region that indiscriminately split Arabic Sunnis and Shiites, as well as Kurdish
populations on either side. 167

Dec. 28, 2006), (noting that "Both Iran (1929) and Iraq (1931) are parties to the Geneva Protocol that
prohibits the use of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials, or
devices, as well as the use of bacteriological methods of warfare. The use of ... prohibited gases is a war
crime.").
164

• David B. Merkin, Note, The Efficacy of Chemical- Arms Treaties in the Aftermath of the Iran-Iraq
War, 9 B.U. Int'l L.J. 175, 184 (1991).
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• Julian Perry Robinson & JozefGoldblat, FactSheet: Chemical Warfare in the Iraq-Iran War, Stockholm
lnt'l Peace Res. Inst. (May 1984) (reporting that "[f]rom an unexploded bomb found at an Iraqi-attack site,
the UN team drew a sample which its analysts in Sweden and Switzerland later found to be high-quality
mustard gas"), http://projects.sipri.se/cbw/research/ factsheet- 1984.html (last updated Oct. l, 1998).
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After the First and Second World Wars, there were insurgencies and counterinSurgencies on the territories of Iraq and Iran. Thus, both countries sat down to negotiate
an end to the cross-border attacks emanating from the minorities living in both countries.
President Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakri of Iraq entered into the 1975 Algiers Accords with
then Shah Reza Pahlavi of Iran. 168 The above 1975 Algiers Agreement, commonly known
as the "Algiers Accords." The treaty was meant to settle disputes over the lands between
Iraq and Iran (such as Shatt-el-Arab and Khuzestan).
There and then, Iraq's President Bakr ceded 518 square kilometers of oil-rich
territory adjacent to the Shatt al-Arab to Iran in exchange for Iran's agreement to stop
supporting Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq. 169 Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, for economic
and strategic reasons, decided to repudiate the 1975 Algiers Accord. According to Kelly:
"By 1979, however, the political landscape had changed dramatically. In Iraq,
Bakr was dead, and Saddam had emerged as the undisputed strongman. In Iran,
the Shah had fled the country, and the ayatollahs were completing their revolution
amid continuing chaos. In the following year, having consolidated his power and
eliminated any immediate threat from his enemies, Saddam sought to take
advantage of the turmoil in neighboring Iran and restore the Iraqi lands lost under
the Algiers Accords." 170
On September 22, 1980, Saddam Hussein sent Iraq's army into Iran, advancing to
the outskirts of Abadan. 171 Iraq also attacked Mehrabad Airport of Tehran and entered
into the oil-rich Iranian land of Khuzestan, which also has a sizeable Arab minority, and
declared it a new province of Iraq. Most Arab nations and the United States supported
him with artillery and medical supplies during this time.
168
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The new Iranian leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, used the invasion to, in turn,
consolidate his own power and rally Iranians to defend their homeland. 172 Thus began the
great clash between two large oil producers that would result in massive casualties on
both sides, during the ensuing eight years. 173 It must be noted that United States viewed
Saddam Hussein, at this time, as a formidable ally in stymieing the trend of Islamic
radicalism started in Iran by Ayatollah Khomeini:
"As with most Cold War conflicts, the world took sides. Islamic countries were
split between supporting secular Islam, personified by Saddam, and fanatical
Islam, personified by the Ayatollah. The superpowers supported Iraq officially,
but assisted Iran clandestinely, perhaps most embarrassingly demonstrated by the
Reagan Administration's secret sale of arms to Iran that secured funding for the
U.S. intervention in Nicaragua." 174

In the first days of the war, there was heavy ground fighting around strategic
ports, as Iraq launched an attack on Khuzestan, but after making some initial gains, Iraq's
troops began to suffer losses from human wave attacks by Iran. By 1982, Iraq was on the
defensive and looking for ways to end the war. Thus, Iraq quickly found itself bogged
down in one of the longest and most destructive wars of attrition of the twentieth
century. 175 According to Professor Kelly:
"By 1982, Iran had reversed the Iraqi invasion, restoring the border region. By
1984, Iran had driven into Iraq itself, secured the desert around Basra in the south,
and cut Iraq off from the Persian Gulf. Desperate to restore the balance of the war
and stem the gradual Iranian advance, Saddam employed chemical weapons
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against Iranian forces. These proved an effective method of offsetting the
advantage oflran's much larger troop numbers." 176
As the war continued to fare very badly for Saddam Hussein, he reached out to other
Arab governments for cash and political support during the war, particularly after Iraq's
oil industry severely suffered at the hands of the Iranian navy in the Persian Gulf.
While Iraq successfully gained some military and financial aid, as well as
diplomatic and moral support from the United States, the Soviet Union, and France,
which together feared the prospects of the expansion of revolutionary Iran's influence in
the region, the debts accumulated were so staggering that they later led to the Kuwaiti
imbroglio in 1990.
Sensing a victory in the offing, the Iranians claimed that the international
community should force Iraq to pay war reparations to Iran, and thus refused any
suggestions for a cease-fire.
The war continued until 1988, mostly because Iran hoped to bring down Saddam's
secular regime and to instigate a Shi'ite rebellion in Iraq. However, the bloody eight-year
war ended in a stalemate.
There were hundreds of thousands of casualties, perhaps upwards of 1. 7 million
died on both sides. Both economies, previously healthy and expanding, were left in ruins.
Saddam Hussein had borrowed a tremendous amount of money from other Arab states
during the 1980s to fight Iran and was stuck with a war debt of roughly $75 billion. Thus,
faced with rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure, Saddam desperately sought out cash once
again, this time for postwar reconstruction. The desperate search for foreign credit would

• 176

. See Kelly II, supra note 5, at 990.
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eventually humiliate the "Strongman of Iraq" who had long sought to dominate Arab
nationalism throughout the Middle East.
Apart from the fact that Iraqi army suffered great losses, Iraq also used chemical
weapons to inflict great injury on Iran and its Shiite collaborators. A recently declassified
1983 State Department Memorandum assessing Saddam's use of chemical weapons
during this period and noting his personal order to employ chemical weapons quotes
Saddam as saying:
"There is a wea~on for every battle, and we have the weapon that will confront
great numbers." 77

VIII. The Massacre of Marshland Shiites ("Maddans") by Saddam Hussein's
Government.
In the aftermath of suffering setbacks during the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam Hussein's
government suspected that the Marshlands Shiites had given tactical and strategic support
to their fellow Shiites in Iran. Therefore, Saddam Hussein decided to have all of them
exterminated. The extent of the extermination caught the attention of the erstwhile
American Secretary of State, Colin Powell, when he referred to the persecution of the
Marshland Arabs as:
"ethnic cleansing against the Shi'ite Iraqis and the Marsh Arabs, whose culture
has flourished for more than a millennium." 178

177

• Memorandum from Jonathan Howe to Secretary of State Eagleburger, Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons
(Nov. 21, 1983), available at http://www2.gwu.edu/nsarchiv/ NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq25.pdf.
178

• Colin Powell, Powell's Address, Presenting 'Deeply Troubling' Evidence on Iraq, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6,
2003, at AI8; Vasuki Nesiah, From Berlin to Bonn to Baghdad: A Space for Infinite Justice, 17 Harv.
Hum. Rts. J. 75, 97 (2004) ("The treatment of the Kurds and Marsh Arabs in particular constituted
violations of the Genocide Convention that warranted intervention.").
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Along the same line, Baroness Emma Nicholson, a British member of the
European Parliament, has also been in the forefront of holding Saddarn Hussein
accountable for the extermination of the Marshland Arabs:
"Evidence collected and reported during the last 20 years clearly shows that the
actions taken by the Iraqi government against the Marsh Arabs constitute
genocide. The international community, the coalition and/or the United Nations is
therefore obligated to investigate and prosecute those responsible for this heinous
crime. Now that Saddam has been captured, there is a unique opportunity to bring
those who committed this genocide to account ..... The evidence shows that [the]
Iraqi regime under Saddam Hussein carried out concerted and planned actions
that targeted and destroyed the Marsh Arabs as a group: military attacks that
killed and injured large numbers of civilians, and exhaustive draiqing of the
Marshlands in order to create conditions in which the group could not survive.
Consequently, the Marsh Arabs are on the verge of extinction, clearly victims of
genocide. In accordance with their obligations under international law, states must
now ensure that the perpetrators of genocide against the Marsh Arabs, including
Saddam, are brought to trial, and must give all assistance to the new authorities in
Iraq for this to happen .... " 179
With the intention of seeking to offset Iranian military offenses in that region, the
· Iraqi regime constructed large earthworks in the drained land as defensive measures. The
Iraqi government-conducted massive relocation efforts were undertaken, leading, in some
cases, to the Marsh Arabs' physical destruction.
As a result, many of the Marsh Arab tribes supported the Basra-based Shiites'
uprising following Saddam's defeat in the first Gulf War. Consequently, when Saddam
was allowed to crush the insurrection wi.th his remaining firepower, the Marsh Arabs took
their share of his fury. Napalm was loosed against them, and gas was dropped to poison

179

· Emma Nicholson, Case for Genocide: The Decimation of the Marsh Arabs, available at
_http://www .emmanicholson.org. uk/downloads/Case%20for%20Genocide%20-%20 article. pdf (Last visited
on: December 29, 2006).
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the water and kill the wildlife in the marshes, thereby eliminating their food chain. 180 The
villages of the most troublesome tribes were razed altogether.
To punish the Marshland Arabs, the drainage project was accelerated after
1991. 181 Those who were not killed during the poisoning, drainage, and razing process,
and who did not remain on the fifteen percent of marshland that survived, fled to
neighboring Iran. 182 Today, 95,000 Marsh Arabs exist in refugee camps along the Iranian
border, relying exclusively on humanitarian aid handouts to survive. 183 Their homeland
and way of life have been decimated to such an extent that they, as a distinct people, can
be considered to have been "destroyed in part." 184
Also, we must note that these acts were accompanied by an attempt on the part of
Saddam's regime to dehumanize the Marsh Arabs, calling them "inferior and un-Iraqi
monkey-faced people." 185 In addition to punishing the Marsh Arabs for their support of
. the uprising following the first Gulf War, Saddam also moved them off the oilfields
under the marshes. The oil reserves in the now drained areas that were formerly covered
with swampland are described as "vast" and "untapped." 186
I

I'

180

• James Drummond, A People Destroyed by Saddam Yearn for 5,000-Year-0/d Way of Life, Financial
Times (London), Apr. 21, 2003, at 6; David Orr, Iraq "Poisons Marsh Arabs"; Mass Exodus into Iran as
Saddam Assault Threatens to Destroy Habitat, Independent (London), Nov. 27, 1994, at 13.
181.1bid
182

• Assisting Marsh Arabs and Refugees (AMAR) Appeal, Humanitarian
· http://www.amarappeal.com/iraq.php (Last visited on: December 29, 2006).
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. . Mars h Arabs and Refugees (AMAR) Appeal, The Marsh Arabs and the Marshlands,
· Asststmg
http://www.amarappeal.com/marsh arabs.php (Last visited on: December 29, 2006).
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·
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·
I ed Thestger,
Lords of the Lost Waters, Guardian (London), Sept. 10, 1992, at 21.
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· Robert W. Gee, Once Fertile Marshlands Have Become Parched Earth, Atlanta J.-Const., May 12,
2003, at4A.
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Destinies, lifestyles, and cultural heritage were ruined. To the marshlands, the
nightmare may never be over in their generation.

IX.

Atrocities Committed During the Illegal 1990 Kuwaiti Invasion: First Gulf
War (1990-1991).
As a result of borrowing too much to prosecute the ill-fated 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq

War, Saddam Hussein heavily borrowed funds from many nations, including the United
States, Britain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, etc. After the end of the war in 1988,
Saddam Hussein decided to seize the Kuwaiti oilfields. The Saddam Hussein regime is
also accused of committing human rights violations during the war with Iran and the
invasion of Kuwait. In fact, during the first three months of Iraq's annexation and
occupation of the state of Kuwait in 1991, an estimated 5,000 Kuwaiti citizens were
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arrested and 600 were killed. 187 From August 1990 until February 1991, when he was

~;,

.expelled from Kuwait, Saddam Hussein reportedly murdered over one thousand

E~
.....

Kuwaitis.
Detainees reported widespread and systematic torture, such as threats of execution
and use of electric shock.

188

A report, declassified by the Pentagon and submitted to the

UN Security Council, revealed, among other things, the discovery by the U.S. military of
"at least two dozen [Iraqi] torture sites in Kuwait City, most of which were [in]
police stations or sports facilities." 189

187

• Human Rights in Iraq and Iraqi-Occupied Kuwait: Hearing Before the House Foreign Affairs Comm.,
102d Cong. (1991) (testimony of Andrew Whitley, Executive Director, Middle East Watch), at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1991/IRAQ9l.htm (Last visited on: December 29, 2006).
188

./bid.

119

• Report on Iraqi War Crimes (Desert Shield/Desert Storm) (Unclassified Version), U.N. SCOR, 48th
Sess., at 13, U.N. Doc. S/25441 (1993).
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siJnilar facilities have been discovered inside Iraq.

190

Aside from the discovery of torture

facilities, the report presents, in sometimes shocking detail, evidence of atrocities
committed against Kuwaiti citizens gathered through
"written and videotaped accounts from rape and torture victims, photogra~hs of
1 1
murdered Kuwaitis, and videotapes of burial sites and torture implements."
With the discovery of similar torture facilities in Iraq came similar stories of brutalities
carried out against Iraqi civilians who, prior to the fall of Saddam, were understandably
afraid to speak out against the regime. Evidence of these atrocities continues to be
discovered in Iraq and presented to the world.

192

Perhaps, to drive home the point made

by print articles, the Pentagon declassified a video taken by an Iraqi man, who claimed to
have been involved in the taping of many similar videos, that shows acts of torture-such
as tossing bound men off rooftops-and executions carried out by what appear to be
Saddam Fedayeen 193 fighters. 194 There are accounts that:
"similar tapes have been found in Iraqi prisons, military facilities and even the
private video collections of Uday and Qusay, Saddam's sons, who were killed by
U.S. forces in a dramatic July shootout." 195

·190
191
192

. see, e.g., CNN, supra note 132.
•

Report on Iraqi War Crimes, supra note 189.

•

In the three months following the end of the 2003 war, over sixty mass graves were found in Iraq.
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1

Associated Press, Another Mass Grave Found in Iraq, July 18, 2003, http//www.
foxnews.com/story/0,2933,92237,00.html. Some of the graves contained hundreds of bodies, including
women and children, and one grave held over 3000 bodies. Id.; Scheherezade Faramarzi, 3,000 Bodies
· Exhumed at Iraq Mass Grave, Associated Press, May 14,2003,2003 WL 55371393.
193

• The Saddam Fedayeen (Saddam's "Men of Sacrifice") were a politically reliable and intensely loyal
paramilitary force outside the chain of military command. GlobalSecurity.org, Saddam's Martyrs ["Men of
Sacrifice"] Fedayeen Saddam, at http://www.globalsecurity.org/ inteiVworldliraq/fedayeen.htm (last visited
December 29, 2006).
194
•

Bret Baier & Ian McCaleb, Videotape Shows Saddam's Men Torturing Iraqis, Fox News, Oct. 31, 2003,

a~http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,101689,00.html.
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s./bid

166

'·.

x.

The End of Saddam Hussein Era

U.S. forces captured Saddam on December 13, 2003, in a small village near
Tikrit. 196 He was caught hiding in a six-foot underground "spider hole" armed with a
pistol which he declined to use. 197 Iraqis quickly promised that Saddam would receive a

fair trial before the Iraqi Special Tribunal. 198 On December 10, 2003, the Iraqi Governing
Council issued a law establishing the Iraqi Special Tribunal to try Iraqis on charges of
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and violations of stipulated Iraqi laws. 199
The major crime with which Saddam Hussein was charged was genocide.
On November 5, 2006, Saddam Hussein was found guilty of crimes against
humanity in ordering the deaths of 148 Shi'ite villagers in the town of Dujail in 1982 and
sentenced to death by hanging. His half brother (Chemical Ali) and the judge at the trial
of the original case in 1982 were also convicted of similar charges. When the judge
announced the verdict, Saddam shouted "God is great!" and "Long live Iraq. Long live
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• How Saddam Was Captured, BBC News, Dec. 15, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 1/hi/world/middle
east/331788l.stm. U.S. President George W. Bush ordered invasion of Iraq without U.N. Security Council
authorization in order to disarm Saddam Hussein's regime, which was suspected of developing nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons in violation of international mandates. Jim Landers, Adviser: WMDs
Given Up by 1996 but Hussein Wanted to Rebuild Arms Program, Senate Panel Told, Dallas Morn. News,
Oct. 7, 2004, at 1A; Roy Eccleston, Bush Ends the Search for WMD, Australian, Jan. 14, 2005, at 1A. No
such weapons have been found to date.
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at

The Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, at hm>://www.cpa-irag.org/human rights/ Statute.htm; See
· also, Bruce Zagaris, Iraq Governing Council Establish [sic) Special Tribunal and Saddam Hussein is
Arrested, 20 Int'l Enforcement L. Rep. 76, 76 (2004); Peter Slevin, Iraqi Governing Council Says It Wants
to Try Hussein, Wash. Post, Dec. 15,2003, at A9, 2003 WL 67893793.
•
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the Iraqi people! Down with the traitors!"

200

There was a right of appeal, which he

exercised and was unsuccessful. Thus, Saddam Hussein's verdict and sentence further:
"c[a]me under review by the nine-judge appellate chamber of the trial court.
There is no time limit for the appeal court's review, but Iraqi and American
officials who work with the court said that the earliest realistic date for Saddam
201
Hussein's execution, assuming it stood up to review, would be next spring."
On December 26, 2006, the Iraqi Appeals Court upheld the death sentence against
202

ousted President Saddam Hussein

'j .
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"The court rejected an appeal by Saddam Hussein's lawyers and confirmed that he
would be hanged, court spokesman Raed Juhi told the BBC. The appeal was
launched after an Iraqi court sentenced Saddam Hussein to death on 5 November
for the 1982 killings of 148 Shias in the town [of] Dujail. Under Iraqi law,
Saddam Hussein must be executed within 30 days. 'It cannot exceed 30 days. As
from tomorrow [Wednesday, December 27, 2006] the sentence could be carried
out at any time,' appeals court judge Arif Shaheen told a news conference in
Baghdad. He added that there could be no further appeal against the verdict. The
decision of the appeals court must be ratified by Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, but
Judge Shaheen said Saddam Hussein's sentence could not be commuted. " 203

I

Iraqi law requires executions to take place within 30 days of the end of the appeal
process; however, it also forbids the executions of people aged over 70 years old, a status
Saddam Hussein would acquire on April 28, 2007 ?04 On December 30, 2006, Saddam
Hussein was executed, in Baghdad. 205
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Wikipedia, supra note II 0.

• New

York Times of November 5, 2006.
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hnp://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle easti62I 0245 .stm. Published: 2006/I2/26 I5 :49:36 GMT.
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• Ibid.
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• See Wikipedia,

supra note IIO.

2os. See Obituary: Saddam Hussein, of Saturday, 30 December 2006, 05:37 GMT. Available at:
!mp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle east/ I 099005.stm. Last visited: on: January 13, 2007
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A Repeat of the Epic of Gilgamesh: Expulsion of the Ba'athists From Iraq
For a Greater Good.
Every dictator's regime must come to an end at a certain time, though his aura and

charisma may endure for a time. Max Weber had defined charisma as:
"a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart
from ordinary men and treated as though endowed with supernatural, superhuman
or, at least, specifically exceptional qualities." 206
Thus, the 2003 military action has been likened to the old Mesopotamian fable of

The Epic of Gilgamesh. 207 About 4, 700 years ago, Gilgamesh was the King of Uruk-the
present day Iraq, and he was so much a tyrant in his youth that he enslaved young men
and raped young women before seeking redemption and immortality. Heavens then sent a
flood to wipe him and his destructive legacies away:
" ... the storm turned daylight into darkness and smashed the land like a cup .... The
tempest raged ... it poured over the people like the tides of battle .... the great gods
of heaven and of hell wept. ... " 208
According to Geaves Whitney, the flood that swept Gilgamesh and his antics
away meant more than physical catastrophe. It is a transcendent event that obliterated the
old dispensation and introduced a new order of the ages. 209 This work will posit that the
2003 Iraqi military action wiped away a dangerous downward trend in Iraqi political and
social history, and that it was necessary to pave the way for the new. This author agrees
with Geaves Whitney that:

206

• Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. A.M. Henderson and Talcott
Parsons 358 (1947).

207
•

208

Andrew George, The Epic of Gilgamesh: A New Translation (1999). (Hereinafter "Gilgamesh")
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• Ibid.
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see Wh'1tney, supra note 33 .
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"There have been just wars, and Gulf War II was one of them. It dismantled one
of the last totalitarian regimes of the last century. Most of Saddam's Ba'athists
now join the likes of Nazis, Leninists, Stalinists, and Maoists in the dustbin of
history. The war, the latest flood to roar through the Tigris and Euphrates valleys,
swept away much that was evil. But, as in Gilgamesh, the flood also left a fertile
deposit of possibility and hope: the seedtime of a new Iraq." 210
We must not be oblivious of the continuous spate of violence that have been
orchestrated by the remnants of the Hussein regime and other international terrorists that
have made Iraq their harboring place in the aftermath of the deposition of Saddam
Hussein. However, we must avoid the Athenian mistake that occurred after the 406 B.C.
Battle of Arginusae against the Peloponnesians.
Just as it was in Athens in 406 BC, the present day western press, motivated by
extreme sensationalism, utter ignorance, and inordinate righteousness, have castigated the
2003 Iraqi military action as having led to chaos. They remain ignorant in history and
warfare tactics. They failed to look back to the aftermath of the collapse of the Nazi
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regime in old Germany. The decay did not last for long. Although the order sustained by
Nazi dictatorship tended to present a coherent and more regimental life for the Germans,
the liberation that followed was, on the long run, welcome over the evils perpetrated by
Hitler and his fellow fascists. While most people expected an Utopian Iraqi society to
emerge very quickly after the fall of Saddam Hussein, thirty years of dictatorship and
misrule must not be wished away. Nation-building takes a lot of time and patience. We
must avoid the macabre 406 B.C. Athenian mistake in the aftermath of the battle of
Arginusae.
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According to Victor David Hanson, 211 immediately after the macabre Battle of
Arginusae in 406 B. C.-i.e., after destroying a great part of the Spartan/Peloponnesian
fleet in the most dramatic Athenian naval victory of the war over Sparta, the popular
Athenian assembly abruptly voted to execute six of the eight successful Athenian
generals (the other two wisely never came back to Athens) on charges that they had failed
to rescue seamen who were clinging to the wreckage? 12
According to Barry Strauss, in his book, The Dead At Arginusae And The Debate
Over The Athenian Navy? 13

"For a brief moment they were all Athenians. On an afternoon in September 406
B.C., the city of Athens achieved a unity that usually eluded it. It was imperfect
unity, with no women and only a small percentage of Athenian men present --less
than one per cent. Yet those men represented a cross-section of Athens' male
population. They ranged from the richest to the poorest, from cavalier to knave,
from representatives of families so old that they seemed to have sprung from the
Attic soil itself to immigrants from obscure villages somewhere in Thrace or
Sicily. As a group they comprised citizens, metics (resident aliens), foreign
mercenaries, and slaves. They spanned the ranks of the Athenian military, from
horsemen to hoplites (infantrymen), from deck-soldiers to rowers, from the home
guard to scouts. On this afternoon, men who normally would have scorned each
other became brothers. They extended their hands to each other, literally, because
they had to hold on for dear life. They sat not in a Greek theater nor on a hillside
assembly place but on the overturned hulls and ruined planks of twenty-five
triremes. A few hours earlier, these same ships had contributed to a great
Athenian victory over the Peloponnesian navy, an action that wrecked the enemy
fleet and left a Spartan admiral dead. The battle took place off the Arginusae
Islands, a small archipelago between the island of Lesbos and the Anatolian coast.
It was late in the fratricidal Greek conflict that history knows as the
Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.). The men in the water were Athenian
survivors of the battle of Arginusae in 406 B.C. This was one of the largest and
211

• See Victor David Hanson, Our Western Mob: From the graveyard of Kabul to the quagmire of Iraq to
the
looting
of
Baghdad,
April
14,
2003 .
Available
at:
http://www.nationalreview.com/hansonlhanson041403.asp. Last visited on October 31, 2006. (Hereinafter
"Hanson").
212

• Ibid.
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Barry Strauss, The Dead At Arginusae And The Debate Over The Athenian Navy, in 545.160 Nautiki
Epithewrisi [Naval Review] 40-67 (Jan-Feb 2004). (Hereinafter "Strauss").
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most important naval engagements of classical Greece. If Salamis in 480 B.C.
was the great fight that made the Athenian navy, Arginusae was the experience
that unmade it. Yet today, Arginusae is hardly known outside a narrow circle of
classicists, because of a historical accident: Thucydides' history of the
Peloponnesian War is unfinished; it ends in 411, five years before the battle (and
seven years before the end of the war). The tale was left to be told by Xenophon,
a less compelling author than Thucydides. But Arginusae was the largest sea
battle between Athens and Sparta in antiquity, involving over 50-60,000 men on
270-300 ships. By its victory there, Athens should have sealed its survival in the
Peloponnesian War, against an enemy coalition that was more dangerous than
ever, with the inclusion of Syracuse and Persia. Yet only a year later, the
Athenian fleet was destroyed on the beach at Aegospotami with hardly a battle. In
fact, Arginusae was a Pyrrhic victory. Athens won the battle but lost the
aftermath, first because of a storm at sea and then because of a political storm at
home, the so-called Trial of the Generals, which led to the judicial murder of six
Athenian commanders. A tactical victory, Arginusae turned into a strategic and
political defeat for Athens. As a result, Athens' leadership was crippled, making
the city's ultimate defeat by Sparta in 404 much more likely if not inevitable." 214
We must avoid the Athenian mistake, in Iraq. Rather than castigate our Pentagon policy
makers and war directors or our war generals, we must encourage them and appreciate
their efforts in perfectly executing the Iraqi Operation Iraqi Freedom, within three (3)
weeks, with minimal loss of lives. We must remember that the Iraqi military action is part
of the larger war against terrorism. If we take our focus off the goal, we may be defeated

in due course-not only in Iraq, but also elsewhere, as in Afghanistan, Syria, Pakistan,
j,

Indonesia, etc. Just as Xenophon noted, there was a lot of frenzy and shouting among the

!'1

assembled Athenian throng during the trial of the Generals-very similar to cacophony

~I

calling for the heads of the American military leaders after the Iraqi invasion.2
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Thus,
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Victor David Hanson carefully admonished us not to get distracted:

214./bid.

m. See Xenophon, Hellenica; Aristotle, Constitution of the Athenians, Diodorus Siculus, Library, John
V.A. Fine, The Ancient Greeks: A critical history (1983); Simon Hornblower, The Greek World 479-323
BC (1991); Peter Hunt, The Slaves and Generals of Arginusae, 122 The American Journal of Philology,
359. 359-380 (2001); Donald Kagan, The Peloponnesian War (2003).
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"Forget that Sparta felt beaten and was ready for peace after such a catastrophic
defeat; forget the brilliant seamanship and command of the Athenian triremes;
forget that a ferocious storm had made retrieval of the dead and rescue of the
missing sailors almost impossible; forget even that to try the generals collectively
was contrary to Athenian law. Instead the people demanded perfection in addition
to mere overwhelming success - and so in frustration devoured their own elected
officials. The macabre incident was infamous in Greek history (the philosopher
Socrates almost alone resisted the mob's rule), a reminder how a society can go
mad, turn on its benefactors, throw away a victory - and go on to lose the entire
,216
w.
ar
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The focus must be at the long-term goal: removing dictatorship and creating political
stability and enduring democracy in a region filled with despair, hopelessness, bloodletting, and abject immoral leadership that would not shy from using nuclear and other
dirty bombs, should a need arise.
"We can hope that the most recent flood will end the way the deluge in
Gilgamesh does: 'When the seventh day dawned the storm from the south
subsided, the sea grew calm, the flood was stilled; I looked at the face of the
world . . . and the light fell on my face.' It was a new beginning in the land
between the Tigris and Euphrates, a new order of the ages." 217

XII.

Conclusion

The tragedy of Iraq and Saddam Hussein is enough to warn other sit-tight leaders
and despotic dictators that maladministration, misrule, and anti-people programs do not
benefit anybody-including the rulers. To bring their nations into social, political, and
economic woes clearly contravenes common sense. Rather than pummel their fellow
countrymen into submission, it would be better to institute programs that would serve as
launching pads into greater future.

216
217

. See Hanson, supra note 211.
·See Whitney, supra note 33.
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Saddam Hussein, who had the largest army in the Middle East, during his reign,
has now been reduced to a prisoner awaiting his execution for crimes against humanity,
1:

war crimes, and genocide,218 and was later executed. According to Patrick Olsen and
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chris Courtney, recounting his end life prior to execution:

~
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"There is a small palm tree in a garden surrounded by walls near the airport in
Baghdad. An elderly bearded man who has turned to writing poetry and reading
the words of God in recent weeks goes out to the garden for an hour and a half in
the morning and an hour and a half in the afternoon. He tends to the tree, putting
stones around the base and making sure it has enough water to survive Iraq's
midsummer. When his hour and a half is over, Saddam Hussein goes back to his
cell. Once, he had dominion over all of Iraq. Now, he is stripped of all the riches
and delusions; all he has left is a little time each day to cultivate a garden that isn't
even his." 219
On December 27, 2006, after losing his appeal against death sentence (appeal ruling was
delivered on December 26, 2006), Saddam Hussein thereafter made out a belated
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sacrificial vow to the Iraqi peoples. According to the BBC, Former Iraqi leader, Saddam
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Hussein, has said he is ready to die as a "sacrifice" for Iraq, urging his countrymen to
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unite against enemies, and in a letter written from his prison cell, Saddam Hussein said
his death would make him a "true martyr":
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"'I sacrifice myself. If God wills it, he will place me among the true men and
martyrs,' the former leader wrote in the letter, said to have been written shortly
after he was sentenced to death in November."221
Historians would wonder why Saddam Hussein did not make this kind of sacrifice
between 1979 and March 2003, when he was in a position to do so? Why did he sacrifice
218

. See Kelly II, supra note 5, at 983.

219

• See Patrick Olsen & Chris Courtney, Saddam's New Life: Poetry and Gardening, Chicago Tribune, July
27, 2004, at 12.
220

• See Saddam sees death as 'sacrifice', Story from BBC NEWS. Published: 2006/12/27 14:37:19 GMT.
Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hilmiddle east/6212393.stm. Last visited on December 27,
2006.
221
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the lives of over 100,000 soldiers in numerous international and border campaigns,
without any single gain for the Iraqi nation? Why did he squander the oil wealth on
building presidential palaces and mansions and in fighting wars, when such could have
been used to develop the Iraqi nation and citizenry? Why did he brutally murder his own
citizens in the name of "Arabization"? Why cause the nation to go through numerous
economic, military, and financial sanctions by the world and the United Nations?
These questions cannot be answered. Certainly, the Saddam Hussein debacle
should serve as a lesson for other nations engaged in genocidal campaigns. International
law rules have changed, making it easier to prove the requisite intent for a genocide
conviction. Hitherto, genocide was the trickiest of international crimes to be proved,
because it requires not mere intent, but specific intent to destroy an identifiable group of
people. 222 We must note that judicial and legal authorities have interpreted the "intent"
required for genocide to be specific, rather than general.223 According to Professor Kelly,
there are varying rationales that existed for the "specific intent" rule applicable to a
genocide charge, and thus, the higher threshold had meant more proof-proof that was
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almost invariably difficult to come by in the form of intercepted conversations,
correspondence, or documents that demonstrate the perpetrator's state of mind at the time
the genocide was carried out. 224 In some cases, the "specific intent" standard was easy to
meet, because such genocidaires, as genocide perpetrators are known, had meticulously

I·

222

• Matthew Lippman, Genocide: The Crime of the Century. The Jurisprudence of Death at the Dawn of
the New Millennium, 23 Hous. J. Int'l L. 467, 474, 485, 506-07 (2001); William A. Schabas, Genocide in
International Law 385 (2000).

223

• M. Cherif Bassiouni, Observations Concerning the 1997-98 Preparatory Committee's Work, 25 Denv.
J. lnt'l L. & Pol'y 397, 413 (1997) (indicating that the requirement for specific intent is a flaw in the
definition of genocide)
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224

I

. See Kelly II, supra note 5, at 985.
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catalogued, indexed, and documented their activities in excruciating detail, as the Nazis
did when carrying out Hitler's Final Solution.225
A ray of fortune beamed, when the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) determined, in the 1999 case of Akayesu, that the "specific intent" to commit
genocide can be successfully inferred through context, thereby easing the way for
proving genocides in many cases.226 The ICTR held that circumstantial evidence can be
used to prove genocide against the head of state or other state personnel who, directly or

indirectly, participated in the dastardly acts:
"It is possible to deduce the genocidal intent inherent in a particular act charged
from the general context of the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically
directed against that same group, whether these acts were committed by the same
offender or by others. Other factors, such as the scale of atrocities committed,
their general nature, in a region or a country, or furthermore, the fact of
deliberately and systematically targeting victims on account of their membership
of a particular group, while excluding the members of other .poups, can enable
the Chamber to infer the genocidal intent of a particular act. "22

Even if circumstantial evidence is not enough, there is now a new rule of international
law, accepted by eminent jurists of international repute, which serves, also, to prove
liability for genocidal acts: "complicity."228 According to Professor Kelly:
" ... Slobodan Milosevic is likely to be found guilty of only complicity in genocide
as opposed to genocide proper. Complicity only requires a showing of
knowledge. "229
225

.,.
't

• Ibid.
t:

226

227

. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, 1998 WL 1782077, Judgment, P 523 (Sept. 2, 1998).

l

• Ibid.

,.I

at p. 523.
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228

• Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919, 395-409 (200 I); Vera Beaudin Saeedpour, Establishing State Motives
for Genocide: Iraq and the Kurds, in Genocide Watch 59, 67-68 (Helen Fien ed., 1992).
229

. See Kelly II, supra note 5, at 986; See also, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, 2004
WL
2781931,
Judgment,
pp
3,
134
(April
19,
2004),
available
at
http://www. un.org/ictylkrstic/Appealljudgementlkrs-aj040419e. pdf.
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Thus, Saddam Hussein and other Ba' athist members could have been, as well, held liable
on account of"complicity," at the least. What is certain is that the Iraqi nation failed,
very woefully, under Saddam Hussein, that it would take decades to rebuild the nation, as
well as the morale and psyches of the Iraqis. The task of rebuilding has started on a full

..
I

scale. The length is, however, uncertain.
The next chapter, using the March 2003 United States-led military action in Iraq
as a case study, will evaluate modalities, justifications, and the legality of using military
force to rescue a nation from total failure, while in the grips of a dictator and/or corrupt
megalomaniac despot. At the end, the thesis would show that the 2003 military action
may be justifiable, under existing rules of international law, not limited to international
humanitarian laws and international human rights laws.
What remains in dispute is the theory of pre-emptive strike that was used to carry
out the military action. Let us proceed, patiently, into the next chapter.

I
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CHAPTER SIX
ASSESSING CONTEMPORARY RESPONSES TO ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM.

"These terrorists are not 10 feet tall. They are not insuperable. They are not
unvanquishable, but we are. We can win, and we certainly will win."

'•I'

I

,l

-Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary-General, on October 10,2001 *

I.

·~

Introduction.

The natural response to attacks by terrorists operating from the nooks and
crannies of failed states, naturally, is by using force as part of individual and collective
self-defense rights of the victim state. These self-defense rights may be those actions
authorized by the United Nations under Article 39 and/or Article 51 of the United

. ..

Nations Charter. 1 The victim state may also exercise either its "anticipatory" self-defense
rights2 or its "pre-emptive" self-defense rights. 3 Under contemporary international law,
the idea of self-defense as an inherent and autonomous right has its roots in two schools
ofthought. 4 According to the traditional naturalist doctrine, espoused by Hugo Grotius:
"[t]he right of self-defence...has its origin directly, and chiefly, in the fact that
nature commits to each his own protection ... each his own protection.. .''5
*.Statement of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (''NATO")'s Secretary-General, Lord Robertson, at the
Rose Garden, White House, Washington DC, on October 11, 2001. Available at:
www.cnn.com/2001/US/1 0/1 0/ret.us.nato/index.html. (Hereinafter "Robertson's Speech").
1
• See

Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993,3 Bevans 1153, June 26, 1945,
(entered into force Oct. 24, 1945). ("U.N. Charter'').
2
•

Here, the defending victim state takes military action against the offenders and/or the offending state,
when there are clear and convincing evidence of an imminent attack in the near future. However, the attack,
from the belligerent state, is still, a little bit, remote in time.
3

• This entails defending itself in the face of an imminent and overwhelming attack that leaves the
defending victim state with no other choice but to use force to defend itself.
4

• See Oscar Schachter, Self-Defense and the Rule of Law, 83 A.J.I.L. 259 (1989). (Hereinafter "Schachter
Self-Defense").

5

• HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS, bk. II, ch. I, pt. ill, at 172 (Carnegie Endowment trans.
1925) (1646).
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Thus, to the naturalist school of international law, preservation of the self, via
self-defense rights, was regarded as a natural right of the state, as of individuals, that
could not be abrogated or limited by positive law. 6 The above naturalists' position is
supported by the United Nations Charter/ which uses the phrase "inherent right" in its
Article 51 8 description of states' exercise of their self-defense rights. This "inherent
right" of self-defense can, also, be termed droit nature/ (French), derecho inmanente
(Spanish), and neotemlemoe pravo (Russian). 9
Another view of the sources of self-defense rights, under international law, is that
of the Positivists, who espouse that the right of self-defense does not exist independently
of positive law and cannot be altered by it. 10
Under the United Nations Charter, 11 a prerequisite to the use of force in exercising
the right of self-defense, is that the preceding act must constitute an "armed attack." 12

6
• See

Oscar Schachter Self-Defense, supra note 4, at 259.

7

. See U.N. Charter, supra note 2.

8
• Ibid.
9

Article 51.

..

I

. See Oscar Schachter Self-Defense, supra note 4, at 259.

10

r.

See HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 791-92 (1950); D. BOWETI, SELFDEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 187 (1958); Ago, Addendum to Eighth Report on State
Responsibility to the International Law Commission, [1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, pt. 1 at 13, 66-67,
UN DOC. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.l; YORAM. DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELFDEFENCE 169-72 (1988). ("Dinstein 1988").
•

11

. See U.N. Charter, supra note 2.

12

•

• Abraham D. Sofaer, The Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International Law: Te"orism, the
Law, and National Defense, 126 Mil. L. Rev. 89, 96 (1989). (Hereinafter "Sofaer").
,•
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Article 51 of the United Nations Charter permits a nation to act in self-defense in the
face of perceived danger. 14 Thus, article 51 provides that:
''Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of
this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council
and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security." 15
Also, the United Nations Charter permits military action by making provisions for the
United Nations Security Council to take collective measures to restore international peace
and security under article 42:
"Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41
would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international
peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other
operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations." 16
While a state's right to act in self-defense is generally recognized under
contemporary rules of international law, the above two sub-species of self-defense
rights-"anticipatory" self-defense actions and "pre-emptive" self-defense rights are
undergoing changes. While these two separate concepts may seem to imply the same sets
of international rights, they, nonetheless, imply separate and distinguishable sets of
international rights and duties.

13

•

See U.N. Charter, supra note 2, at Article 51.

14

• See Leo Van den Hole, Anticipatory Self-Defense Under International Law, 19 Am. U. Int'l L. Jkv. 69,
94 (2003) (Hereinafter "Hole"); See also Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
at 347 (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
15
· • See

U.N. Charter, supra note 2, at Article 51.

I

I

16

•

Ibid. at Article 42.
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To

avoid

misconceptions

and/or

incongruity,

under

international

law,

"anticipatory'' self-defense is best understood by describing a military action undertaken
against an imminent attack. Such use of force, while appearing premature, is justified
under traditional notions of self-defense. 17
"Preemptive" self-defense, on the other hand, is used to describe the use of force
against a more remote, yet significant threat. 18
This chapter intends to examine international law rules, as well as international
practice, with regard to retaliatory measures and self-defense rights, involving military
actions, directed against terrorists and failed states-from which such terrorists attack.
Contemporary history has shown that failed states harbor terrorists who, in turn, pose
voluminous threat to the rest of the world.
This chapter, and this dissertation, shall, therefore, consider the most recent selfdefense-based military actions conducted under rights, assumed/y, conferred by the
United Nations Charter. These recent examples are the: (a) October 2001 United
States/North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N.A.T.O.)-led military action in Afghanistan,

k•
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and (b) United States-led March 2003 military action in Iraq.
In the end, we shall identify the veritable solutions to be taken towards avoiding
similar military actions in future-especially, avoiding military actions against other
failing states.

17

• See Joseph L. Falvey, Jr., Our Cause is Just: An Analysis of Operation Iraqi Freedom Under
International Law and the Just War Doctrine, 2 Ave Maria L. Rev. 65, 72 (2004). (Hereinafter "Falvey'').
18

• See Christopher Greenwood, International Law and Pre-emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida,
and Iraq, 4 San Diego lnt'l L. J. 7, 9 (2003). (Hereinafter "Greenwood").
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We shall, also, make recommendations for amendments and enlargement of selfdefense rights under international law and under the United Nations Charter.

D.

International Law Rules and Practice on Use of Force viz-a-viz Self-defense.
~.

It is now clear, under contemporary international law and practice, that an armed

I

attack that may trigger self-defense rights may emanate from either traditional States,
from international terrorists, or from failed states. While many international scholars have
condemned the use of force in settling disputes arising from international terrorism, it is

~-

1

now clear that the use of force, either in self-defense or in carrying out anticipatory

D

attacks, has come to stay with us as international standard practice for a very long time.

$.
,.

For instance, United States President Bush, on November 13, 2001, declared that the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against United States constituted an "armed attack"
which placed United States in a state of armed conflict:
"International terrorists, including members of al Qaeda, have carried out attacks
on United States diplomatic and military personnel and facilities abroad and on
citizens and property within the United States on a scale that has created a state of
armed conflict that requires the use of the United States Armed Forces." 19
In fact, President Bush is not alone in his conviction that an armed attack had occurred on

that fateful September 2001 day, the United States Congress also authorized the use of
United States armed forces against those responsible for the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks, and so went on to enact Public Law Number 107-40, conferring upon the
President, the power to use military force in response to the attacks. 20 The Congress

19
•

Military Order§ l(a), 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833.
lo

20
•

Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (authorizing use offorce in response to September 11 attacks).

182

affinned that United States would be justified in the use of force against al Qaeda, based
on self-defense rules under intemationallaw.

21

We may note that it is not only the domestic authorities that had recognized that

lr,
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an armed attack had occurred on that day, albeit from stateless organizations. Several
international organizations and States joined the United States in affirming that an armed
attack had taken place on September 11, 2001-thereby justifying the use of force in self-

I..

defense, under the United Nations Charter.

~·
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For instance, while acting under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states
that an armed attack on one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be
considered an attack against them al1, 22 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
also supported the "armed attack" and "self-defense" theories. 23
Further, the Organization of American States (OAS) also upheld the "armed
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attack" findings justifying reprisals on the basis of self-defense-from the events of
September 11, 2001.

24

The OAS had reached this decision, while acting under Article

3(1) of the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance ("Rio Treaty") which

-~·
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provides that:

21./bid.
22

• See the North Atlantic Treaty (''the Washington Treaty") signed at Washington, D.C., on April4, 1949.
North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246. Available at:
http://www.nato.int/doculbasictxt/treaty.htm. Last visited: July 9, 2006; See also, Statement by NATO
Secretary-General Lord Robertson of October 2, 2001, www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011 002a.htm. See
also Statement of NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson (Oct. 2, 2001), available at
www.nato.int/doculmeech/2001/s011002a.htm. ("[I]t has now been determined that the attack against the
United States on 11 September was directed from abroad and shall therefore, be regarded as an action
covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty ...."). See Robertson's Speech, supra note 1.

23

./bid. Washington Treaty, Art. 5.

24

• See Terrorist Threat to the Americas, Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
Organization of American States, available at www.oas.org/OASpage/crisis/RC.24e.htm
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"an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an
attack against all the American States. " 25
In addition, at the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the
Organization of American States (OAS), the honorable Ministers resolved thus:
"[t]hat these terrorist attacks against the United States of America are attacks
against all American states and that in accordance with all the relevant provisions
of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) and the
principle of continental solidarity, all States Parties to the Rio Treaty shall provide
effective reciprocal assistance to address such attacks and the threat of any similar
attacks against any American state, and to maintain the peace and security of the
continent. " 26

'

··'

Similarly, Australia, New Zealand, and United States, acting under the Security Treaty
Between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America (ANZUS) Pact,27
agreed that the September 11, 2001 attacks triggered the mutual self-defense clauses of
their treaties involving the United States. First, Australia committed its armed forces to
the October 2001 Mghan campaign in support of the United States:
"Australia offered combat military forces and invoked Article N of the ANZUS
Treaty, declaring September 11 an attack on Australia."28
Also, following the September 11, 2001 attacks, New Zealand contributed an unspecified
number of commandos to assist in America's military efforts. From the words of New
Zealand Foreign Minister, Phil Goff:
"[w]e don't need a treaty to tell us what is right and what is wrong." 29

25

• Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, art. 3(1), 62 Stat. 1681, 1700, 21
U.N.T.S. 77, 95 ("Rio Treaty") ("an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be
considered as an attack against all the American States").
26

•

Terrorist Threat to the Americas, supra note 24.

27

• Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America, Sep. 1, 1951, art.
N, 3 U.S.T. 3420,3423, 131 U.N.T.S. 83, 86.

28

• See also Fact Sheet, White House Office of Communications, Campaign Against Terrorism Results
(Oct. 1, 2001), available at 2001 WL 21898781, *1.
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Further incidents on the global stage have also called the scope of self defense
rules and/or actions into play. Just of recent, on July 4, 2006, to be precise, North Korea
carried out series of missile launchings, of which one of the missiles-the Taepo Dong
2-was capable of hitting the United States. Several nations, including the United States,
Japan, South Korea, etc, threatened to strike back against North Korea, based on the
injured nations' inherent "individual" and/or "collective" self-defense rights. According
to the White House Press Release:
"On the afternoon of July 4 (Washington, DC time), the U.S. detected multiple
missile launches from North Korea, including the Taepo Dong 2. The United
States strongly condemns these missile launches and North Korea's unwillingness
to heed calls for restraint from the international community. We are consulting
with international partners on next steps. This provocative act violates a standing
moratorium on missile tests to which North Korea had previously committed.
Regardless of whether the series of launches occurred as North Korea planned,
they nevertheless demonstrate North Korea's intent to intimidate other states by
developing missiles of increasingly longer ranges. We urge the North to refrain
from further provocative acts, including further ballistic missile launches."30
As a fallout of these missile tests, Japan has felt threatened, and so, Japan was

,,
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considering:
"whether a pre-emptive strike on North Korea's missile bases would violate its
constitution, signaling a hardening stance ahead of a possible U.N. Security
Council vote on Tokyo's proposal for sanctions against the regime." 31

.·

According to reports, Japan was badly rattled by North Korea's missile tests on
July 4, 2006, and several Japanese government officials openly discussed whether the

'

.

!•

29

•

World Reaction to Afghan Strikes, AP, Oct. 14, 2001, available at 2001 WL 28752064.

30

• See North Korea Missile Launches, by White House Press Release Office of the Press Secretary
Washington, DC, on July 4, 2006. Available at:
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/prs/68546.htm. Last visited: July 11, 2006.

31

• See Mari Yamaguchi, Japan May Postpone North Korea Resolution, San Francisco Chronicle, Monday,
-July 10, 2006. Available at: http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?file=/nla/2006/07/10/international/i073615D86.DTL&t)pe=printable. Last visited: July 11,
2006.
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country ought to take steps to better defend itself, including setting up the legal
framework to allow Tokyo to launch a pre-emptive strike against Northern missile sites. 32
Thus, according to the Japanese Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi, any
responsive acts must convey to North Korea that Japan would not wait to be attacked:
"I think we must send a message that's as clear as possible. " 33
Talking about self-defense, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary, Shinzo Abe, had surmised
thus:

"If we accept that there is no other option to prevent an attack ... there is the view
that attacking the launch base of the guided missiles is within the constitutional
right of self-defense. We need to deepen discussion. " 34
Going on, Secretary Abe has put the seriousness of the North Korean action as follows:

r
t

r'

~'
"
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"It's important for the international community to express a strong will in
response to the North Korean missile launches .. . There is no mistake that the
missile launch ... is a threat to Japan and the region. It is only natural for Japan to
take measures of risk management against such a threat."35
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In the same way, United States Assistant Secretary of State, Christopher Hill, has

,....-·

described the intimidating North Korean action thus:

........

....,

;at...

"We want to make it very clear that we all speak in one voice on this provocative
action by the North Koreans to launch missiles in all shapes and sizes, ... We want
to make it clear to North Korea that what it did was really unacceptable." 36
Clearly, in the modem age of proliferation of failed and/or weak states, long range interballistic missiles, over developed nuclear weapons, accumulation of weapons of mass

32

33

•

Ibid.

•

Ibid.

•

Ibid.

34

35

36

• Ibid.
•

Ibid.
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destruction, and inability of the United Nations to take decisive actions to curtail clear
acts prejudicing international peace and security, it is clear that a thorough reappraisal
and re-evaluation of international rules and practice on self-defense rights and military
actions.

m.

Expanding the Scope of Self-Defense Rights and Use of Force.
With the above July 2006 North Korean missile imbroglio in mind, an apt

'

;

introduction to this chapter, which deals with the legality and scope of military action that
may be taken against a failed state and international terrorists that may reside in such
states, is to consider the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 of September
28, 2001, that applied to al-Qaeda and Afghanistan by providing that there is:
''the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts."37
Under current dispensation, acts of terrorism appear to have been recognized as a
threat to international peace and security. While the United States, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (N.A.T.O.), and other western States have agreed that an "armed
attack" occurred from the territory of a failed State, in the aftermath of the terrorist
r•

attacks of September 11, 2001, other States and international law scholars have argued

I

I

I

that the acts are not enough to constitute an armed attack justifying reprisals under

'

I

internationallaw. 38
I

I
37

See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 of September 28, 2001, U.N. Doc. S /RES/1373
(200 1), at para. 5

t'
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38

• See the Discussion Forum of the European Journal of International Law, held in September 2001.
During the symposium held by the European Journal of International Law, most writers condemned the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, but did not support the resultant military action. See, e.g., Antonio
Cassese, Terrorism is also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law. Available at:

187

I

'

I'

'

I

.

There is a view that even if the terrorist acts do not formally from a state, but from
a terrorist group, that would be enough to satisfy the "armed attack" requirement under
the United Nations Charter. According to the October 2, 2001 statement of NATO
Secretary-General, Lord Robertson, that evidenced NATO's condemnation of the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, it is now clear that, under contemporary rules of
international law, there is now a broad interpretation of the "armed attack" concept, when

Lord Robertson surmised thus:
"We know that the individuals who carried out these attacks were part of the
worldwide terrorist network of Al-Qaeda, headed by Osama bin-Laden and his
key lieutenants and protected by the Taleban. On the basis of this briefing, it has
now been determined that the attack against the United States on 11 September
was directed from abroad and shall, therefore, be regarded as an action covered
by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack on one
or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack
against them all. " 39

·,

~·

In this regard, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty-the NATO Treaty agreement,

provides thus:
"The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or
North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently
they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the
right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the
Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking
forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it
deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the
security of the North Atlantic area.

--.
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'

http://www.ejil.org/forum WTC/ny-cassese.html. Last visited: July 9, 2006; Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The
Attack on the World Trade Center: Legal Responses, The Law after the Destruction of the Towers.
Available at: http://www.ejil.org/forum WTC/ny-dupuy.html Last visited: July 9, 2006; Giorgio Gaja, The
Attack on the World Trade Center: Legal Responses, In What Sense was There an ''Armed Attack"?
Available at: http://www.eiil.org/forum WTC/ny-gaja.html. Last visited: July 9, 2006; Frederic Megret,
'War'?
Legal
Semantics
and
the
Move
to
Violence.
Available
at:
http://www.ejil.org/journaWol13/No2/artl.pdf. Last visited: July 9, 2006; Alain Pellet, The Attack on the
World Trade Center:
Legal Responses,
No,
This is not War!. Available at:
http://www.ejil.org/forum_WTC/ny-pellet.html. Last visited: July 9, 2006.
39

. See Statement by NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson ("Robertson's Speech), supra note 1.
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"Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall
immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be
terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore
and maintain international peace and security. ,,4o
Clearly, terrorist groups, such as al Qaeda, as well as failed states harboring
terrorists (including Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq), that threaten their neighbors' peace

l,
\.
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!
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and security and/or threaten international peace and security, are now subject to the full
brunt of sanctions, under the United Nations Charter, notwithstanding that a traditional

If!

state was not involved in the precipitating act.

It

Apart from above, the states where the acts emanated may be subject to a military

'· I

attack as well. After terrorist attacks were carried out against United States vessel, SS
Cole, in 1998, for instance, in a letter dated August 20, 1998, United States notified the
United Nations Security Council that the reprisal attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan that
followed were carried out based on United States' self-defense rights, and were:
"pursuant to the right to self-defense confirmed by Article 51 of the Charter of the
United Nations.'.4 1
Clearly, every state has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting
or participating in terrorist acts in another state, or acquiescing in organized activities

within its territory. 42
Whether or not the above position is subject tcfdisagreement among international
law scholars, paragraph 3 of the preamble to United Nations Security Council Resolution
40

•

See the Washington Treaty, supra note 22.

41

• See UN Doc. S/19981780 (1998); See also, Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United
States Relating to International Law, 93 A.JIL 161, 163 (1999); Michael Reisman, International Legal
Responses to International Terrorism, 22 Houston J. Int. L. 3, 47 (1999); Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to
Terrorism: The Strikes Against Bin-Laden, 24 Yale J. Int. L. 559 (1999).
42

• See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 of September 28, 2001, U.N. Doc. S /R.ES/1373
(2001), at para. 8 of the preamble.
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1368 (2001t3 and paragraph 4 of the preamble to United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1373 (2001),44 while authorizing military action against Afghanistan,
expressly acknowledged every nation's:
"inherent right of individual and collective self-defense as recognized by the
Charter of the United Nations.'.45
Clearly, this reference to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter is of importance, and it
undeniably recognizes that, under contemporary rules of international law, the right to
self-defense, whether collective or individual, may arise as a result of acts of terrorism.
Earlier on, in 1990, after Saddam Hussein had invaded the Kuwaiti territory,
United Nations Security Council called for a military action against the Iraqi State, and
passed Resolution 660 (1999) in which the Security Council affirmed
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"
I

·'

'

~

=·
l,

''the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence, in response to the
armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the
Charter." (emphasis added). 46
Holding failed and/or weak states liable for terrorist acts emanating from within their
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territories has received substantial support from the international treaties and conventions

Jt:'
II
.....

forming the body of legislative international law rules. Article 9 of the Draft Articles of

~~
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~ .

the International Law Commission on the Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, adopted by the Drafting Committee on second reading, reads thus:
,\

"The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State
under international law, if the person or group of persons is, in fact, exercising

~I
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43

• See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368 of September 12, 2001, U.N. Doc. S IRES/1368
(2001).

44

• See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 of September 28, 2001, U.N. Doc. S /RES/1373
(2001).

-

45
46

• See
•

United Nations Charter, supra note 2, at Article 51.
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See United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 of August 6, 1990, at para. 6.
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elements of the governmental authority in the absence of default of the official
authorities and in circumstances such as to call for the exercise of those elements
of authority." (emphasis added). 47
Clearly, where, for example, the authorities m Afghanistan have condoned and/or
acquiesced in the terrorist actions that were carried out by al Qaeda from Afghanistan, the
Taleban government may be held accountable for refusing to prevent al Qaeda us their
country as a base.
'I'

IV.

International Statutes Prohibiting International Terrorism.

Perhaps a good starting point for the discussion on the treatment of international
terrorism under international law is Principle 1 ofthe United Nations General Assembly's

:
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48

Friendly Relations Declaration, which provides thus:
"The principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations.
"Every State has the duty to refrain in its international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Such
a threat or use of force constitutes a violation of international law and the Charter
of the United Nations and shall never be employed as a means of settling
international issues.
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"A war of aggression constitutes a crime against the peace, for which there is
responsibility under international law.
"In accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, States
have the duty to refrain from propaganda for wars of aggression.

"Every State has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force to violate the
existing international boundaries of another State or as a means of solving
47

. See UN Doc. NCN.4/L.602/R.ev.l of26 July 2001.

48

• See General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) of24 October 1970, UN Doc. N8018 (1970). Available
at: http://www.hku.edu/law/conlawhk/conlaw/outline/Outline4/2625.htm.
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international disputes, including territorial disputes and problems concerning
frontiers of States. " 49
However, it is the Security Council, the "executive" organ of the United Nations
that is in the forefront of curtailing international terrorism. Consistent with Chapter VII of
the United Nations Charter, as well as Articles 24(1)&(2), 39, and 51 of the United
Nations Charter, the Security Council had taken numerous actions to preserve

••

international peace and security, while curtailing growth, and by promoting global
explorer peace and security.

I

'

In the aftermath of the 1992 bombings of the Pan American Flight 103 and the

Union des Transports Aeriens Flight 772, the United Nations Security Council passed its
Resolution 731 condemning the acts. Under paragraph 2 of the preamble to Security
Council's Resolution 731 of January 21, 1992,50 acts of international terrorism were
proscribed, while conferring upon the injured State the right to protect itselt 1 against
terrorists:
"right of all States, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and
relevant principles of international law, to protect their nationals from acts of
international terrorism that constitute threats to international peace and
security."52 (emphasis added).
Concerning the Lockerbie incident during which United States accused the
Libyan government of Colonel Moamar Ghaddafi of complicity, paragraph 6 of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 748 (1992), was enacted to expressly state the
Libyan Government's obligation to curtail terrorist activities from its territory:
49
50

• Ibid.
• See

United Nations Security Council Resolution 731 ofJanuary 21, 1992, U.N. Doc. S JRESn31 (1992).

51

• We must note that how and the extent to which the injured State may go in choosing to protect itself, its
property, and nationals from terrorists is subject to wide debate.
52

• See

United Nations Security Council Resolution 731 of January 21, 1992, at para. 2.
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"every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or
participating in terrorist acts in another state or acquiescing in organized activities
within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when such acts
involve a threat or use offorce."53
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Also, following the August 7, 1998 bombing of United States embassies in Nairobi,
Kenya and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, the Security Council passed Resolution 1189
(1998),54 wherein it condemned the:
"indiscriminate and outrageous acts of international terrorism that took place on 7
August 1998 in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania ... [and that] every
State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating
in terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its
territories directed towards the commission of these acts."55
Going on, the Security Council called:

1 I •
!_I ~

"upon all States and international institutions to cooperate with, and provide
support and assistance to, the ongoing investigations in Kenya, Tanzania, and the
United States to apprehend the ferpetrators of these cowardly criminal acts and to
bring them swiftly to Justice." 5
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There is also Security Council Resolution 1214 of 1998 wherein the Security Council
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r·
requested that the Taleban authorities in Mghanistan stop providing sanctuary and
training for Osama bin-Laden and the al-Qaeda followers. 57 This was followed by

t j

I'.... ,

-·
kt~
I;
~

~

!

Security Council Resolution 1267 of 1999 which condemned the failure of the Taleban
authorities to adhere to paragraph 113 of Security Council Resolution 1214 of 1998. The

53

54
55

56

•

.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 748 (1992), at para. 6.

• United

Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1189 of August 13, 1998

./bid. See United Nations Security Council1189 (1998), at paras 1 and 5 of the preamble.
•

Ibid. at para. 3.

•

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1214 of 1998, at para. 113.
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Security Council went on to note Afghanistan's failure to: "cooperate ... to bring indicted
terrorists to justice" and that such acts constituted threats to international peace. 58
The above shows that there is sufficient evidence that international statutory law,
as well as international treaties, strongly curtail international terrorism. This is in addition

to the fact that terrorism is a crime against humanity under international customary law.

v.

Previous Acts of Collective Self-Defense as Authorized by the United Nations.
Where international terrorist attacks have occurred, especially where another State

has been injured through those attacks, international law stipulates that the primary entity
to take action is the Security Council via "collective" self-defense rights under Article 51.
After the Security Council must have refused to act, or absent action, the country
directly affected may then act. This is the "individual" or "private" self defense rights.
To reiterate, the United Nations is composed of three principal organs (a) the
General Assembly-the legislative arm, (b) Security Council-the executive arm, and (c)
the International Court of Justice-the judicial arm.
Under the United Nations Charter,59 acts tailored at protecting peace and security
of the whole world and authorizing military actions for collective self-defense are
delegated, exclusively, to the Security Council. Therefore, in the past, the Security
Council has authorized military action as part of promoting international peace and

I .
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security and in exercising collective self-defense rights in two cases-North Korea in

58

S9

•

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267 of 1999.

. See U.N. Charter, supra note 2.
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1950 and Iraq in 1990/1991,60 even if such, indirectly, amounted to an exercise of selfdefense rights by the victim states.
In 1950, North Korea crossed the Demilitarized Zone ("DMZ") between North
Korea and South Korea, and threatened to annihilate the weaker southern neighbor. 61 The
Security Council passed Resolution 83 of June 27, 1950 and Resolution 84 of July 7,
1950, authorizing military action to prevent the invasion of South Korea62 Acting under
''

Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council asked members of the
United Nations to:
"furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the
armed attack and restore international peace and security in the area."63
Under Resolution 84 of July 7, 1950, the Security Council enacted thus:
"The Security Council . . . 3. Recommends that all Members providing military
forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council Resolutions
make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under
United States of America ... 5. Authorizes the unified command at its discretion to
use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean
forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating." 64
It has been argued by some legal scholars that the coalition, led by the United States
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during the 1950 Korean crisis, acted in the exercise of collective self-defense authorized

!
i

by the Security Council, because the Security Council limited its authorization to a
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60

61

62

• See

•
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Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence 274-275 (1994) ("Dinstein 1994")

See D. Saaroshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security 171 (1999).

See United Nations Security Council Resolution 83 of June 27, 1950; and United Nations Security
Council Resolution 84 ofJuly 7, 1950.

63

Ibid. at para. 6 of United Nations Security Council Resolution 83 of27 June 1950; and at para. 2 of the
preamble to United Nations Security Council Resolution 84 of7 July 1950.
64
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• United

Nations Security Council Resolution 84 of July 7, 1950.

195

L

I
I

I
I

I

. 1

.I
I

recommendation, leaving room for the application of Article 51 of the Charter when
asking the members of the United Nations to:
"furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the
armed attack and restore international peace and security in the area." 65
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On the opposing side, is the view that the Security Council delegated its powers

under Chapter VIT to the United States and the group of states acting under unified
command, thereby making the action an exercise of "collective security'' rather than
•

I

"collective self-defense" despite the recommendatory character of the findings of the
Security Council in the 1950 Resolutions 83 and 84. 66
Whatever the disagreement that emerged during the 1950 Korean crisis, the end
result was that the crisis showed that the United Nations Security Council may undertake
"collective" security and/or "collective self-defense" measures, where international peace
and security is being threatened by the belligerent acts of another State.
Also, after the September 1990 invasion of Kuwaiti territory by Saddam Hussein,
the United Nations Security Council, because of the armed attack that had occurred, and
while acting under Chapter VIT and Article 59 of the UN Charter, passed Resolution 661
(1990) and Resolution 678 (1990) which authorized:
"Member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait . . . to use all
necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all
subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in
the area. " 67
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It has been argued, by some international law commentators, that United Nations

Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, and 678, which combined elements of self65

• See

66
•

S.A. Alexandrov, Self-Defense Against the Use of Force in International Law 262 (1996).

•

See D. Saaroshi, supra note 61.

•

See United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990), at para. 2.

67

196

i

defense and collective security, in themselves, were the exercise of collective selfdefense under the authority of the United Nations Security Council. 68
Other commentators have, however, taken the VIew that the 1991 military
operation (Operation Desert Storm) was an enforcement action under Article 42 of the
Charter.

69

'•

We must remember that the 1990 United Nations Security Council Resolution
678 actually permitted use of force in chasing out Saddam Hussein from Kuwait:
"The Security Council ... Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter ... 2. Authorizes
Member States ... to use all necessary means .... " 70

Again, the 1950 Korean Crisis and the 1991 First Gulf War ("Operation Desert Storm")
underscored the rule of international law that the primary authority seized with the power
and obligation to exercise "collective" self-defense rights for the protection of
international peace and security is the United Nations Security Council. As clear from
above, in both of these instances, "armed attacks" preceded the exercise of self-defense
rights.
However, there are instances where self-defense rights have been raised by

actions and claims that expand a state's right to use force beyond the archetypical case of
an armed attack on the territory or instrumentality of that state. 71 Such expanded

68

69

•

See, Dinstein 1994, supra note 60.

• See

Frowein, On Article 42, in B. Simma ed., Charter of the United Nations 634-635 (1994).
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See United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990).

11

See Schachter Self-Defense, supra note 4, at 271.
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conceptions of self-defense are exemplified by the following uses of force by states
claiming self-defense: 72

•

•I

(1) the use of force to rescue political hostages believed to face imminent danger
of death or injury; 73

~
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(2) the use of force against officials or installations in a foreign state believed to
support terrorist acts directed against nationals of the state claiming the right of
defense; 74
(3) the use of force against troops, planes, vessels or installations believed to
threaten imminent attack by a state with declared hostile intent; 75
(4) the use of retaliatory force against a government or military force so as to
deter renewed attacks on the state taking such action; 76
(5) the use of force against a government that has provided arms or technical
support to insurgents in a third state;77

72

• Ibid.

73

• Rescue
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actions were undertaken by Israel in Entebbe, Uganda in 1976 and by the United States in Iran in
1980. Refer, also, to the earlier rescue mission that was carried out in Stanleyville in the then Congo by
Belgium See Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1620, 1629-1632
(1984); Myres McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 AJIL 597 (1963); Romana
Sadurska, Threats ofForce, 82 AJIL 239 (1988).
74

• See, e.g., the U.S. bombing of Libya. See DEP'T ST. BULL., No. 2111, June 1986; GA Res. 41/38
(Nov. 20, 1986); Statement of U.S. representative to UN Security Council, excerpted in Contemporary
Practice of the United States, 80 AJIL 632, 633-36 (1986).

15

• See, e.g., the Israeli action against Egypt in 1967; See also, Yoram Dinstein, The Legal Issues of ParaWar and Peace in the Middle East, 44 St. John's L. Rev. 466, 469-70 (1970). (Hereinafter "Dinstein Legal
Issues").
76

• In the history of military action as responses to military threats, we must remember the Israeli military
invasion of Lebanon in 1982; See also, United Nations Security Council Res. 509 (June 6, 1982); and GA
Res. ES-7/9 (Sept. 14, 1982); Barry A. Feinstein, The Legality of the Use of Armed Force by Israel in
Lebanon, 20 Isr. L. Rev. 362 (1985); W. Thomas Mallison, Aggression or Self-Defense in Lebanon?, 77
ASIL Proc. 174 (1983).
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17

• See, e.g., the U.S. support of the resistance (contras) in Nicaragua. See Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 ICJ REP. 14, 94, para. 176 (Judgment of
June 27, 1986); See also, John Norton Moore, The Secret War in Central America and the Future of World
Order, 80 AJIL 43 (1986); James P. Rowles, "Secret Wars," Self-Defense and the Charter-A Reply to
Professor Moore, 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 568, 568-589 (1986).
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(6) the use of force against a government that has allowed its territory to be used
by military forces of a third state considered to be a threat to the state claiming
self-defense;78 and

(7) the use of force in the name of collective defense (or counterintervention)
against a government imposed by foreign forces and faced with large-scale
military resistance by many of its people. 79
In all of the above circumstances, though international and/or collective peace and

security may not have been threatened, several states faced with belligerent acts against
their own direct interests, had exercised their own inherent individual self-defense rights

prior to the first act to an overwhelming act of aggression occurring.
VI.

An Assessment of the United States' 2001 Military Action in Afghanistan
••

On October 7, 2001, the United States, along with its NATO allies, commenced

I. ~

~:, .

military action against Afghanistan as an act of self-defense, following incessant attacks
against the United States by Osama bin-Laden and al Qaeda In fact, it was only on that
I

•

I

occasion that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") invoked article 5
collective defense clause-under the NATO's Washington Treaty-in the 52-years of
NATO's existence.
A historical excursion is proper here. On August 7, 1998, there were simultaneous
bombings of the United States embassies in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, and in Nairobi,
Kenya. The United States indicted Osama bin-Laden and al-Qaeda as being behind these

78

• See e.g., the U.S. blockade of Cuba in 1962; See also, Myres S. McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban
Quarantine and Self-Defense, 51 AJIL 591 (1963); Quincy Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 51 AJIL 546
(1963).
79

Refer to the military aid to the resistance in Afghanistan given by Pakistan and the United States. See,
e.g., J. COLLINS, TIIE SOVIET INVASION (1986). On the legal claim of the USSR; See Louise
Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by Invitation of the Government, 56 Brit. Y.B.
Int'l L. 189 (1985).
•

.,+

!
'I

I

-'I

!

I
199

I

• I

dastardly acts. 80 By this time, bin-Laden had fled from Sudan to the hidden regions of
.

Afghamstan.

81

Although the Talebans controlled approximately 85 percent of Afghanistan, the
United States did not recognize the Taleban as the government of Afghanistan. 82 As well,
the United Nations Security Council refrained from recognizing the Taleban as the
official governmental authority of Afghanistan, addressing them instead only as:
"the Afghan faction known as the Taleban, which also calls itself the Islamic
Emirate of Afghanistan. " 83
The Taleban conceded that bin-Laden was living in the portion of Afghanistan
under their control. 84 Thus, to bring those implicated to book, United States indicted or
filed criminal complaints against a total of nineteen defendants in connection with the
bombings, and nine of those defendants were arrested quickly, with six of them held in
New York and three in London, who were later extradited to the United States. 85
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80

See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 93 AJll.. 161 (1999) ("Murphy If');
See also, Letter Dated 1 October 1999 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States of
America to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/1999/1021 (1999). This
contains a summary of the indictment.
•

r ;.

81

• Colum Lynch & Vernon Loeb, Bin-Laden's Network: Terror Conspiracy or Loose Alliance?, WASH.
POST, Aug. 1, 1999, at A1; Tim Weiner, U.S. Hard Put to Find Proof Bin-Laden Directed Attacks, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 13, 1999, at A1; Benjamin Weiser, Prosecutors Portray the Strands of a Bin-Laden Web of
Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2000, at 1.
82

• See generally, Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International
Law, 94 A.J.I.L. 348, at 366, fn. 7 (2000) ("Murphy I").
83

See the Preamble and paras 5 and 8 of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 of
September 28,2001.
84
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Thomas W. Lippman, Taleban Says Bin-Laden in Its Sector of Afghanistan, Washington Post, July 9,
1999, at A25.
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. See Murphy I supra note 82, at 366.
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From Afghanistan, bin-Laden called for more attacks against the United States.86
It was the sanctuary given to bin-Laden by the Taleban government in Afghanistan that

drew the ire of the United States. Despite several warnings, the Taleban government
refused to curtail bin-Laden's activities and refused to hand him over to face justice for
his acts. The closely-knit connection between the Taleban-govemed Afghanistan and
Qsama bin-Laden-led al Qaeda that had been nurtured and developed since the
Mujaheddens' days, later proved fatal to the Afghan nation's existence in the aftermath of
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, which then led to the October 2001 military
action-"Operation Restore Hope." Thus, in describing that network and its connection
to Afghanistan, the U.S. State Department's coordinator for counterterrorism stated:
"Today's terrorist threat comes primarily from groups and loosely-knit networks
with fewer ties to governments. Bin-Laden's organization operates on its own,
without having to depend on a state sponsor for material support. He possesses
financial resources and means of raising funds-often through narcotrafficking,
legitimate 'front' companies, and local financial support. Today's nonstate
terrorists benefit from the globalization of communication, using e-mail and
Internet websites to spread their message, recruit new members, raise funds, and
connect elements scattered around the world.
"Bin-Laden and al-Qa'ida represent an alarming trend in terrorism directed against
us. Bin-Laden has created a truly transnational terrorist enterprise, drawing on
recruits from areas across Asia, Africa, and Europe, as well as the Middle East.
Bin-Laden's alliance draws together extremist groups from different regions,
linked only by hatred of the United States and those governments with which we
have friendly relations. Perhaps most ominously, bin-Laden has avowed his
intention to obtain weapons of mass destruction.
"Afghanistan has become a new safehaven for terrorist groups. In addition to binLaden and al-Qa 'ida, the Taleban play host to members of the Egyptian Islamic
Jihad, the Algerian Armed Islamic group, Kashmiri separatists, and a number of
militant organizations from Central Asia, including terrorists from Uzbekistan
and Tajikistan." 81

86

• David Stout, Bin-Laden Denies Role in Embassy Bombings, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1998, at A7; BinLaden Calls for Attacks on More Targets, Washington Post, Dec. 26, 1998, at A22.
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In trying to bring bin-Laden to justice in America, the erstwhile United States
President, Bill Clinton, issued an Executive Order in July 1999 barring the import of
products from Taleban-controlled Afghanistan, prohibiting U.S. companies from selling
goods and services to Afghanistan's ruling Taleban militia, and freezing all Taleban
assets in the United States.

88
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According to President Clinton, in a message to Congress, he indicated that the
above economic sanctions were intended to pressure the Taleban to surrender Osama binLaden to United States custody. 89
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At the international level, m 1999, the United States, backed by Russia,
introduced a resolution before the United Nations Security Council, wherein United
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States sought UN sanctions against the Talebans that were harboring bin-Laden by
allowing bin-Laden to use their territory for launching terrorist attacks. 90
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Earlier on, the United Nations Security Council had previously demanded that
"the Taleban stop providing sanctuary and training for international terrorists,"

91

which

went unheeded, and so, Osama bin-Laden was not produced. Therefore, the Security
Council, on October 15, 1999, unanimously adopted a resolution stating that the
Taleban's failure to respond to the 1998 Security Council Resolution 1214 demand now
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87

• Hearings Before the Subcomm on Near E. and S. Asian Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Comm.,
106th Cong. (Nov. 2, 1999) (testimony of Ambassador Michael A. Sheehan, coordinator for
counterterrorism,
U.S.
Dep't
of
State),
available
in
<http://www.state.gov/www/policy_ remarks/1999/9911 02_sheehan_terrorism.html>.
88

. Exec. Order No. 13,129, 64 Fed. Reg. 36,759 (1999); See also Murphy I, supra note 48, at 367.

89

• Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the National Emergency with Respect to the Taleban, 35
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOCS. 1283 (July 12, 1999); See John Lancaster, Clinton Bans Trading With
Taleban Militia, Washington Post, July 7, 1999, at Al5.
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Colum Lynch, U.S. Seeks Embargo on Taleban, Washington Post, Oct. 7, 1999, at A25.

See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1214 of December 8, 1998, at para. 13.
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constituted a threat to the peace contrary to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The Security
Council also demanded the transfer of bin-Laden to a:
II

"country where he has been indicted, or to appropriate authorities in a country
where he will be returned to such a country. " 92
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In addition, the Security Council adopted further sanctions, that took effect on
.I

November 14, 1999, denying pennission to any Taleban aircraft to take off or land in any

~~

other state. The sanctions also froze funds and financial resources owned or controlled by
the Taleban in other states. 93
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In response, the Talebans proposed for an international group of Islamic scholars

!;., W.ll. h
to look into the matter. However, United States rejected this illegal offer.
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sanctions took effect, there were various protests and attacks in several Mghan cities
against UN offices. 95
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Under the auspices of self-defense, after an armed attack from al-Qaeda, in

:.i
~·

August 1998-two weeks after the bombings of its Embassies, United States destroyed a

92

See United Nations Security Council Resolution. 1267 of October 15, 1999, at para. 23; See also, 9 ILM
235 (2000).
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.lbid., paras. 3-4. Two Islamic nations, Bahrain and Malaysia, voted in favor of the resolution. Passage of
the resolution took place in the context of the Security Council's increasing awareness of the need to
combat international terrorism See, e.g., SC Res. 1269 (Oct. 18, 1999), 39 ILM 238 (2000) (calling upon
all states to prevent and suppress terrorist activities); Letter Dated 23 September 1999 from the Permanent
Representatives of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the SecretaryGeneral, Annex II, UN Doc. S/1999/996 (1999) (statement by permanent members on combating
international terrorism). Concomitantly, the General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, GA Res. 54/109 (Dec. 9, 1999); see Barbara Crossette, U.N.
Votes fora Plan That Would Cut OffFunds for Te"orists, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1999, at Al5.
94
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. See Murphy I, supra note 82, at 367-368.

95

• Pamela Constable, Taleban Greets U.N. Sanctions with Defiance, Washington Post, November 28, 1999,
at A27; Barbara Crossette, U.S. Presses Taleban to Deliver Osama Bin-Laden, N.Y. TIMES, October 19,
1999, at A6; Barbara Crossette, New Sanctions Incite Attacks by Afghans at U.N. Sites, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
16, 1999, at A6.
I
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Sudanese pharmaceutical plant in a missile attack. 96 According to Sean Murphy, the
League of Arab States regarded the Sudanese missile attack as an unjustified and
unlawful act of aggression. 97 However, after the strikes, the Sudanese owner of the plant,
Salih Idris, engaged a team of chemists, led by the chairman of the Boston University
chemistry department, to examine soil, sludge, and debris samples from the plant. The
team found no traces of chemical weapons compounds. 98
Then came the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in Pennsylvania, New York,

I

!I

and Washington, DC.
Prior to the military operation in Afghanistan, the United Nations Security

iJ:

I

11:.~1 '-

Council in its Resolution 1373 expressly reaffirmed the need to combat terrorism "by all
means."99 Further, in paragraph 3(c) ofUnited Nations Security Council Resolution 1373
' I[

I

(2001), the Council called upon all States to:

I

l j

'I

"cooperate, particularly through bilateral and multilateral arrangements and
agreements, to prevent and suppress terrorist attacks and take action against such
perpetrators ofsuch acts." 100
Also, in paragraph 8 ofResolution 1373 (2001), the United Nations Security Council:
"expresses its determination to take all necessary steps in order to ensure the full
implementation of this resolution, in accordance with the responsibilities under
the Charter" 101

96

• See Murphy I, supra note 82, at 368; See also, James Risen, To Bomb Sudan Plant, or Not: A Year
Later, Debates Rankle, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1999, at Al.
97

• Ibid; See also, Council of the League of Arab States Res. 5896, para. 7 (Sept. 13, 1999), reprinted in
Letter Dated 23 September 1999 from the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United
Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/1999/997, annex, para. 7 (1999).

98

• See Murphy I, supra note 82, at 368; see also, James Risen & David Johnston, Experts Find No Arms
Chemicals at Bombed Sudan Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1999, at A3; Vernon Loeb, A Dirty Business,
Washington Post, July 25, 1999, at F 1.

99
· • United

100

Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001).

• Ibid.
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After the United States and its allies commenced the military action against the
Taleban government of Mghanistan in October 2001, on the grounds that terrorists were
using the Mghan territory as bases for launching attacks against United States' interests,
the legality of the military action has been appraised ever since by international law
commentators.
First, we must note that the Security Council was hesitant in formally stating the
r

existence of self-defense rights in favor of the United States in clear terms. While

··~

characterizing the events in New York, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania on
•. l;l!llll.:t

September 11, 2001, the United Nations Security Council avoided speaking of an "armed

.I W?r:,

i, •~1;
•,)r
,,

attack," as required under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Instead, the United

~

'01.

: ~jtr.rl

.I .,

Nations Security Council used the term: "terrorist attack," without expressly linking this

:1

'

j

I

notion to Article 51 of the Charter, which is mentioned in a separate paragraph. The
difference in wording becomes particularly evident, if one compares the wording of

.li
Security Council Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001) with Security Council
Resolution 660 (1999), in which the Council affirmed:
"the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence, in response to the
armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the
Charter." 102
Second, in its two resolutions concerning the September 11, 2001 attacks (i.e.,

'

I

jp,.

¢

r'.

':j
i

I

'd

United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373), the United Nations
Security Council did not mention either a specific state as the holder of the right to self-

101 • lb"d
1 •
102

• See

'·

:\

at para 8.

.·:.
I

para. 6 of United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 (1990) of6 August 1990.

i
I
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defense, or that Afghanistan, or another State, was the concrete author of the terrorist
attacks.
J

'I'

Third, the Security Council expressly refrained from attributing the September 11,

2001 attacks to the Taleban regime. This omission gains even more importance, if one

..

takes a closer look at Security Council Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000), in
which the Security Council made explicit statements with regard to the Taleban,
condemning the continuing use of Afghan territory, especially areas controlled by the
Taleban "for the sheltering and training of terrorists and the planning of terrorist acts," 103
allowing Osama bin-Laden and others associated with him to:
"operate a network of terrorist training camps from Taleban-controlled territory
and to use Afghanistan as a base from which to sponsor international terrorist
operations." 104
Fourth, according to some international law scholars, there is a strict

interpretation of the right of self-defense, and that the common understanding of an
"armed attack," as required by the wording of Article 51 of the Charter, goes beyond the
I

mere toleration ofterrorist activity.

~ .

105

~.:.

r,

Fifth, other international law scholars have also referred to the International Court

'

of Justice ("I.C.J.")'s decision in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against

103

• See para. 5 of the preamble to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999) of October 15,
1999 and para. 7 of the preamble to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1333 (2000) of December
19,2000.
104

• See

para. 6 of the preamble to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999).

105

• See Gregory M. Travalio, Te"orism, International Law, and the Use of Military Force, 18 Wis. Int'l
-L.J. 145, 159 (2000); SageR. Knauft, Proposed Guidelines for Measuring the Propriety of Armed State
Responses to Te"orist Attacks, 19 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 763, 772 (1996).
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Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 106 as denying the existence of individual self-defense right

where alleged state-sponsored armed attacks were bases for the exercise of the selfdefense rights. They further argued that a broad interpretation of state-sponsored armed
attacks would open the door for abuse and the use of self-defence as "a mere cover for

!
'I I.

. disgwse
. d as protection.
. ,107
aggresston
Sixth, the September 11, 2001 attacks, of itself, created some peculiarities,

because additional complications arise from the fact that the terrorist acts themselves did
not emanate directly from the territory of Mghanistan, making it difficult to invoke
Taleban involvement in the attack by way of the toleration of the use of force by private
.
.
108
persons from therr temtory.
Seventh, one other fact that is worth noting is that the Security Council has so far

refrained from recognizing the Taleban as the official governmental authority of

'

Afghanistan, addressing them instead only as:

t:
I

"the Mghan faction known as the Taleban, which also calls itself the Islamic
Emirate of Mghanistan." 109
Thus, the case would, therefore, have to be made that the Taleban and Osama bin-Laden
(together with the groups he controls) are so closely linked that bin-Laden's terrorist
activities can be attributed to the de facto government of the state. 110
106

• Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 ICJ REP.
14, 94, para. 176 (Judgment of June 27, 1986).

107

• See the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Jennings in the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 ICJ REP. 14, 94, para. 176 (Judgment of June 27, 1986).
108

• For an insightful discussion of the practice concerning state-related toleration of the use of force by
private persons, see C. KreB, Gewaltverbot und Selbstverteidigungsrecht nach der Satzung der Vereinten
Nationen bei staatlicher Verwicklung in Gewaltakte Dritter, at 268 et seq.

09

! • See para. 1 of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999) and para. 7 of the preamble to
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1333 (2000).
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Eighth, even United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 was highly

incongruous as the right to use force was stated therein with implication only. Thus, it is
particularly striking that the findings of the Council with respect to action by states,
which could possibly be interpreted as an authorization of self-defense or the use of the
force, 111 are not contained in the operative part of Resolution 13 73 (200 1), but only in its
preamble, where the Council reaffirms:
''the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts." 112

",
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Vll.

Argument in Support of United States' 2001 Military Action in Afghanistan.

t

l '
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United States has based its 2001 military campaign against al-Qaeda and

f

I

Afghanistan, on Article 51 of the United Nations' Charter113 which provides thus:
"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of
this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council
and shall not, in any way, affect the authority and responsibility of the Security
Council, under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary, in order to maintain or restore international peace and security." 114
No one would doubt that the United States has an inherent right to defend itself and its
interests.

I

"'.

•' 1

.'1.

~I

• See para. 1 of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999) and para. 7 of the preamble to
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1333 (2000).
111

• See Jordan J. Paust, Comment: Security Council Authorization to Combat Terrorism in Afghanistan,
ASIL Insight, October 23,2001, www.asil.org/insights.htm.
112

• See para.

113
114

5 ofUnited Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 of September 28,2001.

. See U.N. Charter, supra note 2, at Art. 51.
• Ibid.
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Whatever the misgivings against the military action undertaken by the United
States and its allies against al-Qaeda and Mghanistan in October 2001 following the
September 2001 terrorist attacks against United States, an historical and critical
assessment of the facts would appear to justify the military action. According to United
States War Crimes Ambassador Pierre Prosper:
"These aggressors initiated a war that under international law they have no legal
right to wage ... And their conduct, in intentionally targeting and killing civilians
in a time of international armed conflict, constitute war crimes". 115
Assessing the military action within the context of prevailing international law

,lrj

lt;.~..r.

J.~!ll

rules and international practice would also underscore the legality and justification for the
2001 Mghan campaign. While informed minds may differ, it appears that an "armed
attack" had occurred.

i

II
First, the scope and intensity of the attacks were too far-reaching and of high

I

t'

II
t

· magnitude. United States President, George Bush, had always been of the position that

,,

I

the scope and intensity of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York,
Pennsylvania, and Washington, DC, along with repeated doggedness of al-Qaeda in

~[ I

initiating further attacks against United States, its citizens, and interests, are clear
examples of terrorist actions. 116 In reply, however, to the argument that the attacks were
initiated by non-state actors and so cannot be attributed to Mghanistan, United States had
disagreed.

f.
115

• Pierre-Richard Prosper, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, Status and Treatment ofTaleban
and al-Qaida Detainees, Remarks at Chatham House, London, United Kingdom, 20 February 2002,
<http://www.state.gov/s/wci/r1s/rm/2002/849l.htm>, 23 October 2002.
116

• See

President George Bush's Military Order ofNovember 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of

.CCrtain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, § 1(a), 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (2001), also available at
WWW. whitehouse.gov/news/re1eases/2001/ 11/20011113-27 .html ("Military Order'')
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Secondly, based on the magnitude of the attacks, some scholars have argued that
an "armed attack" within the United Nations Charter had occurred. Also, according to
John C. Yoo and James C. Ho, United States government has concluded that the attacks
of September 11, 2001 have placed the United States in a state of armed conflict, to
which the laws of war apply, that United States has also determined that members of the

a1 Qaeda terrorist network and the Taleban militia are illegal combatants under the laws
of war, and so cannot claim the legal protections and benefits that accrue to legal
belligerents, such as prisoner of war status under the Third Geneva Convention of
1949. 117 After the September 11, 2001 attacks, it was clear that terrorist attacks may no
longer be strictly termed as domestic attacks.
The standard for deciding the "level of intensity" that raises terrorist attacks from
a mere domestic crime to a devastating terrorism incident is that stated in the 1996
Amended Protocol II to the 1980 United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, 118 which requires that the

...'
'•

attacks must not be mere riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a

II.,,

rI 1

similar nature, which do not constitute "armed conflict." 119
Undeniably, the magnitude of the economic, personal, and physical destruction

~

,f,

I

caused by the September 11, 2001 attacks is unrivalled. As Yoo and Ho noted:
117

• See John C. Yoo & James C. Ho, International Law and the War on Terrorism, dated August 1, 2003,
at
page
1.
Available
at:
http://www.law .berkeley.edu/students/curriculamrograrnslils/papers/yoonyucombatants.pdf. Last visited:
July 11, 2006 ("Yoo & Ho"); See also, Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. 3364 ("GPW''); Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer, Feb. 7, 2002,
available at www.wbitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-6.html; Katherine Q. Seelye, In Shift,
Bush Says Geneva Rules Fit Taleban Captives, N.Y. Times, at A1 (Feb. 8, 2002).
118

. Art. 1(2), S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-1, at 39 (1997).

210

I
'I

"There can be no doubt that, whatever the "level of intensity" required to create
an armed conflict, the gravity and scale of the violence inflicted on the United
States on September 11 crossed that threshold ... the terrorists have carried on a
sustained campaign against the United States, culminating, on September 11 with
a devastating series of coordinated attacks resulting in a massive death toll." 120
Third, a historical study of attacks by al-Qaeda, and the Taleban government of

!i.

I.

;;·

Afghanistan against United States and against United States' interests, as well as the level
and intensity of the September 11, 2001 attacks, would appear to justify the military

I'

I

action against al-Qaeda and the Taleban government in Mghanistan.
l.':til!

Prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks, al-Qaeda and the Taleban government in

:,

;1
[
.1

Afghanistan, have collaborated to wreak havoc and destruction on the territory of United

I

Will ' •

.I

~

~·!i',.
I

•

t~· ~!t:u

States and against United States' interests.
Speaking about the intensity and scope of the September 11, 2001 terrorist

' Il l

attacks, it is clear that the attacks were not simple acts of a depraved mind, but were
carefully orchestrated by a philosophically charged "movement" bent on disrupting world
events. Thus, on September 11, 2001, four coordinated terrorist attacks took place in
rapid succession, aimed at critical government buildings in our nation's capital and the

...

heart of our national financial system-terrorists hijacked four airplanes--Qne crashed
into the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia and two into the World Trade Centers in New
York City, with the fourth, which was headed towards either the White House or
Congress in Washington, D.C., crashing in Pennsylvania after passengers apparently

120

. See Yoo & Ho, supra note 117, at 6.
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attempted to regain control of the aircraft. 121 According to Judge George H. Aldrich, of

the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 122 the attack:

r

''resulted in very substantial material damage and the loss of life by some three
thousand persons, the great majority of whom were civilians." 123
Also, according Y oo and Ho:
"The attacks caused about three thousand deaths and thousands more injuries,
disrupted air traffic and communications within the United States, closed the
national stock exchanges for several days, and caused damage that has been
estimated to run into the billions of dollars." 124
Historically, there have been the following terrorist acts: 125
(a).
(b).
(c).
(d).

The bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993; 126
The attack on a U.S. military housing complex in Saudi Arabia in 1996;
The bombing of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998; and
The suicide bombing of the U.S.S. Cole127 in 2000.128

i,
I.

I

§I

I'
121

. 1bid.

122

• See George H. Aldrich, The Taleban, al Qaeda, and the Determination of fllegal Combatants, 4 Das
Thema 202 (2002) A publication of Institute for International Law ofPeace and Armed Conflict.
123

• Ibid.

124

• See

at 202.

Yoo & Ho, supra note 117, at 2.

125

• See, e.g., Yonah Alexander & MichaelS. Swetnam, Usama bin-Laden's al-Qaida: Profile of a Terrorist
Network 1 (2001); See also, Three decades of terror, Fin. Times, Feb. 7, 2003, available at 2003 WL
3918586; Military Order § 1(b), 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833; United States Department of State, Patterns of
Global Terrorism 2001, at 105 (May 2002), available at www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2001/pdf/ ("Global
Terrorism").

126

• See Malcolm Gladwell, At Least 5 Die, 500 Hurt as Explosion Rips Garage Under World Trade Center,
Washington Post, Feb. 27, 1993, at AI; Malcolm Gladwell, Sheik, 9 Others Convicted in N.Y. Bomb,
Washington Post, Oct. 2, 1995, at A1 ("The Feb. 26, 1993, World Trade Center bombing ... killed six
people, injured more than 1,000 and did $ 500 million worth of damage.").
127
•

See Susan Page, A Decade of Terrorism, USA Today, Nov. 12, 2001, at 9A (stating that the blast
caused by a terrorist attack against the U.S.S. Cole killed seventeen U.S. sailors).
128

. lbid. Yonah Alexander & MichaelS. Swetnam supra note 125.
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According to Yoo and Ho, even after the Afghan military campaign had commenced, alI
I

Qaeda continued to carry out its terrorist campaign against the United States and its allies
and interests abroad to this day:

"'

We must remember that al-Qaeda's strategy is a catalytic strategy which seeks to inspire
the Moslem constituency to mutiny or to provoke a broader confrontation. 131 It also
possesses an instrumental strategy that seeks an immediate gain or concession of some
sort, and/or it seeks to deter United States' policy in the Middle East. 132 Thus, the
continuity and unbroken sequence of the various attacks by al Qaeda from its base in the
Afghan caves and mountains against American and western interests show a magnitude,
hitherto unwitnessed before, even from a non-state actor and a failed state with a
unrecognized de facto govemment. 133

• See

I

I

129

"It [al-Qaeda] is believed to have been responsible for, or connected with,
numerous terrorist incidents following September 11, including the December
2001 attempt by al Qaeda associate Richard Colvin Reid to ignite a shoe bomb on
a transatlantic flight from Paris to Miami, an April 2002 explosion at a synagogue
in Djerba, an October 2002 explosion on a French oil tanker off the Yemeni coast,
a series of bombs on the Indonesian resort island of Bali that same month, and
two attacks on Israeli targets in Kenya in November 2002." 130

129

~

Yoo & Ho, supra note 117, at 3.

l30.lbid.
131

• Carl Conetta, Dislocating Alcyoneus: How to combat al-Qaeda and the new terrorism, Project on
Defense Alternatives Briefing Memo #23, delivered on June 25, 2002. Available at:
http://www.comw.org/pda/0206dislocate.html. Last visited on July 6, 2006.
132

.lbid.

133

• Paul Wilkinson, The Strategic Implications of Te"orism, in Terrorism and Political Violence: A
Sourcebook (M.L. Sandhi, ed. 2000); Bruce Hoffman, The mind of the te"orist: Perspectives from social
psychology, 29 Psychiatric Annals 6 (1999); Bruce Hoffinan, The Modem Terrorist Mindset: Tactics,
Targets and Technologies (1997); and, Ariel Merari, Te"orism as a Strategy of Insurgency, 5 Terrorism
and Political Violence 4 (1993).
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As a result, al Qaeda attempts to use terror both instrumentally-as in its
assassination of Ahmad Shah Massoud, immediately before the Afghan campaign,-and
as a catalyst. Its global acts emphasize catalytic ends. The catalytic employment of terror
is of greatest concern-both because it tends toward large-scale destruction far removed
:from any specific battlefield and because al-Qaeda happens to have an attentive,
. audi ence. 134
responsive

Fourth, another justification for the Afghan campmgn is that the Geneva
Convention (Ill) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of W ar 135 and International
Practice state that non-state actors could initiate an "armed attack" against another State.
For instance, a provision common to all four Geneva Conventions, for example, creates
certain minimum standards of treatment of prisoners of war and civilians that apply "[i]n
the case of armed conflict not of an international character" occurring within the territory
of a Party. 136 This non-international character conflict is similar to al Qaeda terrorist
attacks.

Fifth, under Article 3 of the Red Cross Conventions, an "armed conflict" exists
when the government is "obliged to have recourse to its regular military forces.

137

Thus,

these provisions make it plain that the laws of armed conflict may apply to more intense

!·I

!

levels ofhostilities conducted by a non-state actor, and they also illustrate that the trigger

134

. See Carl Conetta, supra note 131.

135

• Geneva Convention (ill) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
T.I.A.S. 3364 ("GPW'').
136

i•

See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 3, 6
U.S.T. at 3518.
•

•

137
•

G.I.A.D. Draper, The Red Cross Conventions 15-16 (1958), Art. 3; See also, 3 U.S. Practice § 2, at
3443 (1995).
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for applying these requirements is the crossing of a certain threshold of violence. 138 To
y 0 oandHo:

"Thus, it has long been recognized that formal concepts of 'war' do not constrain
application of the laws of armed conflict and that non-state actors are properly
bound by certain minimum standards of international law when they engage in
armed hostilities." 139
Sixth, in addition, the political, social and economic objectives of al Qaeda and

J :
I

the Talebans evidence a warlike prerogative that cannot be denied by most international
law scholars. As Carl Conetta had rightly noted:
"The 11 September attacks were not only acts of asymmetric warfare, they were
the acts of an asymmetric foe: al-Qaeda. Its organizational structure is that of a
distributed transnational network composed of semi-autonomous subnational
elements. This makes it relatively immune to the type of counter-measures that
might work well against traditional nation-state adversaries. Indeed, the strategy
of this foe depends on provoking a standard military response -- preferably one
that drives a wedge between the Muslim and non-Muslim segments of humanity.
AI Qaeda's terrorist violence is neither "nihilistic", as some have asserted, nor is it
narrowly instrumental. Instead, it is catalytic-meaning that it aims to provoke a
wider conflict and mobilize a larger constituency." 140

.
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showed itself on September 11, 2001 was neither random nor existential, being particular
and historical. 141 The attacks were the worst in a series of assaults drawing attention to alQaeda and to the phenomena of the "new terrorism" specifically, since
"What is uniquely worrisome about al-Qaeda is its size, resource base, energy,
sophistication, global reach, and inclination to conduct mass casualty attacks. Of

138

·

. See Yoo & Ho, supra note 117, at 7.

139

• Ibid.

140

. See Carl Conetta, supra note 131.

141.

Ibid.
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Seventh, another reason why the war in Afghanistan would be justified is based on

the need to avoid rewarding terrorists. As was noted by Carl Conetta, the threat that

'111

L
'I
I

particular concern to the United States is that the organization has specifically
targeted US assets and the US homeland." 142

Thus, to use false arguments in avoiding meting punishment out to al Qaeda would be
sending a wrong message out to other terrorist groups that they, too, can act with
impunity, and escape punishment. As contemporary international practice has shown, the
July 2006 Hezbollah attacks on the Israeli state, and the abduction of two Israeli soldiers
were based on similar assumption of impunity, as existed during bin-Laden's days of

:'

~

,,

terror. Unless appropriate sanctions are meted out to these terrorists, others would feel
emboldened to follow suit.
In the same vein, Yoo and Ho have surmised that the world must be wary of
taking a wrong approach to the growing terrorism menace, because in the past, usually
only a sovereign or quasi-sovereign entity with authority over a substantial territory could
have the resources to mount and sustain a series of attacks of sufficient intensity to reach
the level of a ''war" or "armed conflict." 143
"The terrorist network now facing the United States has found other means to
finance its campaign while operating from the territory of several different nations
at once. Indeed, as we have witnessed subsequent to September 11, 2001 - al
Qaeda's fielding of forces on the battlefield in Mghanistan; its efforts to develop
or acquire weapons of mass destruction - terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda
have now acquired the military power that once only rested in the hands of nationstates."144

142./bid.

,jl

143

· . See Yoo & Ho, supra note 117, at 8.
144

r

• Ibid.
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Undeniably, the September 11, 2001 attacks were a "decapitation" strike, that is,

an effort to eliminate the civilian and military leadership of the United States with one
stroke. 145 In fact, Osama bin-Laden had freely admitted that:

'

~I,
I

"We are seeking to incite the Islamic nation to rise up to liberate its land and to
146
conduct jihad for the sake of God. "

,o

I

\

The attacks were meant to have a far-reaching effect because, in addition to
killing the nation's leaders, al Qaeda sought to disrupt United States' economy by
destroying the main buildings in New York City's fmancial district. 147 Thus, Yoo and Ho
have opined that:

~.
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I
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"The attacks were coordinated from abroad, by a foreign entity, with the primary
aim of inflicting massive civilian casualties and loss. AI Qaeda executed the
attacks not in order to profit, but to achieve an ideological and political objectivein this case, apparently, changing U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Indeed,
the head of al Oaeda, Usama bin-Laden, declared war on the United States as
early as 1996." 14l
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From the above, there is no doubt that the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks
constituted an "armed attack," triggering United States collective and individual selfdefense rights. Also, it is clear that the scope, magnitude, and effect of the attacks justify
the resultant military action in Afghanistan. This is because al Qaeda was planning future
attacks of similar magnitude. Without sustained efforts at eradicating terrorism globally,
oI

145

• Ibid.

at 4.

146

• See June 1999 al-Jazeera interview, A sampling of quotations from Osama bin-Laden, Reuters,
September 20, 2001; See also, Magnus Ranstorp, Interpreting the broader context and meaning of BinLaden's fa twa, 21 Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 4 ( 1998).
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. See Yoo & Ho, supra note 117, at 4.
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• Ibid.; See also, United States Department of State, Fact Sheet: The Charges Against International
Terrorist Usama bin-Laden ( 1999), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topicaVpoVterror/99129502.htm.
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and flushing the terrorists from their hideouts-taking away the capability to launch

.
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future attacks, humanity, civilization, and global peace may be heading for extinction.

VUI. Argument Against United States' Led 2001 Military Action in Afghanistan.
The starting point in this regard is Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter
which provides that:
"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." 149
There is also the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 103-the "nonintervention" principle:
"Recognizing that full observance of the principles of non-intervention and noninterference in the internal and external affairs of sovereign States and peoples,
whether direct or indirect, overt or covert, is essential to the fulfilment of the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations .... " 150
According to Slaughter & Burke-White,
"In 1945, the nations of the world, concerned about the continuing threat of
interstate aggression, committed to a basic principle of not using force in
interstate relations. The principle was articulated in Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter.... " 151
One of the foremost challenges to the United States' military action in
Afghanistan is based on implication. It has been argued that the United States was not
subjected to an armed attack in the context of international law, when the September 11,

149
ISO

• See

U.N. Charter, supra note 2, at article 2(4).

. See G.A. Res. 103, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 79, U.N. Doc. N36/51 (1981)

tst. See Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International Constitutional Moment, 43 Harv.
lnt'l L.J. l, l-2 (2002).
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2001 terrorist acts took place. 152 Mariam Hall, for instance, had argued that, because the
attacks were perpetrated by a terrorist group and not a recognized state or government,
then, no armed attack under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter occurred: 153
"Regardless of whether the UN has implicitly sanctioned the military action by
the US and its allies and that the US has complied with the conditions set out in
Article 51 and its military action satisfies the criteria set out in the Caroline case,
the US still has to justify its action against Afghanistan. In order to do so, it must
be able to attribute the actions of the AI Qaeda network to the Taleban
Government of Afghanistan to justify an action of self-defence against Afghan
territory." 154

I~!
I

I.

In the same way, Avril McDonald had argued that the 2001 military campaign can be

divided into two parts, (a) One, between the US and its allies against the Taleban, the de

facto government of Afghanistan, which took place on the territory of Afghanistan-an
international armed conflict, and (b) two, between the US and its allies against AI Qaeda,
which is not confined to the territory of Afghanistan-whose status as 'international' or
'non-international' is not defined. 155 McDonald concluded thus:
"The conflict against Afghanistan: There is no doubt that there has been an armed
conflict between the US and its allies against Afghanistan as understood by the
1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Additional Protocols. Since it involves
at least two States, clearly it is an international armed conflict, within the meaning
of common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions .... As a non-State, AI Qaeda is
not legally competent to declare war on a State, so the attacks of September 11
could not have initiated an international armed conflict. Since their crimes in
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m. See Miriam Hall, Is the present military action against the Taleban and the AL Qaeda network in
Afghanistan lawful?, a Paper posted at the European Journal of International Law- Discussion Forum on
2002.
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World Trade
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http://www.ejil.org/forum WTC/messages/52.h1ml. Last visited on: July 12, 2006. (Hereinafter "Miriam
Hall").
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• Avril McDonald, Defining the War on Terror and the Status of Detainees: Comments on the
·Presentation ofJudge George Aldrich, 4 Das Thema 206 (2002) A publication of Institute for International
Law of Peace and Armed Conflict.
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attacking the world trade centre and pentagon were not committed in the context
of an armed conflict, they are not war crimes within the meaning of the Geneva
Conventions. In fact, the acts can be legally characterised in several ways, as
crimes against humanity, or as breaches of conventional law concerning terrorism.
They could also be considered as acts of piracy. Clearly, the attacks cannot be
considered as committed in the context of an internal armed conflict. Whatever
the attacks on the US on 11 September 2001 initiated, until the US used force
against Mghanistan, it was neither an international nor an internal armed conflict.
If it was a declaration of war, it is not a war contemplated by humanitarian
,156
1aw.
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Mariam Hall went on to argue that while neither Article 51 of the U.N. Charter
nor Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty expressly stated that such an attack must
originate from a state rather than an organization such as a terrorist group, "it is suggested
that this requirement is implicit."

151

Clearly, this argument failed to consider Article 3 of the Geneva Convention,
dealing with armed conflict on non-international character and Article 3 of the Red Cross
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Convention allowing the use of regular army to respond to armed conflict.

'I

Another argument against an "armed attack" finding is that some international
treaties/conventions have expressly excluded attacks from non-state actors as predicates
for self-defense rights. Some scholars 158 have referred to Paragraph 24 of the North

•
)

Atlantic Council's "Alliance's Strategic Concept" 159 as stating that terrorist attacks have
been distinguished from armed attacks. Therefore they contended, it could be argued that
the United States did not suffer an armed attack in the strict legal sense of the term. 160

156

•

JS7.

158
159
160

/bid. at 206-207.
Miriam Hall, supra note 152.

• /bid.
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North Atlantic Council's "Alliance's Strategic Concept," adopted April24, 1999, at para. 24.
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Miriam Hall, supra note 152.
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One would doubt that a treaty would have more power or force over the United
Nations Charter. The Charter is like a jus cogens or a grundnorm from which other laws
derive their legitimacy. Consequently, United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1368
and 1373 were passed based on Article 51 of the United Nations C~arter.
Another argument against the 2001 military action in Afghanistan is based on the
argument that United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1368 161 and 1373 162 which,
while condemning the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, did not call the attacks armed
attacks-but simply ''terrorist attacks." 163
This writer submits that this argument is without merits. One only needs to
examine the nature of terrorist attacks, as defined by the AEDPA. In this regard, terrorist
activity includes such acts as hijacking, kidnapping, assassination, and the use of any
explosive or firearm, ''with the intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one
or more individuals, or to cause substantial damage to property." Threats, attempts, and
conspiracies to commit164 the above acts also come within the definition ofterrorism. 165
We must consider the decision in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and

against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Jurisdiction and Admissibility,166 where the
International Court of Justice ("I.C.J.") held that an armed attack was "not merely action

161

• United

162

• United

163

• See

164

J

Nations Security Council Resolution 1368 of September 12, 2001.
Nations Security Council Resolutions 1373 of September 28, 2001.

Miriam Hall, supra note 152.

•

Ibid.§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(ii).

•

See Murphy I, supra note 82, at 365.

65

166

. 1984 ICJ REP. 392 June 27, 1986.
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by regular armed forces across an international border, but also the sending by a state of
armed bands on to the territory of another state." 167
However, we must also remember that the ICJ also held in Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), that military action by

irregulars could constitute an armed attack, if these were sent by, or on behalf of, the
State and if the activity:
"because of its scale and effects, would have been classified as an armed
attack...had it been carried out by regular armed forces." 168
Yet, it has been argued that even if the Security Council had authorized the 2001
Afghan military campaign, it would not give a carte blanche to mount an attack against
Afghanistan because
(a).
(b).

(c).

the United States has to notify the Security Council of the action to be
taken;
must cease the action, once the Security Council has taken measures to
maintain international peace and security, such as action under Chapter
Vll of the United Nations Charter, and,
any action by United States must satisfy the criteria of immediacy,
necessity, and proportionality set out by United States Secretary of State
Webster, in 1841 in the Caroline Case. 169
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We must also note that, implicit in the United Nations' Security Council Resolutions
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1214, 1267, 1368, and 1373, is the fact that the United Nations had always understood
that al Qaeda terrorism problem in Afghanistan was a festering sore. There was Security
Council Resolution 1214 of 1998, wherein the Security Council requested that the
Taleban authorities in Afghanistan stop providing sanctuary and training for Osama bin-

161
168
•

.lbid. at p. 14.
.lbid. at p. 103, para. 195.

169
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Miriam Hall, supra note 152.
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Laden and the al-Qaeda followers. 170 This was followed by Security Council Resolution
1267 of 1999 which condemned the failure of the Taleban authorities to adhere to
paragraph 113 of Security Council Resolution 1214 of 1998. The Security Council went
on to note Afghanistan's failure to: "cooperate ... to bring indicted terrorists to justice"
and that such acts constituted threats to international peace. 171
From history, the above mandate has not been achieved yet-and the reporting

i

I'

requirements have not been achieved. The Security Council has not preempted the United
States' position. As we shall see, subsequently, United States has satisfied the Caroline
test and requirements.
The opposition to United States' position failed to note that under Article 2 of the
International Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, adopted in August, 2001,

172
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a State is responsible for certain wrongs, if

such is attributable to the State, or if it is a breach of the State's obligation. This provision
provides thus:
"Elements of an internationally wrongful act of a State
;

There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an
action or omission:
(a) Is attributable to the State under international law; and
(b) Constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State." 173

170
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United Nations Security Council Resolution 1214 of 1998, at para. 113.
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Nations Security Council Resolution 1267 of 1999.
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• See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, adopted by International
Law Commission at its fifty-third session in August 2001, extract from the Report of the International Law
Commission on the work of its Fifty-third session, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth
session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp. N. E.; See also Draft Articles on State Responsibility adopted
at the First Reading, Report of the International Law Commission (I.L.C.), G.A.O.R., 51 11 Session Supp.
· 10, at 125.
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Even with these express provisions, some writers are still unconvinced about
Afghanistan's responsibility for al-Qaeda's actions. They contend that the Articles on
State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts do not have the force of treaty
provisions, that the Articles are considered to reflect customary international law and
therefore are applicable to all states, that there is no fixed rule as to whether the state
liability is strict or whether fault is required to be proven, and that it could be seen as
action contrary to Paragraph 1 of the 1970 Annex to United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 2625 (XXV).

174

Of course, the above argument is without sound legal basis. Most international
law scholars know that while the general rule is that conduct of private persons is not, as
such, attributable to the state, yet we must note that the Articles on State Responsibility
for Internationally Wrongful Acts 175 set out conditions under which a state could be held
responsible for conduct other than that directly attributable to the state or conduct of
individuals or groups, such as
(a) Conduct of organs of a state,
(b) Conduct of entities exercising elements of governmental authority,
(c) Conduct of organs placed at the disposal of a state by another state,
(d) Excess of authority or contravention of instructions,
(e) Conduct directed or controlled by a state,
(f) Conduct carried out in the absence or default of the official authorities,
(g) Conduct of an insu"ectional or other movement, and
(h) Conduct acknowledged and adopted by the State as its own. 176

In this regard, reference must be made to Giorgio Gaja, when he declared that:

174

• See

Miriam Hall, supra note 152.

m . Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Chapter II, Art. 4-11.
176

• Ibid.

at Chapter II, Art. 4-11.
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"When terrorist acts are not attributable to a state, the state would, anyway, incur
into international responsibility, if it failed to take adequate preventive
measures." 177
The question to ask is whether al-Qaeda's activities from the territory of
Afghanistan would satisfy the criteria of State responsibility under the above provisions?
No doubt, al Qaeda's conduct was directed or controlled by the Talebancontrolled Afghan state. Both the Talebans and the Mujahedeens, who formed the bulk of

a1 Qaeda army, were students and products of the Wahabbism School of irredentists and
extreme Islam. As was seen previously, al Qaeda members served both within, and
outside of, the Taleban government providing covert and overt assistance to the Talebans.
The Talebans, in tum, provided training camps and other facilities for the al Qaeda
members. At least, the Taleban government controlled and directed the actions of those
who served with the government. 178
The content of Resolution 1373 of September 28, 2001, clearly found that
Afghanistan, as a State, directly provided active support to entities and persons involved
in terrorist acts, after having done two things at the same time: 179
(a).
It has breached its international obligation ''to refrain from organizing,
instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another State," a rule
which is suggested in the same Resolution to have been well established in
general international law throughout a series of paramount UN General Assembly
Resolutions, starting with the famous October 24, 1970 Resolution 2625 (XXV)
on friendly relations between States; 180
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• Giorgio Gaja, The Attack on the World Trade Center: Legal Responses, In What Sense was There an
"Armed Attack"?, Discussion Forum of the European Journal of International Law. Available at:
http://www.ejil.org/forum WTC/ny-gaja.html. Last visited on: July 16, 2006.
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Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Chapter II, Art. 8.
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• See Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Attack on the World Trade Center: Legal Responses, The Law after the
Destruction of the Towers, Discussion Forum of the European Journal of International Law. Available at:
littp://www.eiil.org/forum WTC/ny-dupuy.html Last visited: July 9, 2006.
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(b).
It has directly participated in actions falling under the newly enlarged
definition of "a threat to international peace and security." As a consequence, it
may constitute the target country in a self-defensive action, whether unilateral or
collective. 181

The United Nations, United States, and most countries of the world refused to
recognize the Talebans, except as a de facto government in Afghanistan. Thus, the fact
that the de facto Taleban government allowed al Qaeda to operate from within its borders
would satisfy the requirement of conduct carried out in the absence or default of the
official authorities. Afghanistan was, therefore, liable for the terrorist activities within its
border.

182

No doubt, al Qaeda is an insurgency-it seeks to overthrow the world order and
impose its own ideology of annihilation and destruction on the world. 183 This amounts to
conduct of an insurrectional or other movement-a movement of terrorism-calculated at
changing the world order for its own selfish ends. 184 This, also, makes Afghanistan liable
for al Qaeda's terrorist organization's acts.
While it may be difficult to prove that the Taleban government had adopted al
Qaeda's objectives as its own, however, it has implicitly adopted those wrongful conduct
as its own. After the United Nations, via Resolutions 1214 and 1267, had ordered the
Talebans to bring bin-Laden and other al Qaeda leaders to book for their complicity in
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the terrorist actions, yet, the Talebans refused to comply with the United Nations'

L

demand. In effect, this amounts to the Taleban acknowledging that al Qaeda was right to
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have used the Afghan territory as its launching base. These events amount to conduct
acknowledged and adopted by the Afghan State as its own.

185

Another argument against military action in Afghanistan is based on lack of

imminent danger. Miriam Hill had argued that contrary to the Caroline case, 186there was
no imminent danger to the United States, as at the time of launching the Afghan
campaign. As it was stated in the September 2002 National Security Strategy of the
United States of America, failed states and terrorists now pose a different type of danger,

as well as a continuing danger to the whole world:
"In the 1990s we witnessed the emergence of a small number of rogue states that,
while different in important ways, share a number of attributes. These states:
brutalize their own people and squander their national resources for the personal
gain of the rulers; display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbors,
and callously violate international treaties to which they are party; are determined
to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with other advanced military
technology, to be used as threats or offensively to achieve the aggressive designs
of these regimes; sponsor terrorism around the globe; and reject basic human
values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands. " 187
While some scholars have laid weighty emphasis on first attack, contemporary
international practices have changed this archaic view:
"For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack
before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that
present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists
often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent
threat-most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces
preparing to attack. We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the
capabilities and objectives of today 's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do
not seek to attack us, using conventional means. They know such attacks would
fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of
185

• Ibid.

Art. 11.

186

• R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, (1938) 32 AJll.. 82 at 85, citing the Law Officers' of
the Crown's Report, dated February 21, 1838, Public Record Office in London, vols. F.O. 83, 2207-2209.
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mass destruction-weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and
. ,188
used wzt. hout wamzng.
Those who fail to see the imminence of the dangers posed by al Qaeda and Taleban
,•'

fundamentalists in October 2001, either fail to consider:
(a) voluminous history which has documented continuous stages of terrorist
attacks against western interests and citizens,
(b) the struggle by al Qaeda to acquire weapons of mass destruction,
(c) great advancement in technology,
(d) the easily available information on nuclear weapons, and
(e) the break up of the old Soviet Empire, with the fragmentation of control over
the various weapons of annihilation that may fall into the hands of terrorists
actively seeking such, etc.
All the above show that the old rules of "imminent attack," which lay emphasis on troop
and tanks movement, are inapplicable to contemporary state practice:
"For much of the last century, America's defense relied on the Cold War doctrines
of deterrence and containment. In some cases, those strategies still apply. But new
threats also require new thinking. Deterrence-the promise of massive retaliation
against nations-means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no
nation or citizens to defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced
dictators, with weapons of mass destruction, can deliver those weapons on
missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies. ( ... ) Our security will require
transforming the military you will lead-a military that must be ready to strike at
a moment's notice in any dark comer of the world. And our security will require
all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for rsreemptive
action, when necessary, to defend our liberty and to defend our lives." 1 9
There is also an argument based on "proportionality." 190 It has been stated that legitimate
defense implies the adoption of measures proportionate to the seriousness of the attack
and justified by the seriousness of the danger. 191 Novel as this argument may sound, there

188
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Ibid., chapter V.
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• See White House, News Release, 20020601-3, "President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West
Point", June 1, 2002. Available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html.
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is no doubt that United States-led military action has used proportional responsive arms
against the Talebans and al Qaeda. These terrorists have bombed and killed over three
thousand innocent persons in one single event.
As far back as 1984, Dr. Polebaum had presented elaborate argument in favour of
a broad interpretation of article 51 to include the right of anticipatory self-defense on the
~

basis that technological advances in nuclear armaments and their means of delivery

!·
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justify a policy of first strike. 192
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The above is very true, since the fight against terrorism is against an asymmetric
foe that does not wear uniform or exhibit any character that would make it easy to
distinguish its army from others. They carry out their attacks with stealth and secrecy,
justifying nipping them in the bud. Thus, other scholars have identified three (3) major
advancements in technology and science that have made international terrorism easier to
carry out. 193 Anthony H. Cordesman went on to list these developments as:
(a).

(b).

(c).

Advances m biotechnology, advanced food processing, and
pharmaceuticals, steadily clearing away impediments for interested
terrorists and states all over the world to manufacture lethal biological
agents. At the same time, a broader process of proliferation is increasing
the likelihood of threats emanating from other non-conventional weapons
of mass destruction, as well;
Advances in information systems and the steady integration of world
trading and financial systems, steadily increasing vulnerability to cyberwarfare and terrorism, and
Advances in global transportation systems creating a separate mix of
vulnerabilities. 194
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• See B.M. Polebaum, National Defense in International Law: An Emerging Standard for a Nuclear Age,
59 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 187, 200 (1984).
193

• See Anthony H. Cordesman, A New Transatlantic Strategy for Terrorism Strategy for Terrorism and
Asymmetric Warfare, Working Draft, Center for Strategic and International Studies, rev'd November 7,
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To recapitulate, United States self-defense military action m Mghanistan was
proportional in scope to the danger posed by al Qaeda. As we shall see, the campaign was
to remove and dislodge the al Qaeda and their Taleban collaborators from their "comfort
zone" and from their positions of power and influence in Mghanistan. Going on, Dr.
Polebaum has defined "proportionality" as:
"alternatively as either inflicting no more damage than that inflicted by the initial
injury of the offending state, or as remaining within the confines of moral notions
of human rights." 195
Applying the above test to the Mghan campaign, United States and Great Britain left the
Afghan land mass and general population unaffected with their military action-showing
that the actions taken were proportional. They only chased al Qaeda and their Taleban
collaborators from their "comfort zone" to the caves of Torah Borah. While Dr.
Polebaum also acknowledged that there is a need to demonstrate the immediacy of the
threat, 196 he also made a very strong argument for a broad interpretation of the right of
self-defense under Article 51. With this expansive interpretation, in the face of terrorism,
the problems identified earlier would become untenable.
To support the application of these criteria in the contemporary context, Dr.
Polenbaum asserted that the broader interpretation of article 51 is far more convincing
than a restrictive view because, according to this broader interpretation, the Charter of

,•
the United Nations was drafted in a way as to either expressively prohibit a behaviour or
to preserve rights. 197 Thus, it was clear to Polebaum that since article 51 states that
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nothing shall impair the right to self-defense and that there is no prohibition expressly
stated on the matter of anticipatory self-defense, it cannot be said to have been
extinguished by the Charter. 198
Also, Avril McDonald, while agreeing that al Qaeda is composed of many
fighters ofvarious nationalities-giving al Qaeda an international flavour, 199 had gone on
to agree that al Qaeda may be fighting on behalf of the Talebans:
"It is theoretically possible that some members of Al Quaeda could be considered

,.

as fighting for Mghanistan or as agents of the Taleban, and should then be
considered as affiliated to Mghanistan's armed forces and as involved in an
international armed conflict, although Aldrich states that no evidence of such
involvement has been shown. More facts need to be made available regarding the
relationship between the Taleban and Al Qaeda and whether Al Queda could be
considered to be working as agents of the Taleban. Did they receive financial aid
from the Taleban? To what extent were their operations known to and directed by
Kabul, etc.? Did the Taleban have overall or effective control of Al Qaeda
operations?"200
Undeniably, al Qaeda is composed of an array of various international persons-Saudis,
Moroccans, Mghans, Pakistanis, British Americans, Jordanians, etc, making the
organization an international body. Thus, this writer agrees with McDonald that this
multi-national flavor gives the September 2001 attacks and the resultant October 2001
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Mghan military campaign an international character.
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• Louis-Philippe Rouillard, The Caroline Case: Anticipatory Self-Defence in Contemporary International
Law, 1 Journal of International Law 104, 104-120 (2004) (Journal of the International Law Department of
the University ofMiskolc).
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Avril McDonald, supra note 155, at 207:
"a clandestine organization with elements in many countries and composed apparently of people
of various nationalities. Given that Al Qaeda seems to have no international legal status, and is
simply composed of terrorists, criminals hosti humanis, who could be prosecuted by any State, but
certainly by a State with a personal interest in the matter, such as the US ... "
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.IX.

Conclusion

It would appear that the United States-led military action was based on sound
legal footing and international practice. The fact that a new government was quickly and
successfully constituted under Hamed Karzai, after the Talebans was overthrown lends
more credence to October 2001 military action.
There was sufficient threat to international peace and security posed by the
Talebans and al Qaeda. Even if it is doubted that an armed attack had occurred, recent
incursions and attempts at regrouping by the Talebans and al Qaeda from the eastern
mountains bordering Pakistan would justify the elevation of the incidents to the level of
an "armed attack" had occurred justifying the collective self defense military action that
followed in October 2001.
Clearly, allowing al Qaeda to use the territory of Mghanistan to train, arm and
sponsor attacks by international terrorists that may cause the deaths of over three
thousand people at a single time justifying the October 2001 military action.
Under international customary and statutory laws, the September 11, 2001 attacks
having emanated from Mghanistan, a crime against humanity had occurred which
threatens the peace and security of the entire world that was appropriately dealt with
under collective self defense rights under the United Nations Charter.
There were many resolutions that were passed by United Nations Security
Council that expressly authorized the use of force in dislodging the Taleban government
and the al Qaeda elements from Mghanistan. As we saw above, there was the United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 of September 28, 2001, that applied to al.Qaeda and Mghanistan by providing that there is:
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"the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts."2o1
Thus, prior to the military operation in Afghanistan, the United Nations Security
Council in its Resolution 1373 expressly reaffirmed the need to combat terrorism "by all
means."202 Further, in paragraph 3(c) of Resolution 1373 (2001), the Council called upon
all States to:
"cooperate, particularly through bilateral and multilateral arrangements and
agreements, to prevent and suppress terrorist attacks and take action against such
perpetrators ofsuch acts. " 203
Also, in paragraph 8 ofReso1ution 1373 (2001), the United Nations Security Council:
"expresses its determination to take all necessary steps in order to ensure the full
implementation of this resolution, in accordance with the responsibilities under
the Charter"204
Finally, with the fact that the October 2001 military action only ended up in
driving the Taleban government and the a1 Qaeda elements from Afghanistan, it follows
that the October 2001 military action was proportionate to the danger posed by
Mghanistan and a1 Qaeda. The action was not broad-ended and/or vindictive. It was
meant to ensure that the threat posed by the Taleban government and the a1 Qaeda
elements from Afghanistan was curtailed to the barest minimum. This goal was achieved,
and a new government replaced the Taleban government.

201

• See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 of September 28, 2001, U.N. Doc. S /RES/1373
(2001), at para. 5

202

• United

Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001).

203./bid.
204

./bid. at para 8.
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With the legality of the October 2001 military action in Afghanistan not in doubt,

it is necessary to examine the March 2003 military action in Iraq.
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CHAPTER SEVEN

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE MARCH 2003 MILITARY ACTION IN IRAQ.
1.

Introduction
What can the world do where a government embarks on committing acts of

genocide against its people? What would happen if the world is faced with the
voluminous violation of human rights of its citizens? What happens if a government in
another state (''the aggressor") has indicated its avowal to attack a second state,
especially, while the aggressor appears to have access to weapons of mass destruction
and/or nuclear weapons? Must the victim state wait to be attacked before exercising its
right of self-defense under the United Nations Charter? These, and other questions/issues,
were implicated in the March 2003 military action in Iraq. This chapter, therefore, deals

1tmro•
. 1ritrtn

with the 2003 Military Action in Iraq, i.e., the legality of United States Military
Action/Response in Iraq under International Law.
On March 19, 2003, United States, Great Britain, and thirty (30) other members
of the ad hoc "Coalition of the Willing" launched military attacks against Saddam
Hussein, the Baa'th party, and the decadent ruling Iraqi elites, under the auspices of
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 678, 687 and 1441, amongst
others. 1 Between March 19th and May 15\ 2003, Saddam Hussein's tyrannical regime that
had defied the entire world, since August 2, 1990, had been overthrown and driven out of
Baghdad. 2

1
•

John Yoo, Agora: Future Implications of the Iraq Conflict: International Law and the War in Iraq, 97
AJ.I.L. 563 (2003). (Hereinafter "John Yoo Agora").
2

•

Ibid. at 563.
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Undeniably, United States military action in Iraq had attracted several criticisms
from various nations and international law scholars. Yet, as this dissertation would show,
rather than heap all the blame on President George Bush and United States, the solution is
devising a broad historical and legal understanding of the contemporary rules of

,l
I
l

''·

international law with regard to the role of the United Nations and the Security Council,
as well as an appraisal of the rules of self-defense.
As we have seen, one view of the sources of self-defense rights under
international law is that of the Positivists, i.e., that the right of self-defense does not exist
independently of positive law and can be altered by it. 3 With this in mind, we shall
~m:: ;

endeavor to show that positive law requires that the United Nations and its Security

lurnr.
~ ~i.t
I

Council be able to act-punctus officio, in carrying out their obligations in the realm of

r~
'ncrt,

protecting global peace and order. If they fail to do so, it would become impudent, on the

l

H IJl:

' r
~I

parties affected by the lack of action, to act in protecting their interests. The world must
avoid the inaction that occurred during the 1950 Korean conflict, as well as during the
Bosnia peccadillo in the 1980's, both of which led to voluminous loss oflives.
Another issue to be discussed is the status of open-ended resolutions of the United
Nations Security Council-whether international law and international practice have
definite rules on the life span of resolutions passed by the Security Council-especially
as to those resolutions authorizing military actions as in the 1950 Korean conflict and the
1990 Kuwait invasion.

3

• See HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 791-92 (1950); DAVID BOWETT,
SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 187 (1958); Ago, Addendum to Eighth Report on State
Responsibility to the International Law Commission, (1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, pt. 1 at 13, 66-67,
UN DOC. NCN.4/SER.N1980/Add.I; YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELFDEFENCE 169-72 (1988).
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Finally, we shall examine the calls for an amendment to the United Nations
charter-especially Articles 2, 39, and 51 dealing with the use of force and self-defense

rights.
11. The 1990 Kuwaiti Invasion Underlying the March 2003 Military Action in Iraq.
An appraisal of the United States-led military action in Iraq, starting from March

19, 2003, would be incomplete without examining at the 1990/1991 Gulf War. On
August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein, just smarting from an inglorious Iran-Iraq war
campaign that had greatly decimated Iraq's military record in the Gulf region swept his
army into Kuwait and captured the oil-rich territory. 4
On August 3, 1990, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 660, 5
which condemned Iraq's actions and demanded Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. 6 Iraq
refused to abide by the demands of the United Nations. Several other resolutions

:,,,

followed, including the following:
(a).

(b).
(c).

4
• See

Security Council Resolution 661 of August 6, 1990: establishing oil
embargo and sanctions regime against Iraq and Kuwait; 7
Security Council Resolution 662, of August 9, 1990, deciding that Iraq's
annexation of Kuwait has no legal validity; 8
Security Council Resolution 664, of August 18, 1990, demanding that Iraq
permit and facilitate the immediate departure from Kuwait of third-party
nationals;

C. Warbrick, The Invasion ofKuwait by Iraq, 40 ICLQ pt. 1, at 482-492 (1991).

s. See United Nations Security Council Resolution 660, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/660
(1990).
6

•

Ibid.

7
•

See United Nations Security Council Resolution 611, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/611
(1990).
11

• See United Nations Security Council Resolution 662, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/662
(1990).
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(d).

(e).
(f).

(g).

(h).

(i).

G).

Security Council Resolution 665, of August 25, 1990, calling upon allied
nations to use necessary measures to enforce embargo established in
Security Council Resolution 661;
Security Council Resolution 666, of September 13, 1990, implementing
sanctions regime and the humanitarian needs exception;
Security Council Resolution 667, of September 16, 1990, demanding that
Iraq immediately protect safety of diplomatic and consular personnel and
premises in Kuwait;
Security Council Resolution 669, of September 24, 1990, relating to
Jordan's request for relief from effects of implementing oil embargo and
sanctions regime;
Security Council Resolution 670, of September 25, 1990, regulating
aircraft transporting cargo to Iraq or Kuwait and reaffirming Iraq's liability
for grave breaches of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War;
Security Council Resolution 674, of October 29, 1990, condemning Iraqi
mistreatment of Kuwaiti and third-party nationals and inviting collection
of materials to bring charges against Iraq for its violations of international
law; and
Security Council Resolution 677, of November 28, 1990, condemning
Iraqi attempts to destroy demographic composition of Kuwait and Kuwaiti
civil records. 9

Clear from above, an immediate solution to the Kuwaiti impasse would have been
reached, had Iraq withdrawn its troops, immediately, in the aftermath of Resolution 660.
Nevertheless, Resolution 661 10 that was adopted subsequently, showed the
Security Council expressing its concern with the actions of Iraq viz-a-viz United Nations'
desire to end the occupation of Kuwait and restore the "sovereignty, independence, and
territorial integrity of Kuwait." 11 A striking content of Resolution 661 is the
acknowledgment of the right of Kuwait and other nations to exercise the use offorce in
recognition of:

9

. See John Yoo Agora, supra note l, at 564, fu. 3.

10

• See United Nations Security Council Resolution 611, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/611
. (1990).
11

• Ibid
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"the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in response to the
armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the
12
Charter."
Later on, the Security Council also enacted Resolution 662,

13

providing that the Iraqi

invasion and annexation of Kuwait had "no legal validity, and [was] considered null and

'd ,14

VOl •

On November 29, 1990, the Security Council passed Resolution 678, 15 which set
a deadline of January 15, 1991, requiring Iraq to implement Resolution 660 fully. In fact,
Paragraph 2 of Resolution 678 authorized member states:
"to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and
all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security
in the area." 16
By midnight of January 16th, 1991, after Iraq had refused to withdraw from Kuwait
before the January 15th, 1991 deadline, the First (1 5t) Gulf War began-code named
"Operation Desert Storm." 17 The operation lasted until February 27, 1991, when Iraq
was expelled from Kuwait.

12
13

./bid.
• See

United Nations Security Council Resolution 662, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/662
{1990).
14

. /bid

I
,.
I

u. See United Nations Security Council Resolution 678, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/678
(November 29, 1990).
16

I

. /bid. at para. 2.

17
,

See C. Warbrick, supra note 4, at 482-492 (1991); See also, D. Gilman, The Gulf War and the United
Nations Charter: Did the Security Council Fulfill its Original Mission?, 24 Conn. L. Rev. 1131, 1149
(1992).
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Further to the above events, the United Nations Security Council then passed
Resolution 687 18 on April3, 1991. To Adam Tait, Resolution 687 was often known as the
"Mother of all Resolutions," because it, in effect, codified the cease-fire agreement
between Iraq and the international coalition. 19 Resolution 687, therefore, established the
conditions for a formal cease-fire suspending hostilities in the Persian Gulf and it
required Iraq to:
(1) destroy its chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles and agree to
on-site inspections;
(2) not use, develop, construct, or acquire such Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) and their delivery systems;
(3) not acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or
components; and
(4) accept on-site inspection and destroy nuclear-related weapons or materials?0
In order to carry out the inspections of such Weapons of Mass Destruction ("W.M.D."),
nuclear-related weapons or materials, Resolution 687 established a United Nations
Special Commission (UNSCOM) to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), which was to take custody of all of Iraq's nuclear-weapons materials.

.,
I

•'

Thus, in accordance with these measures, a strict monitoring system was put into place to
oversee Iraq's compliance, and this monitoring system was hailed as the "most
comprehensive international monitoring system ever established in the sphere of arms
control " 21

'

18

• See United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687
(1991).
19

• Adam P. Tait, The Legal War: A Justification for Military Action in Iraq, 9 Gonz. J. Int'l. L. 96, 100
(2005). Available at http://www.gonzagaiil.org. Last visited on: July 20, 2006 .
20
•

• See United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687
(1991), at paras. 8, 9 & 12.
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In addition, on April 6, 1991, Iraq officially accepted the terms, and a formal

··'

cease-fire went into effect between Iraq, Kuwait, and the nations that had cooperated with
Kuwait, including the United States.

22

Within four months of the installation of UNSCOM, Saddam Hussein's regime
blocked all attempts by UNSCOM to carry out its duties. Thus, on August 15, 1991, the
Security Council adopted Resolution 70723 which "condemned" Iraq's "serious violation"
of all its obligations regarding the destruction and dismantling of its WMD program and
also condemned Iraq's breach of its agreement to cooperate with UNSCOM and the
IAEA. 24 Security Council's Resolution 707 further provided that Iraq's violation:
"constitutes a material breach of the relevant provisions of [Resolution 687]
which established a cease-fire and provided the conditions essential to the
restoration of peace and security in the region. " 25
Despite all of the above international pressure, Iraq did not comply with UNSCOM's
inspection demands. 26 Yet, on June 12, 1996, the Security Council adopted another
Resolution 1060,27 which "deplored" the refusal of Iraq to allow access to UNSCOM

21

• Report of the Secretary-General on the Status of the Implementation of the Special Commission's Plan
for the Ongoing Monitoring and Verification of Iraq's Compliance with Relevant Parts of Section C of
Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), U.N. Doc. S/1994/11138 (Oct. 7, 1994).

22

• See

John Yoo Agora, supra note I, at 564.

,..
'

23

• See United Nations Security Council Resolution 707, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/707
(1991).
24

jl

United Nations Security Council Resolution 707, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/707
(1991).

25

• See

• Ibid.

26

· A.J.R. Groom, Edward Newman, & Paul Taylor, Burdensome Victory: The United Nations and Iraq, in
A UNITED NATIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: PEACE, SECURITY AND
DEVELOPMENT 149, 156 (Dimitris Bourantonis & Marios Evriviades eds., 1996).

27
•

• See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1060, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. SIRES/ 1060
(1996).
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inspectors and Iraq's "clear violations" of the Security Council's resolutions. 28 Twelve
months later, on June 21, 1997, the Security Council passed Resolution 1115,29 which
"condemned repeated refusal of Iraqi authorities to provide access" to UNSCOM nuclear
inspectors, and deemed it a "clear and flagrant" violation of United Nations' resolutions,

°

while demanding full, immediate, and unconditional compliance. 3 Further, on November
12, 1997, the Security Council adopted Resolution 113731 that:
"condemned... the continued violations by Iraq of its obligations under the relevant
resolutions to cooperate fully and unconditionally with [UNSCOM]."32
Resolution 1137 also declared that Iraq's violation of its international obligations
continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security, and warned that
"serious consequences" would result, if Iraq failed to comply with its international
obligations. 33
To forestall a breakdown of law and order, in February 1998, the United Nations
Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, obtained an executed Memorandum of Understanding
confirming Iraq's acceptance of all relevant Security Council resolutions and its
reaffirmation to cooperate fully with UNSCOM and the IAEA. 34

28

.

Ibid.

29

• See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1115, U.N. SCOR, 52nd Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1115
(1997).

30

• Ibid.

31

• See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1137, U.N. SCOR, 52nd Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1137
(1997).

32

• Ibid.

33
•

•
~

Ibid.

.

. Memorandum ofUnderstandmg, U.N. Doc. S/1998/166 (1998).
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By the Fall of 1998, Iraq notified the United Nations that it was formally halting

all cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA at the end of October, 1998. On December
15, 1998, UNSCOM reported that it could not complete its mandate due to impediment
created by Iraq. On December 16, 1998, United States and Great Britain responded by
initiating "Operation Desert Fox" whereby they commenced a bombing campaign against
Iraqi defense installations in approximately one hundred targets in Iraq for seventy hours.
United States and Great Britain argued that Security Council Resolution 115435
authorized this military action.

36

Also, United Nations Security Council, on November 5, 1998, passed Resolution
1205,37 which condemned Iraq's decision as a:
"flagrant violation of resolution 687 ... and other relevant resolutions, ... [and that
the Security Council was noting] with alarm the decision of Iraq ... to cease
cooperation with the United Nations Special Commission, and its continued
restrictions on the work of the [IAEA]."38
In fact, Operation Desert Fox was the third armed attack on Iraqi positions after the 1991

cease-fire, because the Clinton Administration had conducted military strikes in 1993 and
•' I

1996 to extend the southern no-fly zone, while invoking Resolution 678 as authority. 39

lr

35

• See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1154, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1154,
at para. 3 (1998).
36

• See S.M. Condron, Justification for Unilateral Action in Response to the Iraqi Threat: A Critical
Analysis of Operation Desert Fox, 161 Military L. Rev. 115-180 ( 1999).
37

• See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1205, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1205
(1998).

38

• Ibid.

39

- ·Frederick Rawski & Nathan Miller, The United States in the Security Council: A Faustian Bargain?, in
THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY 361 (David M.
Malone ed., 2004).
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Between 1998 and 1999, the mandated inspections were never carried out. Thus,
on December 17, 1999, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1284, disbanded
UNSCOM and replaced it with the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and
Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). 40 In fact, Resolution 1284, which established
UNMOVIC also provided that the Security Council would suspend several sanctions

1,

I'

against Iraq, if it would cooperate with the inspection regiment put into place in
Resolution 687. 41 Nevertheless, on February 20, 2000, erstwhile Iraqi Deputy Prime
Minister, Tariq Aziz, denounced the resolution and declared that it did not:

I

tnun

"address Iraq's legitimate right to secure a lifting of the embargo, having met its
commitments under UN accords." 42
The cat and mouse game continued until the events of September 11, 2001
occurred, when terrorists hijacked four (4) airplanes and smashed them into landmark
economic, political, and government buildings in New York, Washington, DC, and
Pennsylvania. This then made Iraqi's intransigence a matter of international concem. 43
According to John Yoo:
"The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, carried out by Al
Qaeda operatives trained and led from their bases in Afghanistan, demonstrated
the threat posed by terrorists who could seek safe haven in rogue nations with
potential access to WMD. ,.44

40

• See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1284, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1284
(1999).

41

42

• Ibid.

•

at Pt. C.

Statement by the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz (Feb. 20, 2000) quoted in "Iraq Condemns

UN Resolution," available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/llhi/worldl middle_east/649826.stm.
43

·See Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, The President's Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military
Operations Against Terrorist Organizations and the Nations that Harbor or Support Them, 25 Harv. J.L. &
Pub. Pol 'y 487 (2002).

'44

. See John Yoo Agora, supra note I, at 565.

244

I

,,

In light of this apprehension, as we have seen, President Bush addressed the

I'

United Nations General Assembly and characterized the possible use of force against Iraq
as necessary to enforce existing Security Council resolutions and to eliminate a
dangerous threat to international peace and security. 45 In response, the Security Council
adopted Resolution 1441,46 which found Iraq to be in material breach of previous
Security Council resolutions and threatened serious consequences for further
intransigence. 47 Thus, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441, at paragraph 1,
expressly referred to Iraq's:
"non-compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and long-range missiles ... [.]'.4 8
In addition, Resolution 1441 expressly incorporated earlier Resolutions 678 and 687,
declaring that the Security Council
"recall[ed] that its resolution 678 (1990) authorized Member States to use all
necessary means to uphold and implement its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August
1990 and all relevant resolutions subsequent to Resolution 660 ( 1990) and to
restore international peace and security in the area. " 49
Going on, Resolution 1441 also recalled Iraq's obligations under Resolution 687 by:
"Deploring the fact that Iraq has not provided an accurate, full, final, and
complete disclosure, as required by resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of its
programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a
range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometres, and of all holdings of such
4

~. George W. Bush, UN General Assembly in New York City Address (Sept. 12, 2002), 38 Weekly Camp.
Pres.
Doc.
1529
(Sept.
16,
2002),
available
at
<http://www. whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html> [hereinafter Bush UN Address].

46

• See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441
(2002).

47

48
"49

• Ibid

• Ibid.

at para. 1.

. Ibid. at Preamble.
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weapons, their components and production facilities and locations, as well as all
other nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not
related to nuclear-weapons-usable material.
"Deploring further that Iraq repeatedly obstructed immediate, unconditional, and
unrestricted access to sites designated by the United Nations Special Commission
(UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), failed to
cooperate fully and unconditionally with UNSCOM and IAEA weapons
inspectors, as required by resolution 687 (1991), and ultimately ceased all
cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA in 1998,
"Deploring the absence, since December 1998, in Iraq of international
monitoring, inspection, and verification, as required b6' relevant resolutions, of
weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles ... [.]"5
~~Ut.l .

Resolution 1441 further went on to note

I

"the threat Iraq's non-compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace
and security. " 51

b

Also, Resolution 1441 gave Iraq a "final opportunity to comply" with its duties52
and referred to the Security Council's repeated previous warnings to Iraq of "serious
consequences" that would result from continued violations of the regime's obligations. 53
Relying on the above provisions, Adam Tait had proffered that:
d !i

"That language, coupled with the "serious consequences" that would follow upon
non-compliance, shows that Resolution 1441 was, in fact, a legal authorization to
use force to ensure Iraqi compliance." 54
With the passage of Resolution 1441, Iraq permitted the UNMOVIC inspectors
unto its territory again, in December 2002. 55 As was required under Resolution 1441, Iraq

50
51
52

• Ibid.
• Ibid.

at para. I.

• Ibid.

at para. 2

53
•
• 54

Ibid. at paras. 5 and 13 .

. See Adam P. Tait, supra note 9, at 109.
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submitted a Declaration purporting to show complete compliance. However, as was noted

by various experts, the Declaration was a weak and untruthful attempt at compliance. 56
After reviewing the deficient declaration, UNMOVIC's Executive Chairman, Dr. Blix, in

I·

January 2003, issued a Statement that the Iraqis had not lived up to the demands of 1441,
and that the nation had yet to show "a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the
disarmament which was demanded of it. " 57
In the aftermath of the above events, United States and Great Britain pushed for
the Security Council to pass one more resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq
for its continuing disregard of previous resolutions. 58 On the contrary, some powerful
members of the Security Council- including Russia, France, and Germany, opposed the
adoption of such a resolution. 59 Because they were unable to persuade the Security

ll:llltt! ..

ttFII'IX'IJ ..

Council to adopt "follow-up resolutions,"

60

the United States and Great Britain

~~~~IJ

·m4

~·:~·

"abandoned their attempts to convince their stubborn partners on the Council."61

If•;
'1.-rll

''.Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC Dr. Hans Blix, Briefmg of the Security Council (Dec. 19, 2002),
available at http://www.unmovic.org.
6
' •

See United Nations Security Council Twelfth Quarterly Report at 3, U.N. Doc. S/2003/232 (1999),
available at htto://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/documents/guarterly reports/s-2003-232.pdf. (UNMOVIC Executive Chainnan Dr. Hans Blix stated that the declaration "contained little new significant
infonnation").

".Executive Chairman ofUNMOVIC Dr. Hans Blix, Briefing of the Security Council (January 27, 2003),
available at http://www.unmovic.org.
8
' •

See Adam P. Tait, supra note 9, at 104.

9
' •

David Roberts, The Use of Force, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO
THE 21ST CENTURY 141 (David M. Malone ed., 2004) .
•

60

61

• See

Adam P. Tait, supra note 9, at 104.

• Ibid.

at 104.
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Following the above events, on March 19, 2003, the United States led a coalition
62

of nations that quickly destroyed Iraqi resistance and took control of the nation, which
ended on May 1, 2003, when President Bush announced an end to major combat
operations, signaling the end of the regime of Saddam Hussein.

63

The above events show that the threat posed to international peace and security by
the Saddam Hussein-led government in Iraq starting from the 1990 invasion of Kuwait,
subsequent flagrant disobedience of United Nations Security Council's Resolutions, and
the suspected possession of nuclear weapons by Iraq were the underlying causes of the
March 2003 military action.

m.

United Nations Inability to Protect International Peace and Security in the Past.

Clear from above is the fact that United Nations Security Council could not
decide, with unanimous votes, what to do with Iraq, in terms of the country's

T1'l..,.
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disobedience to United Nations' requirements to allow UNMOVIC inspectors unto its
territory. According to John Yoo:
"Iraq failed to provide access to all officials for interview by inspectors;
intimidated witnesses with threats; undertook massive efforts to deceive and
defeat inspectors, including cleanup and transshipment activities at nearly thirty
sites; failed to provide numerous documents requested by UNMOVIC; failed to
list any WMD personnel beyond a period ending in 1991 or to include many of
those identified previously by UNSCOM; and failed to account for seventeen
empty chemical warheads subsequently discovered by weapons inspectors, as
well as over 2000 pages of Iraqi documents regarding past uranium enrichment
programs. " 64

62

63

• Ibid.
•

at 104; See also, John Yoo Agora, supra note 1, at 564.

Ibid.

64

• Ibid per John Yoo Agora, supra note 1, at 566, fu. 21; The Bush administration's more detailed
description of Iraq's refusal to comply with relevant Security Council resolutions can be found in 149
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Before evaluating United Nations and its organs regarding their roles in the build-up to
the March 2003 Iraqi military action, a brief study of the United Nations and its organs in
the context of international peace and security is apposite at this juncture.
While the United Nations Charter pontificated that it was aimed at preventing
wide scale wars, such as the First and Second World Wars, from ravaging mankind again,
the most important organ of the United Nations, charged with ensuring peace and security
globally, is the Security Council. Thus, under Article 24(1) of the Charter, 65 it is provided
~I

that:
"In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its
Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carryin~ out its
duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf. " 6
Also, Article 39 ofthe United Nations Charter, 67 provides that:
"The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to
maintain or restore international peace and security." 68
According to David Schweigman, 69 the duty to determine what constitutes breach of
peace and security is tempered by the fact that the Security Council must act in

CONG. REC. H1957-60 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2003) (Report in Connection with Presidential Determination
Under Public Law 107-243).
65

67
61

,·
I

I

I
• See

Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, June 26, 1945,
at Art. 24(1) (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945). ("U.N. Charter'').

66

I

• Ibid
• Ibid.

at Art. 39.

• Ibid.

69

- · DAVID SCHWEIGMAN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER CHAPTER
VU OF THE UN CHARTER 28-29 (2001).
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accordance with the "Purposes and Principles" of the United Nations, namely principles
71

of"justice and intemationallaw." 70 In this regard, Article 24(2) of the Charter, provides
that:
"2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with
the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to
the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters
VI, VII, VIII, and XII."
We must also note Article 25 of the Charter, 72 which mandates that:
"The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions
of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter."
Thus, when the Security Council acts according to this mandate, its decisions become
binding on Member States. 73
Yet, the United Nations Charter, indirectly, provides for a "Veto Power"-per a
rule known as "great power unanimity." 74 The United Nations Security Council "Veto
Power" is a voting power wielded solely by the 5 permanent members (China, France,
Russia/USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States) of the United Nations Security
Council, enabling them to void any Security Council resolution, regardless of the level of
general support. This power is exercised when any permanent member enters a "nay"
vote.

75

The word "veto" is nowhere to be found in the U.N. Charter, but the document

does mention that Security Council decisions "shall be made by an affirmative vote of
70

71
72

73

• Ibid.

. See U.N. Charter, supra note 65, at Art. 24(2).
• Ibid.

• See

at Art. 25.

Adam P. Tait, supra note 9, at 98; See SCHWEIGMAN, supra note 69, at 31, fils 115-117.

74

· Brendan I. Koerner, Can You Bypass a U.N. Security Council Veto?, Slate Magazine of
Wednesday, March 12, 2003. Available at: http://www.slate.com/id/2080036/.

15
•

An abstention vote will allow the measure to pass.
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nine members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members." 76 In this
regard, Article 27(3) of the Charter77 provides that:
"Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an
affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent
members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of
Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting." 78
Since the Security Council's inception, China (ROC/PRC) has used 5 vetoes; France, 18;
Russia/USSR, 122; the United Kingdom, 32; and the United States, 80. The majority of
the USSR vetoes were in the first ten years of the Council's existence, and the numbers or
''veto" votes since 1984 have been, as follows:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

China 2;
France 3;
Russia/USSR, 4;
the United Kingdom, 10; and
the United States, 42. 79
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During the build-up to the March 2003 military action against Iraq, Russia and
France threatened to veto any United Nations Security Council resolution that would
authorize military action against Iraq. 80

"1
·I

According to Adam Tait, yet, there have been numerous occasions when the
Security Council was not able to decide on a course of action, yet Member States took up
arms, regardless of such inactivity. 81

76
77

• Ibid.

. See U.N. Charter, supra note 65, at Art. 27(3).

78

• Ibid.

79

• Ibid.

80

• See UN Security Council Veto Power, available at http://www.slate.com/id/2080036/; See also, Security
Council veto power usage, Herald Tribune Monday, March 3, 2003. Available at:
http://www.peace.calsecuritycouncilveto.htm.
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First, we must note the 1950 Korean Conflict, when the Security Council was

·'I
held to ransom by Union of Soviets Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.)'s indiscriminate use of
the veto power. On June 25, 1950, the Cold War suddenly turned hot, bloody, and
expensive, and within a few days, North Korea invaded South Korea. The war lasted until

1953.

82
~.

Second, during the Korean conflict, the Soviet delegation refused to support a

'·

resolution to denounce that aggression, and this almost kept the Security Council from
having any influence. 83 John Murphy then submitted that the Security Council was able
to break out of the bondage, when based on the absence of the Soviet delegation (which
bad protested the inclusion of Nationalist Chinese as the Chinese representative in the
Council), the remaining members were able to pass a recommendation to denounce
. on the Korean penmsu
. 1a. 84
aggresston
To underscore the fact that the United States-led drive to intercede in the Korean
conflict was a success, absent full backing by all permanent members of the Security
Council, is the fact that when the Soviets returned to the Council after the boycott,
however, no further Security Council action was taken. 85
On another occasion, the Security Council was helpless with regard to the
situation in Kosovo in the late 1990s. When the old Yugoslavia broke up in the late
81

• See

Adam P. Tait, supra note 9, at 98.

82

• DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY-NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER, The Korean War, June 1950July
1953-Introductory
Overview
and
Special
Image
Selection.
Available
at:
http://www.histozy.navv.miVphotos/events/kowar/kowar.htm. Last visited on: July 20, 2006.
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• John F. Murphy, Force and Arms, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 108
(Christopher C. Joyner ed., 1997)

84

• Adam

8
'.

P. Tait, supra note 9, at 100; See also, John F. Murphy, ibid. at 108.

Ibid. per John F. Murphy, at 108.
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l980's, the Security Council passed a resolution that asked the former Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia ("FRY") to reconsider its refusal to allow European bodies to continue
their monitoring activities in Kosovo, in 1993.

86

Russia continued to block all efforts by

the western countries to curb the excesses of the Serbs.
A little success came on March 31, 1998, when western nations were able to get
the Security Council to pass a resolution placing an embargo on FRY. 87 Nevertheless,
because Resolutions 1160 and 1199 88 did not authorize any military action against the
Serbs and FRY armed forces, on account of their human rights violations, FRY, like Iraq
later did, continued to defy the whole world, and carried on with the abhorrent
genocide. 89 Western nations were forced to act to avoid unimaginable ethnic cleansing
and/or genocide. According to the United Kingdom permanent representative, Jeremy
Greenstock, "[e]very means short of force ha[d] been tried. " 90 Therefore, military action
was necessary.
Thus, while acting under Article 5 of the Washington (NATO) Treaty, which
states that an armed attack on one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall
be considered an attack against them all, 91 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

86

. Sec. C. Res. 855, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/855 (1993).

81

• Sec. C. Res. 1160, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (1998). (imposing an arms embargo
against the FRY and stated that the failure to move towards peace in Kosovo would invite further action
from the Council).

II

. Sec. C. Res. 1199, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 (1998).

89

• Paul Heinbecker, Kosovo, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE
21ST CENTURY 537, 542 (David Malone ed., 2004).

90

• United Kingdom permanent representative Jeremy Greenstock, Address to the U.N. Security Council
(March 24, 1999).

253

(NATO) ordered military air strikes against Slobodan Milosevic and FRY on March 24,
93
92
1999. The bombing campaign lasted for seventy-seven days. The intervention was a

success.
From the perspective of international law, especially growing rules of
international humanitarian law, the United Kingdom delegate to the Security Council
reported to the Council that the bombing campaign was legal and justified to prevent
humanitarian suffering.

94

The event marked a turning point in the role and relevance of the Security Council
under contemporary rules of international law. 95 When Russia came to the Security
Council to stop the air strike in Yugoslavia on March 26, 1999, it was voted down by a
margin of twelve to three. 96 As Adam Tait had observed:
"Commentators have considered this to be an important event in defining the role
of the Security Council in times of crisis, showing that the proponents of military
action may not have to secure a resolution to justify such actions. Some military
actions will go forth without the "blessing" of a Security Council resolution when
a permanent member of the Security Council will not follow the others. In this
case, however, although the Security Council did not expressly authorize the use
of force, it was clear that many Member States were willin~ to support military
action, even if a minority of nations were unwilling to do so." 7

91

. North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246 (''the Washington
Treaty") at Art 5.
92
93

•

See Paul Heinbecker, supra note 89, at 540.

I

I
I

./bid.

94

• United Kingdom Permanent Representative, Jeremy Greenstock's Address to the U.N. Security Council
(March 24, 1999).
95

96

• See

Paul Heinbecker, supra note 89, at 540.

./bid.

91
•

See Adam P. Tait, supra note 9, at 99; See also, Paul Heinbecker, ibid.
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The above two scenarios show that it is not in all situations that the Security Council had
been able to curtail events that threaten international peace and security. They also show
that nations that are parties to the international agreements being breached, or whose
international interests were under siege, had taken the initiatives to act, without express
authority from the Security Council, especially, when the Council is being held hostage
by the interests of the permanent members. It is in this regard that Adam Tait had

surmised thus:
"The Security Council was unable to provide leadership during the [Korean]
crisis. This [Korean] situation, along with the crisis in Kosovo, shows that the
Council is often hard-pressed to exercise its authority under Chapter VII of the
Charter to authorize the use of force when international peace and security are at
risk."9B
Thus, it is clear that there are ample precedents under international law and international
practice when military actions by the United States have been deemed legal, even when
such were undertaken without the authority of the United Nations Security Council. In
other words, as the Security Council's permanent members, France and Russia, during
the build-up to the March 2003 military action, threatened to veto any U.N. Security
Council resolution that authorizes military action against Iraq, 99 United States and the
"Coalition of the Willing" were justified in undertaking the March 2003 military action
against Iraq because inaction, in the face of clear and convincing danger, would have
spelt doom, not only for the United States and its allies, but also for the entire world.

IV.
98

Instances of United Nations Authorized "Collective Self Defense" Actions.

./bid. per Adam P. Tait, at 100.

99

• See UN Security Council Veto Power, available at http://www.slate.com/id/2080036/; See also, Security
Council veto power usage, Herald Tribune Monday, March 3, 2003. Available at:
http://www.peace.calsecuritycouncilveto.htm.
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Notwithstanding international practice precedents supporting United States and
the "Coalition of the Willing" in their undertaking the March 2003 military action against
Iraq, based on threats to international peace and security and, also based on inherent selfdefense rights, a review of United States and other States' international practice within
the last fifty years would reveal that every State acts in its own defense, even if the
United Nations were not involved, for instance, during the 1967 Torrey Canyon
incident. 100 On March 18, 1967, a stricken oil tanker, the Torrey Canyon-a Liberian
supertanker, snagged on rocks between Land's End and the Scilly Isles for 11 days, began
breaking, leaking more of its cargo into the sea, and yet refused to sink. Anticipating an
ecological damage and fearing for the well-being of its resources, Britain bombed and
destroyed the ship, asserting a customary international law right of intervention. 101
Despite more than a day of heavy bombing-the Royal Armed Forces ("RAF") and the
Royal Navy dropped 62,000lbs of bombs, 5,200 gallons of petrol, 11 rockets and large
quantities of napalm onto the ship, yet it refused to sink. 102
Clearly, Britain acted out of self-defense in protecting its environment from
damage and/or harm emanating from a vessel belonging to another state.
Even France, which opposed the Iraqi invasion in 2003, had, in the 1950's, during
the Algerian War of Independence, acted out of preemption by seizing foreign vessels

100

•
See
1967:
Bombs
rain
down
on
Torrey
Canyon.
Available
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/29/newsid_2819000/2819369.stm
101
_ • See
102

• See

Michael Akehurst, A Modem Introduction to International Law 175 (3d ed. 1977).

1967: Bombs rain down on Torrey Canyon, supra note 321.
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that were bringing supplies and anns for the Algerian rebels. France justified the seizure
ofthese merchant vessels on the high seas on self-defense rights.

103

As we saw earlier, the United States also justified the 1986 air strikes against
Libya on self-defense rights because of Libya's avowal to support terrorists and military
strikes against United States. 104 As John Yoo had noted, most nations supported the
United States action on the basis of self-defense:
"Although several countries criticized the U.S. strikes by supporting a UN
resolution condemning the attack as a violation of the UN Charter, Australia,
Denmark, France, and the United Kingdom joined the United States in opposing
the resolution." 105
Then came Panama in 1989, where the lives of Americans living in Panama were
threatened, after Noriega came to power. On December 15, 1989, Noriega sought and
was given by the legislature the title of chief executive officer of the Panamanian
government, and thereafter, the Noriega-led assembly declared that a state of war with
the United States existed. 106 The next day Panamanian soldiers killed an unanned U.S.
Marine officer dressed in civilian clothes. 107 Reaction by the United States was quick and
decisive. On December 17, 1989, U.S. President, George Bush, ordered troops to
Panama, with the aims of protecting American lives and property, and restoring
Panamanian liberties.

103

• See

Michael Akehurst, supra note 10 1, at 175.

104

• See President's Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of
the Senate on the United States Air Strike Against Libya (Apr. 16, 1986), in 1 Pub. Papers 478 (1986)
105

. See John Yoo Agora, supra note 1, at 573; See also, See UN Doc. S/PV. 2682 (Apr. 21, 1986).

106
•

107

US Invasion ofPanama 1989. Available at: http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/papalpanamaus1989.htm.

• Ibid.
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"The deployment of U.S. Forces is an exercise of the right of self-defense,
recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, and was necessary to
.
I'tves m
. tmmment
.
.
danger .... ,lOs
protect Amencan
The initial attack took place in darkness on the morning of December 20, 1989, and was
focused primarily on Noriega's headquarters in Panama City. U.S. forces quickly
overcame most organized resistance, The number of Panamanians killed in the operation

was estimated at 200-300 combatants (soldiers and paramilitaries) and some 300
civilians; 23 U.S. soldiers also were killed. Hundreds from both nations were wounded. 109
As John Yoo noted, in the midst of the fighting, the Security Council considered a draft
resolution that would have labeled the invasion as "a flagrant violation of international
law," but Great Britain, France, and Canada joined the United States in opposing the

. 110
reso Iutton
Clearly, these nations saw United States' actions as having been undertaken under
its self-defense rights.
In the aftermath of the bombing of the United States embassies in Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, in August 1998, the United States launched missile attacks
against suspected terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and against a suspected
chemical plant in Sudan. United States claimed that they launched these attacks to
prevent further attacks from terrorists using these facilities. 111

108

• See Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate
on the United States Military Action in Panama (Dec. 21, 1989), 2 PUB. PAPERS OF GEORGE BUSH
1734 ( 1989).
109

• See

US Invasion ofPanama 1989, supra note 106.

110

. See John Yoo Agora, supra note 1, at 573; See also, UN Doc. S/21048 (Dec. 22, 1989); UN Doc. S/PV.
2902 (Dec. 23, 1989).
111

• See Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Military Action Against Terrorist Sites in
Afghanistan and Sudan (Aug. 21, 1998), in President's Radio Address (Dec. 19, 1998), 2 PUB. PAPERS
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The above actions were undertaken to forestall further terrorist strikes against the
United States and its interests.
One unmistakable event took place on January 13, 1993, when the United States,
Great Britain, and France aircrafts attacked Iraqi positions, destroying Iraqi missile
launchers, due to the violation of ceasefire agreements and intrusion into the "no-fly"
zone. In response to the attacks, erstwhile United Nations Secretary-General, Boutros
Boutros-Ghali, supported the military action as having been undertaken under
Resolutions 678 and 687:
"The raid, and the forces that carried out the raid, have received a mandate from
the Security Council, according to Resolution 678, and the cause of the raid was
the violation by Iraq of Resolution 687 concerning the cease-fire. So, as
Secretary-General of the United Nations, I can say that this action was taken and
conforms to the resolutions of the Security Council and conforms to the Charter
of the United Nations." 112
Clearly, if these actions were legal then in 1993, they would also pass muster in 2003.
The present incapacity of the United Nations was noted by David Tait to be similar to the
circumstances following the 1950 Korean War and the 1990's Yugoslavia debacle, when
the United Nations took no action, unable to pass a unanimous declaration on the grounds
that Article 51 of the UN Charter did not authorize such actions. 113
It follows, therefore, that the incapacity of the United Nations and/or the Security

Council should not be used to hold the world to ransom.
OF WILLIAM J. CLINTON 2197 (1998) [hereinafter "Clinton Papers (1998)"], at 1464 (1998) ("These
strikes were a necessary and proportionate response to the imminent threat of further terrorist attacks
against U.S. personnel and facilities. These strikes were intended to prevent and deter additional attacks by
a clearly identified terrorist threat.").
112

• See Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND INT'L
LAW, 201 (2001) (quoting Boutros Boutros-Ghali, January 14, 1993) .
3

.1• • See Adam P. Tait, supra note 9, at 113; See also, See UN Doc. S/PV. 2682 (Apr. 21, 1986) (US, UK,
Australia, Denmark, and France oppose declaration); UN Doc. S/21048 (Dec. 22, 1989); UN Doc. S/PV.
2902 (Dec. 23, 1989) (US, UK, France, and Canada oppose declaration).
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v.

Argument in Support of the United States-Led 2003 Military Action in Iraq.
As we have seen above, the only organ of the United Nations that has the power

and authority to authorize a military action, when there is a threat to international peace
and security, is the United Nations Security Council. For instance, under Article 24(1) of
the Charter, 114 it is provided thus:
"In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its
Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carryin~ out its
duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf." 1 5
We have also noted that Article 39 of the Charter 116 similarly provides that:
"The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to
maintain or restore international peace and security." 117
As we have seen earlier, according to David Schweigman, 118 the duty to determine what
constitutes breach of peace and security is tempered by the fact that the Security Council
must act in accordance with the "Purposes and Principles" of the United Nations, namely
principles of ')ustice and international law." 119 In this regard, Article 24(2) of the
Charter, 120 provides that:

114

• See

U.N. Charter, supra note 65, at Art. 24(1).

115./bid.
116

. See U.N. Charter, supra note 65, at Art. 39.

117

./bid.

118

. DAVID SCHWEIGMAN, supra note 69, 28-29.

119
120

. /bid.

. See U.N. Charter, supra note 65, at Art. 24(2).
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"2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with
the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to
the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters
VI, VII, VIII, and XII. " 121

We must also note Article 25 of the Charter, 122 which mandates that:
"The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions
of the Security Council, in accordance with the present Charter." 123

Thus, when the Security Council acts according to this mandate, its decisions become
binding on Member States.

124

In this regard, we have seen that on November 29, 1990, when the Security
Council adopted Resolution 678, 125 it authorized the members ofthe United Nations

"to use all necessary means to uphold and implement Resolution 660 (1990) and
all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and
security in the {Gu/j] area."
So long as this Resolution 678 remains valid, especially as at March 19, 2003, when the
Iraqi military action commenced, then "all necessary means" used to enforce Resolution
660 and "all subsequent relevant resolutions" that were meant and directed at

"restor[ingj international peace and security in the [Gu/j] area" are legal under
contemporary international law.
We must note that on April 3, 1991, the Security Council adopted one of the "all

subsequent relevant resolutions" 126-which is Resolution 687, 127 that, in effect, codified

121
122

123
124

lis

• Ibid.

. See U.N. Charter, supra note 65, at Art. 25.
•

Ibid.

•

See Adam P. Tait, supra note 9, at 98; See SCHWEIGMAN, supra note 69, at 31, fns 115-117.

. Sec. C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990).
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the cease-fire agreement between Iraq and the United States and the international
. . ofth e WI'11'mg. " 128
"coalitiOn
Clearly, as is evident from Resolution 687, the Security Council expressly
mandated that the Iraqi authorities unconditionally accept the destruction of all chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons programs. 129 Also, Resolution 687 further required Iraq
to destroy all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers. 130 As we have
seen above, two international chemical and biological monitoring authorities were set up
under Resolution 687 provisions to oversee Iraq's compliance-the International Atomic
Energy Agency ("IAEA") and United Nations Special Conunission on Iraq
("UNSCOM").

131

Later on, in December 1999, a new monitoring body was set up, when the
Security Council disbanded UNSCOM and replaced it with the United Nations
Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Conunission ("UNMOVIC"). 132
We have seen repeated refusal of the Iraqi authorities to permit either the
UNSCOM or the UNMOVIC to carry out their mandated duties. We saw as Iraq shielded
its nuclear and biological weapons from scrutiny. Yet, this nation used chemical weapons

126

• See

Sec. C. Res. 678.

127

• Sec. C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991), which, per Adam Tait, is often
known as the "Mother of all Resolutions." See Adam P. Tait, supra note 69, at 101.
128
129
130

•

Ibid. per Security Council Resolution 687.

.1bid. at paras. 8, 9 & 12.
•

Ibid at para. 8.

IJI.Ibid.
132

. Sec. C. Res. 1284, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1284 (1999).
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against the Kurds in 1993 and against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988.
Clearly, Iraq posed a threat to the "Gulf area," as at March 1993.
Because Resolution 678 authorized "all necessary" actions to enforce Resolution
660 and all "subsequent resolutions," among which were Resolutions 68 7 and 1441, 133
we submit, therefore, that the United States-led March 19, 2003 military action was
justified, under current international law rules.
On November 8, 2002, the Security Council passed Resolution 1441, 134 after
having, unanimously, found that Iraq was in material breach of these earlier resolutions
and that its continuing development of WMD programs, its support for terrorism, and its
repression of the civilian population presented an on-going threat to international peace
and security .m Thus, these findings triggered Resolution 678 's authorization to use force

in Iraq. Suspending the cease-fire and resuming hostilities with Iraq was an appropriate
response to Iraq's material breaches of Resolution 687. 136 As John Yoo had noted:
"Over the years, Iraq repeatedly refused to respond to diplomatic overtures and
other nonmilitary attempts to force compliance with its obligations to disarm and
to permit full UN inspections of its WMD program. Military force was necessary
to obtain Iraqi compliance with the terms of the cease-fire and to restore
international peace and security to the region." 137
That military action was justified under the legal authorities of Resolutions 678, 687, and
1441 has also been echoed by Adam Tait thus:

133
134

135
136
137

. Sec. C. Res. 1441, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. SIRES/1441 (2002).
• Ibid.

. See John Yoo Agora, supra note 1, at 567.
• Ibid.
• Ibid
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"Resolutions 678 and 687 stand together as twin pillars of justification for the USled invasion of Iraq in 2003. Whereas the former enables Member States to
employ "all necessary means" to uphold subsequent resolutions with regards to
Iraq, the latter sets out the mandates that Iraq was required to obey in order to
preserve the cease-fire and suspend Resolution 678. Tracing the history of armed
conflict in Iraq from the end of the Gulf War and identifying the relevant Security
Council resolutions during those periods makes clear that Resolutions 678 and
687 were still in effect in March of 2003, and provide the legal basis for the use of
armed force to enforce those resolutions." 138
Undeniably, the conduct of Iraqi authorities from 1991 until 2003 threatened the world
peace and security. We must remember that in December 1998, when United States and
Great Britain launched a seventy-hour air assault against Iraqi target on account oflraq's
continuing breaches of obligations under existing resolutions, it was clear that
Resolutions 678 and 687 were sufficient justification for the attacks. 139 According to
former President Bill Clinton, the military action was:
"consistent with and has been taken in support of...Resolutions 678 and 687,
which authorize UN Member States to use all necessary means to implement the
Security Council resolutions and to restore peace and security in the region and
establish the terms of the cease-fire mandated by the Council, including those
related to the destruction oflraq's WMD programs." 140
During this military exercise, thirteen nations offered some sort of support, either

in the form of facilities, troops, or equipment, including Australia, Canada, Spain, and
Germany. 141 In the words of Adam Tait:
"This sentiment to enforce Resolutions 678 and 687 only served to strengthen the
position of the US and UK that the cease-fire and disarmament provisions of
those resolutions were still effective to authorize the use offorce." 142
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Adam P. Tait, supra note 9, at 105.
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• Security Council Meets to Discuss Military Strikes Against Iraq; Some Members Challenge Use of
Force Without Council Consent UN Doc. SC/6611, at 1-2, 7 (Dec. 16, 1998).
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• Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Military Strikes Against Iraq (Dec. 18, 1998), 2 Pub. Papers of
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The same legal backing that existed in support of the 1998 military action were
still available, as of March 2003. As at March 19, 2003, the Iraqi regime had not
complied with its obligations under Security Council resolutions to cooperate with the
inspections regime and declare the extent of its nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons programs. There were seventeen resolutions that the Security Council had
.
the mvas10n
.
. ofK uwa1t.
. 143
passed, smce
This disobedience was part of the danger that Iraq posed to mankind in March
2003. As far back as June 1998, United States President, Bill Clinton, had identified the
danger posed by Iraq to the entire mankind:
"The evidence of the Government of Iraq's violence and terrorism demonstrates
that Iraq poses a continuing threat to United States nationals and shows utter
disregard for the will of the international community as expressed in Security
Council Resolutions and the United Nations Charter.. .! concluded that there was
no reasonable prospect that new diplomatic initiatives or economic measures
could influence the current Government of Iraq to cease planning future attacks
against the United States." 144
This threat, as identified in 1993, continued for ten years, until 2003. Thus, along
the same line, in his testimony before the United Nations in February, 2003, United
States Secretary of State, Colin Powell, set forth the case against the Iraqi regime, by
explaining the threat posed by the rogue regime in Baghdad:
"The material I will present to you comes from a variety of sources. Some are
U.S. sources and some are those of other countries. Some are the sources are
technical, such as intercepted telephone conversations and photos taken by
satellites. Other sources are people who have risked their lives to let the world
know what Saddam Hussein is really up to.
142

• See

143

• Ibid.

Adam P. Tait, supra note 9, at 107.

~ • See President's Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Strike on Iraq Intelligence Headquarters (June
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28, 1993), in 1 Pub. Papers 940 (1993).
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"I cannot tell you everything that we know, but what I can share with you, when
combined with what all of us have learned over the years, is deeply troubling.
What you will see is an accumulation of facts and disturbing patterns of behavior.
The facts and Iraqis' behavior, Iraq's behavior, demonstrate that Saddam Hussein
and his regime have made no effort, no effort, to disarm, as required by the
international community.

,I

"Indeed, the facts and Iraq's behavior show that Saddam Hussein and his regime
are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction." 145
We must remember that Articles 24(1)&(2), 25, and 39, all mandate the United Nations
f

Security Council to determine threats to world peace and to pass resolutions on taking

I

I

care of such threats which would be binding on member states. The Security Council,
under Resolution 678, had authorized the enforcement of Resolutions 687 and 1441, by
all means necessary.
In this regard, Resolution 1441 explicitly refers to Iraq's "non-compliance with
Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range
missiles ... [.]" 146 Resolution 1441 further referred to Resolutions 678 and 687, based on
I ' h11 .,.

the fact that the Security Council:

· I~ lrt

:II.Gill,[*

"recall[ed] that its resolution 678 (1990) authorized Member States to use all
necessary means to uphold and implement its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August
1990 and all relevant resolutions subsequent to Resolution 660 (1990) and to
restore international peace and security in the area." 147

1:
I

Legally, it is submitted that United States was authorized to use force and all

't

necessary means to uphold and to implement Resolution 660, and every other sixteen

I

14

s. U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, Address at United Nations Security Council (Feb. 5, 2003),
available at http://www.un.int/usa/03clp0205.htm.
146

• United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441
(2002), at para. 1.
- 147

. Ibid, at Preamble.
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resolutions adopted by the Security Council with respect to Iraqi's threat to international
peace and security.

VI.

Express and/or Implied Authority Arising From Seturity Countil Resolutions.

As we have seen earlier, during the build-up to the March 2003 military action,
Russia and France threatened to veto any U.N. Security Council resolution that authorizes
military action against Iraq. 148 In effect, immediately preceding the March 2003 military
action, there was no formal Security Council vote authorizing the military action.
According to Adam Tait:
"The US and UK worked feverishly in late 2002 and early 2003 to create the
required consensus to pass a resolution that would authorize the use of force in
Iraq. Such a resolution would have been the eighteenth resolution with regards to
Iraq's violation of international law, but it never materialized. Three members of
the Security Council, Russia, France and Germany, strongly opposed such a
resolution, believing that Resolution 1441 was the limit for threats against
Saddam Hussein. As the Kosovo and Korean situations illustrated before, the
interests of but a few members of the Security Council may bar the entire Council
from fulfilling its duties under the Charter. This surely was the case during the
Iraq debate."~'49
Yet, as we have seen, there was no need for any further resolution from the
Security Council because Resolutions 678, 687, and 1441 were still valid and
subsisting-as at March 19, 2003-authorizing the use force and all necessary means to
uphold and to implement Resolution 660 and every other sixteen resolutions adopted by
. the Security Council, with respect to Iraqi's threat to international peace and security.

148

• See UN Security Council Veto Power, available at http://www.slate.com/id/2080036/; See also, Security
Council veto power usage, Herald Tribune Monday, March 3, 2003. Available at:
http://www.peace.ca/securitycouncilveto.htm.
149
•

See Adam P. Tait, supra note 9, at 105; see also, Adam Roberts, The Use of Force, in THE UN

~ECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY 141 (David M. Malone ed.,

2004).
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Some international legal commentators have argued that Resolution 678's
authorization had expired. 150 However, under United Nations practice, and as a matter of
rules of international customary and treaty laws, that position may not be valid. 151
An historical review of past actions of the United Nations Security Council would

show that when the Council authorizes use of force in certain circumstances, that
Resolution continues to be in force until it has expired only in two (2) instances: (a)
where the Council has set a time frame for its validity or (b) where a particular
Resolution has been expressly terminated by the Security Council itself, i.e., where the
Council makes a new Resolution expunging the earlier one.
For instance, while taking care of the Somalia crisis in 1993, as we have seen
earlier, 152 when the Security Council passed Resolution 954 on November 4, 1994, it

expressly extended the mandate for the United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM
II) for a "final period" until March 31, 1995. 153

Similarly, when the Security Council was seized of the Rwanda debacle, it set a
maximum of two months for military intervention, under Security Council Resolution
929, which specified that "the mission of Member States cooperating with the Secretary-

General will be limited to a period of two months, following the adoption of the present
resolution," if not earlier. 154

I'

. lso. See John Yoo Agora, supra note 1, at 567. "Representatives from France, Germany, and Russia, for

I

example, seemed to take the position that because the current members of the Security Council would not
agree to the use of force in the spring of 2003, the 1991 resolution's broad authorization was somehow
extinguished." Ibid
lsi. Ibid; See also, Adam P. Tait, supra note 9, at 107.
IS2.

See the discussion on the State of Somalia in Chapter IV, supra.

u:t. See Security Council Resolution 954, ofNovember 4, 1994, at 3 .

.
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At times, the Security Council may expressly terminate its earlier Resolution.
Thus, concerning the Bosnia imbroglio, the Security Council passed Resolution 1031,
which expressly decided that "the authority to take certain measures conferred upon
States by [various UN Security Council resolutions] shall be terminated." 155
Looking at the above international law practice, Adam Tait had submitted that:
"It is important to note Security Council practice with regards to ending its
authorization to use force. When the Council decides to end the use of force, it
either passes a new resolution extinguishing the previous resolution, or it makes a
clear duration for authority in the resolution itself. In other words, the Security
Council must expressly terminate the authority of its resolutions." 156
Going on, and applying the above principles to the Iraqi situation in March 2003, Adam
Tait submitted thus:
"There is no such language in Resolution 678 which makes clear that its
authorization to use force would lapse at a specific point or that the Council had
reserved the right to determine when the authorization would end. Nor has the
Council ever expressly terminated the effect of Resolution 678. These facts,
coupled with the express language of Resolution 1441, make clear that
Resolutions 678 and 687 remained in effect in March 2003, when the invasion of
Iraq began." 157
John Yoo had gone ahead to also add that, in international practice, when the Security
Council had wanted to reserve for itself whether the conditions for termination of its
authorization have been met rather than leave the matter to the member states, it had
explicitly done so, in the past. 158 For instance, in 1994, while dealing with the overthrow
of President Aristide in Haiti, the Council decided:

154
15

• See

Security Council Resolution 929 (June 22, 1994), at 2 (Rwanda).

~. See Security Council Resolution 1031 (December 15, 1995), at 3 (Bosnia).

1 6

~ • See Adam P. Tait, supra note 9, at 107-108.

!~ 7 • Ibid. at 108.
ISB

. See John Yoo Agora, supra note 1, at 567-568.
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''that the multinational force will terminate its mission . . . when a secure and
stable environment has been established . . . [as determined] by the Security
Council, taking into account recommendations from the Member States of the
multinational force." 159
John Yoo's legal submission is in agreement with Adam Tait's, when Yoo observed that:
"Security Council practice has been consistent on this point over a substantial
period of time. Resolution 678, by contrast, contains no self-imposed time limit,
and none of the resolutions relating to Iraq, including Resolution 1441, explicitly
terminated the resolution's endorsement of the use of force. Unless the Security
Council had clearly stated, using the same language that it has in the past, that it
has terminated Resolution 678's authorization for the use of force, any such
authorization continued." 160
Clearly, the United States had a continuing authorization to preserve peace in the
region, via "all means necessary." That authority had not expired, even, as at today.

VII. Customary and Legislative International Laws as Grounds for the Military
Action in Iraq.
France, Germany, and Russia are ready to point out that the lack of unanimity to
authorize use of force against Iraq in March 2003, as against the total consensus that
obtained in 1990, would make the authority given under Resolutions 678, 687, and 1441,
to use "all means necessary," to have been dissipated. 161
Yet, it would be a very dangerous venture to reduce Security Council Resolutions
to ad hoc executive edicts-this would cause considerable uncertainty about their legal

,
I

force and when they would expire. 162 On the contrary, Security Council's resolutions are
of legal force that only the Security Council can, of itself, change, amend, and/or
19

s • See Security Council Resolution 940 (July 31, 1994) (Haiti)

160

. See John Yoo Agora, supra note l, at 567-568.

161
_ • Ibid.
162

at 568.

• Ibid
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tenninate same-no legal opinion by some scholars may affect its validity. According to
John Yoo:
"If the current members of the Security Council disagreed with Resolution 678,
they could have repealed it. To argue that Resolution 678's authorization had
somehow dissipated, despite its clear text, simply because some of the current
members of the Council no longer agreed with it treats Council resolutions as if
they merely recorded temporary diplomatic agreement rather than enacted
enduring legal texts. The French, German, and Russian view considers Security
Council resolutions to be ad hoc executive edicts, rather than legislative acts--a
result that would cause considerable uncertainty about their legal force and when
they expire." 163
Because United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 had neither been amended nor
expunged, and because there was no provision for a terminable date set within the context
of the wordings of Resolution 678, it necessarily follows that the authorization of force
and military action within the United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 was still
valid and subsisting, as at March 19, 2003, when the Iraqi military action commenced.

VIII. Breach of Resolution 678 Ceasefire Agreement Suspending Hostilities.
Under Article 60(2)(b) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 164
it is provided that in the multilateral context, a material breach of a treaty by one of the
parties entitles a party, "specially affectecf' by the breach, to suspend the operation of the
treaty in whole or in part vis-a-vis the defaulting state.
In addition, a State, whose interests were radically changed as a result of breach
by another state, may suspend its obligations under the treaty that, hitherto, binds the two
states together. Thus, another aspect of a breach of an international treaty provides that,

163

•

Ibid.

164

. See Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties, Art. 60(2)(b), opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155
UNTS 331 [hereinafter "Vienna Convention"].
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even if a state party were not "specially affected," however, a material breach that

'
'

I

''radically changes" the position of the parties also permits complete or partial
l .
0

suspensiOn.

165

After the First Gulf War, Resolution 687 explicitly established:
"a formal cease-fire ... between Iraq and Kuwait, and the [UN] Member States
cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 (1990)." 166
As we know, the States that were parties to the above Resolution 687 cease-fire
agreement were Iraq, Kuwait, the United States, and the other members of the coalition in
the Gulf war, but not the United Nations itself. 167 Thus, as this writer has elaborated
earlier, there have been numerous breaches by Iraq of its duties under the Resolutions
660, 678, 687, and 1441. The United States and members of the "coalition of the
willing," who have been party "specially affected'' by the breach, and those whose
interests were radically changed by the breach, are legally permitted to suspend their

~
·~
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obligations under the cease-fire and resume hostility.

168

In the words of John Yoo:

"Iraq's material breaches of the cease-fire entitled the United States, as a party to
the cease-fire, unilaterally to suspend its operation. Under accepted principles of
international law, the United States did not need the concurrence of the other
parties. Once the cease-fire was suspended, the United States could rely on
Resolution 678 to use force against Iraq to implement Resolution 687 and to
restore international peace and security to the area." 169
This position has been supported by Ruth Wedgwood who opined that Iraq's breach of
the terms of the cease-fire in 1997-1998:

165

166
167
168
169

• See

ibid., Art. 60(2)(c).

• See

United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, at para. 33.

. See John Yoo Agora, supra note I, at 568-569.
• See

Vienna Convention, Art. 60(2)(b)&(c).

. See John Yoo Agora, supra note I, at 569.
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"allowed the United States to deem the cease-fire in suspension and to resume
military operations to enforce its conditions." 170
Clearly, the March 2003 military action was merely a resumption of the continuing 1991
First Gulf War-the conditions of the ceasefire agreement were broken by Saddam
Hussein-led Iraq, and so, hostilities resumed.

IX.

Breach of Resolution 678 Armistice Suspending Hostilities.

Under customary international law of Armistice and the Regulations annexed to
the Hague Convention on the Law and Customs of War on Land, 171 the March 2003
military action was also justified under the law governing armistices, because Resolution
687 was basically an armistice--unlike a peace treaty, it did not terminate the state of war,
but merely "suspended military operations by mutual agreement between the belligerent
parties." 172 Under customary armistice law, a cease-fire generally allows a party to a
conflict to resume hostilities under certain conditions, and for instance, under the Hague
Regulations,
"any serious violation of the armistice by one of the parties gives the other party
the right of denouncin§ it, and even, in cases of urgency, of recommencing
hostilities immediately." 73
As John Yoo had rightly submitted:

.

170

• See Ruth Wedgwood, The Enforcement of Security Council Resolution 687: The Threat of Force
Against Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, 92 AJIL 724,726 (1998) [hereinafter "Wedgwood"]

171

•

Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention on the Law and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,

Art. 36, 36 Stat. 2277, 2305 [hereinafter "Hague Regulations"].
172

• See John Yoo Agora, supra note 1, at 569; See also, Hague Regulations, Art. 40, supra note 171; U.S.
Army Field Manual P493, available at <http://www.adtdl.army.miVcgi-bin/atdl.dlVfm/27-1 O/Ch7 .htm>
(hostilities may be resumed only with "convincing proof of intentional and serious violation of [the
armistice's) terms by the other party").
173

• See

also, Hague Regulations, Art. 40, supra note 171.
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"Because the initial use of force in response to the invasion of Kuwait--Operation
Desert Storm--was authorized under Resolution 678, subsequent uses of force
against Iraq in response to serious violations of the terms of the cease-fire
established by Resolution 687 are authorized as well. Thus, because Iraq refused
to fully comply with Resolution 687, such as by destroying fully its WMD and
their delivery systems, it was in 'serious violation' of the cease-fire and the
United States was justified in resuming the use of force under Resolution 678." 174
Concluding, we submit that Resolutions 660, 661, 678, 687, and 1441, were armistice
agreement suspending hostilities, while the inspection by UNSCOM and UNMOVIC
continued. When the Iraqi government refused permission to the inspectors to search for
weapons of mass destruction, the armistice was suspended, and hostilities were, rightly-

and legally, resumed on March 19,2003.
X.

Expanded Rules of Pre-emptive and/or Anticipatory Self-Defense.
Finally, the United States-led March 19, 2003 military strike against Iraq was

justified under customary and legislative international law rules of self-defense. As we
noted earlier on, while there is no dispute with both the Natural Law and Positive Law
Schools of International Law, there are theoretical differences between (a) anticipatory
self-defense rights and (b) pre-emptive self-defense rights.
In this regard, under international law, anticipatory self-defense is best understood
to describe military action against an imminent attack and such use of force is justified

174

. See John Yoo Agora, supra note I, at 569-570; See also 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW,
A TREATISE: DISPUTES, WAR, AND NEUTRALITY 556 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952); Howard
S. Levie, The Nature and Scope of the Armistice Agreement, 50 AnL 880, 893 (1956).
I'
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under traditional notions of self-defense. 175 Preemptive self-defense, on the other hand, is
. a more remote, yet stgm
. 'fitcant, threat. 176
used to descn'be the use offiorce agrunst

In his May 2002 Speech at West Point Military Academy, President Bush spoke
of "preemption" as a theory of combating terrorism. 177 We must note that the term
"preemptive self-defense" is used to refer to cases where a party uses force to quell any
possibility of future attack by another state, even where there is little reason to believe
that an attack is planned and where no prior attack has occurred. Some writers also call
this "preventive" self-defense or "preventive" war. 178 It is to be distinguished from
"anticipatory" self-defense. The latter is a narrower doctrine that would authorize armed
responses to attacks that are on the brink of launch, or where an enemy attack has already
occurred and the victim learns more attacks are planned.
It is the United States' submission that the threat posed by Iraq as of March 19,
2003 amounted to both "imminent" and substantial "remote" danger to international
peace and security. This position is brought into fore by Iraq's possession of weapons of
mass destruction in 2003, Iraq's violations of numerous Resolutions of the United
Nations, and its use of chemical and biological weapons in scuttling the 1993 Kurds'
Revolt and during the ten-year Iran-Iraq War.

m. See Joseph L. Falvey, Jr., Our Cause is Just: An Analysis of Operation Iraqi Freedom Under
International Law and the Just War Doctrine, 2 Ave Maria L. Rev. 65, 72 (2004). (Hereinafter "Falvey").
176

• See Christopher Greenwood, International Law and Pre-emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, AI-Qaida,
and Iraq, 4 San Diego Int'l L. J. 7, 9 (2003). (Hereinafter "Greenwood").

177

• Mike Allen & Karen DeYoung, Bush: U.S. Will Strike First at Enemies; In West Point Speech.
President Lays Out Broader U.S. Policy, WASH. POST, June 2, 2002, at AO I.
178

~ See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE 168 (3d ed. 2001) ("Dinstein
2001"; IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 275
(1963).
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When the above facts are interposed with the attempted assassination of former
President George H.W. Bush in April 1993, while in Kuwait, by Iraqi forces and secret
services, 179 United States has argued that it would be clear that Iraq posed sufficient
threat to international peace and security.
Applying the "preemptive self-defense" theory to the March 19, 2003 military
invasion of Iraq, it is necessary to consider the elements of "preemptive self-defense," as
laid down in the Caroline case. 180 According to the then United States Secretary of State,
Daniel Webster, Great Britain needed to show that the:
"necessity of self-defence [was] instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of
means, and no moment for deliberation ... [and that the British force], even
supposing the necessity of the moment authorized them to enter the territories of
the United States at all, did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act,
justified by the necessitv of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and
kept clearly within it." 1g1
Contemporary international law scholars have agreed that the Caroline test has been
distilled into two principal requirements:
(a).
(b).

First, the use of force must be necessary because the threat is imminent
and, thus, pursuing peaceful alternatives is not an option; and
Second, the response must be proportionate to the threat. 182

The requirement of "imminent" danger, the United States has argued, was
satisfied by the fact that Iraq refused access to United Nations monitoring team to visit
the sites and laboratories where Iraqi weapons of mass destruction were being produced.

179

• Iraqi secret services tried to assassinate former President George Bush, when he visited Kuwait between
April 14 and April 16, 1993. The Iraqi Intelligence Service (liS) was behind the assassination attempt. See
http://hnn.us/articles/1 OOO.html.
180

• See Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Secretary of State, to Henry Fox, British Minister in Washington
(Apr. 24, 1841), in 29 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1840-1841, at 1138 (1857).
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Ibid.
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. See, e.g., DINSTEIN 2001, supra note 178, at 208-212; See also, John Yoo Agora, supra note 1, at 572 .
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Jrnplicitly, there were some "activities" going on at those sites which were not meant to

.l.,
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be disclosed to the whole world. As we saw, in 1993, Iraq did not hesitate to use chemical

and biological weapons against its Kurdish citizens. 183

I.

Earlier on, in 1987, the chemical weapons that had been used to such
demoralizing effect against Iranian troops, during the ten-year Iran-Iraq War between
1978 and 1988, had also been brought into play, repeatedly, against the Kurds. For an
hour on June 8, 1987, chemical shells from a truck-mounted multiple rocket-launcher, or

rajima, rained down on Bergalou, Haladin, and the nearby village of Sekaniyan ( 11 Three
Springs 11 ). 184 Then came the March 16, 1993 Chemical Attack on Halabja:

~~
GII!Cila

"The Iraqi counter-attack began in the mid-morning of March 16, with
conventional air-strikes and artillery shelling from the town of Sayed Sadeq to the
north. Most families in Halabja had built primitive air-raid shelters near their
homes. Some crowded into these, others into the government shelters, following
the standard air-raid drills they had been taught since the beginning of the IranIraq War in 1980. The first wave of air strikes appears to have included the use of
napalm or phosphorus. 'It was different from the other bombs,' according to one
witness. 'There was a huge sound, a huge flame and it had very destructive
ability. If you touched one part of your body that had been burned, your hand
burned also. It caused things to catch fire.' The raids continued unabated for
several hours. 'It was not just one raid, so you could stop and breathe before
another raid started. It was just continuous planes, coming and coming. Six planes
would finish and another six would come.'

~~ ·

~
~

"Those outside in the streets could see clearly that these were Iraqi, not Iranian
aircraft, since they flew low enough for their markings to be legible. In the
afternoon, at about 3:00, those who remained in the shelters became aware of an
unusual smell. Like the villagers in the Balisan Valley the previous spring, they
compared it most often to sweet apples, or to perfume, or cucumbers, although

183

• See Human Rights Watch, GENOCIDE IN IRAQ: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds, A Middle
at:
East
Watch
Report,
Human
Rights
Watch,
July,
1993.
Available
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/iraganfall. Last visited on: July 23, 2006.
I'

. 184.Ibid.
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one man says that it smelled 'very bad, like snake poison.' No one needed to be
185
told what the smell was."

In addition, the Saddam Hussein government allegedly used chemical and biological
weapons against the Kurds living at Goktapa, Askar, and Anfal Dragnet, East of
Taqtaq.

186

The Baa'thist government in Iraq did not hesitate to use chemical and/or
biological weapons against its own citizens, and it refused the United Nations monitoring
team access to its chemical, nuclear, and biological production sites, from 1991 to 2003.
As we have seen earlier, nations do not need to wait for first attack before reacting:
"The threats posed by the Iraqi regime in 2003 were not precisely known, but
current intelligence showed that the regime had not complied with its obligations
under Security Council resolutions to cooperate with the inspections regime and
declare the extend of its nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons
programs. Such intransigence had long worried the world community, hence the
seventeen resolutions that the Security Council had passed since the invasion of
Kuwait ... Given what the international community knew about Iraq's continued
intransigence, the fact that the extent of Iraq's weapons programs was unknown,
and the magnitude of suffering that could occur if Iraq did have those weapons
programs, the US-led coalition, in an act of collective self-defense, was justified
in its invasion of Iraq under the Caroline test. Invasion was a proportionate
response to the threat that Iraq's weapons programs posed, and the history of
violations by the Saddam Hussein regime made clear that his removal was
justified. Further, the events of September 11, 2001, made clear that threats not
considered imminent are real and deadly nonetheless. The aggressive actions of
the coalition were consistent with previous acts of self-defense taken by numerous
nations, and entirely appropriate under the Caroline test." 187

In international law, circumstances constituting "imminence" encompass an analysis that
goes beyond the temporal proximity of a threat to include the probability" that the threat

185

• Ibid.; See also, Middle East Watch interview, Halabja, May 17, 1992. The symptoms described by
survivors are consistent with exposure to both mustard gas and a nerve agent such as Sarin.
186
•

187

Ibid.

• See

Adam P. Tait, supra note 9, at 112-113.
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will 0 ccur. 188 This must be juxtaposed with the fact that it has been observed that
weapons of mass destruction threaten devastating and indiscriminate long-term damage
to large segments of the civilian population and environment.

189

According to John Yoo:

"In addition to the probability of the threat, the threatened magnitude of harm
must be relevant. The advent of nuclear and other sophisticated weapons has
dramatically increased the degree of potential harm, and the importance of the
temporal factor has diminished ... In addition, the danger posed by WMD is
exacerbated by the possibility that the means of delivery may be relatively
unsophisticated--for example, a 'dirty bomb' driven into a building by a suicide
bomber, or the spread of a biological agent with an ordinary crop duster. At the
same time, the development of advanced missile technology has vastly improved
the capability for stealth, rendering threats more imminent because there is less
time to prevent their launch." 190

In effect, State practice since the development of nuclear weapons and sophisticated
delivery systems demonstrates the evolution of the concept ofimminence: 191
"Factors to be considered should now include the probability of an attack; the
likelihood that this probability will increase, and therefore the need to take
advantage of a limited window of opportunity; whether diplomatic alternatives are
practical; and the magnitude of the harm that could result from the threat. If a
state instead were obligated to wait until the threat were truly imminent in the
temporal sense envisioned by Secretary Webster, there is a substantial danger of
missing a limited window of opportunity to prevent widespread harm to civilians.
Finally, in an age of technologically advanced delivery systems and WMD,
international law cannot require that we ignore the potential harm represented by
the threat." 192
According to the proponents of the war, because Iraq used scud missiles during the First
I
I

Gulf War, and because Iraq refused the world the ability to ascertain the extent and scope
188

•

See Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), 1997 ICJ REP. 7

(September 25, 1997).
189

. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion), 1996 ICJ REP. 95, at P36
(July 8, 1996).
190
191

. See John Yoo Agora, supra note 1, at 574.
•

Ibid. at 573.

m. Ibid. at 572-573.

279

I
I

I

!I

If

I'
,I

of nuclear and other sophisticated weapons, along with its continuing aggression towards

the United States, and its leaders, the 2003 attack would be justified, as being imminent.
Finally, the proportionality element of preemptive strike was achieved.
Proportionality requires that possible civilian casualties must be weighed in the balance.

If the loss of innocent life or destruction of civilian property is out of-proportion to the
importance of the objective, the attack must be abandoned, because proportionality
c:
,193
prohib1'ts 10rce.

"which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated." 194
Also, at international law,
"In the law of armed conflict, the notion of proportionality is based on the
fundamental principle that belligerents do not enjoy an unlimited choice of means
to inflict damage on the enemy." 195
Thus, in a case where a state has failed to control acts of terrorists, but is otherwise not
legally responsible for their acts, the victim state can act in self-defense, consistently with
the principle of proportionality, if it targets the terrorists, and not the government or
military forces of the territorial state.
The military action was directed at overthrowing Saddam Hussein and the
Baa'thist party members. Once these people were taken care of, and once the sites for the
production of weapons of mass destruction were taken care of, the war appeared to be
over, save for pockets of insurgency. This position was supported by John Yoo as well:
193

• Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Myth of Preemptive Self-Defense, Paper Delivered at The American
Society of International Law Task Force on Terrorism, August 2002. Available at:
http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf. Last visited on: July 23, 2006. (Hereinafter "O'Connell").
194

• Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protections of
_Victims oflntemational Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, at art. 51, para. 5.
19
'.

Judith Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 Am. J. Int'l L. 391 (1993).
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"The force used was proportionate to the threat posed by Iraq; in other words, it
was limited to that which is needed to eliminate the threat, including the
destruction of Iraq's WMD capability and removing the source of Iraq's hostile
intentions and actions, Saddam Hussein." 196
1.
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XJ,

Emerging Broader Rules of "Preemptive" Self Defense Rights.

Turning to the test of "preemptive" self-defense rights which focuses on a remote
danger, that is, nonetheless, substantial, it is clear that based on the practice of states and,
perhaps, on general principles of law, as well as simple logic, international lawyers
generally agree that a state need not wait to suffer the actual blow before defending itself,
"so long as it is certain the blow is coming." 197 However, we must note that:
"There is no consensus in international legal doctrine over the point in time from
which measures of self-defense against an armed attack may be taken." 198
The standard for measuring predicate acts justifying anticipatory action is as
stated by Sir Humphrey Waldeck:
"where there is convincing evidence not merely of threats and potential danger
but of an attack being actually mounted, then an armed attack may be said to have
begun to occur, though it has not passed the frontier.'' 199
Also, Professor Yoram Dinstein has labeled the anticipatory defense right as
"incipient self-defense," rather than anticipatory, by arguing, for example, that the United

196
197

. See John Yoo Agora, supra note 1, at 573.
. See O'Connell, supra note 193.

198

• See Randelzhofer, Article 51 in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, A COMMENTARY
675 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 1995).

~ • C.H.M. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81

99

HAGUE RECUEIL 451,498.
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States could clearly have attacked the Japanese fleet during World War II, while the
Japanese were en route to Pearl Harbor?

00

It would appear that those who deny the right of anticipatory self-defense are
stretching the text of the United Nations Charter further than its plain meaning, and
thereby insisting on an unrealistic standard that makes no sense in an age of proliferating
nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile technologies, as well as of biological and
chemical weapons. We must note that, as a practical matter, no state is likely to watch as

its destruction (or the death or injury of its citizens) is being prepared, while taking no
action until after these weapons have actually been used.
Therefore, if international law is to have a meaningful role in ordering
international relations, it must reflect and accommodate the realities of contemporary
international system.201
Applied to the build-up to the March 2003 military action against Iraq, proponents
of the war argue that it is safe to say that an attack was actually being mounted by Iraq
and that an armed attack may be said to have begun to occur, though it has not passed the
Iraqi frontier. 202 This is because, since the cessation of hostilities after the First Gulf War,
Iraq had taken so many actions against United States' interests. For instance, it attempted
to assassinate Former President George H.W. Bush in April 1993, and as President Bill
Clinton noted:

200

• See

Dinstein 200 l, supra note 178 at 183-185.

201

• Lee A. Casey & David B. Rivkin, Jr., "Anticipatory" Self-Defense Against Terrorism is Legal (Dec. 14,
2001), available at htt}>://www.wlf.org/upload/casey.pdf; ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J.
BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 186 (1993).
202 -

.See Waldock, supra note 199, at 498.
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"The evidence of the Government of Iraq's violence and terrorism demonstrates
that Iraq poses a continuing threat to United States nationals and shows utter
disregard for the will of the international community as expressed in Security
Council Resolutions and the United Nations Charter.. .! concluded that there was
no reasonable prospect that new diplomatic initiatives or economic measures
could influence the current Government of Iraq to cease planning future attacks
against the United States. " 203
The fact that Iraq was "planning future attacks against the United States" 204 and

the fact that Iraqi's weapons of mass destruction were being shielded from international
inspectors meant that such diabolical weapons may be used by Iraq against the United
States. The sum total is that, as a practical matter, no state, including the United States, is

'

to watch as its destruction (or the death or injury of its citizens) is being prepared, taking

~~ ·

~~

~a~

no action until after these weapons have actually been used. The events of September 11,

~

2001 have taught us otherwise. As stated earlier on, if international law is to have a
meaningful role in ordering international relations, it must reflect and accommodate the
realities of the international system,205 i.e., that United States may act, premptively, to
prevent debilitating effects of a nuclear attack.

XII.

Limitations on Self-Defense Rights

There are arguments against the exercise of preemptive self defense rights as now
being canvassed by United States. In fact, it is one of the well-known weaknesses of selfdefense-based responses to terrorism that these actions may easily turn into illegal
reprisals. The reaction to a terrorist attack risks, in particular, being unlawful, if is
203

• See President's Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Strike on Iraq Intelligence Headquarters (June
28, 1993), in I Pub. Papers 940 (1993).

204
205

.

• Ibid.
• See

Lee A. Casey & David B. Rivkin, Jr., supra note 201, at 186.
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directed against objects which, and persons who, are not the source of an imminent

threat.

First, specific problems can also arise in this regard not only with regard to the
attack on certain obje~ts, such as dual-use facilities or alleged terrorist targets, which later
tum out to be harmless civilian objects, but also with respect to action carried out against
persons who are not the authors of the armed attack.

Second, another aspect of the issue is related to the general scope and purpose of
the United States-led actions. The current events show clearly that the question of
combating terrorism, for instance, in Afghanistan, cannot be separated from the issues of
the international response to the civil war in the country and the reconstruction of a new
governmental structure. These issues, however, are not related to self-defense, but fall
clearly within the mandate of the Security Council for the maintenance of international
peace and security, which has increasingly qualified internal circumstances as a threat to
peace, under Article 39 of the Charter, and, in particular, has never fully turned a blind
eye to the internal political systems of countries giving rise to international concerns.
Thus, if the exercise of self-defense rights would increase the violence in Iraq, or
if it would escalate the imbalance of neighborly relations in the middle east or threaten
international peace and security further, then the exercise would be illegal

XIII. Iraq as Providing New Bases for Evolution of Newer International Law
Rules on Self-Defense.
It appears that the concepts of "anticipatory" and "preemptive" self defense rights

are now fused. As we mentioned earlier on, the United Nations Charter permits every

284

nation to exercise inherent "individual" and "collective" self-defense rights. To be
allowed under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, a use of force taken in self-defense must:
(1) be in response to an armed attack, 206
(2) be out ofnecessity, 207
(3) meet the immediacy requirement, 208
(4) meet the proportionality requirement, 209 and
(5) the exercise of self-defense rights must only endure so long as the danger
continues. 210

While the exercise of self-defense rights, by a nation being attacked, has never
been a subject of disagreement under international law, the same cannot be said of the
rights to exercise either anticipatory and/or pre-emptive self-defense rights. Under
international law, preemptive self-defense and anticipatory self-defense are two separate
and distinct subjects-even though inter-related. "Anticipatory self-defense" is a military
action against an imminent attack and such use of force is justified under traditional
notions of self-defense.2 11 Thus, anticipatory self-defense is directed against an

immediate and pressing danger, posed by a belligerent state against another victim state.
"Preemptive self-defense," on the other hand, is used to describe the use of force
against a more remote, yet significant threat, 212 and, as such, it refers to a latent and

206

207

• See

Dinstein 2001, supra note 178, at 183-185.

• Ibid.

2os. Ibid.
209

• Ibid.

210

• See Abram Chayes, The Use of Force in the Persian Gulf, in Law and Force in the New International
Order 5-6 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds., 1991); Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, U.N.
Police Action in Lieu of War: "The Old Order Changeth", 85 Am. J. Int'l L. 63, 63-64, 70, 73-74 (1991)
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. See Falvey, supra note 175, at 72.
. See Greenwood, supra note 176, at 9.

285

'Utflllr·
·Ull\ 11
·~l~l 1

passive, but grave, danger whose severity would be felt in a distant time. 213 According to
Louis-Philippe Rouillard, while categorizing the danger that Saddam Hussein and Iraq
posed to the United States and the world in 2003 as a remote one, he noted that the two
concepts of pre-emptive and anticipatory self-defense rights may become merged, after
the radical change in international practice and laws, as a result of the March 2003
military action in Iraq:
"The Bush administration is currently trying to adapt the concept of immediacy to
that of mere possession of weapons of mass destruction to justify intervention. It
proposes to change international law very rapidly by the weight of practice and
opinio juris. This is very efficient because it uses the doctrine of anticipatory selfdefence to have a theory of pre-emptive self-defence recognised in international
law. The difference is not evident at first, but becomes very important due to its
scope and implications. As we have seen, the doctrine of anticipatory self-defence
is one that is punctual, answering the threat of the moment immediately. The
theory of pre-emptive self-defence is a much wider concept, aiming at eradicating
the source of the problem. The whole theory of regime change is based upon this
approach but is neither recognized nor even remotely assented as being somehow
part ofinternationallaw."214
Although there are questions as to United States' action in Afghanistan and Iraq,
there have always been international law rules providing for preemptive self-defense and
anticipatory self-defense, starting from the Caroline Case, 215 to the Covenant of the

213

. See Mary O'Connell, supra note 193.

214

• See Louis-Philippe Rouillard, The Caroline Case: Anticipatory Self-Defence in Contemporary
International Law, I Journal of International Law 104, 104- 120, 119 (2004) (Journal of the International
Law Department of the University of Miskolc).; See also, D. Murswiek, The American Strategy of
Preemptive War and International Law, a Paper delivered at Albert-Ludwigs Universitllt Freiburg, Institute
of Public
Law,
March
2003,
at
p.
10. Available
at:
at
http://www.jura.unifreiburg.de/ioeffr3/pwers/papers.htm; M.W. Reisman, Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War, 97
AJIL 82, 87 (2003).

m. See the Caroline Case, reported in R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AJIL 82, 85
(1938), citing the Law Officers' of the Crown's Report, dated February 21, 1838, Public Record Office in
London, vols. F.O. 83, 2207-2209; See also, The People v. McLeod, 1 Hill (N.Y.) at 375; Letter of
. Secretary of State Daniel Webster to Special Minister Ashburton, dated 27 July 1842, reproduced at
http://www .yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/britianlbr-1842d.htm
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League ofNations, 216 onto its enactment in the current Articles 42 and 51 of the United
Nations Charter?

17

The earliest embodiment of the self-defense rights in international law was
contained in the 183 7 Caroline Case between the Dominion British Government of
Upper Canada and the United States.
The background to the Caroline case is simple and straightforward? 18 In the
aftennath of the victory of the Dominion of Great Britain in crushing the rebellion by the
(a) Lower Canada (Quebec) and (b) Upper Canada, under the leadership of (a) LouisJoseph Papineau and (b) William Lyon MacKenzie, respectively, the remnants of the
rebels fled to the bordering states of Virginia, Michigan, and New York, where they
continued to threaten the British.2 19 Louis-Joseph Papineau had fled to France, while
William Lyon MacKenzie fled to the United States.
MacKenzie then set up his headquarters on a navy island close to the Niagara
River, between the shores of the United States and Canada. Little by little, the population
of the rebels, under MacKenzie, grew to one thousand men, who used the steamship-

Caroline-for the troop movement. The Canadian authorities observed these
developments, and on December 29, 1837, launched an attack against the ship, captured

216

• Covenant of the League of Nations, L.N.T.S. I, at article 10; See also, G. Kervarec, L 'intervention
d'humanite dans le cadre des limites au principe de non-intervention, 32 Revue juridique Themis 77, 81
(1998).
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U.N. Charter, supra note 65, at Arts. 42 and 51.

• See

Timothy Kearley, Raising the Caroline, 17 Wis. lnt'l L.J. 325, 328 (1999).
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.2 John Bassett Moore, A Digest oflntemational Law 217, at 409-14 (1906), as embodied in diplomatic
discussions, treaties and other international agreements, vol. 3, Washington, Government printing office,
1906 at 919; R. Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AJIL 82, 85, 82-92 (1938), citing the
Law Officers' of the Crown's Report, dated February 21, 1838, Public Record Office in London, vols. F.O.
83, 2207-2209; The People v. McLeod, 1 Hill (N.Y.) at 375.
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it, cut her loose, set her on fire, and set her adrift amidst the strongest currents on the
20

Niagara River, causing her entire destruction? In addition, two people were killed, with
two prisoners (an American and a Canadian) captured?21 All these occurred on Fort
Schlosser, on United States territory.
In the beginning of the conflict, the then President of the United States, Martin

van

Buren, took a strong position refusing to ask for redress from the Canadian

authorities. For instance, on January 5, 1838, President Van Buren sent a message to
Congress to ask for full power to prevent injuries being inflicted upon neighboring
nations by unlawful acts of American citizens or persons within the territories of the
United States?22 An American General, Scott, was sent to the frontier with letters to the
Governors of New York and Vermont, calling the militias to order?23 As a result, the
rebels were dispersed, and were easily crushed.
Because of the festering issue regarding the attack of the Caroline ship on United
States' territory, on January 5, 1838, the American Secretary of State, Forsyth, sent a note
to the British Minister at Washington, Fox, expressing surprise and regret for this

220

• On December 29, 1837, the U.S. steamboat, Caroline, made trips between New York and Canada,
carrying men and weapons in support of the rebellion. The British observed the Caroline's activity and
decided to destroy the steamer to prevent it from further reinforcing the rebels. Claiming no wrongdoing,
the British defended their use of force against the Caroline as an act of self-defense and self-preservation.
See Timothy Kearley, supra note 218, at 328-329; See also, See Michael C. Bonafede, Note: Here, There,
and Everywhere: Assessing the Proportionality Doctrine and U.S. Uses of Force in Response to Terrorism
After the September 11 Attacks, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 155, 165-166 (2002). (Hereinafter "Michael C.
Bonafede").
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Louis-Philippe Rouillard, supra note 214, at 105.

. See Moore, supra, note 219, at 920.
• Ibid.
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incident and warning that this incident would be made the subject of a demand for
redress.

224

In a reply from the British authorities, the first elements of "anticipatory attack"
and/or "preemptive strike" under international law emerged. According to Mr. Fox from
the British embassy, in his February 6, 1838 reply letter, there were three defences for the
actions of the British forces, namely:
(1).
(2).
(3).

the piratical nature ofthe vessel,
the fact that the ordinary laws of the United States were not being
enforced at the time, and were in fact overtly overborne by the rebels and
self-defence and self-preservation?25

Having raised the issue of self-defense and self-preservation, the British had to justify
their actions. Further requests for redress by American ambassador to London,
Stevenson, to the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, elicited a March 25, 1838
response stating that, while the December 29, 1837 incident was regrettable, the actions
of the British Authorities were absolutely necessary for the future, and not retaliation for
the past. 226 As a result, the British asserted that the conduct of the British Armed Forces
had been, under the circumstances, justifiable by the Law ofNations?27
At the exit of Van Buren, the new Secretary of State-Daniel Webster-under the
new President, William Henry Harrison, informed the British that there was no
justification for the attacks occurring on United States territory. Clearly, if the concept of
inviolability of an independent state's territory was to be suspended or detracted from, the

224
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• See

Louis-Philippe Rouillard, supra note 214, at 106.

• See

Jennings, supra note 215, at 85.
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See Louis-Philippe Rouillard, supra note 214, at 106.
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belligerent state had to show that its action of encroaching the victim state's territory was
done out of "necessity ofself-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means,

and no moment for deliberation." Thus, Webster argued that a self-defense right entailed
that the retaliatory action be undertaken out of:

"necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and
no moment for deliberation. It will be for it to show, also, that the local authorities
of Canada,- even supposing the necessity of the moment authorized them to enter
the territories of the United States at all,-did nothing unreasonable or excessive;
since the act justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that
necessity, and kept clearly within it. It must be strewn that admonition or
remonstrance to the persons on board the 'Caroline' was impracticable, or would
have been unavailing; it must be strewn that daylight could not be waited for; that
there could be no attempt at discrimination, between the innocent and the guilty;
that it would not have been enough to seize and detain the vessel; but that there
was a necessity, present and inevitable, for attacking her, in the darkness of the
night, while moored to the shore, and while unarmed men were asleep on board,
killing some, and wounding others, and then drawing her into the current, above
the cataract, setting her on fire, and, careless to know whether there might not be
in her the innocent with the guilty, or the livin~ with the dead, committing her to a
fate, which fills the imagination with horror." 2 8
Therefore, Daniel Webster's statement clearly elaborated the new standards of
preemptive and/or anticipatory self-defense rights under international laws, as at 1842.
In reply, British Lord Ashburton, in his letter of July 28, 1842, while agreeing
with the conditions presented by Webster as general principles of international law of

self-defense, as applicable to the case, fully recognized the inviolability of the territories
of independent nations for the maintenance of peace and order amongst nations, and he
added that there are occasional practices, including that of the United States, where this
principle may, and must, be suspended. 229
'I
I
228

Letter of Secretary of State Daniel Webster to Special Minister Ashburton, dated 27 July 1842,
reproduced at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacylbritianlbr-1842d.htm
•

229

• See

Louis-Philippe Rouillard, supra note 214, at 108.
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Lord Ashburton then set out those instances where, "for the shortest possible time

and due to an overruling necessity and within the narrow confines of such a necessity,"
.
k e d .230
self-defense may b e mvo

First, Lord Ashburton stated that "self-defense" is the first law of nature, which
has been recognized by every code that regulates the condition and the relations of man,
including international relations.2 31 Lord Ashburton, according to Rouillard, then
explained how the British met the necessity of the situation, during the attack on SS

Caroline:
"Doing so, he recognizes fully the general principles laid down by Webster and
set his argument upon them but establishes a difference between expeditions
across national border and the case of the Caroline. He presents the example of a
situation where a man standing on grounds where you have no legal rights to
chase him presents himself with a weapon long enough to reach you. He then asks
how long one is supposed to wait when he has asked for succour and asked for
relief and none are forwarding. By doing so, he recognized the efforts made by
the United States to prevent American taking part in the Canadian rebellion, by
underlines the inefficiency of its attempts. " 232

In fact, Lord Ashburton's position has been hailed as correct, and that British action was
necessary because the United States contributed to rebel action, which adversely affected
Canada and precipitated the attack:
"It was in part the failure of the United States that justified the destruction of the
Caroline in American waters by the British forces. " 233
After proving that British reaction was necessary, it was also clear that Britain had to
. prove that its action against SS Caroline was done out of "imminent" danger that the

230
231
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• Ibid.
•

Ibid.

•

Ibid.
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• R.E. Curtis, The Law of Hostile Military Expedition as Applied by the United States, II, 8 AJIL 224,242
(1914).
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rebels posed to Upper Canadian kingdom. Thus, Lord Ashburton argued that the vessel

was pursued (in hot pursuit) from the Canadian side to United States territory in the thick
of expedition:
"It appears from every account that the expedition was sent to capture the
Caroline when she was expected to be found on the British ground of Navy
island, and that it was only owing to the orders of the rebel leader being
disobeyed, that she was not so found. When the British officer came round the
point of the island in the night, he first discovered that the vessel was moored to
the other shore. He was not by this deterred from making the capture, and his
conduct was approved. But you will perceive that there was here most decidedly
the case of justification mentioned in your note, that there should be "no moment
left for deliberation". I mention this circumstance to show also that the expedition
was not planned with a premeditated purpose of attacking the enemy within the
jurisdiction of the United States, but that the necessity of so doing arose from
altered circumstances at the moment of execution. " 234

This overwhelming immediacy of the circumstances, as argued by Lord Ashburton, had
been accepted by Louis-Philippe Rouillard235 as correct because:
"the initial efforts to capture the Caroline was to seize her in British waters at
Navy Island, and not on the American side ... This statement addressed the
question by which not a momen.t was left to deliberation, that the expedition was
not planned with the intent of invading American territory from the outset by
those circumstances and that the necessity of preventing the rebels from further
use of the ship as a mean of invasion overwhelmed the normal respect of national
territory. " 236
Lord Ashburton also justified the attack of SS Caroline in the "cover of the night" on the
basis of necessity-the choice of night time was purposely selected to ensure that the
mission would result in the least loss of life possible, and that it was the strength of the
current that did not permit the vessel to be carried off to the Canadian side, as was
originally planned. For this reason, it became necessary to set her on fire and drawn into
234

• Letter from Special Minister Ashburton to Secretary of State Webster, dated 28 July 1842, reproduced
at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacylbritianlbr-1842d.htm
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See Louis-Philippe RouiJJard, supra note 214, at 110.
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the stream to prevent injury to persons or property at Schlosser. 237 In the end, both states
settled the issue amicably, and this resulted in the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842?38
According to Yoram Dinstein, the Caroline case has come to be accepted as the

locus classiqus of self-defense law, in international practice:
"The language used in Webster's correspondence, in the Caroline incident, made
history. It came to be looked upon as transcending the specific legal contours of
extra-territorial law enforcement, and has markedly influenced the general materia
of self-defence." 239
Also Oppenheim had declared that:
"The basic elements of the right of self-defence were aptly set out in connection
with the Caroline incident in 1837 .... " 240
According to the Encyclopaedic Dictionary oflnternational Law:
"Under customary international law, it is generally understood that the
correspondence between the USA and UK of 24 April 1841, arising out of the
Caroline Incident ... expresses the rules on self-defense .... " 241
While to Rogoff & Collins,
"This formulation, known as the Caroline doctrine, asserts that [the] use of force
by one nation against another is permissible as a self-defense action only if force
is both necessary and proportionate. " 242
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• Letter from Special Minister Ashburton to Secretary of State Webster, dated 28 July 1842, reproduced
at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/britianlbr-1842d.htm.
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no. 302, 25th Congress, 2d session, serial 329, passim, cited in The Avalon Project at
http://www. yale.edu/Iawweb/avalon/diplomacy/britianlbr-1842d.htm.

239

240
241

• See

•
•
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From the above, a State does not need to wait for an actual attack, but could act in

anticipation of a threatened armed attack, provided that there was
"a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means
and no moment for deliberation. " 243
In effect, despite contrary arguments, there is a strong basis for anticipatory selfdefense action in international law, Thus, Leo Van den Hole has argued that anticipatory
self-defense right exists under traditional and/or customary international law, because
"the UN Charter did not eliminate the right of self-defense under customary
international law, or confine its scope to the express terms of Article 51."244
Along the same line, Christopher Greenwood has also submitted that historically, the
United Kingdom and the United States
"have consistently maintained that the right of self-defense also applies when an
armed attack has not yet taken place, but is imminent. " 245
It appears that the Caroline case stands for standards for use of force in both
preemptive strike self-defense and anticipatory self-defense rights under international
law:
"With regards to the right to use force in international law, the affair of the
Caroline case has once again confirmed the right of self-defence and, more
importantly, has established clear criterion for its invocation and that of
anticipatory self-defence. " 246

. 243

. See Christopher Greenwood, supra note 176, at 13, where Greenwood quoted a letter from Secretary of
State Daniel Webster to HenryS. Fox, dated April 24, 1841, in 29 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE
PAPERS 1129, 1138 (1857) (citations omitted).
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We must also note that the United States' change in foreign policy, starting from
September 2001, reflects a fundamental change from the principles of "deterrence" and
"containment" to that of pre-emptive strike and/or "anticipatory" action against terrorists
and failed states. Nowadays, the standards for measuring self-defense tactics and

'I
II

anticipatory actions are clearly set out under international law, and, as well, their legal
. are no more m
. doubt.247
basis
Between 1837 and the First World War, rules of self-defense continued to evolve.
Thus, apart from the Caroline Case, Article 10 of the 1919 Covenant of the League of

-·; i
I

Nations, also made provisions forbidding use of force among member states under
international law:

~ .

"The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against
external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of
all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat
or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which
this obligation shall be fulfilled. " 248
However, the above provisions did not confer use of force in exercising either collective
and/or individual self-defense rights, as its successor-Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter clearly stated. By virtue of inoperative provisions of Article 10 of the Versailles
Treaty, self-defense rights under the Versailles Treaty became stillborn-at delivery.
According to Louis-Philippe Rouillard, the League of Nations failed to regulate the use of
force, a fact made obvious during the trial of major war criminals in Europe by the
International Military Tribunal, which relied on anticipatory self-defence. 249 Thus, in

241
248

.lbid. at 104.
•

~
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Covenant of the League of Nations L.N.T.S. 1, executed on June 28, 1919, at Versailles, ("the

_Versailles Treaty"), at Art. 10; See also, G. Kervarec, L 'intervention d'humanite dans le cadre des limites
au principe de non-intervention, 32 Revue Juridique Themis 77, 81 ( 1998).
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Judgment concerning The Invasion of Denmark and Norway, International Military
Tribunal, Nuremberg, 250 the International Military Tribunal, at Nuremberg, held that the

Nazi Germany invasion ofNorway and Denmark, at the beginning of the Second World

war, was

not defensive, but an act of aggression because there were extensive military

deliberations and planning by the German Officers prior to the invasion, meaning that
. 1mmmence,
.
.
. 1'1ty could not b e prove d .251
necessity,
an d/or proport10na
After the Second World War, there arrived the United Nations Charter, which, as
we have seen, made provisions for the use of force on two occasions: individual and/or
collective right of self-defense (Article 51) and collective security actions under Chapter
VII (Articles 39 and 42).
As we have seen, the standards enumerated under the Caroline case appears now
to be archaic, and outdated, and would not pass muster under contemporary state practice.
In the 2002 National Security Report, President Bush had noted that:
"For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack
before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that
present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists
often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent
threat-most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces
preparing to attack. We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the
capabilities and objectives of today 's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do
not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would
fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of
mass destruction-we~li:ons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and
used without warning." 52
249

• See

,.I

Louis-Philippe Rouillard, supra note 214, at Ill.

250

• Judgment concerning The Invasion of Denmark and Norway, International Military Tribunal,
Nuremberg, reproduced at http://www .yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/juddenrna.htm.

2SI.Ibid.
2

s~. United States, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, at Chapter V (September

2002) at www.whitehouse.gov/ncs/nss.html.
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In support, of the above "Bush Doctrine" of anticipatory self-defense rights, notable
international law scholars have agreed that Article 51 right of self-defense requires a

broader interpretation because, in the context of contemporary weapons of mass
destruction, there would be no need for actual physical armed attack before an
anticipatory attack may be launched.

253

Contemporary state practice also support the view that a broader interpretation of
article 51 ought to be preferred to a restrictive view because, the United Nations Charter
was drafted in a way to either expressly prohibit a behavior, or to preserve rights, and
since article 51 states that nothing shall impair the right to self-defence and that there is
no prohibition expressly stated on the matter of anticipatory self-defence, it cannot be
said to have been extinguished by the Charter. 254
The above fact is further driven home, based on the French version of the term
"armed attack"-"agression armee." 255 To Polebaum, this phrase, "agression armee" is
more carefully drafted than the English version because, using the expression "agression

armee," instead of "armed attack," permits anticipatory self-defence in response to
threats of the use of force, as an aggression can exist separately from armed attack.2 56
Supporting this view is Giorgio Gaja, who has also surmised that:
"Moreover, armed attack is a subcategoiT of aggression, as explicitly said in the
French text of Article 51 of the Charter. 25

253

• See B.M. Polebaum, National Defense in International Law: An Emerging Standard for a Nuclear Age,
59N.Y.U.L. Rev. 187,200 (1984).
254

• Ibid.

m. Editions Larousse, Le petit Larousse, Larousse, Paris, 2003 at 47.
256

. See Polebaum supra note 253, at 202.
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Further, Polebaum had argued that the silence of the United Nations Charter on
the subject of anticipatory self-defense should create a "presumption of its existence in
. 11aw. ,258
internat10na
As President Bush has opined that weapons of mass destruction justify changes in
international law rules on use of force, self-defense, and anticipatory attack, Polebaum
has declared that even if the intention of the drafters had been to prohibit the use of
anticipatory self-defence rights, such a prohibition would be meaningless today, as
advancement in weaponry has made immediacy paramount to other concerns.1

59

I

~
I

After the ratification of the United Nations Charter, two cases that tested the selfdefense rights provisions are Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania),260 and

'
-l>lll

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.) .261

The Corfu Channel Case (UK v. Albania),262 was the first case decided by the
International Court of Justice ("I.C.J."). It was brought before it at the suggestion of the
Security Council. On October 22, 1946, two destroyers belonging to the United
Kingdom, were passing through the Corfu channel, off the Albanian coast, struck mines
,I

that caused the death of 46 Albanian seamen and damage to the ships. The British

I ,

thereupon mineswept the channel. Albania claimed that it had not laid the mines. The
I

I·
257

• Giorgio Gaja, The Attack on the World Trade Center: Legal Responses, In What Sense was There an
''Armed Attack"? Available at: http://www.eiil.org/forum WTC/ny-gaja.html. Last visited: July 9, 2006

258
259
260
261
262

• See
•

Polebaum supra note 253, at 202.

Ibid.

. [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4.
..[1986]I.C.J. Rep.14.
. [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4.
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court found Albania "responsible under international law for the explosions ... and for the
damage and loss of human life that resulted therefrom" and determined the compensation
due to the UK at £843,947, equivalent to approximately US$ 2.4 million, at that time.
The ICJ also found that the British mine-sweeping activities in Albanian
territorial waters had violated international law. The unanimous rejection by the court of
the British claim that the action was justified under the principle of "self-protection"
constituted the first judicial finding that the use of force for self-help would, in certain
circumstances, be contrary to international law
In the later case of Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against

Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.),263 the ICJ narrowly interpreted the self-defense rights
under the Charter and adopted a peculiar definition of "aggression" as providing the
foundation for establishing the threshold for an armed attack, under the United Nations
Charter. The ICJ adopted the definition of armed aggression as stated under Article 3 of
the Declaration on Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, in Accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations. 264
The court held that Article 3 of the 1974 Declaration on Friendly Relations
provided clear cases of "aggression," regarding precipitating acts that would trigger selfdefense right to use force, and that self-defense could not be invoked, if the threshold of
actual armed attack was not reached.

263 [

. 1986] I.C.J. Rep. 14.

2

6"_. Definition of Aggression, GA Res. 3314, UN GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, UN Doc. A/9631
(1974), Art. 3.
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The ICJ then held that, as in the Nicaraguan case, where the only impugned act

was the provision of weapons and ammunition to El Salvador rebels by Nicaragua, the
precipitating acts were not sufficient to reach that threshold. In this regard, Article 3 of
the 1974 Declaration on Friendly Relations provides thus:
"Article 3: Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall,
subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of article 2, qualify as an act of
aggression:
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another
State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such
invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another
State or part thereof,
( ... )
(g) The sending by, or on behalf of, a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such
gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement
therein. " 265
Echoing the ICJ's decision, T.J. Fare had surmised that:
" . . . anything other than a high and conspicuous threshold between an armed
attack justifying the exercise of self-defense and lesser forms of intervention that
transiently threaten freedom of choice but not the long-term territorial integrity or
political independence of the state, would invite internationalization of essentially
civil conflicts."266
Clearly, this decision appears to need more than "threat" for there to be a trigger
for the exercise of self defense rights. We must note that nuclear and/or biological
weapons were not involved in this case.

265

• This was interpreted in conjunction with the Declaration on Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res. 2625, UN GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp.
No. 28, UN Doc. N8028 (1970), especially with regards to the Principle that States shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations and
the Principle concerning the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State,
in accordance with the Charter.

266

._See T.J. Farer, Nicaragua v. United States (Merits), 81 AJIL 113 (1987); See also M.E. O'Connell, The
Myth of Preemptive Self-Defense, The American Society of International Law, Task Force on Terrorism,
August 2002 published at http://www.asil.org/taskforce/index.htm.
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The only instance that has generated an almost unanimous consensus among
international law scholars on the exercise of anticipatory self-defense rights is the 1967
Six-Day-War between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The Six-Day War, also known as
I

the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, or June War, was fought between Israel and the nearby Arab

I

:I
I

states of Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and Syria. It began when Israel launched a preemptive
attack against Egypt, following the latter's blockade of Israeli shipping in the Straits of

.,
Tiran, removal of UNEF peacekeeping forces from the Sinai, and deployment of military

I

forces in the Sinai on the Israeli border. Jordan, in turn, attacked the Israeli cities of
Jerusalem and Netanya. At the war's end, Israel had gained control of the Gaza Strip, the
Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. The results of the war affect the
geopolitics of the region to this day. Israel incapacitated entire Egyptian fleet of aircrafts
and captured Golan Heights, Suez Canal, Gaza Strip, and other land portions from their
adversaries. 267
Clearly, because a military alliance existed among the numerous enemies, and
because there had been obvious troop movement, Israeli anticipatory strike was
justified.268 Thus, according to Louis-Philippe Rouillard:
"Israel struck first to gain the initiative as well as the strategic and operational
surprise. War already existed de facto if not de jure. In a war, the choice of the
moment of attack is simply a matter of military expediency. And this case was
mostly so. At best, the value of the Six-Days War as a test case is arguable." 269

I·

1:
I

I

267

• Shlomo Aloni, Arab-Israeli Air Wars 1947-1982 (2001), Hazel Christie Law of the Sea (1999), Ahron
Bregman, Israel's Wars: A History Since 1947(2002), Mordechai Bar-On, Benny Morris, and Motti Golani,
Reassessing Israel's Road to Sinai/Suez, 1956: A "Trialogue," in VI Traditions and Transitions in Israel
Studies: Books on Israel, at 3-42 (Gary A. Olson ed. 2002), Ian Black, Israel's Secret Wars: A History of
Israel's Intelligence Services (1992), Jeremy Bowen, Six Days: How the 1967 War Shaped the Middle East
(2003), Jay A. Cristo!, Liberty Incident: The 1967 Israeli Attack on the U.S. Navy Spy Ship (2002).
268
_.
269

M.W. Reisman, Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War, 97 AJIL 82, 87 (2003).

• See

Louis-Philippe Rouillard, supra note 214, at 115.
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On the other side of the spectrum is the United States invasion-cum-military strike
on the two Libyan cities of Tripoli and Benghazi in 1986. On December 27, 1985,
terrorists, with ties to Libya, bombed airline offices in Rome and Vienna, killing twenty
civilians, including five Americans.2 70 Libyan leader, Muammar Ghadaffi, hailed the
damnable acts as heroic.

271

The following year, on March 24, 1986, warships of the

United States and Libya, exchanged fire.2 72 On April 5, 1986, Libyan agents, again,
bombed a Berlin discotheque-La Belle-killing two United States soldiers.2 73 After this
event, Ghadaffi boasted that:
"We shall escalate the violence against American targets, civilian and noncivilian, throughout the world. " 274
On April 14, 1986, erstwhile President, Ronald Reagan, ordered an attack against
Tripoli and Benghazi, targeting various terrorists' training grounds and outposts.2 75 The
Reagan Administration claimed self-defense to justify the bombing of Libya.2 76
According to President Reagan
"Today, we have done what we had to do. If necessary, we shall do it
again ... When our citizens are abused or attacked anywhere in the world, on the
I

I'
270
271

•

W. Michael Reisman, International Legal Responses to Terrorism, 22 Hous. J. Int'l L. 3, 30 (1999).

•

Ibid.

I

272

• See William V. O'Brien, Reprisals, Deterrence and Self-Defense in Counterterror Operations, 30 Va. J.
lnt'l L. 421,463 (1990).

273

• See George J. Church, Targeting Gaddafl: Reagan Readies Revenge on a "Mad Dog", Time, Apr. 21,
1986, at 18.

274

'I
I

• See

I

O'Brien, supra note 272, at 463 .

'
275

Gregory Francis Intoccia, American Bombing of Libya: An International Legal Analysis, 19 Case W.
Res. J. lnt'l L. 177, 182-86 ( 1987).
•

276
- .

See Michael C. Bonafede, supra note 220, at 173.
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direct orders of a hostile regime, we will respond .... Self-defense is not onl:t; our
right, it is our duty. It is the purpose behind the mission undertaken tonight." 77
Also, U.S. Ambassador, Vernon A. Walters, informed the United Nations that:
"In light of this reprehensible act of violence - only the latest in an ongoing
pattern of attacks by Libya - and clear evidence that Libya is planning a multitude
of future attacks, the United States was compelled to exercise its rights of selfdefense. " 278

' '

Because this occurred almost more than six months after the triggering events-

I.
jI ·•

the assassination of United States personnel at a Berlin discotheque, the criteria specified

r

in Caroline-"overwhelming immediate cause," "necessity" and "proportionality" were
not met. 279 For instance, former Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, called the strike
"militaristic and aggressive." 280 Alberto R. Coll also questioned the proportionality of the
I

strikes to the initial wrongful act.

281

Nevertheless, the strike received support from some

quarters, since it was intended to:
"persuade Libya and any other similarly inclined actors in the international
community that the support of terrorist activities against the United States 1s
bound to trigger an American response prohibitively costly to such actors." 282
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• See President Ronald Reagan: 'We Have Done What We Had to Do', Wash. Post, Apr. 15, 1986, at A23
(reprinting President Reagan's address to the Nation on Apr. 14, 1986).

278

•

See Security Council Considers U.S. Self-Defense Exercise, 86 Dep't of State Bull., June 1986, at 18,

19.
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279

• See J.M. Beard, America's New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense in International Law, 25
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. 2, fn 93 (2002).
280

• Manning, In Western Europe, Strains Among Friends, U.S. News & World Rep., Apr. 28, 1986, at 2425; See also, See John Quigley, The New World Order and the Rule of Law, 18 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.
75, 106 (1992); Michael N. Schmitt, Bellum Americanum: The US. View ofTwenty-First Century War and
Its Possible Implications for the Law ofArmed Conflict, 19 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1051, 1073 (1998).
281

• Alberto R. Coli, Military Responses to Terrorism: The Legal and Moral Adequacy of Military
Responses to Terrorism, 81 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 297, 299 (1987).
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• Ibid.
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In conclusion, it appears that the 1986 military strikes were simply retaliatory and not an
act of self-defense, because danger had already occurred. As Stuart S. Malawar had
observed:
"The Reagan Administration ordered the bombing of the Libyan capital as
retaliation for Libya's terrorist activities against the United States and other
Western countries. Customary international law does not condone the use of force
for purposes of retaliation or deterrence. It permits the use of force only in selfdefense and perhaps, under some circumstances, in preemptive or anticipatory
self-defense. But the strikes against Libya were for purely retaliatory purposes.
No matter what justifications the Reagan Administration gave for its action or
how effective it has been in counteracting Libyan-supported terrorism, the
bombing was clearly a deviation from the accepted international rules concerning
the use of force by one state against another." 28
In retrospect, it would be that international law scholars were mistaken, because the
Lockerbie incident later proved that the danger posed by Libyan backed terrorists
continued until the early 1990's-involving the December 21, 1988 blowing upmidair-of an American airliner over the Scottish town of Lockerbie. Libya was held
responsible. 284
Another instance of anticipatory strike was the Israeli attack on Osirak Nuclear
Reactor Plant in Iraq in 1981. This case now serves as a lesson for those who presently
criticize President Bush's military action in Iraq. In 1981, Israeli bombed Saddam
Hussein's nuclear factory, after Israel felt threatened by Iraq's possession of nuclear
capabilities within the Middle East region. This act was roundly condemned in 1981,
because there was no evidence that Iraq had perfected the development of nuclear

283

• See Stuart S. Malawar, Reagan's Law and Foreign Policy, 1981-1987: The "Reagan Corollary" of
International Law, 29 Harv. Int'l L.J. 85, 102 (1988) (citations omitted); See also, Commander Byard Q.
Clemmons & Major Gary D. Brown, Rethinking International Self-Defense: The United Nations' Emerging
Role, 45 Naval L. Rev. 217,225 (1998).

284

• The Lockerbie Disaster. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/crime/casecloseclllockerbiel.shtml. Last
visited on: July 17, 2006.
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program? 85 However, the chicken came home to roost in 1991, during the Gulf War,
when Iraq, without provocation, launched scud missiles from Iraqi territory against Israel.
'I

According to Louis-Philippe Rouillard:

bl

"The Scud missiles used
Iraq against Tel Aviv certainly vindicate the hostility
28
of Iraq toward Israel. ... "
This then underscored the danger eloquently stated by President Bush in September 2002:
"We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives
of today's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using
conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts
of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction-we~ons that
can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning."2
It appears that the two concepts of anticipatory and preemptive self defense rights have
now evolved to the point of being fused and/or joined together. If a country would satisfy
the requirements spelled out in the Caroline case, then its exercise of self defense rights
would be within the limits of international law.

XIV. The March 2003 Military Action in Iraq in Retrospect of Hindsight.
As we saw earlier, under the principle of Preemptive self-defense, which, in itself,
is subsumed under general self-defense law, the Caroline case and subsequent legal
authorities have laid down the following criteria to regulate self-defense action, and, ipso

facto, preemptive self-defense rights must:
(1) be in response to an armed attack; 288

285

• See M.J. Glennon, The fog of law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter, 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. 539, 552 (2002).
286
•

See Louis-Philippe Rouillard, supra note 214, at 118, fu. 51.

28

:. United States, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, (September 2002), at
Chapter V. Available at: www.whitehouse.gov/ncs/nss.html.
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(2) be of necessity; 289
(3) meet the immediacy requirement; 290
(4) meet the proportionality requirement; 291 and
(5) the exercise of self-defense rights must only endure so long as the danger
•
292
contmues.
'!

Notwithstanding the above parameters, the "proportionality" element has agitated the

;.I

,I

I

minds of most eminent scholars for a long time. There have been various attempts to lay
down clear yardsticks for measuring the proportionality between the "precipitating

1.. :
l

attack" and the "responsive military action. "

293

I

I

Thus, there are three (3) different

.I

!

approaches for measurmg the proportionality of responses to terrorism under
international law:
(1) the "Tit-for-Tat," or "Eye-for-an-Eye" approach, 294
(2) the "Cumulative Proportionality" approach, 295 and
(3) the "Eye-for-a-Tooth" or "Deterrent Proportionality" approach?96

(a).

288

289

290

291

The "Tit-for-Tat," or "Eye-for-an-Eye" Approach.

•

See Dinstein 2001, supra note 178, at 183-185.

•

Ibid.

•

Ibid.

•

Ibid.
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• See Abram Chayes, supra note 210, at 5-6; Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, U.N. Police Action in
Lieu of War: "The Old Order Changeth", 85 Am. J. Int'l L. 63, 63-64, 70, 73-74 (1991)

293

• Robert J. Beck & Anthony Clark Arend, "Don't Tread On Us": International Law and Forcible State
Responses to Terrorism, 12 Wis. Int'l L.J. 153,206 (1994).
294
•
2

Ibid

~s. Ibid.
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The "Tit-for-Tat" approach strictly limits the right to self-defense by requiring
that the amount of force used, in return, be proportionate to the threat, and that it must not
exceed the force necessary to repel the threat. 297 Thus, according to Oscar Schachter:
"The U.N. Security Council in several cases, most involving Israel, has judged
proportionality by comparing the response on a quantitative basis to the single
attack which preceded it. " 298

I •

.I

This view has been echoed by Robert J. Beck and Anthony Clark Arend, that this
approach requires that the "victim state ... respond proportionately to the specific prior act
ofterrorism."299 Under this approach,
"a claim of self-defense must be rejected if the nature and amount of force used is
disproportionate to the character of the initiating coercion. " 300
Thus, any response to an act of aggression that uses more force than is strictly necessary
to "counter any continuing immediate threat" is not allowable under the "tit-for-tat"
approach. 301
Even, arguendo, if we were to apply this standard to the United States 2001
military action in Afghanistan, it is clear that the United States' action was meant to
"counter any continuing immediate threat" from al Qaeda and the Talebans. As we have
seen, right from the attempted bombing of World Trade Center in 1993 to the 1996 attack
on a U.S. military housing complex in Saudi Arabia, the bombing of American embassies

297

• See

lntoccia, supra note 275, at 205.

298

• See Oscar Schachter, The Extra-Territorial Use of Force Against Terrorist Bases, II Hous. J. Int'l L.
309, 3I5 (1989).

299

. See Beck & Arend, supra note 293, at 206.
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~ • See lntoccia, supra note 275, at 206.
301

•

See Michael C. Bonafede, supra note 220, at I84; See also, lntoccia, supra note 275, at 206.
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in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and the suicide bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in 2000,302 al
Qaeda had stepped up extensive campaign against the United States.
In fact, on July 18, 2006, it was reported that scores of Taleban militants had
chased police out of two southern Helmand districts near the Pakistani border, in
Afghanistan. 303 Thus, the threat posed by al Qaeda and the Talebans is real and
continuing. Thus, the force used to depose the Talebans and al Qaeda from their
stranglehold on Afghanistan was necessary and justified under the circumstances.

:Ir.
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Applied to the 2003 military action in Iraq, the force used to uproot Saddam
Hussein and the Baathists was also justified considering the various wars-the 19781988 Iran-Iraq War, the 1991 Kuwaiti invasion, the 1993 suppression of the Kurds'
revolt, etc, perpetrated by the ousted regime. Numerous United Nations resolutions
requested access to the chemical and nuclear plants in Iraq, as well as cooperation to be
extended to United Nations' inspectors. All were met with stonewall and prevarication,
while Saddam's regime appeared to continue to plot more terrorism-such as the
attempted assassination of George Bush in Kuwait. 304 The active use of napalm against

302

• See, e.g., Yonah Alexander & MichaelS. Swetnam, Usama bin-Laden's al-Qaida: Proflle of a Terrorist
Network I (2001); See also, Three decades of terror, Fin. Times, Feb. 7, 2003, available at 2003 WL
3918586; See, e.g., Military Order§ l(b), 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833; United States Department of State, Patterns
of Global Terrorism 2001, at 105 (May 2002), available at www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2001/pdf/
("Global Terrorism").
303

• See Associated Press (AP), Tale ban capture two Afghanistan towns, July 18, 2006. Available at:
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/07/18/afghanistan.Taleban.ap/index.html. Last visited on: July
18,2006.
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• Former President, George Bush visited Kuwait between Aprill4 and April 16, 1993, to commemorate
the allied victory in the Persian Gulf War. Accompanying Bush were his wife, two of his sons, former
Secretary of State, James A. Baker III, former Chief of Staff, John Sununu, and former Treasury Secretary,
Nicholas Brady. In late-April 1993, the United States learned that terrorists had attempted to assassinate
Bush during his visit to Kuwait. The Kuwaiti authorities arrested 17 persons suspected in the plot to kill
Sush using explosives hidden in a Toyota Landcruiser. The Kuwaitis recovered the Landcruiser, which
contained between 80 and 90 kilograms of plastic explosives cotu1ected to a detonator (the Bush device or
Bush explosive device). The Kuwaitis also recovered ten cube-shaped plastic explosive devices with

308

the Kurds in 1993, and persistent effort by Saddam to obtain nuclear weapons, while
stalling the United Nations' inspection of same were the dangers posed to the entire
world and the United States. The conduct of the regime during the above incidents
showed that Saddam Hussein would not hesitate to use such nuclear weapons, after

I

I

.

obtaining them. These appear to be the justification for the war, and the force used in Iraq
was only tailored to removing the case of the impasse-removal of the rogue regime
terrorizing the Iraqi people, Iraq's neighbors, and the entire world. As such, the force
used to overcome the ruling Baa'thist party was proportionate to the threatened harm, and
so, was justified.

(b)

1:\
, •• 1
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The "Cumulative Proportionality" Approach.
The "Cumulative Proportionality" approach, like the "Tit-for-Tat" approach also

seeks to reduce the reprisal to the barest minimum. According to Guy B. Roberts, 305 the
"cumulative proportionality" approach requires that:

~i.

e
I
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"rough equivalence in the number of deaths and extent of property damage
remains the sine qua non of proportionality. " 306
According to Bonafede, under this approach, states can use the accumulation of smaller

r~~
' -

I
I

I

prior events, such as minor terrorist acts, to justify single, larger-scale responses under
certain circumstances. 307

detonators (the cube-bombs) from the Landcruiser. Some of the suspects reportedly confessed that the Iraqi
Intelligence Service {liS) was behind the assassination attempt. See http://hnn.us/articles/1 OOO.html.
305

• See Guy B. Roberts, Self-Help in Combatting State-Sponsored Terrorism: Self-defense and Peacetime
Reprisals, 19 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 243, 281 (1987).

306
• 307

• Ibid.

at 282 .

. See Michael C. Bonafede, supra note 220, at 184; See also, Guy B. Roberts, supra note 305, at 282.

309

Even using this approach, the United States' military action in Afghanistan and
Iraq would appear to be justified and proportionate. Considering the cumulative effect of

a1 Qaeda's and Iraq's attacks against United States, its allies, and its interests since 1993,
and their passionate search for chemical and nuclear weapons, the United States can go

l•I

back to 1990 Kuwaiti invasion (as to Saddam Hussein's regime) and to the 1993 World
Trade Center attacks in New York (as to al Qaeda). On this basis alone, proportionate
force has been used on both occasions.

(c).

The "Eye-for-a-Tooth" or "Deterrent Proportionality" Approach.

The aim of domestic criminal law is usually deterrence, i.e., punishing the
'

offender with the dual aim of punishment for the past wrongful act and deterring him

J

1•11111 ••

.

•

j

J

from committing future crimes. This deterrence rule applies in the international context,

~= ·

as well. According to William V. O'Brien:

)

"Counterterror measures should be proportionate to the purposes of counterterror
deterrence and defense, viewed in the total context of hostilities as well as the
broader political-military strategic context." 308

~

~

Also, Alberto R. Coll, had surmised that:
,I

"Even though deterrence is incompatible with strict proportionality, ... an
appropriate standard would be that the violence threatened or actually used in
deterring an adversary should be the minimum necessary to persuade him not to
undertake aggression in the future. " 309
Because the United States military action, in the fight against terrorism, underscores the
policy of eradicating future acts of terrorism and disrupting the power bases of terrorists,
Bonafede, after assessing the military action in Afghanistan, had opined that:
308

309

•

1

See 0 Brien, supra note 272, at 477.

. See Alberto R. Coli, supra note 281, at 299.
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"Clearly, the theory that best suits the U.S. response to September 11, both in
Afghanistan and on the grand scale, is the 'deterrent proportionality' approach, or
perhaps the suggested combination of the "cumulative" and 'deterrent
proportionality' approaches. " 31 0
Be that as it may, it is submitted that the best approach of the above three standards is
that of "Deterrent Proportionality," based on history. For instance, Saddam Hussein
defied the whole world by refusing United Nations Inspectors access to relevant materials
and places within the Iraqi state. Without appropriate sanctions, other rogue nations may
follow suit. The cost of repeated punishments, for instance-as was the case with Libya

in the 1980s, when compared with what obtained after the Tripoli-Benghazi bombingshows that Libya practically stopped all acts of terrorism after the 1986 United States
attacks. It is clear that the "Deterrent Proportionality" approach worked once and would
work again.

XV.

Conclusion
In the battle against international terrorism, the United States, we recognize,

should consider whether the actions being undertaken in response to the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks are proportional to the events that transpired that terrifying morning
in New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington, D.C. 311

l '

.
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I

Furthermore, the United States should consider the precedent that their actions are
setting for the global community. 312

310

311

. See Bonafede, supra note 220, at 185.
• Ibid.

at 160.

312 •. /bid
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Finally, the United States must assess the substantial impact and the redefining
force that its precedent in Afghanistan and Iraq would have upon international law and

l·.

!:

I

the doctrine of proportionality in response to an armed attack. 313
We must note that there is a school of thought that believes that law should be

Jj

subordinated to power. According to Dean Acheson, a former United States Secretary of
State and a lawyer, it is not the place for lawyers to debate the legal propriety of

I

I·

international acts of United States exercised in self-defense. 314 Referring to the United
States' quarantine of Cuba during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, Acheson opined that
United States' self-defense rights were:
"essential to the continuation of [its] pre-eminent power, because [Law] ... simply
does not deal with such questions of ultimate power.... The survival of states is not
a matter oflaw."315
Dean Acheson's view had been supported by eminent jurists, and so, Oscar Schachter
had submitted thus:
"Acheson's position can hardly be considered as aberrant. It is in keeping both
with the widely held view that the preservation of the state has precedence over
positive law and with the 'practical' understanding that it must be left to each
state to decide what is necessary for its own self-defense."316
Also, an historical journey into international practice also supports the view that each
nation may choose how it would respond to threats against its citizens and interests. For
instance, in their statements assenting to their adherence to the Kellog-Briand Treaty for

313

• Ibid

314

. See Dean Acheson, Remarks, 57 ASIL PROC. 13, 14 (1963).

m. Ibid.
m>. See Oscar Schachter, Self-Defense and the Rule ofLaw, 83 A.J.I.L. 260 (1989). (Hereinafter "Schachter
Self-Defense").
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the Renunciation of War of 1928,317 both the United States and France (as well as other
l··

signatories) declared that a State claiming self-defense:

l'

"alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in
self-defense. ,:ns

I

I
I

Yet, in its international fight against terror, the United States must not act as an
all-mighty policeman of the whole world. For instance, Peter van Ham

319

has said that

i
''
'.

United States views the NATO and other international organizations as a:
"political and military supermarket where it can shop for moral, political, and
legal support. But the Alliance is not seen as the place to coordinate, let alone
conduct, a consorted military campaign against global terrorism."320
Thus, while referring to Dean Acheson's position above unilateral justification, Hersch
Lauterpacht, disagreed and declared that a claim that self-defense was not subject to
objective evaluation could not be accepted in law. 321 He then surmised that:
"Such a claim is self-contradictory inasmuch as it purports to be based on legal
right and at the same time, it dissociates itself from regulation and evaluation of
the law." 322
According to erstwhile United States State Department's Director for Policy and
Planning, Richard Haass, United States' ambivalent attitude to a jointly-controlled

·on.
.

It
~

~
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317

• United States Notes of June 23, 1928, quoted in H. MILLER, THE PEACE PACT OF PARIS 213, 214
(1928).

318
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• Ibid

319

• See Peter Van Ham, Politics as Unusual: NATO and the EU after 9-11, in Terrorism and
Counterterrorism: Insights and Perspectives After September 11, The Clingendael Institute, December
2001. Available at: httj>://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2001/20011200 eli ess vanham.pdf. Last
visited on July 16, 2006; See also, David Ignatius, The Transatlantic Rift Is Getting Serious, Washington
Post, February 15, 2002, at p. 33.; Daniel S. Hamilton, German-American Relations and the Campaign
Against Terrorism, (2002), http://www.aicgs.org.
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• Ibid.

at 50.
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. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
1(9-80 (1933).

322

• Ibid.
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military action has stemmed from the complication and mess that emerged from a "war
by committee" as obtained during the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 1999 Kosovo Air
War, when it became obvious that where control is shared by so many states, it would be

,..
I

difficult to maintain a focused military strategy through a unified system of command
and control in a real reliance. 323 Thus, Richard Haass surmised that the United States
must assume:
"The role of international sheriff, one who forges coalitions by posses of states
and others for specific tasks. " 324
While Britain had given full support to the United States, most European scholars

\

remain unconvinced, and continue to view the United States as either pursuing a

1

Saulus/Paulus transformation, 325 or that of Unilatera/ism a Ia Carte. 326 It is submitted that
future military action either under NATO or the United Nations' auspices, must include
the core traditional central European countries in its fold and execution. 327 This is
because:

323

• Richard N. Haass, THE RELUCTANT SHERIFF: THE UNITED STATES AFTER THE COLD WAR
6 (1997).

324

Ibid.; See also R. James Woolsey, Where's the Posse? It's high noon for the civilized world. Let
timorous Europeans go home to their kids, Wall Street Journal, February 25, 2002.

I

r

•

32S. In the Gospel of the Acts of Apostle, in the Holy Bible, Apostle Paul (Paulus), prior to his conversion
was known as Saul (Saulus). Thus, Paulus and Saulus are one and the same person: meaning that United
States policy remains the same-a unilateral policy.
326

• See Jessica Matthews, Estranged Partners, I1-12 Foreign Policy 48-53 (200I). The author reviews
points of disagreement between the United States and its European allies before and after the September II,
200 I, terrorist attacks. Jessica Matthews cautions that Europe can no longer be treated as a junior partner
and that the United States through its actions may be pushing the European Union toward a more coherent
and activist foreign policy than it would otherwise be capable of. Available at:
www.ceip.org/files/publications/JTM-EstrangedPartners.asp; See also, Jessica Matthews, Doubts Over
Bush's Policy Conversion, Financial Times November 12,2001.
327

• See Stephan Halper and Clarke, Jonathan, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global
Order 297 (2004); See also John Newhouse, Imperial America: The Bush Assault on World Order 11
(2003); Alvin and Heidi Toffier, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21 51 Century 3 (1993);

314

II

'i

l

"it is difficult to imagine a future without the [NATO] alliance at the core of
efforts to defend our civilization. "328
The above has been underscored by the observation of Jonathan Stevenson, of London's
International Institute for Strategic Studies that:
"As American territory becomes less vulnerable, terrorists will find Europe - as
the United States' cultural and political cousin - a more attractive target of
opportunity. In that light, vigorous European counter-terrorist policies are not
only an alliance obligation but a matter of self-protection."329

In this regard, van Ham had noted that since the war against terrorism cannot be "won" in
the traditional sense of victory involving a ticker-tape parade on Fifth Avenue in
Washington, D.C., this challenge should be solved via a wide and multi-dimensional
statecraft approach, involving reinforced intelligence cooperation, police action, targeted
operations, classical diplomacy, etc, in which NATO and the European Union would be
involved. This is because, in van Ham's view, military power would be of lesser
importance and unlikely to be effective in the long run. 330
We must remember that the September 21, 2001 Conclusions and Plans of Action
of the Extraordinary Council Meeting of the European Union ("E.U.") manifested similar
intents, when the E.U. labeled the September 11, 2001 attacks as:

Wolfgang Ischinger, "The Globalization of Justice," Washington Post, September 24, 2001, at p. A19;
Thomas Friedman, The Lexus And The Olive Tree, (1999); Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, "Shoulder
to Shoulder: Terrorism is not just America's problem and neither is the war against it," Time International,
September 24, 2001.
328

• See R. Nicholas Burns, NATO is Vital for the Challenges of the New Century, International Herald
Tribune, 10-11, ofNovember 2001; See also Anthony Foster and William Wallace, What is NATO for?, 43
Survival 107-122 (2001-2002); Senator Lugar Urges NATO Transformation, Washington File, 18 January
2002; Stanley R. Sloan, Give NATO a Combined Task Force Against Terrorism, International Herald
Tribune, 13 November 2001.

329

• Jonathan Stevenson, "Terror Gap: Europe and the U.S. Head Opposite Ways," Wall Street Journal
Europe, April 9, 2002.
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. See Peter Van Ham, supra note 319, at 51.
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"an assault on our open, democratic, tolerant and multicultural societies ... The
European Union will cooperate with the United States in bringing to justice and
punishing the perpetrators, sponsors and accomplices of such barbaric acts. On
the basis of [U.N.] Security Council Resolution 1368, a riposte by the US is
legitimate. The Member States of the Union are prepared to undertake such
actions, each according to its means."331 [emphasis added].
In this regard, the EU had commenced action to supplement United States' global war on
terror, taking several actions on internal security issues, such as, EU-wide search and
arrest warrant, new extradition procedures, agreement on data-sharing, more prominent
roles for law enforcement outfits-Europol and Eurojust. 332 Thus, European Commission
("E.C.") President, Romano Prodi, declared:
"recent events have shown the need for more-not less-action at the EU
level. " 333
A critical appraisal of the war against terror must also be carried out. While the
October 2001 military action in Afghanistan witnessed the fall of Kabul, victory of the
Northern Alliance, and the shrinking of al Qaeda territory, van Ham has submitted that:
"But it will be easier to defeat a visible enemy like the Taleban than to 'win' the
war against terrorism as such. Apart from retaliating and 'doing something,' the
military strikes in Afghanistan have not solved anything. On the contrary, they
may well strengthen the resolve of many Islamic extremists willing to use force
against the US, and most likely have increased their numbers. " 334
It is this author's position that the 2003 military action ought to have included
plans to take care of the attending breakdown of law and order in Iraq. The ensuing

J
331

• See Conclusions and Plans of Action of the Extraordinary Council Meeting of the European Union on
September 21,2001, Extraordinary Council Meeting ofthe European Union Press Release 140/01.

332

• See Joanna Apap, Common European Instruments to Tackle Terrorism, CEPS Commentary (September
2001 ). Available at: www.cepts.be/Commentary/septemberO 1/terrorism.htm.
333

• See Romano Prodi, Preparation ofthe Ghent European Council, Speech of Romano Prodi, European
C9mmission ("E.C.")'s President, Press Conference, October 18,2001.
334

. See Peter Van Ham, supra note 319, at 51.
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sectarian violence and lawlessness should have been foreseen and provisions ought to
have been made.
Further, a widespread multilateral support ought to have been secured prior to
launching out. The world is a global place and does not belong to one single country.
In the United States, courts are bound by the President's determinations m
evaluating whether the laws of war applied to the blockade he had instituted. In The Prize

Cases, 335 the United States Supreme Court held that:
"Whether the President in fulfilling his duties, as Commander-in-Chief, in
suppressing an insurrection, has met with such armed hostile resistance, and a
civil war of such alarming proportions as will compel him to accord to them the
character of belligerents, is a question to be decided by him, and this Court must
be governed by the decisions and acts of the political department of the
Government to which this power was entrusted.... The proclamation of blockade is
itself official and conclusive evidence to the Court that a state of war
existed .... "336
Perhaps the time has come to increase Congress' power in the declaratuion and
making of war. With the executive possessing the sole decision power to declare war, it
appears that a significant constituency is not being heard.
At this stage, there is little disagreement with the conclusion that if the September
.,

11, 2001 attacks had been launched by another nation, an armed conflict under

!l

international law would exist.337

335

•
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67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1862).

336

• Ibid; See also The Protector, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 700, 701-02 (1871) (relying on presidential
proclamations to determine start and end dates for the Civil War); Salois v. United States, 33 Ct. Cl. 326,
333 (Ct. Cl. 1898) (stating that if the government had treated a band of Indians as at war, "the courts
undoubtedly would be concluded by the executive action and be obliged to hold that the defendants were
not in amity").
337

• See John C. Yoo & James C. Ho, International Law and the War on Terrorism, dated August 1, 2003,
· at
page
1,
4.
Available
at:
http://www .law. berkeley.edu/students/curricularprograms/ils/papers/yoonvucombatants.pdf. Last visited:
July 11, 2006 ("Yoo & Ho").
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At the international stage, the standards for an "armed attack" that would trigger
the exercise of self defense rights under the United Nations Charter must take into
consideration the scope and the intensity of the destruction, flowing from terrorist attacks,
is one that, in the past, had only rested within the power of a nation-state, and should
qualify the attacks as an act ofwar. 338
However, the shock of September 11, 2001, ordinarily, should cause a reexamination of a body of norms conceived solely on the basis of relations between States,
relations which increasingly overlap in the face of the transnational dimension of
international relations, including its terrorist manifestations. 339 We must avoid the risk of
giving, yet, more credence to the already widespread idea that, at the international level,
the law serves little or no purpose once things get serious. 340
"International law, however, like the structures underpinning its application, and
especially the UN, is at once, in its content as much as its results, the expression
of the political will of States and the means of regulating the implementation of
that will. This law does, indeed, suffer considerable lacunae; one need only point
to the incompleteness of the conventional international arsenal to organise the
struggle against terrorism. "341
We must depart with the wise words of New Zealand Foreign Minister Phil Goff.
Prior to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, New Zealand had almost, practically,
withdrawn from the Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand, and the United

338

• Ibid.

339

• See Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Attack on the World Trade Center: Legal Responses, The Law after the
Destruction of the Towers, Discussion Forum of the European Journal of International Law. Available at:
htt;p://www.eiil.org/forum WTC/ny-dupuy.html Last visited: July 9, 2006.
34

~. Ibid

341

• Ibid
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States of America (ANZUS) Pact. 342 In 1985, New Zealand refused to allow U.S.
nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed ships to enter its ports. This caused the United States
to abrogate its ANZUS responsibilities toward New Zealand in 1986. 343 However, seeing
the monstrosity of the September 11, 2001 attacks, New Zealand committed manpower
(Commandoes), to United States' aid. According to New Zealand Foreign Minister Phil

Goff:
"[w]e don't need a treaty to tell us what is right and what is wrong." 344
Surely, the rest of the world, facing the scourge of terrorism, do not need a treaty
or any other document, to tell them "what is right and what is wrong" in the international
struggle against terrorism menace.
The fact that terrorists now possess those powers that have hitherto been within
exclusive reach of States cannot be considered to somehow exempt terrorist networks
·from the standards demanded by the laws of armed conflict. Simply by operating outside
the confines of the traditional concepts of nation-states, terrorists cannot shield
themselves from the prohibitions universally commanded by the laws of armed
conflict. 345
"If terrorists can wield the military power of a nation state, but are exempted from
the laws of war, other groups with similar aims will be encouraged to follow the

342

• See Art. IV of the Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America,
of September I, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3420, at 3423; 131 U.N.T.S. 83, at 86
343

• See generally, e.g., Gary Harrington, International Agreements: United States Suspension of Security
Obligations Toward New Zealand, 28 Harv. Int'l L.J. 139 (1987).

344

• World Reaction to Afghan Strikes, Associated Press ("AP"), October 14, 2001, available at 2001 WL
28752064.
34S

. See Yoo & Ho, supra note 337, at 8.
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example of al Qaeda. International law does not and should not create such a
perverse incentive. " 346
However, in order to avoid a wholesale uprooting of the proportionality doctrine, as a
limitation on the right to self-defense in all contexts, United States policymakers must
clearly articulate that this exception relates specifically to combating international
,.t

terrorism.

347

Such articulation, if coupled with serious diplomatic and political attempts

to reevaluate United States foreign policy and address the root causes of terrorism in the
Arab and Muslim world, will enable the United States to most effectively and completely
wage a successful campaign against international terrorism. 348

346
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Ibid
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~ • See Michael C. Bonafede, supra note 220, at 162-163.
348

•

Ibid.

320

CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSION

I.

Introduction

f,

Failed States and the internal conflicts occurring inside them pose grave moral
questions and almost always pose threats to regional and international peace and security.

v/'

.

1;

Military action against a failed state-amounting to an intervention in the failed state's
internal affairs-such as was undertaken in Iraq, may be the

~EEosite

res

ons~

neutralizing the dangers posed by failed states and international terrorists like al
the Taleban government, or, l!aq, Somalia,

Afghanist~,

in

aeda,

etc. In some other instances,

however, less drastic measures short of actual military confrontation, such as economic
sanctionsL sufficient economic and financial aid, and other nation-building_ measures,
might serve much more effective purposes than milit_ary confrontations. Even then, the
implementation of each measure of coercion to be adopted by the United Nations, v
international organizations, or individual states, would depend on the type of the targeti.e., whether the target is an institutionalized regi~e, or a faceless terrorist

') I

organizatio~.

This is the central theme of this thesis.

,.

The question is: how should the rest of the world int~, with regard to dealing
with failed states and the dangers posed by this problem to the world and mankind? What
are the legal rules governing such acts of intervention? Which organization or state can
intervene? Finally, how is the intervention to be conducted?
~._....(

In this context, "intervention" is defined as a coercive_JlG.!ion intended to change
the behavior of a art j n a country in question, and this may involve the threat or use of
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economic sanctions and the threat or use of force. 1 However, as this thesis shall conclude,

tom state would serve the best interests of global peace, over and above sending military
--.
forces to attack such states.
Clearly, from the preceding discuss in previous chapters, after a half-century of
forming new states from former colonies and from the breakup of the old Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics ("U.S.S.R."), the international community is now focusing on the
disintegration of sta!es. As we have seen previously, the term "failed states" is now part
of our working vocabulary, describing countries where there is no longer a central
2

govemment. Thus, an International Study Group had observed:

I

"Failed states have made a remarkable odyssey from the periphery to the very
center of global politics."3
Necessarily, after recognizing this increasingly common phenomenon, various

groups concerned with economic development and international affairs have begun to
identify failing or failed states and the indicators associated with their failure. 4 The goal
of this is to eradicate the dangers posed by failed states and international terrorists within
them from hampering the rest of the world.

1
•

It may also involve criminal prosecution. This aspect of intervention, although important, will not be
covered in this paper. In the case of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the UN Security Council
established International Criminal Tribunals tasked with bringing to justice those responsible for war
crimes and other gross violations of human rights. See Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, Humanitarian
Intervention: The Lessons Learned 99 Current History 419 (2000). (Hereinafter "Oudraaf').
2

• Lester R Brown, Early Signs ofDecline, in Plan B 2.0: Rescuing a Planet Under Stress and a Civilization
in Trouble, Chapter 6 (Lester R Brown, ed. 2006). (Hereinafter "Lester Brown").
3

• Fund for Peace and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Failed States Index, Foreign
Policy, 56-65 (July/August 2005). (Hereinafter "Fund for Peace").
4

•

See Lester Brown, supra note 2, at 117.
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Therefore, the World Bank, for example, has constructed a list of {0 "low-income

'

countries under stress." 5 Also, the United Kingdom's Department for International

Agency has constructed a list of 20 failing states. 6 In addition, the Fund for Peace and the
Carnegie Endowment for International Pe~ have worked together to identify a list of 60
states, ranking them according to ''their vulnerability to violent internal con:flict."7 Most

·-

f; ..

of these states are in the sub-Saharan region of Africa, South-East Asia, and central

~

America. According to Lester R. Brown, as lately as 2006:
"[There are] .... , published in Foreign Policy, ... based on 12 social, economic,
political, and military indicators [responsible for state failure]. It puts Cote
d'Ivoire at the top of the list of failed states, followed by the Democratic ReQublic
of the Congo, Sudan, Iraq, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Chad Yemen, Liberia, and
Haiti. ext in line are three countries that have been much in the news in recent
years: Mghanistan, Rwanda, and North Korea." 8

'?

In the contemporary global terrain, failing states are of growing international
concern because they are a source of terrorists, drugs, weapons, and refugees. 9 For
instance, not only was Mghanistan a training ground for terrorists, but it, also, quickly
became, under the Allied occupation, the world's leading su

lier of heroin. 10 Also,

l

1 1.

n

1111

r\

.,.t

I
~.

..,

~

~

refugees from another weak state, Rwanda, including thousands of armed soldiers,

5

.lbid.
r'

I
7

. See Fund for Peace, supra note 3, at 60.

8

. See Lester Brown, supra note 2, at 118.

9

• Ibid.

10

at 119.

. Jbid.
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contributed to the destabilization of the Congo. 11 We cannot but agree with the
Economist that:
"Like a severely disturbed individual, a failed state is a danger not just to itself,
but [also] to those around it and beyond." 12
While it may not be very clear to most people, recent terrorist attacks and threats
all over the world have culminated in the September 11, 2001 attack~ in the United
States, the July 7, 2005 attacks in London, the March 11, 2004 Train Bombings in
Madtjd, Spain, 13 multiple attacks in Indonesia, including the October 12, 2002 Bali
Bombings, 14 the August 5, 2003 M~ott Hotel bombing in Seti~budi, Sou~ Jakarta,
Indonesia, 15 the September 9, 2004 Australian Embassy bombing in Jakarta, 16 and the

11

• Ibid.

12

• See American Progress Action Fund, Afghanistan: The Ignored War," in The Progress Report (Christy
Harvey, Judd Legum and Jonathan Baskin, eds. 2005); See also, Abraham McLaughlin, "Can Africa Solve
African Problems?" Christian Science Monitor, January 4, 2005; A Failing State: The Himalayan Kingdom
Is a Gathering Menace," The Economist, December 4, 2004.
13

• The 2004 Madrid train bombings (also known as 11-M, 3/11, 11/3 and M-11) consisted of a series of
coordinated bombings against the commuter train system of Madrid, Spain, on the morning of March 11,
2004, which killed 191 people and wounded over 1,700. Available at:
http://en. wikipedia.org/wiki/2004 Madrid train bombings. Last visited on: December 31, 2006.
14

• The October 12, 2002 Bali bombing in Indonesia, perpetrated by Jemaah Islamiyah members. The First
Bali bombings took place on October 12, 2002, in the tourist district of Kuta, on the Indonesian island of
Bali. The attack was the deadliest act of terrorism in the history of Indonesia, killing 202 people, 164 of
whom were foreign nationals (including 88 Australians), and 38 Indonesian citizens. A further 209 were
injured. Available at: http://en. wikipedia.org/wiki/2002 Bali bombing. Last visited on December 31, 2006.

15

• The August 5, 2003 Marriott Hotel bombing in Setiabudi, South Jakarta, Indonesia. The 2003 Marriott
Hotel bombing occurred on August 5, 2003, in Setiabudi, South Jakarta, Indonesia, when a suicide bomber
detonated a car bomb outside the lobby of the JW Marriott Hotel, killing twelve people and injuring 150.
All those killed were Indonesian, with the exception of one Dutch businessman. Jemaah Islamiyah (ll), an
organisation allegedly affiliated with al-Qaeda, is suspected of responsibility for the bombing. Available at:
http://en. wikipedia.org/wiki/2003 Marriott Hotel bombing. Last visited on: December 31, 2006.
16

• The Jakarta embassy bombing took place on September 9, 2004, in Jakarta, Indonesia. A car bomb
exploded outside the Australian embassy at Kuningan District, South Jakarta, at about 10:30 local time
(03:30 UTC), killing several people, including the suicide bomber, and wounding over 140 others. Damage
to the nearby Chinese embassy was also reported. Numerous office buildings surrounding the embassy
were also damaged by the blast, injuring many workers inside, mostly by broken glass. Available at:
http:// en. wikipedia.org/wiki/2004 Jakarta embassy bombing. Last visited on: December 31, 2006.
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October 1, 2005 Second Bali bombings, 17 the September 1-3, 2004 school siege in
Beslan, Chechnya, etc.
The above incidents are all part of the shockwave emanating from the Middle
East, Persian Gulf, and South and Central Asia conflicts of the past 35 years. 18 It is
undisputable that these international conflicts have filled the ranks of terrorist
organizations, given them a field of play, and provided them with an attentive potential
constituency.
In addition to finding the appropriate responses to dealing with failed states, we

must strive to get to the root-causes of the terrorist breeding grounds. Therefore, progress
toward fairly resolving the conflicts in Kashmir, conflict between Israel and the
Pa_!e_stinian Authori!y, and between Russia and Chechnya, etc, would serve to weaken the
resonance and mobilizing capacity of organizations like al-Qaeda. 19
As we shall discover, what needs to be done is the adoption of other less coercive
strategies, in addition to military action or confrontation, such as economic and social
sanctions,20 alongside nation-building objectives. This dissertation would conclude by
arguing for a quicker, faster, and more efficient pacific s

ste~

for resolving various

volatile conflicts in the world. It would also argue for the institution of a program similar

17

• The 2005 Bali bombings were a series of explosions that occurred on October 1, 2005, in Bali,
Indonesia. Bombs exploded at two sites in Jimbaran and Kuta, both in south Bali. Twenty-three people
were killed, including three bombers. Available at:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005 Bali bombings. Last visited on: December 31, 2006.

18

• Carl Conetta, Dislocating Alcyoneus: How to combat al-Qaeda and the new terrorism, Project on
Defense Alternatives Briefing Memo #23, delivered on June 25, 2002. Available at:
http://www.comw.org/pda/0206dislocate.html. Last visited on July 6, 2006. (Hereinafter "Carl Conetta")

19./bid.
20

• This makes international historians remember the various trade, sports, economic, and social embargoes
placed on the South African Apartheid regime in the 1970's and 1980's.
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to the Marshall Plan that bailed out West Germany and other western European countries
from extinction, in the aftermath of the Second World War that began in 1945.
We have seen the intertwined connection between failed states and international
terrorism. We have also seen the various approaches formulated for solving these
conjoined twin problems. What follows is a summary of the issues already discussed in
the preceding chapters, as well as an attempt to proffer pertinent recommendations to the
various international key players about how these difficult international law issues could

'I

be resolved. We shall conclude by answering three questions:
(a).
(b).

(c).

Is it necessary to intervene in the internal affairs of a failed state as the
United States-led military action did in Iraq in March 2003?;
If so, who should intervenes-would it be the United Nations Security
Council, regional organizations, international organizations, individual
states, or private security organizations?; and
When intervention is appropriate, how should the intervention be carried
out?

After a very critical assessment of the circumstances of each intervention, for each of the
above three questions, this paper will proffer recommendations. In previous chapters, has
thoroughly examined recent trends in international practice, identified policy challenges
for the future, and, in concluding formulate policy recommendations.
Therefore, particular attention will be paid to the roles of the United Nations
Securi

Council,

its

Secret

-General,

regional

organizations,

international

organizations, and individual states.
This dissertation, by no means, is meant to be an exhaustive discussion of the
multi-faceted issues involved in the subjects under consideration, however, it is meant to
be an attempt to ''join in" in finding solutions to the various problems that face mankind,
in particular, and global peace, in general. Thus, the last word, in this matter, belongs to
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the entirety of human race, which must determine the course and path for its future
i.

existence.

. n.

Appropriate Academic and Legal Research Must Be Undertaken.

A very good starting point for an effective solution to the problems of
international terrorism and failed states is that all key players involved-United Nations,
individual nations, international organizations, and international law scholars-must
understand the actual nature and impact of the problems that these two concepts pose to
mankind. 21 A broad and detailed research, understanding, and dissection of the conditions
underpinning the growth of international terrorism, and the proliferation of the failed
states phenomenon would contribute, to a large extent, to the efficacy of all efforts-legal
and extra legal, aimed at solving these problems. 22 In this context, Carl Conetta had
surmised thus:
"Official discourse on terrorism has tended to treat the subject in an undisciplined
fashion, preferring rhetoric to analysis. Effective action requires that the subject
be parsed. An important first step is to recognize that 'terrorism', per se, is not the
type of thing against which a state or an alliance can 'wage war,' properly
speaking. Terrorism is not an entity, like a nation-state, that can be simply
targeted. It is an activity-and one that in many respects is more akin to crime,
than war. It has no capital, no center, no unifying program or ideology. It is not
even truly an 'ism. "'23
Thus, problems of international terrorism must be approached from the
perspective of its historical foundations. We must note that current international terrorism
has its foundation built on crisis that had existed for the past fifty years in the Gulf and
21

• See

Carl Conetta, supra note 18.

22

• Sir Michael Howard, Mistake to declare this a 'war', RUSI Journal (December 2001); Andrew Bacevich,
Terrorizing the truth, Foreign Policy (August 2001); and, H. Cooper, Terrorism: the problem of definition
revisited, American Behavioral Scientist (February 2001).

23

• See

Carl Conetta, supra note 18.
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Middle East regions. It builds on the mutual distrust and hostility that exists between the
Arab/Moslem nations and the Israeli nation and its key western supporters.24
On the other hand, problems posed by failed states emerged, on a larger scale,
after the end of the Cold War in the late 1980's.
We must, therefore, understand that terrorism is a political pathology generated
by conditions of communal violence, civil decay, and social despair, polarization, and
alienation. With regard to modem international society, and we must recognize that
terrorism is not a transient or ephemeral problem, but an existential one, meaning that it
is deeply rooted in modem conditions and not vulnerable to a quick "knock out" blow.25
In addition, a proper study of al-Qaeda and other current international terrorist

organizations, such as Egypt's Jihad Group and Islamic Group, Pakistan's Al-Ansar
Movement, the Jihad Movement of Bangladesh, Algeria's Armed Islamic Group, and the
Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines, would show that these groups have unique
characteristics regarding their sizes, resource base, energy, sophistication, global reach,
and inclination to conduct mass casualty attacks, and so confronting them militarily may
not augur well for the country conducting the military action. 26
For instance, some members and associates of al-Qaeda had been able to gain
facilitated entry into the United States and United States armed forces as a consequence

-·

of earlier United States' support for the "Arab Afghan" Mujahedeens in Afghanistan
- ..

-- - -

24

• V. Kauppi, Terrorism and National Security, National Security Studies Quarterly (Autumn 1998);
Walter Reich, ed., Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (1998); and,
Walter Laqueur, Postmodem Terrorism, Foreign Affairs (September/October 1996).
25

• See

26

.lbid.

Carl Conetta, supra note 18.
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against Soviet invasion between 1979 and 1990, and also due to the close on-going
United States relationship with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. 27
In the past, as well, the United States had supported Saddam Hussein in
confronting the danger posed by the militant and radical Islamic tendencies led by
Ayatollah Khomeini. Therefore, United States and other western countries must have
defined goals, as well as clearly identifiable foreign policy that is divorced from
immediate economic gains, so as to avoid equipping terrorists and/or rogue states,
inadvertently.
Further research into the dangers posed by failed states and international terrorism
would also require an in-depth understanding of the objectives, goals, and/or ends of
these outlaw organizations.
Mention must be made, at this juncture, that in the field of Political Science, there
are three (3) different kinds of functional taxonomy of terrorist strategies, based on how
they relate their terrorist acts to their ultimate ends or goals. 28 Understanding these modus
operandi would assist us in countering the debilitating dangers posed by failed states and
terrorists. These terrorists' ends are (a) instrumental strategy, (b) catalytic strategy, and

·'
(c) immanent strategy.

29

27

• Among these individuals were several of the principals of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing; Sheik
Omar Abdel Rahman, a spiritual leader of both the Jihad Group and Islamic Group of Egypt; and Ali
Mohamed, a former Egyptian army colonel, US green beret, and security officer for Osama bin Laden. See
Joseph Neffand and John Sullivan, Al-Qaeda terrorist duped FBI, Army, The News and Observer Sunday
(Raleigh, North Carolina), October 21, 2001; George Wehrfritz, Catharine Skipp, and John Barry, Alleged
Hijackers May Have Trained at US Bases, Newsweek, September 15, 2001; Robert I. Friedman, The CIA
and the Sheik; the Agency coddled Omar Abdel Rahman, allowing him to operate in the US; Now this
Unholy alliance has blown up in our faces, Village Voice March 30, 1993.
28

. See Carl Conetta, supra note 18.

29./bid.
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An instrumental strategy, when employed by rogue states and/or international
terrorists, seeks an immediate gain or concession of some sort; or it seeks to deter some
policy. For instance, in an effort to discourage western pillaging and desecration of their

I,

Niger Delta homeland and natural resources, various Ijaw, llaje, Ogoni, and other Niger
Delta tribes in Nigeria, have engaged in acts of sabotage against oil installations and oil
wells in southern Nigeria. They have, even, been involved in acts of kidnapping as wel1. 30
On the other hand, a

cat~tic

strategy seeks to inspire a constituency or to

provoke a broader confrontation. Here, terrorists would carry out a small scale attack, and
then assess the response and reaction of the target. Further, depending on the intensity of

I

.
I'f

the reaction, the terrorists may choose to carry out a large scale attack at a latter date.

d

t

Finally, there is the immanent strategy which entails those actions in which terror
and destruction are the ends in themselves-although the terrorist actor may see them as
part of some greater metaphysical drama (apocalyptic terrorism), or as a desperate act of
defiance and protest (expressive terrorism), or as a blow against a social order that is
regarded corrupt beyond reform (nihilistic terrorism). 31
Clearly, a careful historical analysis of the modus operandi and acts of roguish
states, such as Afghanistan, Somalia, or Iraq, and/or international terrorists, such as alQaeda, in recent times, would show that these entities see violence primarily as a
catalysis of broader conflict, they sought to cause as much damage as their capabilities
allow. They did not fear polarization, but, instead, sought it. For instance, Al-Qaeda seeks

30

• See Talks to free Nigeria oil workers, BBC Internet edition of June 3, 2006. Available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/21hi/africa/5043516.stm. Last visited: July 9, 2006: See also, Niger Delta youths
kidnap four naval officers. Available at: news.monstersandcritics.com/africa/article_1178522.php/
Niger_Delta_youths_kidnap_four_naval_officers. Last visited: July 9, 2006.

31

. See Carl Conetta, supra note 18.
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a division between the western world and Moslems. It basks in causing and/or exploiting

.,

,.
I

such divisions with the aim of propagating its own goals. 32 Iraq also sought a division

within the world during the 1991 First Gulf War by launching military strikes against
Israel, with a view to provoking the Arab world to take the Iraqi side against the
Coalition. Once the western nations have all understood this strategic goal in their war
against terrorism, the tedious battle may be won more easily.
After studying the various acts of al-Qaeda, Carl Conetta has submitted that alQaeda's policy involves a combination of both of the instrumental and catalytic
strategies:
"AI Qaeda attempts to use terror both instrumentally-as in its assassination of
Ahmad Shah Massoud-and as catalyst. Its global acts emphasize catalytic ends.
The catalytic employment of terror is of greatest concern both because it tends
toward large-scale destruction far removed from any specific battlefield and
because al-Qaeda happens to have an attentive, responsive audience. Its hope of
inciting a broader Islamic extremism is not delusional. This is not to say that alQaeda "represents" a constituency. It does not. But it does speak in a popular
idiom, echoing popular concerns in the Muslim world ... Thus, al-Qaeda strategy
sees competition as occurring in two dimensions: the first involves ultimate
objectives and is protracted; the second involves altering the political-military
context in which ultimate objectives are pursued. The second dimension of
struggle comprises a contest of political-military or strategic mobilization.
Viewed from this perspective, the aim of terrorist activity is to catalyze a
constituency in support of their program while compelling their opponents to act
in ways that leave them exhausted, divided internally, despised within the
terrorists' community of origin, and isolated internationally. Compared to this, the
competition in the first dimension seems fairly straight-forward: it involves each
side trying simply to impose its will on the other. Viewed solely in terms of this
dimension, the terrorist challenge seems to invite fairly standard military and law
enforcement responses. But it is the second dimension of competition that
determines the magnitude, tenacity, and effectiveness of the terrorist challenge
overall. " 33

32

.lbid.

33

.lbid.
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ro. European Imposed Colonialism and End of the Cold War Created Failed States.
When the Europeans and the western world colonized various states in the 17tlt
and 18tlt centuries, they created fragile states. Also, when the hurriedly left and decided to
end the Cold War between the East and the West, they accelerated the creation of failed
states.

:·
As international terrorism is closely linked to failed states, the United Nations,

individual western states' governments, and international organizations must, instead of
focusing on military solutions as a means to end international terrorism, face the indices
and/or causes of state failure. 34 As we saw earlier, there are three top indicators, roughly
used, used in constructing causes of state failure: (a) Uneven Development, (b) the Loss
of Governmental Legitimacy, and (c) Demographic Pressure. 35
"Uneven development" typically means that a small segment of the population is
accumulating wealth, while much of the society may be suffering a decline in living
conditions. This unevenness, often associated with political corruption, creates unrest and
can lead to civil conflict. 36 During the Ba'athists' regime in Iraq, the top echelon of the
Ba'ath party seized all the state largesse and cornered them to themselves and their

.-

---

cronies, thereby excluding the minority Kurds and powerless Shiites.
Another factor that must be quickly addressed in ''the Loss of Governmental
Legitimacy'' with most failed states is that the whole world must be mindful of

34

. See Fund for Peace, supra note 3, at 56-65.

35

. See Lester Brown, supra note 2, at 118.

36

. See Fund for Peace, supra note 3, at 61.
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governments that have lost their legitimacy, i.e., governments that fail to effectively
manage emerging issues and provide basic services are seen as useless. Saddam Hussein
did not manage the multiple ethnicity tension very well in Iraq. This maladministration
often causes segments of the population to shift their allegiance to warlords, tribal

,,.,

·-

chieftains, or religious leaders, and so a loss of political legitimacy is an early sign of
state decline. This, also, was what happened in Somalia and Mghanistan. 37
The third top indicator is demographic pressure, with most countries having fastgrowing populations. As we shall see subsequently, stability in population growth is very
I

important in rebuilding states. In many states, that have experienced rapid population
growth for several decades, governments are suffering from demographic fatigue, unable

I'
f!,
j.

l
to cope with the steady shrinkage in per capita cropland and fresh water supplies or to
build schools fast enough for the swelling ranks of children. 38 Most of the weak and/or
failed states are states with high growth of population as opposed to stable growth. China
and India have been able to arrest excessive population growth, and, at the same time,
achieved economic growth and political stability in the last decade.
According to Lester R. Brown, among the most conspicuous indications of state
failure is a breakdown in law and order and a related loss of personal security. For
instance, in Haiti, armed gangs rule the streets, kidnapping the local people, who are
lucky enough to be among the 30 percent of the labor force that is employed, for
ransom. 39

37

• Ibid.

38

• Ibid.

39

. See Lester R. Brown, supra note 2, at 118-119.
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As we have seen previously, the loss of security and breakdown of law and order
was highly evident in Afghanistan, where it has always been the local warlords, and not
the central government, that control the country outside of Kabul. Also, Somalia, which
now exists only on maps, is ruled by tribal leaders, each claiming a piece of what was
once a country. 40 This provision of internal security must be primary in the agenda of
nation-building in the century.
Also, we must not send half-hearted international peace-keeping force to volatile
regions, as was done-with failure in the last decade-in Burundi, Rwanda, and Sierra
Leone. Most of the weak and/or failed states have been long involved in long-standing
_civil conflicts. For instance, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, occupying a large

\

l

...

part of the Congo River basin in the heart of Africa, has been the site of an on-going civil
conflict for six years, a conflict that has claimed 3.8 million lives and driven millions
more from their homes. 41
As would be argued subsequently, there must be an "humanitarian intervention"
exception enacted into the United Nations Charter amending the sections dealing with
prohibition of force. This is because, according to the International Rescue Committee,
for each violent death in this conflict, there are 62 nonviolent deaths related to it,
including deaths from hunger, respiratory illnesses, diarrhea, and other diseases. 42 The
world must act, quickly and decisively, to curb and arrest human rights violations.

40

• Ginger Thompson, A New Scourge Ajjlicts Haiti: Kidnappings, New York Times, 6 July 6, 2005;
Madeleine K. Albright and Robin Cook, The World Needs to Step It Up in Afghanistan," International
Herald Tribune, October 5, 2004; Desmond Butler, 5-Year Hunt Fails to Net Qaeda Suspect in Africa, New
York Times, June 14,2003.

41

. See Lester R. Brown, supra note 2, at 119.
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Some potential sources of instability are taking the world into uncharted territory.
For instance, in the sub-Saharan Africa, where HN infection rates have exceeded 30
'\

percent of all adults, there are millions of orphans living there, and with the number of

.,

orphans overwhelming society's capacity to care for them, many will become street
children. Clearly, growing up without parental guidance and appropriate role models, and
with their behavior shaped by the desperation of survival, these orphans will become a
new threat to stability and progress. 43 This will only increase the recruitment pool of
hotbed of international terrorism.

·.

The world, United Nations, and other western nations, must act by providing
sustainable development programs available to developing countries. Once the United

'I'

i

\

Nations, United States, and the rest of the world have understood these policy objectives
of al-Qaeda, roguish, weak, and/or failed states, and other terrorist organizations, it would
be easy to fashion out appropriate legal, political, and military strategies that would
adequately address the problems posed by international terrorism and those failed states

l

t'

I
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that harbor the terrorists. Necessarily, Carl.Conetta has advised against taking a one-sided
military action based view of the struggle against terrorism by arguing that:
"Military and law enforcement officials may choose to take a one-dimensional
view of the struggle, but their actions will register in both dimensions,
nonetheless. The danger is that governments will opt for 'intuitive' onedimensional responses that inadvertently contribute to the success of the terrorist's
catalytic project. In order to dislocate terrorist groups, governments must isolate
them politically and morally from the constituencies these groups hope to
mobilize or co-opt. Less ambitiously: governments must minimize actions that
have the effect of increasing the resonance of the terrorists' message. Actions that
42

• Abraham McLaughlin, Can Africa Solve African Problems? Christian Science Monitor, January 4, 2005;
Marc Lacey, Beyond the Bullets and Blades, New York Times, March 20, 2005.
43

• Joint United Nations Program on illV/AIDS (UNAIDS), 2004 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic
191 (2004); United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision (2004); AIDS orphans from
· Children on the Brink 2004: A Joint Report on New Orphan Estimates and a Framework for Action 29
(UNAIDS, UNICEF, and USAID, ed. 2004).
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fail to respect these limits can have broadly destabilizing effects, swelling the
ranks of the terrorist organizations and the discontented. Recognizing the catalytic
strategy that al-Qaeda and like-minded organization pursue, the program of
counter-measures should emphasize actions that exhibit a high ratio of
effectiveness to visibility and collateral effects. Low profile actions are best.':M
In concluding, this thesis shall posit that while supporting the use of military action to

curb the dangers posed by terrorists and their hosts, western nations must also exploit
pacific avenues of mediating the hotly contested issues of international concern. We must

'l·

dislocate these roguish nations and terrorist groups by isolating them "politically and
morally from the constituencies that the terrorists hope to mobilize or co-opt.'.45

.

I
Mention must be made of the 1978 Camp David Accords that was negotiated by
erstwhile President Jimmy Carter between Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and his
Israeli counterpart, Menachem Begin. We also advocate the use of "soft" pressure tactics
such as was used to bring the apartheid regime in South Africa to an end in the 1980's.
In sum, in doing this, sufficient efforts must be made towards understanding the

mindset of dangerous enemies, whether they are state actors, like Saddam Hussein of
Iraq, or non-state actors like Osama bin Laden-led al-Qaeda. The following suggestions

are, therefore, proffered to the international community:

(,
'·
I

(a)

Introduction of the 21•t Century Marshall Plan

This thesis will compare and contrast the present day humanitarian relief efforts in
Afghanistan and Iraq against the 1947 Marshall Plan by which the United States bailed
out the staggering Western European States from the grim effect of the Second World
War and the encroaching communists from Eastern Europe. The thesis will conclude by

44

45

•

See Carl Conetta, supra note 18.

•

Ibid.
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arguing that since the Somali relief efforts were not undertaken on the same political,
economic and strategical foundations as the Marshall Plan, the Iraq, at least, effort was
bound to fail, in and of its own.46
For the Iraqi State to regain its lost statehood, international effort similar to the
Marshall Plan of 1947, must be instituted with strict adherence to those three important
strategic stages of effective rebuilding efforts mentioned earlier: 47
(a).
First, they must be tailored to the postwar situation with which they are
dealing. An assessment of which factors pose the gravest challenges to rebuilding
in each post-conflict situation is absolutely necessary. Factors that destabilize
rebuilding must not be addressed haphazardly but rather at their roots.

....
I

(b).
Second, successful rebuilding involves a vast commitment of resources
and assistance on the part of the international community. Piecemeal efforts will
not suffice.

I

'j.
1

(c).
Third, rebuilding efforts must involve a nation's own people in a way that
allows them to ultimately control their destiny and that eventually provides a clear
exit strategy for international actors.
The present Iraqi State can be likened to the post-war 1945 Europe, when the economy
and political structures of most European nations were in tatters. At that time, the
American policy was to offer limited aid and relaxed trade barriers, assuming that these

,.

economic incentives, of themselves, would spur the European nations back on their
recovery. 48

See, George _ C. ~ll, "The Marshall Plan." George C. Marshall Foundation.
http://www.rriarshallfoundation.org/about gem/marshall plan.htm#expenditures
[Hereinafter
"The
Marshall Plan"]; See also, "Transcript of Marshall Plan (1948)." Our Documents. NARA; National History
USA
Freedom
Corps.
Day;
http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=82&page=transcript
[Hereinafter "The Marshall Plan Transcripf'].
46

47

• Ibid.

48

• David W. Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe: Western Europe, America, and Postwar Reconstruction 82
(1992).
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On the contrary, by 1947, the economic situation was dire, and the United Nations

reported that postwar labor productivity in Europe was 40-50 percent of prewar levels,
and low wages and food shortages compounded the problems.49
In addition, as most western European nations found themselves on the brink of
collapse, and with their economy dwindling, support for the Communist party in various
countries began to grow. 50 The United States began to fear Soviet domination of Western
Europe. 51
It was this sage that the erstwhile American Secretary of State, George Marshall,

I·

came out with his most famous phrase:
"The patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate."52
This phrase he used to characterize the post-war calamity facing Europe requiring urgent
and far-reaching American intervention. Thereafter, Secretary Marshall disclosed his
European Discovery Program-the Marshall Plan-by which he would help the post war
Europe back on their feet. 53
George Marshall's outline followed the above three strategies. According to
Vivek Viswanathan, first, Marshall correctly assessed the situation in Europe, realized
that the root problem that afflicted rebuilding efforts was economic and not political in
49

•

Robert A. Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War 64 (1985).

50

• Michael Wala, The Council on Foreign Relations and American Foreign Policy in the Early Cold War
103 (1994).

51

• See, Vivek Viswanathan, Establishing Peacefol and Stable Postwar Societies Through Effective
Rebuilding Strategy, National Peace Essay Contest, 2004 Winning Essay. Available at:

htt;p://www.usip.org/ed/npec/winningessays/04winner.html. Last visited on June 20, 2006. [Hereinafter
"Vivek Viswanathan"].
52

• Forrest C.

Pogue, George C. Marshall: Statesman 1945-1959 200 (1987).

~3 • See Transcript of Marshall Plan, supra note 46.
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nature, and thus Marshall emphasized that the effective way to stifle Communism was to
address Europe's economic troubles. 54 In the words of George Marshall:
"Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger,
poverty, desperation, and chaos .. .Its purpose should be the revival of a working
economy...to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free
institutions can exist."55

Second, George Marshall voted a very big chunk of money from America to
Europe towards rebuilding Europe. 56 According to Vivek Viswanathan:
"Marshall understood that for rebuilding to succeed, a massive investment of
resources into Europe on the part of the United States was necessary ...
Eventually, between 1948 and 1952, the United States appro~riated 13.3 billion
dollars-a staggering sum in that day-for the Marshall Plan." 7
In George Marshall's own words,

,,
!

.
'

;

I.

"Assistance ...must not be on a piecemeal basis... [it] should provide a cure rather
than a mere palliative."58

\
,,.i

Third, George Marshall also understood that the chances of a rational and cohesive

rebuilding effort would be greatly increased by allowing Europeans to retain much
control over the rebuilding program. The United States, he said, should limit itself to
"friendly aid" and advice. 59 In other words, the natives in the home country were
incorporated into the Marshall Plan's prosecution, and they were co-opted into the
implementation. As Vivek Viswanathan enthused:

54

• See

Vivek Viswanathan, supra note 51.

55

• See

Transcript ofMarsball Plan, supra note 46.

57

• See

Vivek Viswanathan, supra note 51.

58

59
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See Transcript of Marshall Plan, supra note 46.
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"The Marshall Plan's four-year timetable also provided a framework for success.
Eventually, between 1948 and 1952, the United States appropriated 13.3 billion
dollars-a staggering sum in that day-for the Marshall Plan. The money was
spent toward greatly increasing European productivity and modernizing factory
and transport systems. And the Europeans had a hand in formulating a workable
rebuilding policy. The plan was incredibly successful. Western Europe's gross
national product climbed 32 percent during the Marshall Plan, and by 1952
agricultural production and industrial output exceeded prewar levels by 11 and 40
percent, respectively. Through the revived economy, Western Europe had been
re-integrated into the free world; even as the U.S.S.R. dominated Eastern Europe,
Western Europe would stand for four decades as a bulwark against Soviet
expansion. Calling him a man who 'offered hope to those who desperately needed
it, TIME named him its 1947 Man of the Year. And in 1953, Marshall was
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize."60
In Iraq, today, the underlying problem is not humanitarian in nature only.

However, it was clear that the problems that flowed after the overthrow of Saddam
Hussein and his departure and immediately prior to the United States entrance was
political, involving which ethnicity and religious divide play a very high role. Political
allegiance and affiliation, thus, determined the distribution oflargesse. 61
In short, had the same approach, as adopted by Mr. George Marshall in 1945,

been applied to the United States humanitarian efforts in Somalia, it is highly probable
that a different result would have emerged. We must borrow Vivek Viswanathan's view
on Somalia, and then apply it to Iraq:
"In contrast, the United Nations and United States' post-conflict reconstruction
experience in Somalia in the early 1990s demonstrates the consequences of an
incompetent and halfhearted approach to nation-building. " 62

60

• See Vivek Viswanathan, supra note 51; See also, Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America,
Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 431 (1987); "Man of the Year: George C.
Marshall," Time January 5, 1948.

61

• Robert M. Press, The New Africa: Dispatches From A Changing Continent 173 (1999). [Hereinafter
"Robert M. Press"].
62

•

See Vivek Viswanathan, supra note 51.
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United States must learn from the failure of the United nations efforts in Somalia
in the 1990's towards avoiding the same mistakes in Iraq in the present.
For instance, in Somalia in the 1990's, on hindsight, while some positive results
came from the humanitarian efforts, the United Nations and United States response,
afterward, showed a disregard for the three important strategies of rebuilding mentioned
above.

First, the United Nations and the United States did not accurately assess the
Somali situation-and they failed to see that it was a political problem primarily.
According to Vivek Viswanathan:
"The immense humanitarian crisis blinded the international actors to the fact that
the root problem that was afflicting reconciliation was political in nature. The
initial United Nations and United States response in Operation Restore Hope
sought to be purely humanitarian in nature, when in fact the humanitarian and
political situations were intertwined." 63

In fact, President Bush declared, without mincing words, that as regards
"Operation Restore Hope,"
"It's a humanitarian mission .. . not an open-ended commitment." 64
Along the same line, Walter Clarke, the U.S. deputy chief of mission to Somalia,
noted that:
"The country's entire political and economic systems essentially revolved around
plundered food" that was stolen from the relief effort."65

63./bid.
64

• See "History Channel-Speeches-George Bush, Forty-First President, Addresses U.S. Troops in
Somalia," http://www.historycbannel.comlspeeches/archive/speech_ 34 .html.
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See, Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, "Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention," 75
·Foreign Affairs, 74 (1996) [Hereinafter "Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst"]; See also, Jeffrey Clark,
"Debacle in Somalia," 72 Foreign Affairs 115 (1993). [Hereinafter "Jeffrey Clark"].
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It was only after they had been faced with difficulties in the distribution of food and
drugs, that they realized that they were now confronting a deteriorating political situation,
that the UN Security Council authorized Resolution 794 in December of 1992, which
allowed U.S. and international troops to use "all necessary means" to establish "a secure
environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. "66
Without mincing words, the western nations missed the ultimate goal in Somalia,
i.e., rebuilding a failed state. Their main focus was in providing humanitarian needs.
Although a noble cause, it was a poor strategy for rebuilding the fabric of a nation.
Operation restore Hope assumed that guaranteeing political stability was only a means for
providing humanitarian relief, rather than an end in itself. This was wrong, it was the
political goal that subsumed the humanitarian goal. As we have seen earlier, the problems
in Somalia stemmed from the colonial groupings which merged over five different kinds
of cultures and political differences together. In addition, we saw that there were various
clans that jostled for control in Somalia, the United Nations' intervention should have
devised ways to handle the political wrangling among the various clans and warlords. By
ignoring this aspect of Somali's internal hullabaloos, the UN effort opened itself up for
/•''
I

'·

failure and it did fail.

It is submitted that future efforts to get the Iraqi nation, just like Somalia, on track

·.
must have a clear and definite goal in sight-i.e., to merge all parts of the Somali society
together and forge unity among the various warriors. The peoples, the warlords, and the
clans must be made to sit down at a mediating table to vent their grievances and

66

• United Njltions Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) - Background," United Nations Completed
· Peacekeeping
Operations,
United
Nations,
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_missionlunosom2backgr2.html#four.
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complaint for discussions and solutions. It is after there had been mutual consultation and
settlement that the nation can move forward. Without a clear sight of the necessary aim,
the effort would be futile. While Barre was ruling in Somalia, and when Saddam Hussein
ruled in Iraq, even though they were dictatorial, there was no starvation. The only time
that starvation became an issue was when the government broke down. Therefore, it
follows that the government must be fixed to be able to fix the starvation and
humanitarian needs. In Somalia, when the Pakistani members of the UN peace-keeping

I'
forces departed Somalia, Pakistani Brigadier-General, Saulat Abbas, summed up the true

I,

situation of things thus:
"We've been able to save a lot of people from hunger, disease. But we've not been
able to contribute anything politically." 67

I'

Moreover, the rebuilding efforts must be sustained for a long time, with strong
and sufficient financial, material, and military support. At the onset of Operation Restore
Hope, there were twenty five thousand troops in Somalia. By June 1993, it had been
reduced to four thousand and two hundred men. In October 1993, warlord Farah Aideed
struck and killed eighteen men from the United States anny. Thus, in the words of James
Dobbins, who oversaw various postwar reconstruction efforts (including Somalia), while
serving Presidents George H.W. Bush and Clinton,
"Only when the number of stabilization troops has been low in comparison to the
population have U.S. forces suffered or inflicted significant casualties." 68

In the same vein, Vivek Viswanathan has clearly enthused that:

67

·

•

,.

See Robert M. Press, supra note 61.

I

68

• Fred Kaplan, "He Saw It Coming- The Former Busbie Who Knew Iraq Would Go to Pot." Slate August
5, 2003. bttp://slate.msn.com/id/2086636/.
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" .. . the international community was not eager to put forth the significant
monetary and troop commitment that successful nation-building entails ... The
international effort in Somalia was strikingly deficient."69

':
..
('
I

Also, in Iraq, the troops committed must be sustained for a long tome to avoid a
breakdown oflaw and order.

Third, the peace-keeping efforts under UNOSOM treated Farah Aideed and Ali
Mahdi as the only parties to the Somali debacle. They ignored the Puntland, Somaliland,
t•.

Ogaden, and the other warlords who also had stakes in the Somali political landscape.
By failing to involve the local power brokers in the search for peace, the two UNOSOM
forces appeared like foreign-imposed invaders, who sought to colonize the Somalis.
,,

Thus, the non inclusion of some sections of Somalis in the peace-brokering process
proved to the Achilles heel of most efforts by the United Nations-sponsored peace
processes. 70 In this regard, mention must be made ofVivek Viswanathan's opinion:
" ... the Somali mission failed to include many of the Somali people in rebuilding
efforts. The cease-fire efforts attempted to treat the conflict as one between two
major warlords, when there were actually many other disaffected people who
were not invited to peace talks." 71
In Iraq, as well, all he various tribes, the Sunnis, the Shiites, the Kurds, the

Marshland Arabs, and every minority sect must be harnessed together to find a lasting
solution to the problems facing Iraq.
In concluding, provided there is a clear understanding of the Iraq's political

landscape, provided that foreign intervention is aimed at solving the political problems in
Iraq, provided there are sufficient funds and military commitment in support of all peace-

69

•

See Vivek Viswanathan, supra note 51.

~0• See Robert M. Press, supra note 61, at 197.
71

• See

Vivek Viswanathan, supra note 51.
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keeping military operations in Iraq, and provided there is a broad-based grassroot

it·
.;t
I.

participation by all sectors of the Iraqi nation in the peace process, steps towards
rebuilding Somali State would succeed.

(b) Efforts Toward Stabilizing Population Growth and Eradicating Hunger.
In Africa, an adage says that ''the Devil Finds Work for the Idle Hand."72 Thus,

(I •

there must be concerted efforts to improve the standard of living of the people living

within the "database" of terrorists' nexus. Clearly, the bad news is that sub-Saharan
Africa-with 750 million people-is sliding deeper into poverty. 73 It is disheartening that

I,

I

hunger, illiteracy, and disease are on the forward march in the developing world, by this

I

offsetting some of the gains in China and India. To address this anomaly, Africa was
selected as a focus of discussion at the G-8 meeting in July 2005, as needing special
I

attention. It is undisputable that the cases of Somalia, Ivory Coast, Burundi, Rwanda, and

tI

Congo, indeed, need special attention. 74 We must heed the warning by Lester Brown that:
"In an increasingly integrated world, eradicating poverty and stabilizing
population are national security issues. Slowing population growth helps eradicate
poverty and its distressing symptoms, and, conversely, eradicating poverty helps
slow population growth. With time running out, the urgency of moving
simultaneously on both fronts is clear."75
72

•

Sometimes, it is put thus: "An idle mind is the devil's workshop."

73

• See Lester Brown, supra note 2, at 124. It is time for the international community to make sure that India
has the resources needed to maintain the momentum it has built. With India now on the move
economically, the world can then begin to concentrate intensively on the remaining poverty concentrated in
sub-Saharan Africa and a scattering of smaller countries in Latin America and Central Asia.

74

• United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision (2005); GS leaders, "Gleneagles
Communique on Africa, Climate Change, Energy and Sustainable Development," document from GS
Summit, Gleneagles, Scotland, July 2005; United Nations, "Poverty, Percentage of Population Below $1
(1993 PPP) Per Day Consumption (World Bank)," Millennium Development Goals Indicators Database,
updated on August 26, 2005.

?s.

See Lester Brown, supra note 2, at 124.
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The global community must institute toward Stabilizing Population Growth and
Eradicating Hunger.

(c)

Universal Basic Education Must Reach Every Person in the World.

George McGovern and Robert Dole, both former members of the United States
Senate Agricultural Committee, as well as former candidates for President of the United

,.

States, have strongly advocated for the provision of amenities and support to all low

·,
income earners, in every part of the world, so as to:

"dry up the swamplands of hunger and despair that serve as potential recruiting
grounds for terrorists."76

!~.

I

,,

..

Along the same line, the Nobel Prize-winning economist, Amartya Sen, had once
declared thus:
"Illiteracy and innumeracy are a greater threat to humanity than terrorism." 77
Also, Gene Sperling has advocated that every development plan should provide for
getting to the hardest-to-reach segments of society, especially poor girls in rural areas.78
Thus, in a world where vast wealth is accumulating among the rich, it makes little sense

76

• George McGovern, Yes We CAN Feed the World's Hungry, Parade, December 16, 2001; George
McGovern, The Third Freedom: Ending Hunger in Our Time Chapter 1 (2001).

n. UNICEF, Progress for Children: A Report Card on Gender Parity and Primary Education 3 (2005);
Hilaire A. Mputu, Literacy and Non-Formal Education in the E-9 Countries 5 (2001 ); Paul Blustein, Global
Education Plan Gains Backing, Washington Post, April 22, 2002; Gene Sperling, Educate Them All,
Washington Post, April20, 2002; Polly Curtis, Lack ofEducation 'a Greater Threat than Terrorism': Sen,
The Guardian (London), October 28, 2003.

i.

78

• Gene Sperling, Educate Them All, Washington Post, April 20, 2002; Gene B. Sperling, Toward
Universal Education, Foreign Affairs, 7-13 (September/October 2001).
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for children to be going to school hungry. 79 Such hungry children can be easily recruited

1
j

into the terrorists' fold.
I'
I

Given that basic education increases agricultural productivity,

80

and invariably,

the annual income of the developing countries, it is this thesis' position that as the world
becomes ever more integrated economically, with its nearly 800 million illiterate adults
being severely handicapped, this deficit can best be dealt with by launching adult literacy
programs, relying heavily on international volunteers. 81 The international community
must offer seed money to provide educational materials and outside advisors where
needed. 82 When the financial commitment to universal literacy is compared to money
needed to fund international military actions, it would be clear that it is more
advantageous to provide universal education over and above launching military actions.
Universal literacy will, surely, dry up the swamplands of hunger and despair that serve as
potential recruiting grounds for terrorists.

IV.

•

Alternative Responses In Countering International Terrorism.
International law scholars have surmised that organizations, such as al-Qaeda, that

employ terrorism as their principal means of action, lack the capability to persist in open
armed contests with regular government forces. Thus, they compensate for this weakness

79

• George McGovern, Yes We CAN Feed the World's Hungry, Parade, December 16, 2001; George
McGovern, The Third Freedom: Ending Hunger in Our Time Chapter 1 (2001).

80

81

•

See Lester Brown, supra note 2, at 125.

•

Ibid.

82

• The Education for All (EFA) Global Monitoring Report Team, EFA Global Monitoring Report 2005:
The Quality Imperative 21 (2004); U.N. Commission on Population and Development, Thirty-sixth
· Session, Population, Education, and Development, Press Releases of March 31-April4, 2003; UNESCO,
Winners of UNESCO Literacy Prizes 2003, Press Release of May 27,2003.
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tbfough stealth and by choosing "soft" high-value (or strategic) targets. 83 According to
Carl Conetta:
"Their stealth derives from their modest institutional 'footprint' and from their
reliance on very small, irregular units that adopt civilian guise. This civilian guise
allows their members and cells to disappear into civilian life and exploit channels
of movement and communication not normally open to hostiles. This is an
indirect method of opening gaps in their opponents' defenses. " 84
As we discussed above, a proper understanding of the terrorist organizations that
proliferate the world would assist, in great detail, to solving the impasse that exist in the
world arena. We shall be discussing Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda, in particular, because
it is the foremost terrorist organization that is being combated by nearly the whole world.
These characteristics should determine how to deal with the errant state or the terrorist
organization. Where the culprit is ready to negotiate and desist from bad works, western

r.•'

nations must be ready to negotiate with the target entity. 85

'
\.''

In the recent past, the United States had always acted decisively and quickly. For
instance, sanctions were imposed upon Sudan because of Sudan's refusal to extradite
three individuals accused of the assassination attempt on the Egyptian President

83

• Paul Wilkinson, The Strategic Implications of Te"orism, in Terrorism and Political Violence: A
Sourcebook (M.L. Sondhi, ed. 2000); Bruce Hoffman, The mind of the terrorist: Perspectives from social
psychology, 29 Psychiatric Annals 6 (1999); Bruce Hoffman, The Modem Terrorist Mindset: Tactics,
targets and technologies (1997); Ariel Merari, Te"orism as a Strategy of Insurgency, 5 Terrorism and
Political Violence 4 (1993).
84

•

See Carl Conetta, supra note 18.

85

• Thomas Homer-Dixon, The Rise of Complex Te"orism, Foreign Policy (January 2002}; John Arquilla
and David Ronfeldt, Osama bin Laden and The Advent ofNetwar, New Perspectives Quarterly (Fall2001);
Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (2001); Ian 0.
Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, and et. al., Countering the New Terrorism (1999); Walter Enders
and Todd Sandler, Transnational te"orism in the post-Cold War era, 43 International Studies Quarterly 1
(1999); Arquilla and Ronfeldt, In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age (1997);
Paul Wilkinson, Security and Terrorism in the 21st Century: The Changing International Terrorist Threat
(1996).
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:Mubarak.86 These sanctions went into effect on May 10, 1996, and they consisted of
restrictions on the travel of Sudanese diplomatic personnel. Also, in 1999, sanctions were

,,
jl

!

i,
I'i

imposed on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, because of its refusal to hand over Osama
bin-Laden and his associates for tria1. 87 The sanctions went into effect on November 15,

l'

1999, and consisted of a freeze on financial assets and a boycott of Taliban owned
~.

aircraft. Also, in 1999, seven countries believed to be supporting international
terrorism-Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria-were subjected to
unilateral US sanctions, including 202 terrorist organizations and 59 individuals. 88 While
the unilateral adoption of economic sanctions for coercive purposes has been condemned
I

in many UN General Assembly resolutions, yet, unlike the use of force, the U.N. Charter

does not contain a specific prohibition on the coercive use of economic sanctions, nor
does it prohibit states from imposing sanctions unilaterally, if they so wish. 89
This thesis, therefore, recommends that the United Nations Charter be amended
and re-drafted to allow for quicker and more effective application and implementation of
political, moral, and economic sanctions, to prevent harm to world peace and security.
The world must act by dislocating terrorist groups, as well as isolating them politically
and morally from the constituencies they are mobilizing and/or co-opting.

V.

86

87

The "International Terrorism Exception" to the Rule Prohibiting Use of Force.

•

See UNSCR Res. 1054 (1996) of April26, 1996.

•

See UNSC Res. 1267 (1999) of October 15, 1999 for the sanctions on the Taliban (Afghanistan).

88

• See Office of Foreign Assets Control, US Department of the Treasury, Terrorism: A Summary of
Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, Terrorism List of Government Sanctions Regulations, and Foreign
Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations, June 25, 1999. (www.treas.gov/ofac)
89

•

See, for example, UNGA Res. 2131 (XX) of December 21, 1965
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This is the nuclear age, with reports of several failed states and international
terrorists having had access to weapons of mass destruction. Despite arguing for more
elastic and less combative ways/means of dealing with terrorists and/or failed states, this
author supports an expansion of the rules of self-defense, so as to deal with harm posed
by roguish states and/or international terrorists. During the middle ages, warfare and selfdefense measures were without strictures, and so the standard, then, was whether any
military action was a "just war." Thus, according to St. Augustine (AD 354-430):
"Just wars are usually defined as those which avenge injuries, when the nation or
city against which warlike action is to be directed has neglected either to punish
wrongs committed by its own citizens or to restore what has been unjustly taken
by it. Further, that kind of war is undoubtedly just which God Himself ordains."90

i'

The ''just war" idea continued to be accepted for over 1,000 years, and so, war was
regarded as a means of obtaining reparation for a prior illegal act committed by the other
side-the reparation sought had to be proportional to the seriousness of the illegality. 91 In
addition, wars against unbelievers and heretics were sometimes (but not always) regarded
as being commanded by God. 92
As we have seen earlier, during the late part of the nineteenth century, and
continuing to the early part of the twentieth century, international law rules started to
impose restrictions on the use of force. As the laws of armed conflict were formulated
90

• See Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst's Modem Introduction to International Law 306, 316 (7th ed. 1997).
There, Malanczuk, at 306, was quoting St. Augustine.
91

• Ibid. Malanczuk, at 306; See also, Reflections on Law and Armed Conflicts: The Selected Worlcs on the
Laws of War by the Late Professor Colonel G.I.A.D. Draper, OBE 1-20 (Michael A. Meyer & Hilaire
McCoubrey eds., 1998) (Hereinafter, "Reflections on Law and Armed Conflicts"); Roland H. Bainton,
Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace: A Historical Survey and Critical Re-evaluation (1960); James
Turner Johnson, Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts 1200-1740
(1975); Frederick H. Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages (1975).

·

92

•

Ibid. Malanczuk, at 306
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and codified, so too emerged the modern formulation of the proportionality doctrine. 93
According to Judith Gail Gardam, the "proportionality" doctrine states that:
"belligerents do not have an unlimited choice of means to inflict damage on the
enemy." 94
The old fashioned proportionality doctrine and laws on self-defense were, clearly based
on the 19th century laws of warfare, during which chemical weapons and nuclear attacks
were unknown. Other analysts have argued that states have an inherent right to use
force. 95 This right, they say, is restricted by the UN Charter, but not prohibited by it. 96
Several scholars have outlined conditions under which military intervention would be
lawful, drawing on just war theories of the 19th century. 97 These theories established
criteria by which war could be considered just and legitimate. These criteria include:

I

I

I'
I

i.
ii.

iii.

right authority--which actor has the authority to decide on war?
just cause-is the cause legitimate?
right intention-what are the motives behind the launching of the war?

93

• See Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 Am. J. Int'l. L. 391, 397
(1993). (Hereinafter "Gardam").

94

• Ibid.

at 397.

95

• The US and the UK defended such a right during the Kosovo crisis. In general, though, the US and
European governments made weak legal cases when defending a right to unilateral humanitarian
intervention. On the different positions of the NATO members. See, for example, Serge Sur, Les aspects
juridiques de /'intervention des pays members de l'OTAN au Kosovo, Revue de Defense Nationale 44-62
(December 1999); Adam Roberts, NATO's 'Humanitarian War' over Kosovo, 41 Survivall02-123 (1999);
Catherine Guicherd, International Law and the War in Kosovo, 41 Survivall9-34 (1999).
96

•

Ibid.

97

• See for example, Richard Lillich, "Kant and the Current Debate over Humanitarian Intervention, 6,
Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 397 (1997); Michael L. Burton, Legalizing the Sublegal: A
Proposal for Codifying a Doctrine of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention, 85 Georgetown Law Journal
417 (1996); David J. Scheffer, Toward A Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 23 University of
Toledo Law Review 252-293 (1992); Theodor Meron and Allan Rosas, A Declaration of Minimum
Humanitarian Standards, 85 American Journal of International Law 375 (1991); See also, David J.
Scheffer, Challenges Confronting Collective Security: Humanitarian Intervention, in Post-Gulf War
Challenges to the UN Collective Security System: Three Views on the Issue of Humanitarian Intervention.
11-13 (David J. Scheffer, Richard N. Gardner, and Gerald B. Helman, ed., 1992); John Norton Moore, The
Control of Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflict, 9 VA J. of Int'l L 264 (1969); Richard B. Lillich,
Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights, 53 Iowa L.Rev. 347 (1967).
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iv.
v.
vi.
vii.

last resort-have other actions been considered?
open declaration--did war start with a declaration?
proportionality-is the act of war proportionate to the harm inflicted?
reasonable hope-is there a reasonable chance for a successful
outcome?98

These criteria have provided a useful framework regarding conditions under which
intervention should be allowed. They point to the essential role of actors, objectives,
strategies and outcomes. Thus, Judith Gail Gardam had submitted that:
"Much of the law of the means and methods of warfare was codified between the
middle of the nineteenth century and the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907."99
Although the laws on self-defense and "proportionality'' doctrine had developed,
however, prior to the First World War, the principle was almost entirely confined to
combatants, since wars, during the nineteenth century, were primarily waged by
professional soldiers on the battlefield, and civilians were, for the most part,
uninvolved. 100
Further, the catastrophe brought about by aerial bombing during the First World
War (1914-1918) and the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) caused the application of the
"proportionality'' doctrine to combatants and civilians, as well. Because the destruction
caused by aerial bombing could be incredibly indiscriminate between military and
civilian targets, its emergence demanded an increased scrutiny of the relationship
between civilian casualties and military necessity in armed conflicts. So due to the

98

• See Dan Smith, Interventionist Dilemmas and Justice, in Humanitarian Force PRIO Report No. 4
(Anthony McDermott, ed. 1997).

99

•

See Gardam, supra note 93, at 397.

100

• See Michael C. Bonafede, Note: Here, There, and Everywhere: Assessing the Proportionality Doctrine
and U.S. Uses of Force in Response to Terrorism After the September 11 Attacks, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 155,
164-165 (2002); See also, Gardam, supra note 93, at 397.
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extreme vulnerability of civilians to this form of warfare, the primary focus of the

I'

modem proportionality doctrine rests on the protection of civilian lives. 101
In discussing the "international terrorism" exception to the self-defense rights and

proportionality rules, a brief recapture of our earlier discussion on international law rules
providing for preemptive self-defense and anticipatory self-defense, starting from the

Caroline Case, 102 to the Covenant of the League of Nations, 103 onto its enactment in the
current Articles 42 and 51 of the United Nations Charter, is necessary here. 104
As we saw earlier on, the right of self-defense is not without fetters. There is the
concept of "proportionality," which is inherently wedded into the right of self-defense. 105

In turn, the "proportionality'' concept has its roots in domestic self-defense law. Thus,
proportionality can be seen as a sub-doctrine of self-defense that limits the severity and

'

'··
:

j'

duration of actions taken by states in self-defense.

106

For example, section 35.15 of the

New York Penal Law provides that:
"A person may ... use physical force upon another person when and to the extent
he reasonably believes such to be necessary to defend himself or a third person

I

Ibid. per Gardam, at 396-97. For the historical background and general principles of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, see Reflections on Law and Armed Conflicts, supra note 91, at 54-62.
tot.

102

• See the Caroline Case, reported in R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AJIL 82, 85
(1938), citing the Law Officers' of the Crown's Report, dated February 21, 1838, Public Record Office in
London, vols. F.O. 83, 2207-2209; See also, The People v. McLeod, 1 Hill (N.Y.) at 375; Letter of
Secretary of State Daniel Webster to Special Minister Ashburton, dated 27 July 1842, reproduced at
http://www. yale.edu/lawweb/avalonldiplomacy/britianlbr-1842d.htm
3

Covenant of the League of Nations, L.N.T.S. 1, at article 10; See also, G. Kervarec, L 'intervention
d'humanite dans le cadre des limites au principe de non-intervention, 32 Rewe juridique Themis 77, 81
(1998).
to •

t04. Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, June 26, 1945,
(entered into force Oct. 24, 1945), Arts. 42 and 51. ("U.N. Charter").
105

• See

t06.

Bonafede, supra note 100, at 162.

Ibid.
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from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful
physical force by such other person .... " 107
Under international law, according to Peter Malanczuk,
"Force used in self-defence must be necessary, immediate and proportional to the
seriousness of the armed attack." 108

j .

The time has come for a revision of the rules on self-defense rights under the
United Nations Charter, by taking into consideration the dangers posed by weapons of

I,
.

'

mass destruction, and so making provisions for "international terrorism" exception. The
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks demonstrate that an exception to the proportionality
doctrine, narrowly tailored to combat the growing threat of international terrorism, has
now become necessary. 109 According to Michael C. Bonafede:
"The need for this exception is evidenced by the current shift in state practice that
is relaxing the traditional norms which regulate the right to self-defense with
regard to the use of force in response to international terrorism. This is due in
large part to the complicated structure of international terrorist organizations and
the non-traditional nature of the threat they present." 110

r,

.
i

!·.

The above view has its foundation in the writings of eminent legal scholars, who had
always proposed that the concept of "proportionality" is not an absolute one. According
to Yoram Dinstein:
"[Proportionality] is frequently depicted as 'of the essence of self-defence',
although it is not always easy to establish what proportionality entails... . [As
such,] the ~rinciple of proportionality must be applied with some degree of
flexibility." 11 (citations omitted).

107

• See,

108

• See

Malanczuk, supra note 90, at 316.

109

• See

Bonafede, supra note 100, at 162-163.

110

• Ibid.

111

• See

e.g., N.Y. Penal Law 35.15 (McKinney 1998).

Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence 184 (3d ed. 2001).
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Along the same line, Judith Gail Gardam had surmised that
"Proportionality is a complex concept to apply to particular cases and there will
inevitably be differences of opinion." (citation omitted). 112

As we noted earlier, there are three (3) different approaches to measunng the
proportionality of responses to terrorism under international law: (1) the "Tit-for-Tat," or
"Eye-far-an-Eye" approach, 113 (2) the "Cumulative Proportionality" approach, 114 and (3)
the "Eye-for-a-Tooth" or "Deterrent Proportionality" approach. 115
Earlier on, this thesis favored the "Deterrent Proportionality" approach over the
other two, because it supports United States' policy-<>n the basis of expediency and cost
measure effects-that counter-terror measures should be proportionate to the purposes of
counter-terror deterrence and defense, viewed in the total context ofhostilities, as well as
the broader political-military strategic context. 116
We must also note that some international lawyers have asserted that the
legitimate self-defense right, under Article 51 of the UN Charter, should be construed
more liberally. 117 This means that the predicate "armed attack" element of self-defense
rights should not be restricted to an armed attack from a state, since such attack may
come from stateless terrorist organizations, such as al Qaeda and/or, as well, failed/weak

112

• See

Gardam, supra note 93, at 405.

113

• Robert J. Beck & Anthony Clark Arend, "Don't Tread On Us": International Law and Forcible State
Responses to Terrorism, 12 Wis. Int'l L.J. 153, 206 (1994).

114./bid.
115

./bid.

116

• See William V. O'Brien, Reprisals, Deterrence and Self-Defense in Counterterror Operations, 30 Va. J.
lnt'l L. 421,477 (1990).

117

• See Oscar Schachter, Self-Defense and the Rule ofLaw, 83 A.J.I.L. 259, 272-273 (1989). (Hereinafter
"Schachter Self-Defense").
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states like Mghanistan and Iraq. 118 As Professor Polenbaum has rightly noted, even if the
intention of the drafters had been to prohibit the use of anticipatory self-defense, such a
prohibition would be meaningless today, as advancement in weaponry have made
immediacy paramount to other concerns. 119
Polebaum went on to present an elaborate argument in favour of a broad
interpretation of article 51 to include the right of anticipatory self-defense, on the basis

..,

that technological advances in nuclear armaments and their means of delivery justify a
policy of first strike.

120

In the same vein, other scholars, such as Anthony H. Cordesman,

have identified three (3) major advancements in technology and science that have made
international terrorism easier, and, thus, underscoring the need for a liberal interpretation
of the predicate "armed attack" requirement under Article 51: 121

i
I

(a).

(b).

(c).

118

Advances m biotechnology, advanced food processing, and
pharmaceuticals, steadily clearing away impediments for interested
terrorists and states all over the world to manufacture lethal biological
agents. At the same time, a broader process of proliferation is increasing
the likelihood of threats emanating from other non-conventional weapons
of mass destruction, as well;
Advances in information systems, the steady integration of world trading
and financial systems, and steadily increasing vulnerability to cyberwarfare and terrorism; and
Advances in global transportation systems, creating a separate mix of
vulnerabilities. 122

./bid.

119

• See, e.g., B.M. Polebaum, National Defense in International Law: An Emerging Standard for a Nuclear
Age, 59 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 187, 202 (1984). (Hereinafter "Polenbaum").

120
•

Ibid at 200.

121

• Anthony H. Cordesman, A New Transatlantic Strategy for Terrorism Strategy for Terrorism and
Asymmetric Warfare, Working Draft, Center for Strategic and International Studies, rev'd November 7,
2001.
122
•

Ibid. at 3-6.
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While Dr. Polebaum also acknowledged that there is a need to demonstrate the
immediacy of the threat, 123 we submit that an expansive self-defense rights will mean that
the "imminence" or "immediate danger" requirement, as laid down by the 1837 Caroline

case, will afford greater latitude to the aggressor, where nuclear weapons or weapons of
mass destruction are involved. This is in light of President Bush's opinion that weapons
of mass destruction justify changes in international law rules on use of force, self defense,
and anticipatory attack. 124
We must remember that Polebaum has declared that even if the intention of the
drafters had been to prohibit the use of anticipatory self-defense, such a prohibition
would be meaningless today, as advancement in weaponry has made immediacy
paramount to other concerns. 125
Nevertheless, because over the years, it has appeared that the United States has
been attempting to squeeze the War on Terrorism into a justification in which it does not
fit, therefore, it would be necessary for the United States policymakers to clearly

·-

articulate an "expanded version of the proportionality doctrine, as it relates to
international terrorism." 126 This thesis agrees that in order to more properly and logically

('

I.

address the current threats to United States, and, indeed, the entire world's national
security, a revision of the proportionality doctrine, narrowly tailored to effectively
address and combat international terrorism, would allow the United States to respond to

123

.lbid.

124

• See United States, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, at Chapter V (September
2002) at www.whitehouse.gov/ncs/nss.html. (Hereinafter "National Security Strategy'').
125

• See

Polebaumsupra note 119, at 200.

126

• See

Bonafede, supra note 100, at 188.
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the September 11, 2001 attacks, in a manner beyond that which would normally be

.:
I

acceptable under the traditional notions of the right to self-defense. 127
1bis "international terrorism" exception to Article 2(4) prohibition of use of force
and Article 51 self-defense rights is very necessary in the context of modem day weapons
of mass destruction, powerful stateless organizations, easily accessible nuclear
information, etc. We must remember that President Bush has declared that weapons of
mass destruction justify changes in international law rules on use of force, self defense,
and anticipatory attack. 128 The above position recognizes the reality that modem-day
I,

international terrorism has created. This is because when Article 51 of the U.N. Charter
was drafted in 1945, following the Second World War, its drafters could not have
envisioned that international terrorist organizations would rise to the level of strength and
ol 1

sophistication that they possess today.

129

Thus, according to Jack Beard:

"When representatives of fifty countries assembled in San Francisco in 1945 to
draw up the United Nations Charter, modem threats of terrorism, such as those
posed by the AI Qaeda terrorist network, were not yet known."130
The same position has been asserted by Frederic L. Kirgis that:
"If the party responsible for the attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon is not the government of the country from which the terrorists operate, a
question could arise whether use of armed force that causes injury to that country
is lawful. The U.N. Charter was not drafted with such situations in mind." 131

127
128

• Ibid.
•

at 188.

See National Security Strategy, supra note 124, at Chapter V.

129

• See Jack M. Beard, America's New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense Under International Law,
25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 559 (2002). (Hereinafter "Beard").
130

. /bid. at 559.

131

• Frederic L. Kirgis, The American Society of International Law (ASIL) Insights: Terrorist Attacks on
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh77.htm (Sept. 2001)
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Another reason why there is a need for "international terrorism" exception has to
do with complexity of the world affairs today. According to Leah M. Campbell, 132
"a single international terrorist strike can be planned in one country by terrorists
hailing from a second country, executed against targets in a third country by
terrorists recruited in a fourth country using weapons acquired in a fifth country
that were manufactured in a sixth country, and sup~lied by a diplomat from a
seventh, while financed with money from an eighth." 1 3
The above example, it has been noted, demonstrates why the traditional notions of
proportionality will not be effective in addressing the problems and dangers posed by
international terrorism. 134 Nevertheless, it is important to stress that this "international
terrorism" exception would be specifically limited only to measures taken to combat
international terrorism, and that the exception would not extend to the classic right of
self-defense.

'

~I
I

The "international terrorism" exception cannot be used as a response to a military
strike by one state upon the territorial integrity of another state, nor would it cover
conflicts normally considered to be civil wars or regional territorial disputes. 135 A final
argument for the adoption of the "international terrorism" exception was that made by
Bonafede thus:
"By moving beyond the scope of traditional proportionality, this exception for
international terrorism would increase the United States' ability to more
adequately match its response to the September 11 attacks with the nature of the
132

• See Leah M. Campbell, Defending Against Terrorism: A Legal Analysis of the Decision to Strike Sudan
and Afghanistan, 74 Tul. L. Rev. 1067, 1072-73 (2000).
133

134

•

Ibid. at 1072-73.

• See

Bonafede, supra note 100, at 190.

135

• Ibid. per Bonafede, at 188-189; See also, Dinstein, supra note 111, at 192-213; Beard, supra note 129,
at 589; Michael Byers, Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law After 11 September, 51 Int'l &
Comp. L.Q. 401, 410 (2002) Michael J. Kelly, Understanding September lith - An International Legal
Perspective on the War in Afghanistan, 35 Creighton L. Rev. 283, 285 (2002); Gregory M. Travalio,
Terrorism, International Law, and the Use of Military Force, 18 Wis. lnt'l L.J. 145, 172 (2000)
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terrorist threat facing U.S. national security. Thus, the United States could legally
seek out and disable the international terrorist infrastructure that has proven itself
to be quite potent." 136
It is now left for the International Law Commission and Drafters for the United Nations

to insert appropriate wordings in the Charter, providing for the "international terrorism"
exception, within the context of exercising self-defense rights.

VI.
Allowing for "Humanitarian Intervention" Exception, Absent the United
Nations Security Council Authority. 137
There is a great need for the recognition of the "Humanitarian Intervention"
exception that will enable the curtailment ofhuman rights violations around the globe. 138
Immediately following the Kosovo crisis, the debate over humanitarian intervention has
become more agitated. Unlike the early 1990s, international law commentators are not

136

• See

Bonafede, supra note 85, at 189.

137
• Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, Humanitarian Intervention: The Lessons Learned 99 Current History 419429 (2000); Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, Intervention in Internal Conflicts: Legal and Political Conundrums
(2000); Stephen J. Solarz and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Humanitarian Intervention: When Is Force Justified?,
20 Washington Quarterly 3-14 (1997); M. Sornarajah, Internal Colonialism and Humanitarian Intervention
11 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, 45-77 (1981); David J. Scheffer, Richard N.
Gardner and Gerald B. Helman. Post-Gulf War Challenges to the UN Collective Security System: 1bree
Views on the Issue of Humanitarian Intervention (1992); Albrecht Schnabel, Humanitarian Intervention: A
Conceptual Analysis in Peacekeeping at a Crossroads, at 19-44 (S. Neil MacFarlane, ed. 1997); Advisory
Council on International Affairs and Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law
Humanitarian Intervention (2000), Reassessment of the concept of humanitarian intervention and the issues
raised by the experiences of the 1990s (2000); Kofi A. Annan, The Question oflntervention: Statements by
the Secretary-General (1999); Hedley Bull, Intervention in World Politics (1984); Danish Institute of
International Affairs, Humanitarian Intervention: Legal and Political Aspects (1999); Ian Forbes and Mark
Hoffman, Political Theory, International Relations, and the Ethics of Intervention (1993); Robert H.
Jackson, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States (2000); gene M. Lyons and Michael
Mastanduno, Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention (1995); Jan Nederveen
Pieterse, World Orders in the Making: Humanitarian Intervention and Beyond (1998); Oliver P.
Ramsbotham, and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict: A
Reconceptualization (1996); Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in
International Society (2000); Francis Kofi Abiew, Assessing Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold
War Period: Sources of Consensus 14 International Relations 61-90 (1998).
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• See also, the 1991 Annual Report of the UN Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, A/46/1,
September 1991.
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simply concerned with whether humanitarian considerations could be characterized as
"threats to international peace and security" and, thus, justify intervention in the domestic
affairs of the states, but, in fact, they are rather concerned with whether such
interventions needed the authorization of the United Nations Security Council.
Under contemporary international law rules and practice, "Humanitarian
Intervention" rotates between two opposing viewpoints. First, some commentators have
argued that in an increasingly interdependent and globalized world, communal strife is
difficult to ignore, especially with images of gross human rights abuses frequently

i·

.

11

creating pressures on outside powers to intervene in target states. Thus, the erstwhile
United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, had asked Algeria, China, and India, i.e.,
countries that had vehemently opposed the US-NATO intervention in Kosovo and Serbia
in March 1999, and that had spoken against the idea of humanitarian intervention during
the 1999 General Assembly debate, what these countries would have done if, in the case
of Rwanda, a coalition of states had been prepared to act in defense of the Tutsi

..
I

population, but did not receive prompt United Nations Security Council authorization: 139
"Should such a coalition have stood aside and allowed the horror to unfold?" 140
The question directly puts the role of the United Nations Security Council, within

I

I'

I

contemporary international practice, in issue.
There is also the second school of thought that advocates that allowing for the use
of force in humanitarian emergencies without United Nations Security Council
139

• During the 1999 UN General Assembly debate, some states emphasized the need for a set of generally
accepted rules and guidelines that would regulate humanitarian interventions.
140

• See "Secretary-General Presents His Annual Report to General Assembly," United Nations Press
Release, SG/SM/7136 and GA/9596, September 20, 1999. In March 2000, Kofi Annan also launched a
major study on peace operations. The results of this report are expected to be published in July 2000. See
UN Press Briefing, March 7, 2000.
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authorization could (a) easily lead to erosion of the general rule on the prohibition of the
use of force and efforts to restrict its use in relations between states, and (b) that it would
also contribute to a weakening of the United Nations. 141
However, it is clear that the United Nations Charter should be amended to allow
for the "humanitarian intervention" exception to the rule against the use of force. Thus, a

,.

law commentator had written thus:
"Since the end of the Cold War, the most pervasive form of violent conflict in the
world has been internal conflict. These conflicts cause great suffering to civilian
populations. They often involve direct and deliberate attacks on civilians.
Intimidation, mutilation, forced expulsion and systematic slaughter are common.
The numbers of people displaced, maimed or killed in such conflicts are counted
in tens and hundreds of thousands, even in millions. Moreover, these conflicts
almost always produce huge flows of refugees. They also give rise to cross-border
military activities, and often involve international criminal elements. In sum,
these conflicts pose grave moral questions and almost always pose threats to
regional and international peace and security."142
Within the last two decades, the United Nations (UN) Security Council has
increasingly intervened to stop internal conflicts. 143 At various occasions in the 1990s, it
has considered gross violations of human rights and civil strife ''threats to international
peace and security," and decided on the imposition of economic sanctions, or authorized
I;

the use of force. Within this period, the Security Council had imposed sanctions towards
quelling internal conflicts by imposing sanctions on the Republics of the former

141 .

Ibid.

142

See Oudraat, supra note 1, at 419-420.

•

143

• Since 1989, the Council has imposed economic sanctions fourteen times-compared to twice in the
period 1945 to 1988. In nine of these fourteen cases, sanctions were imposed to contain or stop internal
conflicts. The use of force other than for self-defense was authorized in eleven cases as opposed to three
times in the period from 1945 to 1988. Ten of these cases concerned internal conflicts. Despite this increase
in coercive action the results have been limited and in some cases coercive. See, See UN Secretary-General
Commencement Address at Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins
University, United Nations Press Release, SG/SM/7421, May 25,2000.
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Yugoslavia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Bosnian Serbs, Somalia, Haiti,

I.

Liberia, UNITA (Angola), Rwanda, and Sierra Leone.
As we saw earlier, in the case of Iraq, sanctions were imposed to force Iraq to end

·'

its occupation of Kuwait and subsequently to ensure Iraq's compliance with United
Nations Security Council Resolution 687 of April3, 1991. Also, in the case ofEritrea and
Ethiopia, an arms embargo was imposed to stop war between these two countries. While
in the case of Afghanistan, Libya and Sudan, sanctions were imposed to force those
countries to extradite individuals suspected ofterrorist attacks. History has it that military
force was authorized in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Zaire, Albania, Kosovo, East

~·

Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
Clearly, where human rights of the local citizens are being violated on a large
scale, there should be an opportunity for liberation and redress from within the comity of
nations.
This thesis, therefore, argues for a comprehensive enactment of international law
rules that will address issues associated with the legal framework of intervention-asking
the question: whether to intervene, absent the United Nations Security Council
Authorization to prevent gross violation of human rights, as obtained in Kosovo in 1998,
Rwanda, Haiti, Burundi, and Iraq?
This thesis further advocates for a new doctrine and legal framework for
humanitarian intervention: A doctrine that allows for humanitarian intervention, absent a
UN Security Council authorization that is sorely needed. Such a doctrine will, hopefully,

integrate the legal, political, and operational aspects of humanitarian interventions.
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We must note that Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter does not contain a
general and comprehensive prohibition on the use of force. It merely regulates the
conditions under which force is prohibited, but leaves room for exceptions, only two of
which are mentioned in the United Nations Charter (Articles 51 and 42), and so, it is clear
that the United Nations Charter permits the use of force in other circumstances, especially
where there is gross abuse of human rights. State practice, despite declaratory policies to
the contrary, seems to concur with this view. Thus, according to Anthony Clark Arend
and Robert J. Beck,
" ... there exists a substantial gap between, on the one hand, the 'restrictionist'
views of most states and legal scholars, and, on the other, the consistent practice
of those states whose interests (have been) specially affected.' Such a significant
discrepancy would seem to call into question the existence of any authoritative
and controlling rule prohibiting state intervention to protect nationals. " 144

•

I

Over the years, governments and legal scholars have argued that force can be lawfully
used: (a) to protect and rescue one's nationals abroad;

145

(b) to free people from colonial

domination, 146 (c) to fight terrorism; 147 and (d) to protect people from gross violations of
human rights.
While the "humanitarian intervention" exception has not been fully accepted,
there are two views on the legal foundation for this exception. The first elaborates on the
144

•

See Anthony Clark Arend and Robert J. Beck, International Law and the Use of Force 111 (1993)

145

• See Natalino Ronzitti, Rescuing Nationals Abroad 1brough Military Coercion and Intervention on
Grounds of Humanity 76 (1985). Ronzitti had argued thus: "that a process is under way that might entail
the creation of a new rule of customary international law permitting intervention for protecting nationals
abroad."
146

• See UNGA Res. 2625, October 24, 1970; See also, Rein Mullerson, "Self Defense in the Contemporary
World," in Law and Force in the New International Order, at 16 (Lori Fisler Damrosch and David J.
Scheffer, eds., 1991).
147

• See, for example, UNSC Res. 1269 (1999) of October 19, 1999; See also, UNSC Res. 748 (1992) of
March 31, 1992. Sanctions were imposed on Libya under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, supra note 89.
They were lifted on April5, 1999.
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framework laid down in the United Nations Charter, and so, advocates for new
interpretations of certain Charter articles. The second elaborates on law outside the UN
Charter and draws on the inherent rights of states. Advocates of this school of thought
argue that states have a unilateral right to humanitarian intervention.
Those advocating for an extension of the rules of the United Nations Charter
suggest an extended reading of Chapter Vlli of the United Nations Charter-that is the
Chapter dealing with regional arrangements. 148 Thus, they propose to broaden the
mandate of regional organizations and to give them the right under certain conditions to
authorize the use of force. Like the "Uniting for Peace Resolution'', which gives the
United Nations General Assembly the right to recommend military action, in case the
Council is paralyzed, this view maintains the central role of the United Nations Security
Council and argues for the activation of other loci of authority only in case of the
Security Council's incapacity to act.
The second view supports an enlarged inherent right of intervention by states,
based on customary international law. This view, however, advocates for an enlarged role
for the United Nations, after an individual state may have intervened in the internal
affairs, so as to confer legitimacy on the intervening state•s actions. Thus, Chantal de
Jonge Oudraat had concluded:
"Reaching some measure of international consensus on when, why, and whether
to intervene for humanitarian purposes is sorely needed. The United Nations has
an important role in this regard. It will be crucial in creating a new consensus.
Devising a framework under which military intervention for humanitarian
purposes can lawfully be undertaken should go hand in hand with an effort to
148

• See Winrich KUhne, Humanittire NATO-EinsiJtze Ohne Mandat?: Ein Diskussionsbeitrag zur
Fortentwicklung der UNO-Charta (Ebenhausen, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, AP3096, Marz 1999);
See also, Michael E. Brown, The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict, in The
International Dimensions of Internal Conflict at 590-599 (Michael E. Brown, ed., 1996).
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mobilize public support for such interventions. Indeed, humanitarian interventions
are long-term operations. As such, they are not sustainable without large public
support. All actors of society have an important role to play in supporting and
forging a consensus for humanitarian interventions. Research institutes and
universities have a particularly important role to play: they should lay out the
intellectual and moral dilemmas of such endeavors." 149

If, as this thesis proposes, it is accepted that the "humanitarian intervention" exception is
an acceptable rule of international law and practice, to the rest of the world, the
enforcement and implementation of the peace initiatives would involve armed forces put

I

I'

I'

'
at the disposal of the UN Security Council, and commanded by the UN Military Staff
Committee, 150 UN Volunteer Military Force or the creation of UN peace enforcement

ri

t

units, 151 regional organizations, such as NATO, Economic Community of West African
States ("ECOWAS"), and private military corporations. 152
To prevent the use of humanitarian intervention exception from being misused,
there are six (6) conditions that need to be fulfilled for the effective multilateral use of
coercive instruments:
(a)

(b)
(c)

149

150

Outside powers need to have a clear political objective in international
intervention missions;
They need to correctly identify and assess the political, economic and
military characteristics of the group they seek to coerce;
Someone needs to take the lead and guide and coordinate the coercive
action;

•

See Oudraat, supra note 1.

•

See UN Charter, supra note 104, at Articles 43, 46 and 47.

151

• Brian Urquhart, For a UN Volunteer Military Force, XL The New York Review of Books, 3-4. On
peace enforcement units, see the proposal by Boutros-Ghali in An Agenda for Peace: Preventive
Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, A/4 7/277 or S/24111, June 17, 1992, at para 44.

152

• For details, see David Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention Adelphi Paper 316 (1998);
David Shearer, Outsourcing War, Foreign Policy 68 (1998); Deborah Avant, The Market for Force:
Exploring the Privatization ofMilitary services, A Paper for the CFR Study Group on the Arms Trade and
the Transnationalization of the Defense Industry: Economic versus Security Drivers (1999); Abdel-Fatau
Musah and J. K.ayode Fayemi, Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma (2000)
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(d)
(e)

(f)

Whoever takes the lead of such an action, needs to build widespread
international support;
Sufficient resources need to be made available. Otherwise, policy
pronouncements will not be followed by effective policy implementation;
and
Outside powers need to develop an appropriate strategy, including
escalation, exit, and post-intervention strategies. 153

It is, therefore, submitted that the "humanitarian intervention, exception be enacted into

the United Nations Charter towards preventing and eradicating gross violation of human
rights by roguish states.

VII.

The Need for a "Global Sheriff'' or a "World Policeman."

With the end of the Cold War, in the 1990's, the world has witnessed the rise of
stateless terrorists and failed states endangering their neighbors and the rest of the world.
It has become a protracted journey-a journey without end-in this endless battle against

these faceless entities, who are causing sorrow to the rest of mankind.
As we have seen, the right of self-defense, as presently espoused in the United
Nations Charter, is not only outdated, but is also ineffective, within the context of
astronomical developments in warfare tactics and weapons of mass destruction.
This thesis proposes that in addition to the imperatives of national security, an
expansive self-defense rights will underscore the need to impose the responsibility on the
world's powerful states that they have a duty to maintain international order-the words
of the Charter should be interpreted "in context" so as to yield "reasonable, meanings

153

•

See Oudraat, supra note 1.
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required by the "purpose and object" of the text. 154 An enforcer of the rules in clearly
needed.
No other nation can serve as the Global Policeman, other than the United States.
The United States has fought six (6) major wars in the 20th and 21st centuries: The World
War I and World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the 1990-1991 First Gulf
War, and the 2003 Second Gulf War, and in all these cases, Americans fought not only to
defend our national interests, but also to protect the rights and hopes of other people and
other nations. 155 According to Brian Beck, no other nation has fought, in the recent past, to make the
world a safer place:

" .. .it is also true-and more significant-that when our unjust institutions
conflicted with the principles of the Declaration, the principle of every individuals
right to 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness' won out in the end. During
World War I, the president from Princeton, Woodrow Wilson, fought to 'make
the world safe for democracy.' The US was drawn in again in 1941 in response to
Japanese aggression, but also in an effort to extend President Roosevelt's 'Four
Freedoms' to the world. The wars in Vietnam and Korea were fought to protect
people against communism, and the Gulf War was fought to protect the
sovereignty of Kuwait. The common thread, is that we fought not only for
ourselves but also for others." 156 (Emphasis added).

'
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In contemporary international practice, President George Bush has, decidedly, taken the
above Wilsonian tone in his campaign against terror: President Bush has frequently cited

l'
'I

humanitarian concerns in justifying intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq.

157

In fact,

President Bush's speeches, as we have seen in previous chapters, have consistently
154

• SeeM. S. McDOUGAL & F. FELICANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 207-61
(1961); See also, John Norton Moore, The Legal Tradition and the Management of National Security, in
TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND IillMAN DIGNITY 321 (W. M. Reisman & B. Weston eds. 1976).

ISS. See Brian Beck, The United States as Global Policeman, IT American Foreign Policy 2 (Issue No. 4)
(November 2002). Available at: http://webscript.princeton.edu/-afp/archives/PDF/vol002 iss04.pdf. Last
visited on: January 3, 2007. (Hereinafter "Brian Beck").
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focused on the theme that it is the duty of the United States to use military force to
depose totalitarian regimes, making it appear that President Bush wanted to make the
United States into a global policeman. 158

!.·

Clearly, the United States must be the world's policeman for two main reasons.

I

First, and more pragmatic, no other country can or will protect the world as safely as the
United States can. According to Brian Beck:
"The United Nations has time and again proven ineffective in the face of genocide
and other crimes afainst human rights, whether in Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia,
Kosovo, or lraq." 15
Questions may be asked as to how the United States can be a global policeman, and the

I

II.

effect of such on "national sovereignty." This leads to the second justification: based on

I

morality. Morally, the concept of national sovereignty should only apply to governments,
based on consent of the governed. An attempt to defend the sovereignty of totalitarian
regimes leads to a basic contradiction:
"if a government does not respect its own people, then why should anyone respect
it? Even worse, the doctrine of absolute sovereignty leads to the horrific
conclusion that there is a right to commit genocide. So if another nation is out and
out evil, and if that nation has no right to sovereignty, why should America be the
one to use military force to overthrow that nation's government? ...the moral
reason is much stronger than any pragmatic ones." 160
Clearly, a legitimate government, such as the United States, must take it upon itself to
enforce universal morals, including basic laws such as ''unjustified murder is wrong," and
"slavery is wrong." 161 In fact, this kind of moral reasoning applies to foreign relations, as

158. /bid.
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well. Only a wicked or lawless state would fail to defend human rights in Kosovo or
Iraq. 162 Thus, Brian Beck concluded:
"The United States, on the other hand, is founded on universal moral principles, is
strong enough to act, and has a duty to act as a policeman for human rights. Our
only justification to the contrary is assured failure, which is why we will not
invade China and push for regime change there (though were we strong enough,
we would be justified in doing so.)" 163
As we have previously seen, in many weak and/or failed states, that may serve as
breeding grounds for terrorists, the United Nations and other internationally organized
peacekeeping forces are trying to keep the peace, often unsuccessfully. 164 Based on the
above, this thesis, for the sake of international peace and security, submits that a global

.,

policeman is needed to check the excesses of despotic rulers, failed and/or roguish states,
and their terrorists counterparts. This is moreso in view of the end of the Cold War.

VITI. Conclusion
It is clear that the United Nations and most western nations have started to gear up

actions towards solving those problems that plague weak states, including helping to get
failed states back on their feet. Thus, the new century began on an inspiring note when
the countries that are members of the United Nations adopted the goal of cutting the
number of people living in poverty in halfby 2015. And as of2005, the world is ahead of
schedule for reaching this goal. 165
:.
162.

Ibid.
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Lester Brown, supra note 2, at 119.

165

• United Nations General Assembly, "United Nations Millennium Declaration," resolution adopted by
the General Assembly, September 8, 2000; United Nations, The Millennium Development Goals Report
2005 (2005); More or Less Equal? Is Economic Inequality Around the World Getting Better or Worse?,
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Even, if we are to adopt military strikes against failed sates and international
terrorists, we are apt to agree with Carl Conetta that such organizations cannot be easily
"decapitated" or destroyed by one devastating blow to a "center."166 Thus, attacks on
individual components will be far less effective in collapsing these types of organizations
than they are when used against centralized or pyramidal structures. Rather than investing
heavily in the hope for a "knock out" blow, a more systematic approach is required-- that
is: an approach that attacks the network comprehensively as a system. 167
Carl Conetta has submitted that a systematic campaign against failed states and/or
'I

international terrorists must compose of activities that:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)

(iv)

squeeze the blood flow of the organization-- its financial support system;
throw more light on the organization's members and components through
intelligence gathering activities;
impede the movement of the organization by increasing the sensitivity of
screening procedures at critical gateways-borders, financial exchanges,
arms markets, and transportation portals; and
improve the protection of high-value targets. 168

These measures would serve to diminish the organization's stealth, flexibility, and
resourcefulness, while also decreasing the vulnerability of its preferred targets. 169

In final conclusion, the following are the suggested policy guidelines for tackling
failed states and the attendant international terrorism that they seek to foster on the rest of
the world:

The Economist, March 13, 2004; International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, electronic
database, www.imf.org, updated September 2005.
166
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(a)
Effective action against terrorism requires that we attend to, and balance,
the variety of issues that constitute the problem cluster of which the new terrorism
is only one aspect; 170
(b)
The international community must redouble its efforts to clean-up the
effluent of the Cold war, defuse chronic conflicts, and stabilize war-ravaged
societies. This task is harder and more expensive than once imagined, but clearly
the price of neglect is even greater; 171 and
(c)
Finally, nations must (at minimum) avoid feeding the fires of toxic
regional conflicts through destabilizing arms transfers and military assistance.
Outside powers must finally abandon the reckless notion that such conflicts or their
participants can be reliably harnessed to support national objectives. 172 If the 20-year
Afghan civil war and its aftermath teach any lesson, it is this: that the dogs of war, once
I

stirred, are likely to run out of control. We ignore this lesson at our peri1. 173

I

I

Regurgitating, in many weak and/or failed states, which may serve as breeding
grounds for terrorists, the United Nations and other internationally organized
peacekeeping forces are trying to keep the peace, often unsuccessfully. 174 Among the
countries with United Nations peacekeeping forces are the Democratic Republic of the
I .

Congo, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. Other countries with multinational peacekeeping
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forces include Afghanistan, Haiti, and Sudan. However, all too often, these are token
forces, not nearly large enough to assure stability. 175
In stepping up aids and support for these nations, we must remember that

countries like Haiti and Afghanistan are surviving today because they are on international
life-support systems. Economic assistance-including, it is worth noting, food aid-is
helping to sustain them. Abundant assistance must be provided to overcome the
reinforcing trends of deterioration and replace them with state stability and sustained
economic progress. 176 Clearly, in order to dislocate terrorist groups, the rest of the world
must isolate them politically and morally from the constituencies they hope to mobilize
or co-opt.
As we have said earlier on, this dissertation, by no means, is meant to be an
exhaustive discussion of the multi-faceted issues involved in the subjects under
consideration, however, it is meant to be an attempt to "join in" in fmding solutions to the
various problems that face mankind and global peace, in general. Thus, the last word, in
I •

this matter, belongs to the entirety of human race, which must determine the course and
path for its future existence.
This writer has a fervent dream that one day the entire world shall be free from
oppression, hatred, and poverty. As Dr. Martin Luther King once said:
"Let us not wallow in the valley of despair, I say to you today, my friends. And so
even though we face the difficulties of today and tomorrow, I still have a dream.
It is a dream deeply rooted in the American dream.

175

United Nations, "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," background note, at
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"I have a dream that one day this nation [and indeed-the whole world] will rise
up and live out the true meaning of its creed: 'We hold these truths to be selfevident, that all men are created equal.'
"I have a dream that one day on the red hills of Georgia, the sons of former slaves
and the sons of former slave owners will be able to sit down together at the table
of brotherhood.
"I have a dream that one day even the state of Mississippi, a state sweltering with
the heat of injustice, sweltering with the heat of oppression, will be transformed
into an oasis of freedom and justice.

.

'·

"I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where
they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their
character.
"I have a dream today!
"I have a dream that one day, down in Alabama, with its vicious racists, with its
governor having his lips dripping with the words of "interposition" and
"nullification" -- one day right there in Alabama little black boys and black girls
will be able to join hands with little white boys and white girls as sisters and
brothers.
"I have a dream today!
"I have a dream that one day every valley shall be exalted, and every hill and
mountain shall be made low, the rough places will be made plain, and the crooked
places will be made straight; "and the glory of the Lord shall be revealed and all
flesh shall see it together."
"This is our hope, and this is the faith that I go back to the South with.
With this faith, we will be able to hew out of the mountain of despair a stone of
hope. With this faith, we will be able to transform the jangling discords of our
nation into a beautiful symphony of brotherhood. With this faith, we will be able
to work together, to pray together, to struggle together, to go to jail together, to
stand up for freedom together, knowing that we will be free one day.
"And this will be the day -- this will be the day when all of God's children will be
able to sing with new meaning:
"My country 'tis of thee, sweet land of liberty, of thee I sing.
Land where my fathers died, land of the Pilgrim's pride,
From every mountainside, let freedom ringf' 111
177

• Martin Luther King, Jr.: I Have a Dream delivered on August 28, 1963, at the Lincoln Memorial,
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We all have a dream that peace, justice, equal rights, universal education, fairness,
equity, full financial buoyancy, economic viability, high GDP and high income shall be
the portion of every nation and person living on this earth.
Like Martin Luther King, this writer has a dream that one day, terrorism, failed
states, and all forms of conflicts-national or international-shall cease, and yield place
· to a world where peace, cooperation, and economic growth shall hold sway. The adage, si

vis pacem, bellum para, 178 the writer submits, is no longer good law, and should be
jettisoned. This is because wars are fought with heavy consequences-loss of lives
(human and other living things), economic losses, political instability, mistrust, disunity,
and a collapse of international law. In its place, the writer suggests the verbiage, "If you
think peace is expensive, by wars." Wars take devastating tolls: peace unites and unifies.
Thus, the latter should be preferred to the former. It is only the achievement of this dream
that can sustain international law, whose major objective is to unify the world through
laws and rules that all nations can live with.

178

• The Latin adage, "If you seek peace, prepare for war". It was spoken by Roman military writer Publius
Flavius.
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